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Research ethics has become integrated into what it means to conduct good science. This thesis is 
about the nature of that integration, which I argue is not neutral, carrying with it ideas of duty, 
moral obligations, organisational mechanisms, and processes of monitoring. For developing 
countries to participate in global research, the pre-requisite of ethical review has necessitated a 
growth in capacity building exercises.
The chapters aim to elucidate ethnographically the activities and implications of ‘capacity 
building’ activities in biomedical research ethics, through following the trainings, assessments and 
networking of the Forum of Ethics Review Committees of Asia and the Pacific (FERCAP), a Non-
Governmental Organisation. The work provides a critical reflection on the spread and uptake of 
ethics, contributing particularly to literatures in medical anthropology, organisational studies, and 
development anthropology. Drawing on material from ethnographic fieldwork with the NGO in 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan and mainland China over 12 months between 
March 2009 and November 2010, it advances an argument that the uptake of ethics through 
forms such as the Ethics Review Committee implicates social relations in new forms of 
management, with the moralities assumed to be part of ethics attaching to varied understandings 
of obligation, accountability, trust and personhood. Central to the analysis is the exploration of 
the co-existence of standardisation with practices of differentiation within the activities of 
FERCAP, a tension explored through a theoretical framework informed by attention to fractal 
imageries replicated across the settings of research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
I want to begin by recounting a conversation that occurred at a Bangkok lunch table during a 
training workshop on Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and Research Ethics. Our plates were almost 
cleared and Cristina, the speaker, was reporting a recent discussion she had had with an American 
academic: 
They asked me, ‘How are you going to do a system when you don’t have any laws?’ And I 
said, ‘Have you never heard of moral force?’ If a group of people believe something strongly 
enough, you don’t need laws. I think that is what we’re doing. You need to be strategic.
‘And what is “moral force”?’ I asked.
You get the leaders in different countries to be with you. That kind of force. I think we’re 
happy to meet the doctors, because they’re leaders in their respective countries. That kind 
of moral force can be powerful as well if you can convince important people. We’re not a 
human rights program, that would work with the masses and make them agitate for 
regulation. We’re trying to create a duty based ethics, if you don’t do your duty then you’re 
not a good professional. We’re not working with patient groups. Our audience are the 
doctors, academics, regulators.
Conducted within the International Science and Bioethics Collaborations (ISBC),1 a tri-university 
anthropological study of collaborations in biomedical science across Asia, this doctoral research 
was tasked with examining capacity building of research governance in developing country 
settings. It takes Ethics Review Committees as the locus of that governance. Cristina, with whom I 
shared lunch that day in Bangkok, is the coordinator of a regional Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) called the Forum of Ethics Review Committees of Asia and the Pacific 
(FERCAP), who became the focus of the study. Her comments above have come to form one of 
the key conversations structuring my analysis of the Forum’s work. FERCAP’s principal activity is 
capacity building in ethics review through trainings, networking, Surveys and an annual 
conference. Positioning myself in this regional NGO for 12 months of fieldwork, I followed their 
activities across several of the Asian countries they work in. Though the research is ‘multi-sited’, 
the faces at each site have been largely familiar as it is they who move, surveying, training and 
conducting meetings. I followed.
The American academic’s question betrays a sense of absence in the face of the project of ‘doing’ 
a system: where are the laws? Over the course of the following chapters, I explore the various 
12
1 ESRC Res 062-23-0215.
implications of Cristina’s rich response. Through both the ethics committee and the dissertation 
we find repeated the tensions between different forms of governance. As the following chapters 
demonstrate, claims to independence, the consideration of different viewpoints, a commitment to 
evidence and ‘objectivity’ are all tools used within and upon ethics. Cristina’s invocation of the 
concepts ‘moral force’ and ‘duty based ethics’ provide a way in to conceptions of ethics which 
themselves have a long history in anthropology (Durkheim 1995[1912, 1992[1957]). She positions 
herself and her organisation clearly: the capacity she wishes to build is that of professionals, 
‘doctors, academics, regulators.’ Her conversation also reveals the questioners preoccupation with 
a ‘system’, law and regulation. It is between these two poles that this thesis stretches. Can one type 
of behaviour — the conduct of clinical trials — be governed through another: the ethical 
assessment of proposals? In the growth of ethics committees, we see the growth of and in 
FERCAP, an ‘institution’ of governance. In the study of governance through ethics, and the 
governance of ethics itself, I am led to questions that those who serve on, and train ethics 
committees ask: how does one convince, compel, or force others into a particular way of acting?
Many of the questions I ask in the text seem elementary: what is an ethics committee? What 
makes ethics committees necessary, desirable and possible? How do ethics committees make 
decisions? In order to begin to answer these questions, ‘committee’ and ‘ethics’ must be 
disaggregated and put back together again; the form (Riles 2001) of this form of governance, and 
the people who exercise it, carefully examined. Ethics is a contemporary companion to audit and 
other fixtures of regulatory life. The research constitutes an investigation into the introduction of 
ethics review committees to Asian settings, and the chapters of this thesis have two aims: to 
explore the ethics review committee as a form of decision-making, and to explore its 
consequences.
 
The recent collection Social Knowledge in the Making summarizes neatly the background to my 
approach, borrowing from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Legal Anthropology a ‘turn 
to practice’ in the study of social knowledge, ‘the overdue arrival of social knowledge practices as a 
central topic for empirical investigation’ (Camic, Gross and Lamont 2011:13). I add to this 
practice based study of social knowledge Annelise Riles’ observation that ‘behind and within 
objects are theories and behind theories are objects’ (2011:68), evident in my attention to the 
material manifestations of ‘ethics’. I combine the interest of STS scholars in ‘showing how specific 
relations between human and non-human agents are drawn into the business of sustaining the 
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image of an external, objective order of being — the networks that sustain the practices and 
indeed the notion of modern science’ (Edwards et al. 2007:4) with the interest of anthropologists, 
looking ‘at how connections are made and unmade between persons, on what terms and with 
what effects (ibid).
The collection on social knowledge in the making contains an essay by Laura Stark on 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in the USA, for whom ‘[s]tudying evaluation as a social process 
offers an opportunity […] to explore the practice of statecraft and to consider its effects on 
knowledge production’ (2011a:250). She is writing in an environment where ‘the state’ is active 
through the committees she studies. She can speak of coercive power, and cite laws upon which 
committees can rely. Indeed, in speaking of IRB members assessment of risks and safeguarding of 
participants rights, her board members ‘say that they do these things because they are moral 
imperatives and also because they are the law’ (2011b:9). Part of what makes her research 
compelling is that it adds IRBs to a broader consideration of what she terms “declarative 
bodies” (Stark 2011a:233) through whom state power is issued, such as ‘data-and-safety monitoring 
boards, funding panels, editorial boards and film rating committees’ (Stark 2011a:233). Her 
concern is that these ‘expert groups […] are empowered by governments to make decisions without 
consulting citizens’ (2011a:233). But it is precisely the ability of committees to become ‘declarative 
bodies’ (2011a:233) which is at stake in my material. The question posed to Cristina by the 
American in my opening vignette makes a little more sense. ‘How can ethics be done in the 
absence of law’, s/he is asking. How do committees gain their authority? Upon what grounds are 
they able to claim direction over the work of colleagues?
Noting the capacity of models to travel, Simpson argues that ‘the current proliferation of codes of 
ethics and the ethics committees that are needed to realise these as forms of practice across the 
developing world’ illustrates this mobility, ‘a kind of institutional and conceptual penchant to 
create templates that pass virtually undetected across international frontiers’ (2012:156). This 
research was based in Asia, but its focus is on an activity and phenomenon with distinctly Euro-
American origins. In addition, members of FERCAP have received fellowships and training from 
Western IRB, in Olympia, Washington2. They have been fellows of the Global Forum on 
Bioethics in Research, and are in regular contact with the WHO-TDR.  I have spent more time 
learning about the regulatory systems of the USA and Europe than anticipated, since 
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2  The fellowship program, established in 2002, an initiative by the Western IRB, in Olympia Washington, in 
collaboration with the WHO, Middleton Foundation for Ethical  Studies and NIH university of Washington. It allows 
for international fellows to spend six months in Olympia working with WIRB. 
understanding the expectations and problems that these systems face in their ‘native’ 
environments, I might better understand how FERCAP are approaching ethics. As Simpson 
remarks, ‘[t]he question of who is building capacity and for what purpose becomes contested and 
challenged in ways that are not apparent in First World contexts’ (2012:157). This thesis is about 
what becomes apparent as ethics committees are established and instiutionalised in Asia, and 
ethics becomes professionalised.
I therefore cannot begin where Stark does, since her concern with experts, empowered 
committees, involved governments and the enforcement of laws to protect human subjects in 
research emanates from a particular setting. This Introduction serves to provide an ethnographic 
view on my different starting point. I use presentations given at two events during my fieldwork to 
frame both the organisation I worked with and my approach to their work. The first, a Regional 
Collaborative Workshop, opens onto the contemporary concerns of members and the need 
FERCAP serves. I then turn to the FERCAP annual conference as a site from which to view the 
world of clinical research, looking at who is present, listening, imagining, affected, compelled, and 
persuaded, considering the events as opportunities to observe world-making.
A Regional Collaborative Workshop
In 2009, on my third day of fieldwork, a workshop took place in the Medical Faculty of Colombo 
University, Sri Lanka. Designated a ‘Regional Collaborative Workshop’ in the ISBC research 
proposal, it had been arranged through the work of ISBC colleagues at Durham and members of 
the Colombo medical faculty. Held the day before the Sri Lankan Medical Association (SLMA) 
annual conference, the invited speakers from across the region each gave a summary of their 
concerns and experiences around the workshop’s title: Ethical Issues in International Collaboration. 
The workshop was my first encounter with members of FERCAP, the regional forum I would go 
on to study, and it demonstrated the expansion of problems considered to be within the scope of 
ethics committees. As an entry point for fieldwork it was a rich ethnographic event, its 
collaborative formation constituting what Marcus (2008:52) would call a ‘para-site.’ We — UK 
based researchers — had provided funds and worked with Sri Lankan counterparts to invite 
speakers around a theme which would not only be of interest to us as part of research, but also to 
them. As a ground for my analysis of FERCAP’s capacity building work, I take the presentations 
Introduction
15
of speakers from the day which afford insights into concerns, both in practice and the literature 
surrounding the ethics of international research and capacity building efforts. 
Dr Vasantha Muthuswamy, the speaker from India, was FERCAP’s founding secretary. She 
presented that day on the large number of research studies being proposed for and carried out on 
India’s ‘diverse population’ as a result of international collaborations. ‘We will make ethics as a 
major activity to see that we will take part in international collaboration on our own terms, 
without compromising the rights of any our population,’ she told the audience. Taking examples 
from genetic research she moved from the consideration of the ethics of presenting a Hindi 
speaker with a thirty-page informed consent form in English, to the management of a situation 
where current technologies make possible research that was not conceivable at the time original 
human tissue samples were collected. The list of things to consider within the meeting was long, 
and went all the way to publication. 
Our major concern is that generated information may produce ethnic disharmony without 
realising this, if some information is published without looking at that, it may cause havoc 
to the whole community and the country. So the results have to be well examined before 
they are being published. 
In that sentence, we left behind the patient in the clinic with their thirty page informed consent 
document and displaced them with the question of how many samples were really required, or 
whether there was a collaborative agreement in place for the material transfer of samples. The 
view of the layperson moved aside as the expert on Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) spoke. 
We then began a deliberation on what proposed research will do ‘for India’, moving from 
empathy with a potential participant, from immediate physical harm to bodies, to judgement of 
the measure of harm to a ‘whole country’. While these are all different orders of knowledge, our 
audience experienced no whiplash. We followed the presentation through. ‘Learning to think 
ethics requires thinking of many things,’ Vasantha told us. 
Dr Muthuswamy’s talk demonstrated the encompassment of ethics, not only the use of the term 
but the way it can be used to reframe, reconfigure. The encompassment is perhaps not surprising. 
In order to be seen to be ethical, there is always more one could have thought of: having thought 
of it becomes evidence of an ‘ethical’ stance. Not only is it ethical practice to consider the ‘social’ 
or ‘legal’ aspects of a proposed piece of research, it becomes a game of ethical one-up-man-ship to 
extend the reach of this arm. Particularly in countries without legislation on the conduct of 
biomedical research, or governments that run ‘public consultation’, conjuring ‘the public’ as 
something to be consulted, ethics must stand on its own. One set of American powerpoint slides 
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circulating (Emmanuel 2008) listed three ‘tiers’ of consideration: ‘Must consider how the research 
will improve the health of: i) Participants in the research, ii) the Community where the research is 
conducted, iii) The World’. As we watched the presentations at the Regional Collaborative 
Workshop, the concept seemingly expanded, covering more and more ground. At the time, this 
appeared
to leave the work of ethical review in a state of perpetual insufficiency: an ever widening 
remit, not enough committees, not enough scrutiny, not enough trained people and not 
enough public participation (Simpson et al. 2010:113).  
The next speaker, Dr Hemantha opened by comparing his country with the others gathered. 
‘Unlike some neighbouring countries, for Sri Lankans, international collaboration is a new field 
and brings new challenges,’ he said. ‘As ethicists we need to be prepared to meet these challenges.’ 
The first slide up was a definition of collaboration, which he used to make a contrast between 
collaborative work that seeks to build something in common, and collaboration that is considered 
a betrayal. He commented that we often only think of the positive side of collaboration, of all 
there is to be gained: ‘We must never forget there is a negative side as well.’ Switching slides, he 
showed the audience an image of shaven-headed women being paraded through the streets of 
Second World War France. ‘These women were collaborators,’ he said. Then: 
I fear this. I fear this. If something goes wrong, we could be paraded around in the press. 
We have to be acutely aware we could be accused of colluding in exploitation. New 
colonialism, sweatshops.
I repeat his presentation delivery because it gives us pause. Capacity building may come through 
collaborative scientific enterprise, but ethical review must balance desires to further a national 
science arena against the fears outlined above. The word ‘collaboration’ contains the potential for 
a switch. Are the relations (and what they bring) welcome? Who decides? This ambiguity is 
replicated in the research being carried out: science and health can be portrayed as development 
and progress, but this is a vulnerable image. The language of ethics can be employed to make the 
shift. The accusation of being unethical can stop research; researchers can be evicted (see Simpson 
2012). While international collaborative research was thought to bring technologies both material 
and practice based (Sariola and Simpson 2011), such opportunities present challenges: who will be 
responsible for decisions about ethics? The task falls to ethics review committees. In this thesis, I 
trace FERCAP’s capacity building of ethics review committees in the way that one might trace a 
disease, a medical practice or a trial. Before I do, however, it is worth looking at why ethics 
committees are being focused upon now, and what they are responding to.
Introduction
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Attracting and Deflecting Research
The theme of International Collaboration at the Regional Collaborative workshop was of interest 
to both the ISBC team and local researchers. Collaboration is a contemporary mode of research 
favoured by ‘knowledge economies.’ As Konrad  (2012:6) writes, the:
widely held assumption among leaders of OECD countries [...] that economic growth 
depends on science-driven technological innovation [...] has resulted in numerous decisions 
by governments all over the globe to commit investments in science and technology as part 
of national or cross-national collaborations in innovation.
Similarly, the Royal Society’s report on ‘Knowledge, networks and nations’ (2011) highlights the 
changing landscape of scientific research, focusing on the growth in collaboration (see also 
Wagner and Leydesdorff 2005). Several of my interviewees felt that to build research capacity, 
research had to be going on: ‘research capacity building happens at the high end,’ said one Ethics 
Committee member in Sri Lanka, ‘and how many randomised drug control studies are coming 
through?’ He identified improvements in both finance and Sri Lanka’s ‘academic status’ as 
benefits, saying ‘it is easy for a local set up to hang onto the tail and move on, dragged up and be 
integrated.’ The workshop touched upon the ‘fine line’ walked by ethics committees in developing 
world settings: ‘too restrictive [...] impeding scientific and economic development’ or ‘excess 
permissiveness [...] complicit in abuse, injustice or exploitation in research’ (Simpson et al. 
2010:114). These concerns were echoed in my interviews with ethics committee members in Sri 
Lanka. For example:
Say the USFDA approved a test of doing some genetic study and they wanted to use Sri 
Lanka as an area to do research. They would want to know the credibility of the hospital. If 
we say “no” [and] take the safe route, then that technology and knowledge could come to 
Sri Lanka ten years from now. Whereas if we are progressive, if we can take Sri Lanka 
forward, [we will be] zooming on to the next level.
While emphasis is placed on the export of Euro-American trials to other countries (Angell 2005), 
the growth in research comes from the confluence of many agendas. Studies of academic, industry 
and corporate relationships have led to models such as University-Industry Research Relationships 
(UIRR, see also MacKenzie 2004), ‘Mode 2’ (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001), ‘helical’ 
relations (Etkowicz et al. 1998, Etzkowicz and Leydesdorff 1997, 2000, see also Baber 2001) and 
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‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Mirowski and Sent 2008).3  Research 
ambition is not limited to the West (e.g. Sunder Rajan 2005). At a Regional Workshop on 
Capacity building in Ethical Review in Bangkok in 2009, Professor Priom Kamolratanakul, 
President of Chulalongkorn University4 in Thailand announced that:
One of the ultimate goals of Chula is to become a fulfill[ed] research university. Regarding 
to that respect, besides conducting international standard level of researches, performances 
of the Ethics Committees need to meet international standard[s] as well. Fortunately, main 
Ethics committees of Chula, the medical school’s and the Health science group [...] have 
been recognised by SIDCER/FERCAP (Kamolratanakul 2009:36).
Changes in University administration, expectations and pressures (Shapin 2008, Croissant and 
Smith-Doerr 2008) mean that universities and researchers in developing countries are keen to 
host research. ‘People can’t do research just based on their own curiosity anymore’, commented 
one university lecturer I interviewed in Sri Lanka:
There are other reasons to do it. It is becoming an institutional necessity. Something has 
come at the right time and that is the move towards ‘publish or perish’. We have to have 
publications in ICI recognised journals.
Not all institutions were moving in this direction though, as several researchers and interviewees 
complained that the research quality, even that required for promotion in the universities was still 
quite poor:
It is seniority based hierarchy, and it’s [position] based on time spent, or I say, wasted. Time 
spent in a place is the most recognised and you could even have the position if you had not 
published anything [...] You don’t perish, you prosper!
As such, changes in institutional recognition procedures, while approved from above, were being 
changed from below. ‘The old ones aren’t going to do this’, remarked a lecturer, ‘they’re already 
high up.’ Dissanayake et al. (2006) reported that the number of institutional Ethical Review 
Committees (ERCs) in Sri Lanka ‘increased rapidly… due to the requirement of ethical review 
being mandatory for presentation and publication of research.’ As Dingwall puts it, 
an important export route for the IRB model has been the control of access to scientific 
publication. Unless biomedical research has been approved by an IRB-type body, it cannot 
be published in any major journal. Most leading research countries, and many lesser ones, 
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3  Croissant and Smith Doerr (2008:704) draw attention to the critique leveled at these models from scholars. 
Grundmann (2004) points to the apparent ‘free flowingness’ of knowledge, missing the embeddedness and relationality 
of  people and materials. Pestre (2000) criticises their presentist ahistoricism and MacKenzie notes (2004) the 
implications of models which get taken up outside the academy (see also Nowotny et al. 2003). 
4 Commonly abbreviated to “Chula.”
have installed such systems in order to maintain their access to the international scientific 
community (Dingwall 2007:788).
Thus sites of biomedical research are linked now not only by experimental practices, but also by 
particular forms of what could be called ethical practice. 
Capacity building and FERCAP 
In 2003, the Lancet reported mobilization of capacity building in research ethics, with the 
European Group on Ethics (EGE)’s announcement that ‘fundamental ethical rules applied to 
clinical trials in industrialised countries must be applicable elsewhere’:
Collaborative trials must involve local scientists from the host country from the earliest 
stages of research protocol development “to develop a culture of collaboration” and to 
harness “knowledge of local conditions and traditions”. Research protocols must be 
evaluated by ethics committees from “all involved countries”, said the report. But since 
local ethics panels are commonly lacking in poor countries, EHC “strongly supports EU 
initiatives” to build local committees in host countries, which should be considered as a 
priority in terms of “capacity building” (Bosch, 2003:579).
Prompted particularly by the turn of the century increase in multi-sited and ‘collaborative’ trials, 
the Lancet’s was one of many calls for improvements in ‘local’ ethical capacity (Eckstein 2004). 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2002, paragraph 8.22) recommended that all research should 
have ‘dual ended’ review, meaning review in both the sponsoring country and the countries where 
the research will take place (‘hosts’). Nuffield’s 2008 overview also notes that the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) (2002) ‘does not necessarily require 
host countries to have a distinct, fully functioning REC, although representatives from the host 
countries should be involved in the ethical review process’ (2008:490). More recent documents 
put the need for a ‘local’ ethics committee more strongly:
A clinical trial should not take place in a country in the absence of a review by an Ethics 
Committee in that country. If such a committee does not exist it should be established as a 
pre-requisite before the trial takes place (EMA 2012:17).
Through the ‘local’ of two-ended ethical review, there is a recognition that while the bodies of 
‘elsewhere’ may become (can be imagined as) part of the assemblages of international medical 
research, the social worlds may not. The problem with having trials reviewed ‘elsewhere’ (here the 
elsewhere is not the elsewhere of the ‘local’, whose capacity is to be built, but the West 
understood as elsewhere), as one WHO employee told me, was that ‘those people in Geneva’, 
even if they were ‘very good’ and even if they meant well, could not tell how research would be 
‘locally’ received. Although guidance exists (e.g.. Fitzgerald et al. 2003), most I interviewed felt 
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that no matter what their scientific and ethical expertise, committees abroad did not have the 
‘local knowledge’ required to make a decision, or to make it on behalf of people in (any part of) 
Asia, for example. Capacity building is pitched as the solution, through which ethics can be 
taught ‘locally’, ‘local’ committees established, and standards met. 
Juntra Karbwang, one of my key interlocutors, was the coordinator and a co-founder of the 
Strategic Initiative in Developing Capacity in Ethical Review (SIDCER). The initiative was 
established to help countries help themselves as they establish biomedical research arenas; its aims 
are described in its promotional documents (Figure 1). Speaking about the initiative and its 
intended effects, Juntra commented that
Review has to come from within the country. Rather than use England, ‘the competent 
one’ or Geneva, why not harness capacity? When we are in Geneva, we say we want this to 
change. In Geneva we say, it has to be like this, but how do we know what is acceptable? We 
imagine these will be the issues.
Like Juntra, others who wish to see capacity describe the form it must take. Nancy Kass of Johns 
Hopkins University has argued that
short workshops cannot effect a sustained impact on their own [...] Without sustained local 
presence, it is unrealistic to imagine that ethics training ultimately will have much impact. 
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Figure 1: SIDCER Pamphlet. 
And to state the obvious, it is both impractical and inappropriate for that role to be served 
by a transient professional from the outside (Kass, cited by Eckstein 2004) 
There is even the suggestion that short term training may reinforce existing disparities (see Ulrich 
2011, Shrum 2005, Wagner et al. 2001). Juntra reframes her point, emphasising not the 
inadequacy of review inspired by distance, but the inadequacy of the current inequalities in review 
capacity. She leverages her position as an experienced Thai researcher against her job and 
colleagues in the WHO:
Why use Geneva? The power stays with [Geneva]. [Geneva] thinks you’re not good enough 
to have power, and then they never share it, so nobody else ever tries. Once you assume 
[other countries] don’t know how to do review…[she shrugs]. I say [other countries] do, and 
[Geneva] says, ‘What evidence do you have?’
In response to these challenges and issues, Juntra has been instrumental in establishing regional 
branches for SIDCER, of which FERCAP is the most successful. An indicator of its capacity 
building profile is its recent citation by The European Medicines Agency, which lists FERCAP’s 
work as a key initiative in its recent report on the ethical and GCP aspects of clinical trials 
conducted outside the EU (EMA 2012:14). As a network of persons, institutions and events, its 
primary activities are: trainings, surveys and conferences (Figure 2).  
The Survey, which I discuss in Chapter 2, implements the SIDCER Recognition program, a three 
day assessment in which groups of FERCAP surveyors visit ethics committees, review them, make 
recommendations, and if the standards are met, award them a certificate of recognition. The 
hoped for effects are laid out in this Strategy Diagram (Figure 3).
In the following section I focus on one of these activities, the annual conference, as a way of 
describing FERCAP’s priorities and concerns as they play out through presentations, break-chats 
and trainings. I draw on ethnographic material from my visits to the 9th conference in Chiang 
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Figure 2: Objectives and Initiatives box (Torres 2011)
Mai in 2009, and the 10th in Shanghai in 2010 as well as archived materials from previous years. 
To understand Cristina’s response to the question asked in the opening vignette, it is essential to 
also address the world the question comes from (Haraway 1996:440). At the Conference, the links 
between the world Stark studied in the USA and the committees trained by FERCAP in Asia 
become more visible, and the way these links are conceptualised become part of the way I 
establish my approach to the topic.
Thinking Conference
Conferences are familiar to the point of banality for academics. From time to time, 
anthropologists have turned their attention to their own ritual gatherings — and those of others 
— in order to analyse what it is that compels people to travel large distances, meet, and discuss. 
Anthropologists of policy, expertise and the character of knowledge in contemporary institutions 
and organisations have found themselves conducting fieldwork at conferences, listening to papers 
being given and break-time conversation shared (Gross and Fleming 2011, Schwegler 2008, Fortun 
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Figure 3: FERCAP Strategy Diagram
2001, Shore and Wright 1997, Gusterson 1996, Helmreich 2000, Sunder Rajan 2006, for 
historical attention see Mead and Byers 1968).  
The Annual Conference is FERCAP’s key annual event, where people speak from podiums to 
colleagues gathered from across Asia. For the observer, it provides a glimpse of the organisation’s 
self descriptions, the images that constitute its imaginary of place within an international arena. 
At the Conference, FERCAP describes itself both to itself and to international guests. It needs to 
draw a convincing image, and ‘to create the conditions of trust under which their representations 
will hold conviction’ (Strathern 2006:189). The FERCAP Conferences I attended during 
fieldwork in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand (November 2009) and Shanghai, China (November 
2010), were held, as Conferences usually were, in a vast single room of a large, chain hotel. 
Banners detailing the title, venue, dates and sponsors were strung up on vast boards; rows of 
chairs placed in equally spaced lines. An annual event since 2000, the Conference brings together 
FERCAP members from around the region, and past titles of the FERCAP Conference give us a 
sense of the priorities of the meetings: ‘equity and responsibilities’ (2004), ‘roles, responsibilities 
and relations’ (2006), ‘developing quality systems ‘transparency and accountability’ (2007) ‘ethics 
of responsibility’ (2007, also 2008) ‘developing leadership’ (2009) ‘towards good practices and 
integrated systems’ (2009) ‘networking and alliance building’ (2010) ‘innovation and 
integration’ (2011), and in 2012 ‘ethnicity, culture, religion and ethical research’. The invited 
guests — international speakers from US NIH, EMEA, regulatory bodies, European Universities 
and the WHO-Tropical Disease Research arm — speak alongside researchers and ethics 
committee members from the Asia-Pacific region. All are called upon as ‘stakeholders’ — 
physicians, researchers, manufacturers and governments, national health authorities and ethics 
committees — to work together towards human subject protection. 
In what follows, I begin by examining the ‘macro-structuring’ (Callon and Latour 1981) active in 
the Conference through presentations and images. Macro-structuring is the term given by Callon 
and Latour to the work and techniques by which both actors and analysts structure realities, their 
point being that each act of definition can be regarded as a negotiated achievement when the 
‘large’ and ‘small’ are not pre-assumed. Before I start, I want to emphasise that claims of 
‘fragmentation’ originate and circulate within the field; they are a description generated by the 
field itself, not my analysis or claims. I will revisit the point below in a section on Vocabulary, but 
because of the similarity the terms have with language anthropologists have used to describe 
‘world systems’ (Wallerstein 1974) and fragmented realities (Tyler 1986, Clifford 1986), I repeat 
Introduction
24
the point for emphasis. Part of the challenge of an ethnographic account of this kind is that the 
language used to describe the world by those with one whom works resembles (even takes on) 
certain of the problems of the history of anthropological and sociological thought. 
The Cloth: Systems and Fragments
At the 2008 FERCAP Conference in Bangkok, Dr Koski, chair of the SIDCER advisory board 
and ex-director general of the Office Human Research Protection (OHRP) in the USA, projected 
this slide to his audience. 
The individuals and entities engaged in human research constitute a matrix of 
overlapping roles and responsibilities that together serve to ensure that the duties are 
satisfied. This matrix is like a finely woven silk cloth. A single broken thread causes a 
defect, a single defect spoils an entire cloth. A single hole can result in disaster, a single 
disaster can shred the fabric of trust. It is our duty to protect not just research subjects, 
but to protect the integrity of science itself.
What is this image of a cloth? What can it tell us? (Douglas-Jones, forthcoming). Adriana Petryna’s 
research (2007, 2009) on the spatial mobility of the clinical trials industry shows an ‘outsourced 
world’ (2007:290) whose scope and reach is vast, but largely unknown (Sim and Detmer 2005). 
The growth of multi-centered clinical trials and contract research organisations (CROs) mean that 
not only is information being generated in many different places by many different people, but 
the sites of responsibility and oversight seem confused and overwhelming (Etkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 2000; Nowotny et al. 2002; Ong and Collier 2005). Petryna writes as an American 
who has researched this outsourcing, but at the FERCAP conference, we begin at what are 
imagined as the further reaches of these networks. For both analysts and researchers, finding a 
vantage point from which to view the research process — from the study design to the subject 
recruitment, data collection and analysis, preparation of report manuscripts creation of strategies 
for data dissemination and publication (Lemmens 2006) — seems impossible. In Koski’s image, 
the system is imagined in such a way that any point in it — the committee, the standards, the 
people, the personalities, the institutions — could be ‘broken.’ 
Clinical Trials
When FERCAP presents its program to committees, it describes a world in which trials happen. It 
is not just that the world contains clinical trials, but that the trials are composed from research 
done in different parts of the world. ‘The same trial being done in Asia, we see it in being done in 
Africa, in the West. No matter where,’ they say, ‘the concern is about quality of research.’ At a 
cancer centre in southern China, Cristina explained:
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Basically we work in an environment where clinical trials are globalizing. In your cancer 
centre, you’re doing some of the global trials. I have visited many countries in Asia. Cancer 
clinical trials are most frequent and popular, and I see the same design being adopted — 
indication that clinical trials are globalized — one protocol done in different countries all 
at the same time. 
Contemporary biomedical research has the objective of producing a very specific kind of 
knowledge. The clinical trial, preferably a double blind, randomized control trial (RCT), has 
become the “gold standard” of medical research; the technique considered to produce the ‘best’ 
evidence (Williams and Garner 2002, see also Marks 1997). As Kelly and Geissler remark, 
The RCT provides a statistical framework to interpret the merits of new drugs against the 
biases of patients and doctors[...] The method can be understood as part of a general 
epistemic shift across the sciences to practices that privilege objectivity and 
disinterestedness, the particular objectivity of the RCT is defined by the needs of the 
market place (2011:4).
Some voices from my research attest to the changes brought about by the RCT and the effects they 
have had on their practice. Evidence, and the nature of it, is at the center of their experiences:
This is the thing about presenting evidence. You have to compare it with something else, 
and there comes this question of double blind trials. Or ‘class one evidence.’ You have to 
have a control group, individual patients as per random number and you have to do away 
with bias on the trial. As a result, class one evidence is very hard to come by, nearly 
impossible. 
Ecks (2008:S80) argues that ‘the rise of EBM [Evidence Based Medicine] can be interpreted as one 
more phase in a systematic devaluation of immediate visibility as a reliable source of scientific 
evidence,’ and he goes on to make the rather astonishing claim that ‘[d]octors are trained to 
believe more in statistical evidence than in what they observe in clinical practice’ (2008:S80). 
Jesse, a researcher with whom I had lunch in Bangkok, repeated this feeling: 
In the old days they did not stress RCTs. Now we have realised to make results reliable, [we 
need to] make sure groups are equal, that there are control and test groups. But placebos 
are hard to get. You need a package of something of the same colour, the same size, you 
need to order them and get someone to make them for you. It’s more difficult than in the 
old days, when you said [to the patient] ‘I’ll give you this’ and not give the full information. 
The research conducted in institutions in Asia is shaped by the changing expectations of ethics 
review committees. Cristina reminds her audience at the Cancer Center that:
Because of [the globalization of clinical trials] it becomes more important that standards are 
harmonized and there’s some assurance that no matter where the trial is held there’s some 
harmonization of standards. All, no matter where, the concern is about quality of research 
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and the clinical trial and to talk abut quality you need some kind of oversight, monitoring. 
That monitoring at the lower level is being done by the EC.
Jesse had found this to be the case in her field. ‘IRBs want a good methodology,’ she said. 
No more observation. You have to do a RCT, give a participant information sheet, explain 
the risk. But this is different, and it’s hard because the patient may not want to know. In 
the old days, they didn’t want to [know]. 30 years ago, the doctor may not want to tell the 
patient that they have cancer, because the patient could be sad. That was the ethical 
thinking of the doctor. But now if he wants to do a trial, he has to prepare an information 
sheet. The education level of the patient may be low. They may be very frightened. 
The difficulty of conducting an RCT led some to claim ‘lower classes’ of evidence were being 
produced. According to one of my interviewees, a practicing researcher in Sri Lanka: 
Evidence itself can never be absolute. Unless it is double blind, controlled and free of bias 
[...] In the past, where you compared something with virtual zero, then a trial was very easy. 
There’s the famous example — what is the ethics of a parachute? If you jump with a 
parachute, your chance of survival is very high. If you jump without a parachute, your 
chance of survival is very low. But to prove the parachute is a useful entity, one has to do a 
double blind to be absolutely ethical. Well, to be scientific.
In his extraordinary example lies a switch: to be ethical, to be scientific. An essential means by 
which this relationship is negotiated and in which it is contained is Good Clinical Practice, or 
GCP.
Good Clinical Practice
At the 2010 Shanghai FERCAP conference, Dr Robert Ridley, then-director of WHO-TDR, 
linked ‘ethics’ with a turn of the millennium campaign to build capacity in Good Clinical Practice 
(GCP): ‘one of the logjams that inhibited GCP was the lack of appropriate ethical review.’ GCP is 
the result of the cooperation between the regulatory authorities of Europe, Japan and the United 
States (the International Conference on Harmonisation, ICH), working with the pharmaceutical 
industry to develop international guidelines for:
a more economical use of human, animal and material resources, and the elimination of 
unnecessary delay in the global development and availability of new medicines whilst 
maintaining safeguards on quality, safety and efficacy, and regulatory obligations to protect 
public health (ICH 2005).
ICH define GCP as:
an international ethical and scientific quality standard for designing, conducting, recording 
and reporting trials that involve the participation of human subjects.  Compliance with this 
standard provides public assurance that the rights, safety and wellbeing of trial subjects are 
protected, consistent with the principles that have their origin in the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and that the clinical trial data are credible (ICH 1996:1).
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A 20th anniversary booklet celebrating the value of ICH-GCP for regulators contained an account 
from Toshiyoshi Tominaga, of the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency Japan. It gave the 
story of how Japanese GCP was developed, publicly and contentiously, with consensus forged by 
the Japanese working group experts and opinion leaders. Tominaga’s narrative ends on April 1st, 
1997, the day when Japan was able to ‘generate globally usable clinical data’ (ICH 2010:14). This 
‘usability’ was intended for regulators, such as Fergus Sweeney, a European GCP working group 
member who presented to the FERCAP conference in 2010:
Sitting in Europe, I rely on data coming mostly from countries in other parts of the world. 
But if I was to change places, and set up in China, the Philippines, in Africa, the USA or 
Argentina, wherever I sit as a regulator I have data coming from somewhere else. We think 
it’s very important to set out a network. It’s very hard for an inspector to inspect 5 different 
countries [and] it would be impossible to inspect every clinical trial outside Europe. But we 
receive more and more trials coming from outside Europe. We need a system, we need to 
network between competent authorities, get some transparency and knowledge of and 
between different systems.
GCP was about harmonising the regulations and guidelines for drug development, to provide a 
unified standard to facilitate the mutual acceptance of clinical data by the regulatory authorities. 
It was, at the outset, focused ‘on input by industry — the technical submission requirements for 
pharmaceuticals for human use’ (ICH 2010:2). The submitted information was collated in a 
‘consistent harmonized format’ which was named the ‘Common Technical Document’ and this 
standardised format, it was hoped, would ‘relieve pharmaceutical companies of the time, 
workforce and financial burdens of assembling a submission for on DRA and then having to 
reformat it for another.’ The Common Technical Document became electronic, and was widely 
celebrated: 
Seasoned regulatory affairs hands recall with a mix of bemused nostalgia and frank horror 
the days before the electronic Common Technical Document - or to be more exact, the 
days, nights, months, weekends and holidays spent by sleep-deprived regulatory staff to 
build an NDA for the FDA then deconstructing and reformatting it for EU submission [...] 
The eCTD has changed all that [...] and the world is better off’ (ICH 2010:10) 
Petryna writes that the US FDA took an active role in establishing the International Conference 
on Harmonisation5 and GCP and it ‘began to actively promote the globalisation of clinical trials, 
declaring that the search for sites and sources of data is part of its mandate to determine the safety 
and efficacy of new drugs’ (2009:37). She provides the backstory to Ridley’s ethics logjam:
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5 In addition, ICH E5 (1998: 9, 14) encourages sponsors to address ethnic factors of ‘Asians, Blacks and 
Caucasians’ in early phase clinical trials, prompting further trial internationalisation.
[m]any countries that had already tailored their patent laws according to the provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement also signed on to the ICH GCP. They were eager to attract new 
investments and participate in the booming production of global pharmaceuticals. As ICH-
GCP members, they began the costly work of setting up national agencies that could 
standardise and monitor the conduct and performance of trials in their territories. 
Countries were required to create ethical review boards to ensure the rights and protections 
of patients (2009:37).
In the rush to adopt GCP, which they hoped would ‘attract new investments,’ countries set up 
ethics review boards. But this quickly became a sticking point: Ridley told the Conference in 
Shanghai that WHO-TDR recognised ‘a need to develop some documentation to facilitate the 
creation of ethical review committees, and how those committees might operate.’ These 
documents are known as ‘The Silver Book’ (2000) and ‘The Blue Book’ (2002), entitled ‘Operational 
Guidelines for Ethics Committees that Review Biomedical Research’ and ‘Surveying and Evaluating Ethical 
Review Practices’ respectively (Figure 4). 
The books are published by the World Health Organizations’s Tropical Disease Research arm
(TDR), which, according to its Business Plan (2008-13), saw itself in a ‘stewardship role for 
Introduction
29
Figure 4: Multiple translations of the Silver Book on the left. Blue Book on the right. 
infectious diseases research’ (TDR 2008:2). Philanthropic support, the document states, ‘while 
well meant’ has resulted in ‘fragmentation’ with ‘knowledge on priority needs [...] becoming 
blurred as different research constituencies define priorities from their own specific 
perspective’ (TDR 2008: 6). TDR’s Plan writes of a ‘need for a global information platform to 
facilitate effective collaboration among all stakeholders in order to avoid fragmentation and to 
enhance effective utilization of available resources.’ In line with this spirit, in 2009, SIDCER and 
FERCAP came up with a shared vision of ‘a global network that fosters an integrated and 
sustainable ethical review system toward quality culture in health research’ (FERCAP 2009, 
Navarro and Na-Bangchang 2011).6
GCP is a measure against which research matters; it also claims the entanglement of scientific and 
ethical knowledge in the same document. The debate over nature of this entanglement has 
increased in recent years, as in 2008, the USFDA declared that clinical trials performed outside of 
the US only had to comply with GCP, not the declaration of Helsinki (DHHS 21 CFR part 312). 
In the academic and professional debate which followed, Goodyear et al. argued that 
despite assurances by the FDA, GCP is not an ethical code, but a procedural regulatory 
manual based on the regulatory frameworks of the US, Japan and Europe. Thus it is a 
description of existing procedures (2009: 1559).
The USFDA has also come under strong criticism from academics, who see the GCP guidelines 
— ‘abetted by a rhetoric of universal human rights‘ that steps into ethics and ethics review — 
turning Research Ethics Committees into ‘mechanisms for creating ‘open’ worldwide markets in 
pharmaceuticals and clinical devices’ (Abraham and Reed 2002 cited in Dyer and Demeritt 2009: 
53). This arena provides perhaps another forum for studies of the co-imbrication of economics 
and morality (e.g. Bornstein 2003, Coleman 2005).
GCP describes two-fold quality systems: quality control and quality assurance (Bhatt and Pradhan 
2008:15), the former checking and testing for quality, the latter designing and planning a process 
or system which will result in the desired outcome. Comparing the Belmont Report with GCP, a 
FERCAP trainer said: ‘Those were principles. These are procedures. GCP is the common 
language.’ At the 2010 FERCAP Conference, Sweeney reminded attendees that:
It’s not regulators from another part of the world which can ensure the patients are 
protected [...] Therefore we want to reach out more and build and extend our relationships 
with regulators in all parts of the world. In every case the trial must receive positive 
opinion, or approval from an ethics committee with appropriate jurisdiction for the 
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6 I pay closer attention to the notion of quality culture and the use of language in Chapter 7.
investigator sites for the trials concerned. And your contribution to that is enormous. You 
are the people who can make that happen.
In planning how to ‘make that happen’, models are actively discussed, and are understood to 
move between places. As one 2009 conference attendee mused while thinking over the possible 
implications for his country of a Dutch presentation, ‘Foreigners show us different systems.’ I turn 
now to one of these ‘systems’ and the means of its circulation.
The Warning of Coast
International speakers invited to the FERCAP Conference sometimes presented national versions 
of their ‘system.’ The tale told here was repeated at several surveys and trainings during my 
research but I heard it first from Leslie, an employee of the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) whose first job had been in the Philippines as a paediatrician. Her affinity with the region 
and support of FERCAP’s work led her to present at the FERCAP general conference in Chiang 
Mai, in November 2009. Her talk detailed what she called a ‘sting’ operation, conducted by the 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) earlier that year. Speaking nine months after the 
‘sting’ occurred, Leslie’s topic was ‘Conducting IRB inspection for better Human Subject 
Protection, from the USFDA perspective’. She specified her concern with how ‘we’, the USFDA, 
view ethics review outside the USA: 
The public must have confidence in the whole research enterprise. IRBs should fully 
understand the scope of their responsibilities. We will be looking at paperwork outside the 
US and we are looking into having a more active role outside the US. If one component is 
weak or fails then there are ripples in the whole system.
Weak components and system-wide ripples echo the language of Koski, and the story she told was 
part of another kind of rippling. Emerging from doubts of the GAO regarding the operation of 
IRBs, the ‘sting’ had been commissioned by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s 
subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. It had two parts. In the first, fake IRBs were 
successfully registered with the Department of Health and Human Services despite listing 
members such as ‘April Phuls,’ ‘Timothy Wittless’ and ‘Alan Ruse.’ 
The second part involved a fake trial proposal, sent to three commercial IRBs. The fake drug was a 
surgical adhesive gel, called ‘Adhesiabloc’, supposedly developed by a company called Device Med-
Systems. According to the trial protocol, a litre of 2.5% Adhesiabloc gel was to be poured into the 
abdominal cavity of post-operative female patients, to aid healing. The non-existent investigator, a 
Dr Jonathan Q. Kruger, had a four-page CV and was supplied with a fake Virginia medical license, 
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which had an expiry date of 1991. Two of the three commercial IRBs rejected the trial outright, 
on the basis of patient risk. The third however approved it with minor changes. This IRB’s name 
was Coast. In the minutes of the meeting, the committee stated the trial was ‘probably very 
safe’ (Walton and MacDonald 2009).
At this point accounts vary, but five months later, prompted either by a letter from the GAO 
panel or by a ‘routine audit,’  Coast made two announcements in quick succession. In the first, 
Coast stated they believed the trial of Adheisiabloc to be fraudulent, and warned against 
enrollment of patients. In the second, they indicated that trial was actually part of a government 
‘sting’ operation,’ and did not in fact exist. Coast responded to FDA warnings by agreeing to 
‘voluntarily halt aspects of its clinical trial oversight operations’ (Mundy Wall Street Journal 2009) 
and for a time, it seemed the company were hoping to return to business in a new incarnation: 
sweeping overhauls were undertaken, ‘to ensure maximum protection for human subjects,’ a new 
board chair and new board members were to be put in place. ‘Coast IRB is changing everything,’ 
said Chief Executive Dan Dueber: 
Within the next 30 days this company will be completely different, operated by different 
people, relying on different standard operating procedures, even having a different name
(Mundy, Wall Street Journal 2009).
A congressional hearing ensued. Rather than defend his own company, Chief Executive Dueber 
took the approach of insisting that the GAO were the criminal party. No human subject 
participant had been harmed, he argued, since there was no trial.  The GAO, on the other hand, 
according to Dueber, had violated state and federal criminal laws in perpetrating the sting. ‘The 
question confronting me, and which I hope will occur to you’ he said at the hearing, ‘is whether 
this committee and the GAO have lawful authority to defraud an innocent party to prove a 
political point’ (Mansell 2009). Asked why he hadn’t done background checks on the research site 
(a strip mall in Clifton, Virginia) or the PI (with his expired medical license), Dueber said it never 
occurred to him that anyone would develop a study that was not real. In the aftermath of the 
hearing Coast decided to close entirely, citing loss of key customers. Dueber conceded that his 
committee had been ‘duped’: ‘had we started from a premise of skepticism rather than trust, we 
would not have been’ (cited in Dove 2009). Officials concluded that the ‘sting‘ had raised ‘serious 
questions not only about the specific IRB involved in this investigation but with the entire system 
for approving experimental testing on human beings’ (Stupak, Chair of the Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee, cited in Mansell 2009).
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It becomes clearer now why Koski, an American commentator, in thinking of clinical research is 
concerned with the potential for fragmentation. The many official bodies, committees and 
government agencies listed in this story, and the manner in which the law becomes involved, only 
begin to cover the American ‘Human Subject Protection’ system and biomedical research arena. 
The story is about IRBs as part of a system of checks on research, and the ‘sting‘ reveals their 
potential inadequacy. When Leslie began her presentation, she told us that it would ‘echo some of 
the themes about the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of us all, in this global research 
enterprise.’ I suggest that it did more than echo themes; it participated in relating the US sting 
story with Asian concerns. Traveling with Leslie to the FERCAP conference in 2009, and around 
the world through forwarded emails, industry circulars and discussions, the story of how Coast 
closed down was not confined to American territory.7
For researchers in Asia, it carried in itself another story. Despite the domestic response to the 
American sting operation being far from approving, and the FDA regularly coming under 
criticism for being under-resourced and “lacking teeth”, it matters that there is a ‘system’. Some 
months after Leslie’s presentation Cristina referenced the Coast scandal as she explained to me 
the role she saw FERCAP playing in the region:
In the US, they have money from government and they have a system. Here, that system 
doesn’t exist yet. The US have a good system to check and balance. If the EC is not good, 
then they’ll close them down. And funding will be stopped as well. Funding for that 
research, for the whole institution. You sign a Federal Wide Agreement (FWA) and it 
means you’ll comply with all the regulations. So if you [institution] don’t support the EC, 
they’ll be stopped, because you didn’t comply. That’s why its so effective in the US — they 
have control. If you’re not compliant...They have a good system. In Asia, we don’t have 
that.
By ‘system’, I took Cristina to be referring to the range of government, legal and institutional 
powers invoked by Leslie in the Coast sting story. For many of the countries Cristina worked in, 
however, being seen to have sufficient capacity in ethics review was a prerequisite for attracting 
research to their shores8, as a means of increasing local competence and knowledge. With a 
greater number of trials conducted as ‘multi-sited’ studies over the last two decades, sponsors and 
funders also look increasingly for sites with a certain degree of ‘capacity’. Ethics has come to form 
an important part of this capacity, and its development is not always at the behest of governments 
or public concern. Rather, committees often undertake this through their own initiative, with the 
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7 To be clear, it is not the system itself which circulates as yet, even though the US FDA is in the process of opening 
offices in Asia for monitoring trials. Rather, what travels is the idea, the promise and the desirability of such ‘systems.’
8 Recognition, provided through the Survey, was an important part in this. I discuss it in Chapter 2. 
support of FERCAP and its networks. Indeed, comments during my fieldwork indicated that 
advances in ethics committee capacity were often seen as being ahead of national programs. As a 
coordinating trainer Thailand laughingly said,
Now, ethics committees are more advanced than the regulatory bodies! In the Philippines, 
they’re happy [that we run trainings] as they’ll learn from us how to inspect! We have to 
build little by little. Build ethical review system first. From there, link the system as a whole. 
FERCAP conference brings in dialogue among stakeholders. That’s the aim of FERCAP — 
to have a a research system. Not only ethics committees, that’s only part. [The] ethics 
committee is our entry point.
Ethics committees are the entry point for both FERCAP and GAO: where for FERCAP they are a 
building block towards establishing a future system, to GAO they are the weakest link of a system 
that is already taken to exist. Both rely on an imaginary of a whole system, currently operating in a 
way that is — in some respect — inadequate. In one sense, the GAO’s sting ‘uncovered’ the 
possibility of inadequate review, as a hidden potential of the system. As Gregory Kutz, the 
Managing Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations (FSI) put it in his testimony to 
the Subcommittee: ‘The IRB system is vulnerable to unethical manipulation, particularly by 
companies or individuals who intend to abuse the system or commit fraud, or who lack the 
aptitude or qualifications to conduct and oversee clinical trials’ (Kutz 2009:4). In Coast’s view 
however, the GAO sting represented a potentially illegal overstepping of its jurisdiction. Dueber’s 
comments indicate that in attempting to prove the fallibility of the system, which would in turn 
provide the necessary political pressure for reform towards a more ‘trustworthy’ system, the sting — 
a fraud perpetrated by the system against itself — had in fact created a new layer of mistrust. As he 
said, before evaluating scientific and ethical merit, the starting point of Coast should have been 
not trust, but doubt in the very existence of researchers and drugs. From Cristina’s standpoint 
outside the US, both Dueber and Kutz speak of a system that already exists, illustrating how the 
parameters that underpin the story have yet to be established in Asia. To detect inadequacy is to 
detect the potential for a failure with potentially damaging consequences: trust is both a function 
of being able to measure the conditions, and left implicit as an outcome. To speak in Koski’s 
terms, Cristina handles threads from which to make a cloth, whereas in the US these threads can 
be frayed and need to be protected. What separates the two is a difference in temporal 
orientation: towards a future cloth, or the protection of an existing one. The conference provides 
a forum in which members of FERCAP can raise concerns, and it makes the need for the 
organisation more evident; as one commentator on the above debate said, 
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In developing countries, we don’t have laws and regulations. It is important that we 
advocate, so a regulatory authority can be set up. The initiative has to come from us. We 
cannot wait for [governments] to recognize the importance of an ethical regulatory system.
But we have reason to be cautious about the framing of research provided by Leslie. The ‘sting’ 
was conducted with accountability in mind, and in her language we find resonance with Dr 
Koski’s concern for the trust of the public. It is a concern which frames much discussion on ethics 
and science in Euro-American settings, a theme I will go on to develop in Chapters 4 and 5. For 
now, I look at some of the ways members of FERCAP frame their work not in relation to science 
or publics, but to bioethics and research ethics.
Not doing Bioethics 
It would be easy to regard research ethics as a part of a larger project on bioethics. FERCAP’s 
trainings are peppered with bioethics stories, examples and issues, a litany of historical examples 
with which I became familiar over the course of research. The stories that circulate are largely 
Euro-American; they tell of people, please, dates and diseases. Edward Jenner, England 1796, 
small pox; Major Walter Reed, Cuba, 1900s, yellow fever; 1932-72 Alabama, the Tuskegee Syphilis 
study; 1943, Josef Mengele, Auschwitz.
As I became familiar with FERCAP’s work however, I observed the distinction they make between 
bioethics and their own activities. Take, for example, Cristina’s comment that:
[FERCAP’s] approach has made it possible to operationalize the basic ethics principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, and justice in the review of health research and translate them into 
tools, such as checklists and assessment forms to assist the EC/IRB members in reviewing 
protocols, consent forms, and related documents. (Torres 2011: 49)
While I was speaking to a researcher about bioethics organisations and activities in the region, he 
commented on the style of reasoning he had observed in encounters with bioethics organisations: 
‘In the moral dilemma approach, when something is resolved, they introduce another factor so 
another dilemma emerges. But research ethics needs to be solution oriented.’ His example was the 
preparation of a curriculum that had been drawn up for a collaborative course between the 
University of the Philippines, Manila, and the Fogarty International Centre on Bioethics.
There was a lot of discussion. [Fogarty] wanted a course on “moral dilemmas” and they said 
it was a “skills” course! Doctors in the course said, ‘This is a never ending discussion!’ 
Suppose someone is run over by a car. Who is responsible? The driver. Suppose the 
pedestrian is drunk? Well, both. But say the driver... And you keep adding to the issue. It 
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goes on and on. The medical doctors, they said, ‘There is no resolution to the issue!’ That 
was the “skill” they learnt. It is a very different approach.
That bioethics was a ‘very different approach’ to research ethics was a repeated sentiment 
throughout my research. One interviewee remarked that the divergence led to bioethicists 
condemning the work of FERCAP as that of ‘clerks’: meaning, in her interpretation, that to 
bioethicists FERCAP were not ‘really’ engaging with bioethical issues. In turn, this meant that 
engagement with explicitly ‘bioethics’ networks was not a priority for FERCAP. Few considered 
this a great loss, since the attempts of certain FERCAP members to bring in bioethicists had led to 
blank faces and reportedly confused clinicians. Another interviewee illustrated for me the systems 
she implicitly understood to be at work in the region through an event involving American and 
Chinese bioethicists and members of FERCAP.
Some Harvard fellows9 also work with us. That’s when it gets complicated. Bioethicists 
in China, they are philosophers. So they think we belong to one group. When you do 
training they put us together, with the bioethics lectures. We had a session on Standard 
Operating Procedures, management of Serious Adverse Events.... and then the Chinese 
philosophy people talked about principles. They were talking about “there is no 
objective reality,” the deconstruction movement. I know what it is, because I’m coming 
from a social science background, I’ve been exposed to these things at the University, 
about radical sociology, but can you imagine doctors listening to that! How can you tell 
which drug is more effective if there is no objective reality?! Meiji was doing the 
translation for me and I asked her what they were talking about and she shook her head 
and said, ‘I cannot translate this, I do not know how to.’ She is a very smart medical 
doctor. But she will just stop doing the translating and say, ‘I don’t know how to 
translate that.’ Even she gets confused.
The work of training ethics review committees can at times be aided by being viewed as ‘part’ of 
bioethics. In the examples of international involvement with groups like the US NIH Fogarty, 
Harvard program or UNESCO Bioethics offices, brief, sometimes tense alliances are formed. 
Researchers trained abroad return, collaborations are set up. However, as these narratives suggest, 
these events also reaffirm FERCAP’s distinctness. As Cristina put it: 
What is the point of talking about these things when we’re talking about research ethics? 
For us, the guidelines are there. For us, what is more important is for us to be able to 
operationalise those guidelines. If a new issue comes up and they can incorporate it into 
the guidelines, we can follow it and start implementing.
When I pushed this point with Cristina, she said that FERCAP worked to take the tension 
between bioethics and research ethics away. One way in which this would be achieved by 
reframing ethics as a part of a quality system: 
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9 Graduates of the Harvard School of Public Health Program on Ethical Issues in Global Health Research.
If it is unethical it cannot be quality research. I think that makes us different from other 
bioethics groups, because we focus on a system and ask [about] the role of the stakeholders. 
It’s not about moral dilemmas or conformism. We say what’s there and how we apply the 
ethics. Because that is what is lacking in Asia. The system. And we’ve established that 
niche.
Cristina’s definition of the system and its link with quality recalls Fujimura’s definition of a 
‘standardized package’ (1992). Unlike the perhaps more familiar concept of boundary objects 
(Star and Griesemer 1989, Bowker and Star 1999), standardized packages are robust enough to 
change local practices (Guston 2000:29), something which is clearly FERCAP’s intent. They are 
both ‘a theory and a standardized set of technologies’ that together make it possible ‘to locally 
concretize the abstraction in different practices to construct new problems’ (Fujimura 1992: 169, 
179, cited in Riles 2011:70). This thesis is an exploration of what it looks like to roll out ethics as 
such a package, with attention to the politics of the differentiating work of standards and the 
technoscientific expertise needed for their efficacy (Busch 2011). Though I argue that the “ethics” 
conducted and advocated by FERCAP is not one single thing, it does aspire to standards, and 
standardization, through its recognition program. The effects of these aspirations I explore in the 
chapters to come.
Since I have made it clear that FERCAP members believe they are ‘not doing bioethics’ perhaps I 
should also make it clear that I am not either. Although a recent empirical turn in bioethics 
research is resulting in the use of various social scientific approaches, with bioethicists seeking to 
bridge the gap ‘between ethics as presented in bioethics, and the way in which ethical reasoning 
takes place in the clinic’ (Hedgecoe 2004:121, see also Goldenberg 2005), in the arena FERCAP 
defines as research ethics, the opposite seems to be occurring. FERCAP’s drive is towards more 
formalized, structured, assessable formulas. Nonetheless, both moves can be rendered in the same 
language of evidence: evidence for how bioethics operates ‘on the ground’ and evidence for 
research ethics as having an effect. I take this pervasiveness up in Chapter 7.
Research Communities and Advocacy
If FERCAP are not ‘doing bioethics’ then what are they doing? The group established its self-
described ‘grass-roots’ ethos at its first seminar in 2000, when, writes a founding member:
we noted that working with government will be very difficult and very slow because of too 
much red tape. So instead of working with government, we chose to start from scratch and 
create our own organization starting with the participants of the seminar (Chokevivat 
2011:7). 
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At the 2009 Conference, Juntra described the FERCAP approach as ‘bottom up’, saying it was like 
a family. She described members eating together: ‘we don’t want people to [just] have a meal, we 
say ‘let’s cook together,’ not ‘you will eat now, and this is what you will eat and this is how you will 
cook.’ The common effort and direction encapsulated in Juntra’s metaphor is echoed in another 
FERCAP member’s statement about the organisation’s values, which uses the metaphor of a 
house to explain that involvement in FERCAP is about more than just self-improvement, or 
improvement for one’s own country. ‘If you have your house nice, you cannot just be happy with 
that,’ she said. 
You need to think about what is around it. Are the streets tidy, is there trash? If you are just 
here to talk about yourself, that is not the way, that is not the attitude... You need to care 
about it all, the universe.
Caring here translated to inter-regional support, the universe made equivalent to the ‘family 
region,’ and took the form of visiting for training, surveys, and a shared distribution of costs 
which took into account each country’s ability to pay. This is described in the FERCAP@10 
anniversary booklet as the value of equity, ‘shown in [FERCAP] being accessible to both 
developed and developing countries and in [FERCAP’s] socialized costing of programs’ (Torres 
2011:50). Taiwan, posed against Cambodia, can pay, ‘but Cambodia at the moment, TDR 
supports. Our philosophy is to help them help themselves,’ said Juntra during the 2009 
Conference. As a Taiwanese conference delegate put it,
for us, [funding ethics committees is] not a big deal, but for them it is. Delegates from 
poorer countries have their flights to conference paid by Korea and Taiwan. They ask for 
money from [pharmaceuticals] because you need sponsors, whether countries or companies. 
America can’t understand that. 
I rarely saw financial issues discussed, particularly since I did not attend FERCAP’s steering 
committee meetings. The network has been supported by annual project grant applications to 
WHO-TDR, receives institutional contributions for trainings, the use of FERCAP modules and 
the Survey. It also collects institutional fees from recognised committees, of which there will be 
over 100 in 2012. Annual conferences, however, provided an opportunity for evaluating funding 
mechanisms, sustainability of the network, and models of payment. During a 2009 conference 
discussion on how to finance FERCAP in the future, one delegate did not think the idea of 
“family” was enough. He suggested FERCAP seek out wealthy donors, who could gain tax 
exemptions or fame from supporting ethical review:
Many people want to do something for FERCAP [...] We’re an international organisation, 
we can change our idea, [get] NGO tax-free donations. Some of our people want to do that 
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because they can create their own dignity. Obama, he [might] put $1000 in FERCAP 
because he is going to have Peace Prize!’ 
Juntra considered a donation model unsustainable, and returned to the idea of a house to explain 
her reasoning: 
Do you want to be on the first page of a newspaper, or just want to keep doing [this], 
sharing same values? This [work] is not only for our country. Our house is really nice, but 
it’s not a good environment for the house. I don’t think FERCAP wants millions...maybe 
better to think “OK, we have activities, how can we maintain our activities?”
In the view of its leaders, the organisation aims not at profit but at sufficiency. It simply wants to 
continue doing what it is doing, and do it better. This modesty of aim was reflected in the 
attitudes towards the roles countries wanted, and were encouraged to take. FERCAP encouraged 
delegates ‘not look at themselves’ but look at ‘someone else.’ Cristina took countries with ‘more 
advanced economies’ as examples of this shift in attitude: 
In the beginning, it was different, it was about “my” interest. “I don’t want to share.” Now, 
they have a different perspective...[T]hey were like that, now they want to host the 
conference. They want to help those less fortunate to them.
When I asked how this shift had occurred, Cristina was very aware of how the phrasing of her 
requests affected others. ‘You adjust the language,’ she said. ‘You ask them what they want their 
role to be.’ She had suggested to some of the Korean delegates that perhaps their role was one of 
leadership, because they were coming from an advanced economy and had resources. ‘And then 
they are happy,’ she said, ‘they can help others.’ I pressed this point of attitude with Juntra later:
When you’re in the same room talking about the same thing, then there are unfortunates 
in the room, you ask, could I contribute to make it better? They feel proud. The minute you 
help others, its hard to explain. Happiness that comes from that is hidden until you 
experience it. In the old days, they had an agenda in mind. Even now, people do. For 
example, let’s say your country is helping another country. You’ve got an agenda, you’re 
wondering what you’ll get out of it. If you do something without expecting what you’re 
going to get, if you get it, you know what it feels like. If you do it because you feel like it’s 
the right thing, because you want to contribute, you get more back. You have to experience 
it. I like to train people, to see them advance in their career - that gives me happiness. At 
that moment, I just try to help them, and then in the future they will become something. 
The minute you say “I do it because of this or because of that,” you lose that.
Why do Cristina and Juntra liken their organisation to a family? Drawing on kinship, Juntra is 
accessing the implicit assumptions of ‘relatedness’: ‘predicated on the absorption of difference by 
commonality and togetherness’ (Viveiros de Castro 1999:S80). This foregrounding is visible when 
principal investigators, often cast in an antagonistic relationship with ethics committees, become 
extensions of the committee. They become ‘members of the family’: ‘don’t say they are your client, 
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without them FERCAP would not exist! They are part and parcel’ (see Chapter 2). During 
questions at the 2009 conference one IRB chairperson stood up and argued that thinking big was 
difficult, because sometimes it was the researchers who seemed very ‘big’. Some of them were 
‘even up for a Nobel’ he said:
Sometimes [they] act before IRB. They’re not…they think we are strong a big rock. So 
regulation - between researchers to IRB member - sometimes doesn’t work. Difficult to 
make them understand why IRBs trying to protect human subjects.
Different countries described different tactics to engage researchers. In stepping up to their 
leadership role, Korea became host for the 2011 conference. At the 2010 conference, a Korean 
delegate had gone to great effort to present the transition that she and a colleague had prompted 
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Figure 5: Stills from South Korean Animation at FERCAP Conference 2010.
through illustrating their achievements in an animation (Figure 5). Against the music to Totoro, a 
popular Japanese anime,  the presenter narrated the struggle:
Here is the door [1]. The door is really a difficulty. If you don’t overcome this difficulty, I 
can’t work on the IRB. So at that time my friend Sang is coming. Everyone told me she is a 
very good doctor in Emergency Medicine. She is coming to me. And we are trying together: 
how to open this door? [2] Its difficult. We have to find the key: key is the main solution of 
opening the door, of overcoming difficulty [3]. Now, we find the key, but the door is really 
really big [6]. So we don’t know how to reach the keyhole. We can’t reach. So we have to 
find a way: what is a good way to reach they key [hole]? We try over and over again [7, 8]. 
We are cooperating together, but we get a ladder and the key open the door [10]. We open 
the door, wow! [11] But when we open the difficulty another difficulty is in front of us [12]. 
At that time nobody is interested in us. Every time we shouting, they are indifferent. They 
are just doing their job. They are just in front of their computer [13]. Writing some 
document [14]. They are talking among themselves [15]. But we never stop here. We have to 
overcome. We are shouting “IRB”, “IRB” over and over again [16]. At that time we try and 
speak about the meaning of IRB. Protection! Why we have to do?  With our effort, they try 
to understand what IRB is [17, 18, 19]. At first we are just the two, but every persons are 
getting together and they are shouting together so it is possible to make them understand 
why human protection subject is so important for developing medical [20]. And what is the 
right way and they really understand [21]. I don’t think they can understand it fully but 
they are trying.
By telling this story the presenter managed to convey, with indirect criticism, the ‘deaf ears’ upon 
which calls for ethical review fell, and how ethics had successfully been brought to the attention of 
new actors.  A Chinese delegate agreed:
In the early times [...] most of them say ‘We don’t have support from the institution, 
nobody notice[s] we are there.’ And then they say the investigators don’t listen, they just 
come to say ‘Could you just stamp on this letter?’ But nowadays when I visit the IRB those 
members feel really honoured to be IRB members.
There are a great number of institutional and interpersonal dynamics involved in ‘changing’ an 
institution’s approach to ethics, and changing individual researchers. Both could be the subject of 
the advocacy work conference delegates were encouraged to undertake (c.f. Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Rushton and Williams 2011). As Cristina put it, ‘we must advocate for the values we believe 
in. Other parts of the system do not respect the same values [...] Advocacy is very important, so is 
the sharing of values.’
The point at which FERCAP had arrived on its 10th anniversary in 2010 meant that in the 
annual November conference in Shanghai, Robert Ridley, Director of the Special Programme for 
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), could say that ‘[f]rom very small beginnings, 
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[FERCAP] has now developed into almost an institution. The number of representatives here 
from different countries across the region’, he continued, ‘is testament to that. I’ve been asked to 
talk about FERCAP in TDR’s product development activities. However, FERCAP has now got so 
big and so large that I think it’s also appropriate to talk about how TDR can fit into FERCAP’s 
activities’. 
Ridley’s opening line suggests the ‘child’ is outgrowing the ‘parent’, or at least becoming so ‘big’ as 
to require a reconsideration of the current relationship. Through its own ‘organisational charts’ or 
‘organograms,’ FERCAP provides family trees worthy of African Structural Functionalists (figure 
6). These charts are a favoured method of positioning an organisation, committee or group ‘in 
relation’ to other groups, mark FERCAP’s perceived (and given) place in the world (Callon and 
Latour 1981). 
Taking FERCAP as the ego, there is the parent (SIDCER) and grandparent (TDR) and great-
grandparent (WHO). We find siblings across (PABIN, FLACEIS, FOCUS and FECCIS), children 
(NAREC) and grandchildren down (FERCIT (Thailand), CIDCER (China), FERCSL (Sri Lanka), 
KAIRB (South Korea), FERCI (India) etc). A project of the Strategic Initiative for Developing 
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Figure 6: SIDCER Organogram, showing FERCAP
Capacity in Ethical Review (SIDCER), FERCAP is compared with its ‘siblings’, the other four 
regional fora. 
Drawing on Koski’s image of a finely woven silk cloth I have explored how the language of systems 
and fragments permeates the research arena of which FERCAP thinks and enacts itself as part of. 
The conference as an ethnographic site allows the display of attitudes, priorities, connections and 
relations imagined. It also hints at how these images have effects, how they move people, and 
move with people. 
Strathern sets up the markers by which the movement of knowledge may be detected, for we can 
never see the movement itself, she writes. ‘What we stop to describe is at rest itself; however many 
places it has come from, we give it a singular location in the moment of reflection’ (2004: 17). 
Leslie’s story of Coast’s demise was just that, a story told to a specific group of people at a specific 
conference. These people then carried it with them as they returned to their countries, hospitals 
and institutes. Leslie’s concern, with the Coast story, was to emphasise how the research 
conducted in Asia is vitally important; she insisted on the ‘interconnectedness and 
interrelatedness of us all.’ The planning that constitutes ‘capacity building for research ethics’ is 
the planning of connections-to-be (Strathern 2004: 15), both equipping committees and members 
to make their own judgements, and ensuring that research sponsored from abroad remains 
‘acceptable’ to those authorities (EMA, FDA) who will eventually review and ‘accept’ the scientific 
data. 
FERCAP’s conferences are designed to bring together ‘stakeholders’ from the various sectors, 
having ‘representatives from national health authorities, ethics committees, researchers, research 
participants, academic institutions, pharmaceutical industry sharing their ideas and experiences’, 
‘educating’ them on their roles and responsibilities, ‘empowering’ them (FERCAP 2008 and 2011 
Conference Agendas). There is a sense in the documents produced by FERCAP that the 
conference helps hold these Koski-an “threads” together. Here Koski’s image has further claim on 
our attention. It reveals a habit of scaling, the microcosmic into the macrocosmic and the reverse 
(see Chapter 5). Koski aims to addresses himself to both to the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ when he draws 
on the image of a single broken thread, to both committee members and ‘science’. He does so, 
however, in a way which recalls the unsettling of these scales in the work of Callon and Latour 
(1981) where both people and objects challenge presumed scalings:
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At other times actors who had always defined themselves and had always been defined as 
micro-actors ally themselves around a threatened district, march to the town hall and enroll 
dissident architects. By their action they manage to have a radial road diverted or a tower 
that a macro-actor had built pulled down […] A tiny actor becomes a macro-actor, just like 
in the French nursery rhyme: ‘The cat knocks over the pot, the pot knocks over the table, 
the table knocks over the room, the room knocks over the house, the house knocks over 
the street and the street knocks over Paris: Paris, Paris has fallen!’ (1981: 295-296, cited in 
Jensen 2007: 846) 
Koski’s broken thread repeats the nursery rhyme, but instead of Paris, we find the feared 
destruction of ‘public trust’ (see Institute of Medicine, USA, 2001). This fusion of trust, ethics 
and science requires attention. Although Dr Koski’s intent is to contextualise ethics within wider 
systems of product development and biomedical research, his slide itself needs contextualization. 
In his presentation, Koski discusses the trust that is spoken about by medical regulators, by 
‘publics,’ by governments. It is a trust that at its mention, is always lacking or about to be absent; a 
vulnerability or fragile future (Strathern 2005b) rolled out in a display of socially robust 
knowledge (Nowotny et al 2001). But what are these ‘gaps’, and how is ethics to bridge them? Dr 
Koski’s image builds from a ‘single broken thread’ towards a shredded ‘fabric of trust.’ Trust is 
widely acknowledged as a contemporary problem and Alberto Corsín Jiménez has recently 
pointed to the way it has become entrenched not only in political but also sociological discourses: 
‘Everyone’, he says, ‘is talking about trust’ (Corsín Jiménez 2011:177). He is, too, in his paper, but 
his intention is not to add to the growing literature which takes trust as its organising device, 
replacing ‘class’ or ‘gender’ to spin stories of the consequences of its absence. His interest lies in 
the reasons for its political salience. Dr Koski is part of Corsín Jiménez’s ‘everyone’, speaking in 
his presentation about the trust that medical regulators worry about, the trust in science feared 
lost by ‘publics’ and the trust sought by governments (Johnson et al. 2008). Ethics is thought to 
work in the ‘gaps’ between the threads, to rebuild and reassure. This mode of thinking about 
ethics I revisit in Chapters 4 and 5.
One of FERCAP’s challenges is to sustain something that looks like the unified systems towards 
which Koski leans. It does this largely through appeals to standards, ‘good practice’ and the 
display of knowledge of regulatory affairs abroad. Here I have been concerned with the 
environment that FERCAP imagines for itself, and has had imagined for it. As Star (1991:52) 
writes, ‘power is about whose metaphor brings worlds together, and holds them there’. I argue that 
the images that I have discussed are inherited imaginaries, endorsing and emphasising a systemic 
approach to ethics. If the act of imagining oneself as part of a system can itself be regarded as a 
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capacity, then it is one that the Conference surely shores up. When Cristina Torres describes her 
job as FERCAP coordinator (2011:44) she says her travel in the region showed her 
the urgency of the work to build an ethical review infrastructure that we could promote. I 
soon realized that FERCAP’s unique role was to develop and advocate for a systems 
approach in ethical review.
Consequently, her definition of capacity building was:
getting people to do their thing correctly. Doing what is expected of them. [Learning] what 
they need to ask, how to review a [biomedical research] protocol. It’s being able to fulfill 
your role. Capacity is always specific to a role. You have to define, like each person has his 
role in society. You cannot be good for all, you do a specific role.
I return to her discussion of roles, systems and capacity in Chapter 5 since it applies both to 
individual members being a part of FERCAP, and FERCAP as a part of international research. 
Their imaginings and descriptions make it, and have effects. To be a part, as ethics is perceived to 
be, is not only to belong but to be part of some other image: the fracture references the complete. 
The conference is a means of holding steady this reality. Hence the surprise of this speaker’s 
colleague: ‘My friend came with me to the FERCAP conference, and they ask ‘Who is, where is 
FERCAP’, and I have to explain that it is only one full time person!’10 The conference is a site at 
which FERCAP’s reality can be generated, as in Riles’s summary of a network as ‘a set of 
institutions, knowledge practices and artifacts thereof that internally generate the effects of their 
own reality by reflecting on themselves’ (2001:3). But, Latour cautions,
these panoramas […] have to be studied very carefully because they provide the only 
occasion to see ‘the whole story’ as a whole. Their totalizing views should not be despised as 
an act of professional megalomania, but they should be added, like everything else, to the 
multiplicity of sites we want to deploy (Latour 2005:189).
The ‘whole’ which I have depicted in this introduction I will not sustain across the chapters to 
follow; I will show instead how it is made, adding the images at the conference to the ‘multiplicity 
of sites’ from my fieldwork. As Latour also says, ‘[panoramas] allow spectators, listeners and 
readers to be equipped with a desire for wholeness and centrality […] However much they trick us, they 
prepare us for the political task ahead (Latour 2005:189). What is so powerful in these panoramic 
images is that they nicely solve the question of staging the totality, of ordering the ups and downs, 
of nesting ‘micro’, ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ into one another. They also clearly delineate roles. The talk 
of fragments, just as much as the talk of systems, is a tool for imagining. 
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(Atoy) Navarro.
Research Questions
George Marcus claims that ‘classic anthropological ethnography, especially in its development in 
the apprentice project/dissertation form, was designed to provide answers, or at least data, for 
questions that anthropology had for it’ (Marcus 2008: 52). ‘Nowadays’, he continues, 
‘anthropology itself does not pose these questions […] thus it is a contemporary burden of projects 
of anthropological research — and especially apprentice ones — to identify these question-asking 
domains’ (Marcus 2008: 52). In a field already thick with its own commentators, what role exists 
for extended ethnography or slow anthropological analysis? I opened the thesis in a way which 
outlined some of the themes it will address; here I detail questions that run throughout. I suggest 
that while the International Science and Bioethics Collaborations (ISBC) project identified a 
question-asking arena — the challenges of international collaboration in scientific research — the 
questions it has posed within that ‘question asking domain’ serve questions that anthropology 
itself continues to have; material gathered on the ISBC project and for this doctoral research 
contributes to longstanding debates within the canon, and that which is anthropological need not 
— despite utilitarian research environments — be relegated as secondary to the interests of other 
domains. 
I began my study with a strong interest in how ethics committees make decisions, not dissimilar 
from that of Stark (2011a, 2011b), or Lamont’s (2009) work on the deliberations of academics. 
The research shares with Stark (2011a, 2011b) a concern with what happens inside ethics 
committee rooms, a common interest in the creation and sustaining of ‘the image that members 
have reached a legitimate decision’ (Stark 2011a:233). Although attempts to get closer to decision-
making took me elsewhere,11  an interest in ‘how disparate evaluators reach collective 
agreement’ (Camic, Gross and Lamont 2011:19) remains a question in this text. However, ethics 
committees have a claim on the making of another kind of knowledge. Stark puts it plainly when 
she writes that ‘[w]hen researchers look beyond the administrative burden of IRBs, they find that 
IRBs are consequential because they affect how researchers go about creating knowledge -  and, as 
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11  I did collect material  from ethics review committee meetings I was present at in Sri Lanka, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Thailand and China, mostly in my capacity as a trainee Surveyor. I do not bring the material  together to produce an 
analysis of decision-making practices in this thesis however, in part because of the resources that would be required for 
translation but more significantly  because my focus shifted during research and analysis towards how participants in 
committees describe and experience the problems of decision-making (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
a result, the kinds of things that are knowable’ (2011a:234, emphasis added). This is something I 
explore in the chapters to come. 
Ethics
The starting point of any good ethnographic analysis must be an examination of the categories by 
which people live their lives. The rapidly proliferating language of ethics (Simpson 2012: 153) is 
the category under examination here. I explore the formation of the concept through its 
articulation in ‘formal and informal practices, where and by whom it is contested, [and] how it 
reasserts itself in the face of challenges to its integrity or meaning’ (Jasanoff 2005:19). Throughout 
the thesis the way in which ‘ethics’ is used, called upon and summoned is examined, the edges 
and limits of its reach explored. At a most general level, this inquiry addresses the question of the 
concept of ethics as it is employed in the governance of biomedical research. How has it been 
brought in to the making of good science, what is its given role? More specifically, the thesis asks 
what ethics is for the members and participants in the Forum for Ethics Review Committees in 
Asia and the Pacific. Who gets written in to what ethics is to be? What are the social relationships 
that ethics inscribes, how does it intervene on the social, what are its tools, what counts as an 
accomplishment? 
Though the conceptual centering work of ethics is powerful (it links transparency and 
accountability, takes on the languages of human rights, efficiency, economic use of resources, 
quality, even justice in its promises to check the strong and protect the weak), ethics review 
committees have been accused of being unethical, both within medicine and law. In this pitch of 
one ‘ethics’ against another, academics in the USA have challenged Ethics Review Committees as 
unconstitutional, using First Amendment concerns (Lerner 2007) and issues of censorship12 
(Hamburger 2004, 2007; Weinstein 2007a, 2007b; Bledsoe et al. 2007; Menikoff 2007; Katz 
2007). The effect of an IRB on ‘how researchers go about creating knowledge’ comes from their 
attention to methodology, as ‘IRBs might suggest changes to researchers’ site selection, sample 
size, recruiting methods or interview questions’ (Stark 2011b: 74), rarely approving research 
without requiring some changes to the proposal. Stark writes that
IRB members suggest (read: require) changes that a researcher could make to the proposal 
that would result in the board’s approval […] This coercive power to change research is quite 
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to a work of art - in order to suppress or delete elements alleged to be harmful, offensive, or immoral 
(Bledsoe et al. 2007:596). 
effective since getting approval is the ultimate goal for researchers who submit protocols 
(2011a:234).
It is worth reflecting on Stark’s comment with an eye to literatures in the history of science. 
Recounting Shapin and Schaffer’s analysis of scientific life in the 1600s, Haraway writes that ‘[e]
xperimental philosophy — science — could spread only as its materialized practices spread. This 
was not a question of ideas, but of the apparatus of production of what could count as 
knowledge’ (Haraway 1996:430; Shapin and Schaffer 2011 [1985]:25). ‘Ethics’ is on the move; as a 
result of its integration into the making of science, not merely its affirmation, its materialized 
practices too must spread. While the question of what an ethics committee is in the USA is largely 
solved (Stark 2011b), their establishment in Asia is ongoing. 
What is an ethics committee?
Initial questions on how (and why) ethics decisions were apparently being taken in the ‘same’ way 
in different places led me to questions on why it was that the committee itself was the form of 
choice for making these decisions. Indeed, what was the committee as ‘a form’ (Riles 2001)? An 
ethics committee is a group of people but the idea of it is more than the instantiation of it at any 
given time. Was this one of the qualities that allowed it to move? Another way of asking why the 
ethics committee is enjoying such proliferation is to ask “what are the problems to which the 
ethics committee is a solution?” My overview of the spread of biomedical research and GCP above 
provides some direction, but there are further answers. 
As Dr Muthuswamy’s concerns at the Regional Collaborative Workshop illustrate, ethics 
committees are a form of managing biomedical research and the consequences of the knowledge it 
produces. Strathern describes ‘a particularly Euro-American oscillation between the condition of 
knowing through investigation (research) and the condition of asking what is to be done with that 
knowledge (management)’ (2006:195). If, as I am suggesting, ethics committees embody this 
oscillation, how does this play out in Asia?
How does ethics work as governance?
Ethics committees have become a point through which all research must pass. In studying the 
implications of this development, I have sought to understand what kind of control they are 
thought to have over research and how this is enacted.  FERCAP’s capacity-building concern with 
‘how to get people to do things’ — to run good ethics committees, to encourage ethics activity in 
their institutions, to educate researchers in ethics, to protect human subjects — reveals, with a 
little shift, a double sided question. 
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First, how to get people, to do things. Ethics appears as a solution to a failed science, an ethics of 
‘research’ whose practitioners, after Nuremberg, cannot be entrusted to their professions or 
consciences. These rules made by persons, it was hoped, would make persons made by rules. 
However, it would not do to follow what Laidlaw (2002), Zigon (2006) and Robbins (2004) all 
attribute to a Durkheimian legacy: a reduction of morality to social norms. In distinguishing the 
work of FERCAP from bioethics, my interviewees did remark that the guidelines were ‘already 
there,‘ that the work they did was implementation, or operationalisation. Nonetheless, in 
attention to the language of training sessions and conference I am brought to ask how and why 
actors are invited to ‘make themselves into subjects of esteemed qualities or kinds’ (Faubion 2011: 
3), how an ethics of the self intertwines with the ethics of review committees and trials. FERCAP 
itself asks how and why people behave the way they do (cf. Howell 1997; Malinowski 1926); the 
form of its capacity building exercises gives an insight into what people are imagined to be, in 
order that they can be changed, inspired and governed. My attention to the making of particular 
types of people is one part of showing, as Shapin does ‘how and why people and their virtues 
matter to the making and the authority of late modern bodies of technological 
knowledge’ (2008:3). He points out that in order to give an account of why personal virtue “still 
matters” he must also give an account of “why it is so widely said that it does not 
matter” (2008:13). 
There is also the question of the kind of governance which FERCAP’s implementation of the 
SIDCER recognition program establishes. Are we looking at members of an organisation 
concerned with standards for the collective sentiment of protecting the human subject, or with 
the trials and research that SIDCER recognition could bring? Though the answer cannot be 
exclusively either, in this question we see rewritten a division between Malinowski and Radcliffe-
Brown, who, Kuper writes, did not agree on sociological theory: ‘In his Essay on the Gift, in 1925, 
Mauss rewrote the kula ethnography in terms of Durkheimian collective sentiments. Malinowski 
in turn recast reciprocity as a matter of enlightened self-interest’ (2005:48). Cristina’s response to 
the question posed by the American academic in the opening vignette of this thesis — No, we 
don’t have the kind of systems or law that you’d recognise but we have ‘moral force‘ — recalls 
debates common in 20th century anthropology, as researchers interested in the dispute settlement 
and judicial systems of peoples they studied focused on principles of social control (Colson 1953) 
to discern how societies were governed. 
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With this, we move to the second side of the question: ‘how to get people to do things’, with the 
emphasis on getting them to do something, what we tend to call governance. ‘Late modernity’, 
write Shapin, ‘is supposedly marked by the extension of impersonal means of control to ever new 
domains, ultimately bringing all of social life under the sway of impersonal reason’ (2008:9). He 
remarks that 
[i]t would be convenient to be able to tell a story of linear transition from [...] a sacred to a 
secular world, from trust-in-familiar-people to anonymous trust in impersonal standards and 
faceless institutions; from virtue to institutional control as a solution to problems of 
credibility and authority (2008:17). 
However, as his circumspect tone indicates, this is not the case. In the chapters that follow I 
explore FERCAP’s standardisation agenda (Chapters 2, 3 and 6) alongside its reliance on ‘familiar 
people,’ asking how the two successfully coexist. This is not to say the FERCAP program has no 
struggles with authority. Entities such as FERCAP, non-governmental organisations between 
government and state, prompt questions about their sources of legitimacy (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Irwin 2008). They also prompt contestation over epistemic authority: who should set the 
standards, should they enable or constrain? Who should do this kind of recognition? While it has 
come to be agreed that governance over biomedical research is needed, the question of how it can 
be both effected and enforced varies. I explore the variety of answers given in the text. 
Where is Ethics?
Where does one look for ethics? Who decides? By what criteria? Ong (2010: 13), suggests that
[i]nstead of proceeding from a position of moral certitude to make judgements about 
particular ethnographic situations or seek to remedy them according to a universal set of 
ethics, an anthropology of ethics is necessarily about locating ethical practices, that is, 
tracking ethical configurations where “ethicalizing” processes and decisions take place.
Capacity building in research ethics — “ethicalizing” — takes place in rooms, around tables. The 
thesis examines these sites. It also considers the form of the committee, an ‘ethical configuration.’ 
What kind of politics inhere in it; what does it assume? The ethics committee is one of several 
contemporary spaces of deliberation into which ‘society’ is thought to enter, converse with, and 
engage science. Consensus conferences, round tables and public consultations are, argues 
Weingart (2008), the outcome of academic debates on the democratization of expertise. He cites 
the House of Lords Science and Society report (2000) which followed the UK’s BSE (mad cow 
disease) crisis, and the European Union’s white paper on democratic governance (2001). In light 
of these developments, Strathern (2005) cautions us against the abstraction of ‘society’, arguing 
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that it produces the concept of ‘science’ in ‘contradistinction to itself,’ de-socialising ‘science and 
technology’ in the process:
it encourages the idea that all ‘science’ need now is that it does useful things ‘for society.’ It 
could even prompt people to equate ethics committees and government commissions with 
society’s studied opinion. But above all, the invocation of ‘society’ summons the fragility of 
measurement: what will count as society, whose views will figure? (Strathern 2005b: 476)  
The question of who counts is central to this inquiry. I reflect on the convenience of reifications 
such as society and the individual, the political tools of science, and the problems to which audit 
and oversight appear as solutions. Many research ethics committees in developing countries work 
in the absence of national ethics committees. Governments and scientists do not conduct the 
kind of public consultation or polls with which analysts of Euro-American science studies are 
becoming familiar (Nowotny et al 2001). I pay attention to what and how knowledge are displayed 
in the committee, the articulation of these positions, and the making of the ‘view’ from which 
members of an ethics committee can speak.
In asking where ethics is located, the question of where differences are located also arises. 
Difference is a problematic category for bioethics: the Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends 
a ‘duty of respect’ which ‘implies a duty to be sensitive to other cultures’ (2002:50). Simpson 
(2004a, 2004b) asks ‘to which cultural differences’ is this sensitivity to be directed? FERCAP 
works between countries pre-conceived as ‘different’ through their legal systems, research cultures 
and ‘cultures’. How are these difference managed (Wastell 2001) by this system–in–the making? 
FERCAP must manage the central authoritative texts of GCP, WHO, CIOMS, etc, and at the 
same time, strive to honour sensitivity to ‘local difference’ (Nuffield 2002). FERCAP comes to be 
a context in which these things can be worked out, and how it does so is an ethnographic 
question I explore in this thesis.
Methods
This was fieldwork organised around the aeroplane, as I traveled to the various sites of FERCAP 
activity in the region. Planning from a calendar .pdf13 emailed to me by Cristina, I spent 4 months 
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Figure 7: Fieldwork Map, March 2009 – November 2010. 
at the offices of the Colombo Medical Faculty Ethics Review committee, Sri Lanka and for each 
of the subsequent 15 committees with which I had contact, either observed their activities 
through the FERCAP Survey, met members at trainings or solicited interviews through contacts. 
The field based research consisted of six months in Sri Lanka (March – July 2009, February – 
March and May 2010) resulting in contact with four committees; a month in Thailand (March – 
April 2010) largely interview and workshop based, contact with one committee; 3 weeks in the 
Philippines (April 2010) contact with three committees; 3 weeks in Taiwan (May – June 2010) 
contact with four committees; and just over a month in China (June 2010 and November 2010) 
contact with three committees (Figure 7). In arranging the time by country, the impression is one 
of disjointedness. While there was a great deal of unfamiliarity over the course of the ‘following’, 
my facility with the activities I was observing and participating increased. I met the same people 
over and again. Interactions with one key informant ran like this: March 2009 Colombo; 
November 2009 Chiang Mai; March 2010 Bangkok; April 2010 Manila; June 2010 Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, November 2010 Shanghai. We became more familiar with one 
another, and as I trained, I saw trainings, surveys and lectures repeated. A core group of four or 
five members of FERCAP showed up regularly at events, trainings and meetings but I knew 
people as they knew one another — through surveys, trainings, conferences. At certain points, 
this forced me to raise a question much like that which Candea asks for his Corsican village: ‘how 
is one to ground one’s knowledge in intimacy, when people’s intimacies only stretch so far?’ (2010: 
22).
As a participant observer, I was a trainee, a Surveyor, an interviewer. It was requested that, as an 
observer of the workings of the network, I provide a form of feedback. I produced a commentary 
on some of the metaphors the group used to describe themselves (Douglas-Jones 2011). Thus, in a 
study of systems oriented towards improvement, and while immersed in the participant 
observation role of surveying and critically assessing ethics review committees, one of the 
difficulties, perhaps, was that of being an ethnographer, not an auditor. Understanding how the 
critical angle was prized open and how critique was formulated revealed a great deal more about 
the relationships between surveyors and surveyed than simply coming to a detailed understanding 
of the process of critique. As with anthropologists who work with development, there was a 
double-think required to get around the promise of the ‘good’ contained within promise of the 
capacity building sessions in which I participated. Improving the system in the hope of providing 
‘better human subject protection’ is difficult to disagree with, but it was not disagreement that 
would — in the end — allow an externality to the rhetoric. While the role of auditor or surveyor 
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wonderfully naturalised extensive note-taking, as Strathern pithily put it, ‘ethnography does not 
measure accomplishments in the hopes of improving the system’ (2003a: 309). 
While the scrutiny of audit provided a foil for ethnographic attention (as long as I could divine 
the difference), my data collection seemed to resemble the increasing multi-sitedness of clinical 
trials. Similarly, collaboration as a problematic was written into this research from the outset. Cast 
as a research topic, methodology, and the form of the ISBC project’s operations, it coloured both 
practice and analysis, a concept in vogue both in the anthropological academy (Marcus 2008, 
Lassiter 2005, 2008, Reddy 2008, Holmes and Marcus 2008, Lowe 2007, Konrad 2012) and 
within the bioscientific world (Glasner 1996, Hackett 2005, Royal Society 2011, Wagner 2001, 
2002a, 2002b, Parker et al. 2010, Halliday 2010, Hackett 2005). The way in which the project was 
set up might lead one to a conclusion that the whole picture gathered by nine anthropologists 
would (necessarily) be greater, clearer, more accurate, than the picture gathered by one alone, were 
she to set out on the same task. As the collaborators in the Matsutake Worlds Research Group 
(MWRG hereafter) confirm, collaboration in multi-sited research seems simple, to the point of 
obviousness:
To the extent that the sites are different from each other, expertise and commitment are 
necessary to study each site, and this is most easily accomplished with more than one 
researcher on board. Multiple researchers can carry the burden of multiple languages, area 
studies and histories in the study (MWRG 2009:198).
However, they note, the danger is that in the collection and deployment of these multiple 
expertises, the method might be ‘mistaken for a division of labour’ (MWRG 2009:198), with 
analyses compiled to generate, ‘add up to a coherent whole’ (MWRG 2009:198) as is the ambition 
in multi-sited clinical trials.
But neither the ISBC project nor my fieldwork were cases of methodological mimicry, with the 
imagined outcome being a larger sample size, more perspectives, resulting a greater view on the 
‘whole’ work of the organisation under study.14 It is not my contention that a single site would be 
‘insufficient for capturing the complexities of social systems,’ (MWRG 2009:197) nor is it a 
quantitative ‘adding on’ of sites. What I must also do is insert some doubt as to the ‘view’ 
achieved from this multi-sited approach. Indeed, it was the proliferation of these knowledge 
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It is not possible to read back from the outputs of the ISBC the successes and impasses of our 
conversations, since as the project’s PI once put it ‘[t]he kinds of communities formed by the circulation of 
knowledge in the course of producing an artifact, a product, can only be imperfectly gleaned from the 
product itself’ (Strathern 2004:21, see however Law 2002).
practices of research, and their assumptions, which interested me. The problem was one of 
gaining critical purchase on such ideas. 
So how is one to study such an object? Would it not be simpler were I to say that in the addition 
of sites, I had gained many more perspectives upon the (single) phenomenon, that my regard 
could be classed not as local, not as national but as regional? This is a hierarchy, with associated 
scales. The complaint an examining anthropologist might have of a regional claim — that it 
would be ‘too general’, also fails the point: it is no more general at this fictional place called the 
‘regional’ than it would be in a single ethics committee room in Sri Lanka. I could fill a thesis 
with each, and progress no further than the assumption that the ‘global’ is necessarily more 
complex than the local. That in invoking complexity, in relying on the scaling effect of the global 
in the minds of the western anthropologist, the complexity of the global (imagined as large) must 
necessarily be greater than the local (imagined as small). Actor Network Theory has prepared the 
way, and, more recently, provided ancestors with whom one can battle Durkheimian legacies in 
revisionist re-matches. Tarde, recently revived ancestor remarks that 
[i]t is always the same mistake that is put forward: to believe that in order to see the regular, 
orderly, logical pattern of social facts, you have to extract yourself from their details, 
basically irregular, and to go upward until you embrace vast landscapes panoramically 
(1999: 114, cited in Latour 2002:124).
Wanting to avoid the idea that FERCAP was indeed an object of a certain (regional) size that 
articulated differently in the various countries in which it operated (for that would be to 
reproduce a global/local binomial) I wanted my activities to question the concept of context as a 
tool used by FERCAP and through this, make ethnographic the question of how FERCAP 
organised ‘object’ and ‘context’. One effect of the scaling and organisation of description in 
writing is to locate ‘the field’ in geographic coordinates, comments Leach, arguing that: ‘a 
descriptive and explanatory strategy that outlines how meaning systems are built upon particular 
social-organizational bases, which themselves rely upon certain material conditions, makes obvious 
sense to us’ (2006: 149).
While this research is, in the classic sense, an arrangement of a number of sites, it is so because 
the work of FERCAP is itself multi-sited. I do not describe the research done as the ‘gathering of 
different perspectives’ — a gathering neither conceived of as representative nor as complete. 
Indeed, it is as a result of the way in which the trope of ‘perspective’ is used by research ethics 
committees that I take the approach I do. How persuaded am I by FERCAP’s models, how can I 
read their frames (Marcus 1986, Strathern 1987)? I could have portrayed FERCAP as abstract, a 
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structure emerging from relationships that I as an anthropologist would be able to observe first 
hand. But it could equally serve as the explanation for the meetings of those people: it describes, 
stands for, their activities and meetings. Indeed, FERCAP’s representation of itself is much like 
what a 20th century British Social Anthropologist would have produced. The privileging of 
‘concrete, observable relationship over the abstraction of structure is most evident in the legacy of 
kinship studies’ (Munro 2005: 225-226). I intend to show how the social life of the organisation is 
made to hold, how people become interested, the reasons they give for their continued interaction 
with one another. 
The form of questions I was able to ask developed and my sensitivity to recurring and important 
issues within the concerns of the network grew as time passed. I was, at each point, explicitly 
provided with a different country’s “perspective”, the multi-sited work connected through the 
organization, watching when cultural difference was inserted or asserted to signify disconnection. 
To return to the significance of this ‘objectification’ of comparison for my methodological 
approach, it becomes necessary to state again what might otherwise seem obvious: that the object 
of FERCAP exists only because of its multiple contexts, and in fact exists as a relationship between 
those contexts. As I explored above, the metaphor of the family does its work here, uniting and 
differentiating at once, with the trope of family forming not the object but the objectification of 
the relationship. To state it another way, FERCAP both creates and is the relationship between 
contexts, in addition to being an object that appears differently in different contexts. 
This formulation allows me ground for thinking through my own movements. My participant 
observation in the network amounted to ‘following’, participating through moving. In order to 
examine FERCAP — an object made up of relationships — I myself had to move, shadow 
relationships and make my own in so doing. Thus, by configuring here what it was that I did 
methodologically, I find myself laying foundations for what it is that FERCAP is, with its ontology 
enmeshed in the method used to ‘follow it’. What matters is a lively alignment between object and 
context, through which I came to understand a need to allow the making of context to form the 
context for my arguments, so to speak.
The strongest argument for this tracing is that things that happen in one place affect things that 
happen in another place. As Cook, Laidlaw and Mair say for their work on Buddhist practices:
there is no serious room to doubt what is happening in these different sites profoundly and 
intricately influences and affects the others, and that some similar processes are at work in 
different sites. But this does not mean there is one whole of which they are all parts (2009: 
50). 
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They relate, as an opening, a story used in Buddhist texts. Their objective in relaying it is also a 
methodological and conceptual one — to dissuade anthropologists from looking for complete 
wholes:
A king orders all the men in his kingdom who have been blind from birth to be brought 
together and led before him, each having been partially introduced to an elephant, by each 
being given just one part of that elephant’s body to handle. Those who had felt its head 
replied that the elephant is like a pot. Those who had held its ear said it resembled a 
winnowing basket. Those who had held only the trunk likened it to a plough and so on. 
Then, just like the Brahmins, the blind men began to quarrel. The parable is used within 
the Buddhist text to warn against trying to reach conclusions about the nature of reality on 
the basis of only the partial view of the unenlightened (Cook, Laidlaw and Mair 2009:47). 
Cook, Laidlaw and Mair recall that multi-sited research seemed to be an answer to the ‘partial 
perspective afforded by a single research site’ (2009:47) in the age of global systems. I would 
suggest that this formulation is itself the result of a particular way of regarding space, one which 
they seek to upset as their article progresses. Their research topic, an ethnographic description of 
the teaching and practices of self-cultivation and transformation in new forms of Buddhism across 
at least three states in Asia, would seem to be a perfect candidate a multi-sited approach. However, 
in the course of the chapter, they question the usefulness of systems thinking, question why it is 
that ‘accounting for local ethnographic phenomena must involve locating them within an 
encompassing trans-local ‘system’ located theoretically at a ‘higher’ level’ (2009:48). This is an 
assumption implicit in multi-sitedness they wish to step away from: that more perspectives on 
something will make a more complete whole; be more than the sum of its parts. Their position 
recalls that of Schneider (2011 [1963]) who, in his rejection of the making (and mending) of 
anthropological models, wrote that:
it is too late in the history of the social sciences to think we can go out among societies, and 
by keeping our eyes open, sort them into their natural classes. It is not possible to operate 
like those in the story of the blind men and the elephant and hope that if only we can put 
enough blind men on the elephant we will get a good factual description of the beast - the 
total elephant (2011 [1963]: 486) 
What brings me to compare 1963 and 2009 is not just mention of the elephant; it is the common 
critique of anthropological aspirations towards a ‘total system.’ The concerns resemble one 
another: the world religions/world-systems critiqued by Cook, Laidlaw and Mair in their essay on 
multi-sited Buddhist ethics, echoes Schneider’s challenge to the mysterious location of ‘the system‘ 
in the work of  descent and alliance theorists (Needham in particular). Both are concerned with 
the mapping and location of explanatory power, suspicious of systematicity. Schneider is critical of 
Needham’s (1962) ‘whole concrete entities [and] discoverable [...] perfect crystals’ (2011[1963]: 
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482) asking ‘at what level does the system exist?’(2011[1963]:481). He recommends attention to 
analytical terms. Cook, Laidlaw and Mair also leave us with the question: what if there is no 
elephant? No such higher level? (2009:48). The recommendation, in this case, may still be 
attention to analytical terms.
Vocabulary: a framing by description
In research ethics, as I have shown above, emphasis is placed on the need for ‘local’ review of 
‘global research.’ Such a statement appears self-explanatory. Global research ‘summons no further 
exemplification: it is a macrocosm, a complete image, and requires no theoretical 
underpinning’ (Strathern 1995b:169). In the same way, the local of ‘local review’ ‘points to 
specificities and thus to differences between types of itself — you cannot imagine something local 
alone: it summons a field of other ‘locals’ of which any one must be only a part’ (Strathern 1995b: 
167). At the same time, the push for global health, particularly the needs of the developing world, 
is seen to be large. As the Royal Society puts it, ‘global approaches’ are needed for ‘global 
problems’, ‘grand challenges […] which transcend national boundaries’ (2011:72, see also 
Highfield and Lawton 2010).
Anthropologists have been drawn into imagining the ‘relation’ between the global and the local, 
as they were to configuring analyses of the ‘individual’ and ‘society’. In her analysis of English 
kinship, Strathern (1992) argues that the individual person came to be seen as incomplete, 
needing integration into the whole through socialization and convention. However, she then 
demonstrates a counter, coexisting and equally totalizing view, that the person was already a 
biological and psychological whole. Otto and Bubandt summarise the position as one of
two partly incompatible holistic perspectives [which] could not be matched or exchanged, 
because they only partially overlapped: the individual as part of society and the individual 
as part of nature. Both perspectives were totalizing, but neither could fully encompass the 
other, thus positing a contradiction at the heart of modern English holistic perceptions of 
social relations (2010: 256). 
Strathern refuses to allow the phrase ‘global and local relations’ to lie flat, arguing that they were 
‘incommensurable from the outset’: [w]hatever relationship lies between the two parts, it divides 
as much as links them, renders them as much disjunct as connected (Strathern 1995b:165).
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It is evident that care must be taken with these terms. I pay close attention to the language used in 
describing the world of clinical research: looking at the effects of organising a world into the 
‘local’ and the ‘global’, a problem paralleling disciplinary discussions (Kearney 1995, Strathern 
1995b). ‘The danger in thinking that one can move one’s analysis from the larger scale (macro) to 
the smaller (micro) is just that of being caught in an antinomy like that between ‘society’ and 
‘individual,’ writes Munro (2005: 262). Instead, I ask what their use tells me about what is going 
on when people talk about ‘local’ ethics committees, or ‘global’ research. There is, at the same 
time, another question at hand, which is ‘how actors engage in a constant deployment of their 
own scales’ (Jensen 2007: 833). Latour agrees that ‘framing’ is ‘what actors constantly 
do’ (2005:186), but does not find mere recognition of it sufficient: for him, if this framing is an 
activity, contextualization is active, and should be examined. He takes issue with scales, asking:
does it not make perfect sense to say that Europe is bigger than France, which is bigger than 
Paris that is bigger than rue Danton and which is bigger than my flat? Or to say that the 
20th century provides the frame ‘in which’ the Second World War has ‘taken place’? (2005: 
185)
It may be commonsensical, he writes, but this ‘common sense’ is obscuring ‘actors at work in their 
deployment of scales.’ Observing this ‘work’ is impossible, he says, 
as long as the zoom effect is taken for granted’, [since] ‘to settle scale in advance would be 
sticking to one measure and one absolute frame of reference only when it is measuring that 
we are after; when it is traveling from one frame to the next that we want to achieve (2005: 
186). 
The scale that I avoid settling in advance is one which casts the local as small, the global as large. 
Work by Actor Network Theorists that has tried to take this on board has been accused of 
‘flatness’, a denial of existing power inequalities. I would argue rather that by denaturalising 
taken-for-granted scales of large and small, and their concomitant power attributes, it becomes 
possible to see how the ‘taken-for-granted’ comes to be. More than this, we can notice that the 
near and far are not defined ‘in purely spatial terms’ (Cook Laidlaw and Mair 2009:69, see also 
Mol and Law 1994). Jensen, in his work on the implementation of an Electronic Patient Records 
system in Denmark, notes how the macro and micro structure structured the imagination: the 
system was ‘formulated in political offices (macro) - in order to be disseminated (‘rolled out’) at 
hospital wards (micro). Ideas do not come from ‘somewhere very distant, large and powerful’ (Jensen 
2007: 846). Jensen reminds us that:
in a fractal approach it is [...] crucial to refrain from relying on a specific prioritized scale 
from which to evaluate all other actors, for the point is precisely to learn from those others 
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about the intellectual, practical and moral scales they work with in order to build social 
networks and spaces (2008:833).
As Callon remarks in his classic study of the scallops of St. Brieuc Bay, an author ‘cannot simply 
repeat the analysis suggested by the actors he is studying’ (Callon 1986: 197).
The challenge here is translation from familiarity. Anthropology’s own language, words which — 
though now out of vogue in contemporary writing — inform how FERCAP describes its world. 
Viveiros de Castro draws upon Herzfeld to argue that ‘the anthropologist and native are engaged 
in “directly comparable intellectual operations” (Herzfeld 2003:7) and such operations are above 
all else comparative’ (de Castro 2004:2). He suggests that ‘a good translation is one that allows the 
alien concepts to deform and subvert the translator’s conceptual toolbox so that the intention of 
the original language can be expressed within the new one’ (2004:23). Strathern (1988: 328-329) 
points directly at the difficulty as she tries to translate a Melanesian symmetry between the 
positions of men and women against a ‘Western aesthetic’ whose conjuring cannot be evaded. 
The language available to her, she demonstrates, will not permit what she means to be 
communicated to her reader:
If I say that men’s exchanges are oriented towards their wives’ domestic concerns, then the 
statement will be read as men appropriating those concerns and turning them to their own 
use. If I say that women’s domestic work is oriented towards their husband’s exchanges, 
then this will be read conversely, not as their appropriating men’s activities but as being 
subservient to them. I know of no narrative device that will overcome this skewing, because 
it inheres in the very form of the ideas in which we imagine men’s and women’s powers 
(1988:329)
Sometimes, researchers unwittingly play into anthropological hands, the emphasis on systems 
promoting paper names such as the ‘structure and function’ of ethics review committees (Kass et 
al. 2007, Savelescu 2002; Wenger et al. 2002). This evokes, of course, an earlier era of analysis that 
it might be tempting to return to for the sheer explanatory capacity and clean lines of systems that 
work. In finding these terms in bioethics, I find also the debates anthropology had in the 
twentieth century. I find the patterns of thoughts that provide those concepts with their 
foundation. Problems borrow framings.
Take for example the location of ‘value’ when it is ‘elaborated as a negotiation between the 
interests of communities, the protocols of science, the priorities of global health’ (Kelly and 
Geissler 2011:3). In the protection of the human subject, the interests of that individual are 
caught up against those of ‘society’, the pharmaceutical industry, even national agendas. But these 
categories betray a whole to which they are part: the familiar reification of ‘society’ (Munro 
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2005:474). Where international biomedical research is framed in such terms, ‘the vulnerable’ are a 
category of person that emerge, the language of ethics containing ‘women’ or those unable to give 
‘informed consent’ as subset of a broader ‘society.’ It is in these reifications that we come to see 
bioethics as set upon the ‘antinomy between society and the individual’ (Strathern 1988a:12), with 
‘specific interests’ (ibid). I ask in this thesis what those interests rely upon, how the categories 
order thought, and what the ethics promulgated by FERCAP does with them. 
The anthropological questions asked of this material, then, must engage the anthropological 
canon of work on structures, functions and systems by drawing on other languages of description. 
While it is largely comforting to know that anthropologists have been puzzling over related fields 
since the inception of the discipline it can also complicate analysis, knowing that the models with 
which ones interlocutors are working have close ‘relatives’ in the descriptions and carried out by 
earlier anthropologists. Wagner reminds us that no transformation is independent, nor are the 
anthropological modes of analysis that come with it: 
Historical anthropology mirrored the ideology of the late colonial and supraethnic empires 
of Britain, France, Central Europe and others […] Systemic anthropology reflected the 
rational urgency of wartime mobilization and the economic nation state (1981[1975]:107) 
His reflections prompt questions of what it is that today’s anthropology mirrors. Peter Pels has 
argued that anthropological attention should be paid to ethics for the way it is used as ‘a word to 
talk about things that anthropologists were used to calling culture and society’ (1996:18). In a 
similar vein of awareness, Molyneux and Geissler remark that:
debates underline that the concept of research ethics or bioethics, its historical emergence 
and transformations, and the workings of regulatory frameworks, review boards and 
concrete ethics procedures, ought not to be taken for granted; rather than being self-
evident, they constitute an important subject of ethnographic and historical research (2008: 
693).
The work I have undertaken fits Geissler and Molyneux’s call that ethnography be enrolled to 
question in an historical framing these self-evident (and self-justifying) developments. However, 
what if, in the entanglement Pels suggests, bioethics inherits certain of anthropology’s conceptual 
problems? 
I suggest that bioethics has taken on the antinomy between ‘society’ and the ‘individual’ that has 
shaped, and been shaped by, much of the last century’s social science. This ‘taking on’ lies in the 
form of images and assumptions, conceptualisations and framings of problems. For example, 
although social science’s ‘preoccupation’ with the ‘total relationship between the individual and 
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society […] belongs to a (modernist) phase already culturally superseded’ (Strathern 1988a:20) the 
dichotomy lives on in ethics. The language ethics promulgates also contains these assumptions, 
but ‘it would be naïve to imagine that along with the borrowing of constructs goes the borrowing 
of the understandings that produced them’ (Strathern 1995b:154). There is an important 
analytical distance to be claimed, since ‘such borrowings recontextualise the conceptual intent 
with which the constructs were once used’ (Strathern 1995b:154).
Equally, FERCAP’s engagement with comparison and difference-making was so familiar, that it 
might have gone unnoticed ethnographically (e.g.. Miyazaki and Riles 2005). What alerted me, 
however, was the way in which the moves made by FERCAP echoed so closely the moves that 
many an anthropologist might make. Within academic bioethics particularly, the role of pointing 
to differences, exceptions, uniqueness has tended to fall to anthropologists (Marshall 1992, Bosk 
2001, Turner 2009). If it is, then, taken as a trope that A is different in some way from B, what 
emerges is that FERCAP is already dependent on that relationship. Were I, for example, to build 
an argument that used my ethnographic observations from Thailand and the Philippines to argue 
that things were done differently in each place, I would be replicating how FERCAP understand what 
they do themselves: the expectation of difference, and a comparison is already incorporated into the 
practice. Thus, the first, and simplest step is to recognise that my interlocutors are already actively 
doing something interesting with comparison and differentiation. Perhaps more importantly, any 
place within the FERCAP network is already ‘in’ comparison, through a practice that incorporates 
the presence of difference. It is this which forms a ground for an analysis of the particularity of 
standardisation which has come to be a key thread in my material, with the repeated question 
‘what people are comparing things “for”’ (Jensen 2011:2). Holisms of anthropological invention, 
such as the global, local, world system, centre and periphery, society, cannot be uninvented. These 
concepts are often at work in our own field-sites, not just replicated in our analyses, and we would 
be remiss if we did not pay attention to how people make them do their work. By paying attention 
I mean not only close ethnographic observation of the way these concepts are drawn upon, 
employed in descriptions and arguments, but also taking as much care when writing, so that 
through observing the language we use, we can see what these concepts are up to, under our 
noses, perhaps sometimes too close for focus (Brennais 2006, Riles 2006). 
I have demonstrated the terminological challenges presented by the material, and some of the 
strategies I propose to address them, joining what Miyazaki calls a 
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long strand of anthropological attention to the parallel between anthropologists’ and their 
interlocutors’ ways of analyzing, critiquing, interpreting, knowing, modeling and theorizing 
(Miyazaki forthcoming, see e.g. Bateson 1958 [1936]; Holmes and Marcus 2008, Leach 
1954; Miyazaki 2004, Riles 2000, 2011, Strathern 1988a). 
‘The work we do with concepts transforms them, and sometimes to the point of 
displacement’ (Strathern 1995b:169, 2011c). This is Miyazaki’s stated intent with the concept of 
‘arbitrage’, as he examines its use by Japanese derivatives traders in a Tokyo securities company 
(forthcoming). He explores how the concept rests on an essential ambiguity, an ambiguity he 
exploits through the narratives in his chapters. Ethics is the term which comes under scrutiny in 
this thesis. I have shown its positive connotations (‘the ethical’); its hold on the ‘good’ is such that 
even critiques of it can seem to provoke its (equally connotation laden) obverse ‘unethical’. As for 
anthropologists working with human rights, it takes an examination of the consequences of the 
language (e.g. Englund 2006) to realise that the enquiring mind is confronted with a self justifying 
force. Thus, in order to analyse the role of ethics, and the role given to it by those with whom I 
worked, there is some work to be done in denaturalising it in order to bring the enterprise of 
ethics itself under critical examination. Henare et al. remark that Roy Wagner sees the ‘encounter 
between anthropologists’ own concepts and those of their informants as a productive one because 
of their divergences’ (2007:21 emphasis added). It will pay to remember, however, that it cannot be 
known in advance how much of the contexts concepts carry within themselves (Wagner 1986), 
how much of the ‘understandings that produced them’ (Strathern 1995b:154) will be borrowed 
along with the words themselves. This a challenge for an anthropology of the contemporary 
(Rabinow et al. 2008).
Overview of Chapters
In preparing the text, I have chosen events, spaces and moments from the fieldwork that were 
common to each of the countries where I followed FERCAP. This is not to deny the important 
differences between the sites but, rather, to leave them aside from the structure of my analysis, in 
order that they emerge in the narratives of the network itself. Where this occurs (Chapter 6), it is 
hoped that the reader will have enough exposure to the workings and priorities of the network to 
understand how my analytic treatment of difference differs from the enrollment of difference 
within FERCAP.
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Contributing to the practice based study of knowledge-in-the-making (Camic et al. 2011), the first 
two chapters follow ethnographic objects: the survey and the rooms of ethics review committees. 
Chapter Two takes the Survey, FERCAP’s implementation of the SIDCER Recognition Program, 
as its ethnographic core. While FERCAP employs only Cristina full time, the Survey is a key 
activity of the FERCAP network and she draws upon volunteers from reviewed and surveyed 
committees to become Surveyors. I combine close observation of the Surveying and auditing 
process with the descriptions and reflections of surveyors. The discussion explores the ways in 
which the social relationships that constitute the survey teams and surveyees are carefully 
managed using supporting literature on hospitality. 
Chapter Three, The Rooms of Ethics focuses more closely on the space of ethics. The achievement 
of ‘a room’ is a physical requirement for an ethics committee. I pay conceptual attention not only 
to its symbolic status but also its role in quite literally making the space for ethics. Talked of as a 
means of expanding the importance of ethics, ensuring recognition of ethics, and being a form of 
standardising — laboratizing even — ethical review processes, the room is at once a template and 
a unique space in an institution or hospital that comes under assessment during a Survey. An 
analysis of what happens in the room, particularly decision making, the problems of conflicts of 
interest and the art of minute taking lead to a discussion of how we can better understand the 
social space an ethics committee creates. 
Chapter Four develops certain of the tensions in Chapters Two and Three by embarking on an 
active comparison of the Ethics Committee with a Jury. Here I focus on a comparison made by 
those in the field and then develop the comparison ‘so as to translate’ (de Castro 2004:3) the 
concerns the field comparison originally raised. In what ways is an ethics committee like a jury? 
How can the answers tell us more about how ethics committees operate in the countries where 
FERCAP works? In the close of this chapter I also address the question of law and ethics, and the 
poles of regulation and self-governance that I develop in Chapters Seven begin to emerge in the 
views of my interviewees.
Chapters Five develops material presented in Chapters Two and Three by focusing closely on the 
problem of perspectives in the committee. Drawing on descriptions of ideal ethics committees 
both from interviews and from published material, I analyse how knowledges adhere to both 
professions and persons. Chapter Six extends the work of ‘perspective’ from the committee to the 
organisation, exploring explore how images of plurality, perspective, difference and scale are scaled 
in turn by the languages of comparison at work in the network. Rather than embarking on a 
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comparison of the countries where FERCAP works, I aim to illustrate FERCAP’s own work of 
comparison, and provide a view of the politics of the organisation’s achievements. The analysis of 
near and far, large and small, takes inspiration from Mol and Law’s work on anaemia (1994), 
Riles’ work on UK/Fijian colonial legal documents (1995) and Jensen’s discussion of the macro 
and micro in Danish healthcare systems (2007). 
Chapter Seven takes off from Chapter Four, shifting from ethics committees to the employment 
of ‘ethics’ by those involved with committees. I return to the phrase with which this thesis began, 
‘If you don’t do you duty, you are not a good professional’ by examining both ‘duty’ and 
‘professional’. I look at the creation of a profession of ethics, and the professionalising work that 
capacity building workshops make possible. What are persons, that they are to be governed? What 
does an approach of governance through ethics reveal about the assumptions that are made about 
them? Overall, the turn is towards the narratives that invoke the personal characteristics of those 
who engage with ethical review, an ethics that is located ‘within.’ Training involves learning 
particular ways of seeing, of reading for ethical issues and of self examination for problems of 
conflict of interest. As a way of drawing together the themes of this final chapter with those of the 
preceding chapters, I turn to a range of ethics committee members’ dreams of the future of ethics. 
In my conclusions, I situate the ethics committee as a contemporary witness to good science 
alongside those written about by historians of science. The ethics committee not only contains a 
bundle of models and imaginings, but is itself a model. The ways in which people involved with 
FERCAP handle the assumptions of this model is the overarching topic of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: The Survey 
It is late on a sultry April afternoon, and I have joined a group gathered in the ground floor 
meeting room of the medical faculty at a University in Manila. The windows are tightly closed 
against the roar of traffic outside, and the air conditioner in the corner is hard at work. Dr Sam, 
our Lead Surveyor, is standing at the front of the room fiddling with the powerpoint, about to 
begin his final presentation. He will sum up the findings of the Survey we have been conducting 
over the past three days. We, his audience, are the members of the survey team, the trainees, local 
surveyor and international surveyors, and members of the ethics committee that has been under 
review. His words will be directed at this last group, who are shuffling and whispering amongst 
themselves. There is a certain amount of suspense: this final meeting, where the findings of the 
survey team are presented, is a delicate social occasion. The standardised sentence — seen on the 
closing powerpoint of every survey — seems both recognition and reminder of this: ‘The Reason 
for the Survey: To assist [insert IRB] in reviewing their practices and appraise their performance 
against the SIDCER criteria for recognition.’ Sam begins by listing those who have taken part, the 
trainees in three groups, each under the guidance of the local, foreign and lead Surveyor. The first 
fifteen slides list the selected research protocols and meeting minutes that were looked at, the SAE 
reports considered, and the members of the IRB who were interviewed. 
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Figure 8: Slide Sixteen of Dr Sam’s closing presentation.
Slide sixteen falls between those which document the method of the survey, and its findings 
(Figure 8). It is a blurry image of a green camouflage-painted helicopter, flying low over the sea. A 
a rope ladder dangles from its open door. There is a person clutching the ladder, and to its right, a 
shark is leaping out of the water, its jaws aimed at the suspended figure. Dr Sam has typed in 
labels for the scene: the helicopter, in a large white font, is FERCAP. In red, the person hanging 
onto the ladder is the Surveyor, and the shark the ERC/IRB. Will he, the dangling surveyor, the 
representative of FERCAP, be eaten by the shark of the IRB? Having raised a laugh in the room 
and dispersed some of the tension, Dr Sam continues with his presentation of the 
recommendations.
What to make of this moment, and Sam’s visual joke? Why is Dr Sam, the apparent authority, 
portraying himself as in danger? Standing alone at the front of the room delivering the findings of 
the Survey, he is worried about how the committee he addresses will respond. As this chapter 
hopes to demonstrate, doing criticism well is difficult, even if one is an invited guest. Humour can 
help. The placement of his slide, between the technicalities and the results reveals that although 
during the Survey, it is the IRB that has been under scrutiny, at this point, the surveyor becomes 
vulnerable to the reaction of the committee. The standardised sentence with which Sam opens 
emphasises the assistance the Survey intends to offer. A three day review of an ethics committee’s 
activities according to five standards set down by SIDCER in 2005, the Survey is a key FERCAP 
activity. The Lead Surveyor is always “foreign”, a stranger in the country of the IRB. S/he is 
assisted by a second “International” surveyor, and a “Local” surveyor. Each of these will lead a 
team in the detailed assessment of the workings of the committee. The international surveyors 
will be treated as welcome guests, their long hours eased by the hospitality of the committee under 
survey: tables are laden with water bottles, flowers, fresh fruit and other snacks. A formal meal will 
often take place on the first or second night, and then, the following day, the work of dissecting 
the committee (on the guest’s terms) begins. Time is found or made for Surveyors to see the cities 
they are visiting, whether it be the Olympic site in Beijing, the walled city of Santiago in Manila or 
the markets of Guangzhou. After the three days of Survey and closing meeting, the committee will 
be left with recommendations to complete. If they comply with the modifications in the agreed 
timeframe, the committee will be ‘recognised’ with a glass trophy and certificate (Figures 9 and 10) 
at the annual conference. 
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I suggest that the ambivalence captured by Dr Sam’s summary meeting presentation — the 
precarious power of the guest, and the potentially volatile vulnerability of the host — stand to be 
illuminated by a recent resurgence of academic interest in hospitality (Derrida 1997, Herzfeld 
1987, Lashley and Morrison 2000, Selwyn 2000, Shyrock 2004, Rosello 2001, Lashley, Lynch and 
Morrison 2007, Cole 2007, Candea and da Col 2012). A concept that involves ‘reciprocity, a 
tension between spontaneity and calculation, generosity and parasitism, friendship and enmity, 
improvisation and rule’ (Candea and da Col 2012:S1), hospitality serves in the first instance to 
help us understand Sam’s experience. Being a guest, particularly a guest invited to make criticisms 
— no matter how constructive they may be — is a difficult task. Surveyors are in a precarious 
position. The success of recommendations, indeed, of the survey program itself, depends on the 
interaction between the visiting ‘Foreign’ surveyors and the ‘Local’ committee members. The 
latter must accord the former the right — and authority — to make recommendations and 
suggest corrections. This is a permission granted largely because is is repeatedly said to be done 
with the intention to improve, to help. But the final meeting, talked of as an opportunity for 
discussion and feedback, also has the potential to develop disputes if the ‘recommendations’ are 
not taken well; that is, if they are taken as criticism. As Selwyn notes, in the celebration of and 
legitimation of hierarchical structures, hospitality seeks to make ‘friends and familiars out of 
strangers and enemies,’ and yet this work also ‘serves to draw hospitality’s ‘twin sister’ hostility out 
of the shadows’ (2000:26).
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Figures 9 and 10: The trophy and certificate awarded to committees upon recognition. These 
are presented at the Annual Conference. 
Dr Sam’s slide reinforces the uneasy potential in guesthood. Survey guests must be objective 
outsiders, maintaining their authority to speak and suggest, while softening criticism into 
‘recommendations’, emphasising that they ‘come as friends’ and ‘learn’ from the committee they 
have studied. They are friends one does not necessarily want to see again too soon, however. 
Again, we are aided by the scope of analysis hospitality offers, as it ‘encompasses distant agents; it 
embeds social transactions in materiality and raises complex questions relating to economy and 
time’ (Candea and da Col 2012: S2). We will see international travel, observe the attention to 
material detail as Surveyors sift through paperwork, puzzle over the potential of reward, and learn 
about time: the ambiguities of follow up visits, and the reversals involved in delayed return. 
Having given the Survey’s recommendations, Dr Sam’s final slide is a black and white photograph 
of American soldiers and troops landing from boats, wading through the shallows, sunglasses on, 
caps jauntily tilted. In the background, a ship, with the word ‘FERCAP’ superimposed over its 
hull. A man with binoculars around his neck has been given a yellow speech bubble: ‘General, 
should we return for follow-up visit?’ (Figure 11). A follow up visit is only required when 
committees are significantly deficient. As there are always points to improve, a follow up action 
plan is always necessary, and evidence of corrections to documents, equipment or work spaces are 
sent via email to the surveyors. But a return visit denotes more serious shortcomings. As Dr Sam 
told me shortly after his presentation, in his experiences of surveys in Taiwan, the immediacy of 
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Figure 11: Follow up visit slide from Survey in Manila
the result is hoped to bring an equally immediate recognition of success, and any kind of 
recommendations — the ‘follow-up action plan‘ — can bring the sense of inadequacy and failure. 
But with principles of continuous quality improvement, ‘There is no such thing as a perfect ethics 
committee,’ state the coordinators. 
Hospitality, then, affords me a language in which to speak about the survey as friendly support 
and quality assurance evaluation simultaneously, tracing the ambiguous line of friend and critic 
that Surveyors must walk. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the role of “foreign” and 
“local” surveyors, the guests, the intermediaries and the committee, the hosts. The local surveyor’s 
position is ambiguous, a discomfort described by interviewees, highlighting the tensions between 
the language of friendship and the dangers of critique. The second part of the chapter explores 
what constitutes the SIDCER Recognition program, the standards upon which the Survey is 
based, the observations that take place. What I demonstrate is the mutual investment of the 
surveyors and surveyees in the recognition program, while relying on means of creating the social 
separation and ‘objectivity’ crucial to the program’s success. 
In the third and final section I turn to the appeal the Survey ‘recognition’ program has to 
committees across the region. Why has the program been so successful? Why do committees 
submit themselves to a voluntary audit? When FERCAP presents the program of ‘recognition’ to 
committees, it begins by describing the international research arena which we saw foregrounded 
during Chapter One. Surveyors voice a key concern:  
The same trial being done in Asia, we see it in being done in Africa, in the West. All, no 
matter where, the concern is about quality of research. If we are not harmonised, chances 
are they will not accept the results coming from your country. The objective is to give public 
recognition to ECs who comply with intentional and national regulations, drive them to 
the pursuit of excellence and its rewards.
As ethics review committees are trained with a view to their role within this project, as noted 
above, the image of a ‘whole system’ provides a context for their operations. That context then 
becomes the appeal: in becoming hosts to research, they may also gain access to clinical trials, 
funds, publications. In this shift a scalar slipperiness (Herzfeld 2012:S211) is revealed: hosting 
surveyors is potentially not far from hosting biomedical clinical trials. In these movements analysts 
of hospitality are at home (Candea 2012, Shyrock 2012: S28). Cristina outlines below some 
possible benefits of the recognition program to a committee in southern China who wanted to 
know more about the Survey: 
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It can have impact on an entire research team. You can put the name on your website: I 
receive queries from sponsors who ask if we want to do research in Thailand; sponsors like 
assurance that the Ethics Committee is doing their job. [They] ask us if we’ve visited this 
Ethics Committee and if we have recognised them. Thats how we do our work. Sponsors 
would like to have some assurance that the EC is GCP compliant. If its not, it becomes 
GCP deviation, a violation, therefore they want to make sure that’s adequately addressed. 
So the recognition program becomes important to sponsors as well. So we call it SIDCER 
recognition program. We’re part of this global network. A global initiative called SIDCER, 
which is a project of WHO TDR — trying to do this in different parts of the world, though 
we’re most popular in the Asia Pacific region.
Attention to the survey as a means of participation allows us to ask what it means to become, as 
the literature puts it, a ‘host country.’15 ‘Compliance’ is an essential factor for sponsors, and we 
can also read it as a measure that a site is hospitable to research: research conducted here can be 
submitted to regulatory authorities, published and relied upon. Ensuring GCP compliance, to 
measure oneself against standards and processes, ensures participation. To become hospitable in 
this sense, then, is to do so on someone else’s terms. The point has been made forcefully in 
discussions of bioethics (Macklin 2004, Farmer 2005). As Candea and da Col write, ‘[a]cts of 
hospitality turn people themselves into things, usable, exploitable assets, indexes of other 
intentionalities’ (2012: S10). This is the potentiality of clinical trials. 
Movement
Is the Survey an audit? While its audit traits are immediately recognisable with their emphases on 
documentation, measurement and the need for renewal, the approach taken by FERCAP is 
distinctive. Surveyors are welcomed as guests, and the language is not one of pass or fail but, in 
the phrases used by FERCAP surveyors, ‘our approach is to help’, ‘it’s developmental’; ‘the 
intention is to make it easy to comply’, ‘our objective is not to help us but to help you’.
This section takes the idea of ‘help’ and reads it against the relationships created through surveys. 
It details the movement of people across the region as they train and participate in FERCAP’s 
“Surveys,” as committees volunteer to submit themselves to peer scrutiny. It draws on 
observations made during surveys and pre-surveys around the region in my role as a ‘trainee’ 
surveyor. The whole of the first day is usually put aside for an ‘International Course’ on Surveying 
Ethics Review Committees. In order to take part in the Survey as trainees, and thus earn the right 
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15 This is the terminology  used by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, for example (NCOB 2002: 27) but the document 
places emphasis on enhancing the ability of developing countries to conduct research that is relevant to their needs.
to become Surveyors at a later date, trainees must attend the whole of the first day, and each 
subsequent day. I have a collection of certificates of attendance, printed in colour on shiny paper, 
adorned with the logos of FERCAP, WHO-TDR, the institution, bordered with patterns. Surveys 
proceed by taking the trainees, assigning them to surveyors to create groups and delegating tasks 
to them. Each group will visit the EC’s office, and the entire survey group — including local 
surveyors, and trainees — will observe the committee meeting. Meetings take place around a 
table, with the chairperson sitting at the head. Chairs arranged around the outside of the room 
then provide a second horseshoe of observers, looking (quite literally) over the shoulders of the 
ethics committee members as they discuss. During research, I kept some, though by no means all, 
of the hours that the surveyors did, arriving on site by eight, not leaving until nine, ten, 
sometimes twelve hours later. On days we finished early, there would be homework: the review of 
a section of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). I would sit on hotel beds going through 
procedural points, one by one. Typical notes from those evenings read as alien poetry, it is 
difficult to recall accurately the state of mind that produced them: 
Chapter Eight, Page 93: ‘inconsistency between 8.1 ‘special meeting’ and 8.3 ‘emergency 
meeting’ - or rather, is ‘emergency meeting’ a ‘special meeting?; Page 94,  8.3.3.2.2: Possible 
activities listed are inconsistent with description of Scope. Page 97. Suggest logbook for 
phone calls. 
Back in the institutions, I observed the observers, actively learning techniques of the Survey. A 
photograph taken by a Surveyor during a Survey in the Philippines captures it well (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: A photograph taken by a Surveyor of the author (C) observing a 
Surveyor (R) interviewing a committee member (L). 
Belle, the international surveyor of my team is on the right. The secretary of the committee under 
survey is on the left. Belle is interviewing her about her role. They face each other. The back of my 
head falls between them, as I sit in the dialogue, observing the interview. Obscured by my head, a 
notebook with two columns open is open on my lap. The left contains notes for the survey, the 
right, field-notes: notes on my notes.
The Survey, while being a learning experience between friends (an event of hospitality between 
colleagues) is also a badge of quality as suggested above. It indicates hospitality to outsiders, by 
their own measurements. Bill, a surveyor from South Korea, thought government interest in 
clinical trials had been a significant factor in the success of the recognition program. 
It started in Thailand, then it moved to Taiwan because the government wanted to get 
involved in clinical trials, Korea too. And now China. It’s in their interest, it’s kind of a 
business, the institutions need to advertise, to put up some accreditation, to show. 
This ‘show’ is written in to the SIDCER initiative, the standards of which are implemented 
during the Survey: 
SIDCER provides the international community with not only a means to build in-country 
human subjects protection programs, but also a way to measure and provide accountability 
regarding the quality and effectiveness of ethical review worldwide (Karbwang Laothavorn 
2011:11).
Since outsiders’ measurements value greatly the principle of objectivity, the Survey must also 
achieve a representation of its own objectivity. Standards for the Survey were set early in the 
development of the scheme at a meeting in Olympia, Washington by the SIDCER working group 
which included Directors of Quality Assurance, Internal Auditors, Quality Assurance Analysts, 
Directors of Regulatory Affairs. 
The Survey is the measure. It has the potential to make hosts of these countries. Bill reflected that 
as a result of state-level interest and increase in international or multi-sited trials being run, 
‘people who really care about human subject protection have taken the opportunity to do work - 
for example FERCAP. It’s a very complicated landscape.’ The survey relies on the voluntary labour 
and expertise of members of its network, who have received training in surveying. Cristina, the 
FERCAP coordinator explained conducting training alongside the survey as ‘killing two birds with 
the same stone’, an innovation to ‘keep the ball rolling.’ ‘Whenever we do a survey we train a new 
group of surveyors, and later on we invite you to join us in some of our trips abroad.’ At the 
dinner of our survey together, Bill told me that his IRB had first been surveyed three years ago.
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We had our renewal two weeks ago. So we’re part of the FERCAP family. I do surveys, I’ve 
done one in Taiwan, some in Korea and now here. I want to help. That’s the spirit of 
FERCAP. There’s give and take. My EC learned a lot from the Surveyors who came.
Bill admitted that finding the time was very difficult, there was a ‘lot to balance’ and he had 
responsibilities both at home and work, but he said he would do one a year. FERCAP are very 
aware that, and I quote from a powerpoint, ‘confidence and reliance in the survey process 
depends on the competence of those conducting the survey.’ An excellent SIDCER Surveyor will 
have:
excellent human interaction skills, they will be respecting, appreciative and positive. They 
will have patience and persistence (be stubborn nicely). Active listening. Good memory 
(along with note taking) System thinking - no assumption, no prompt judgement. Ability to 
work hard, and long hours. A good team player. The team’s ground rules - mutual respect, 
be objective and observational, share openly and willingly, make it a learning experience, 
make decision based on evidence and consensus (FERCAP training powerpoint 2009).
International Surveyor
‘The rule is that when we survey one country there has to be a foreign surveyor...It depends on 
their availability, most are medical doctors and find it difficult to join us abroad.’ Cristina told me 
that FERCAP’s surveyors are volunteers who have been through two trainings in their own 
country. They are then invited to be ‘local’ surveyors or ‘foreign’ surveyors. Having a ‘foreign’ 
surveyor was described as an external quality assurance system: ‘It’s not you saying you are good.’ 
At the opening to a survey in Manila, Cristina explained it to trainees in this way:
We are from [University], so we say, “We are the best”. Do other people think you are the 
best? It has to be validated. So people from outside [University] should audit and check the 
[University] IRB. So that’s the concept and in FERCAP we try and bring in foreign 
surveyors. We are developing an external quality assurance system, a backup system. We 
have the rule that the lead surveyor should not come from the same country that is being 
surveyed. Before we did not even have a local surveyor but now we’ve accommodated that 
kind of perspective since we have trained a lot already.
Cristina’s phrasing shows us the tension emerging between the auditors’ proximity to or distance 
from the committee under scrutiny. The implicit attribute of the foreign surveyor here is that they 
are external to the organisation being studied, a (more distant) externality that ‘checks’; a view, 
one that rests on an explicit desire for objectivity. In their introduction to the volume on 
hospitality Candea and da Col observe that the Chinese language already has terms for precisely 
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this position: Keguan, ‘the view from the guest’ is used to express the concept of ‘objective’ or to 
view things as outsiders would (2012:S6). Sally, a surveyor from Taiwan, considered the Survey an 
opportunity for committee members to ‘get outside of themselves’. ‘Maybe people in the IRB are 
too busy to do a self-audit’, she speculated: 
Also, because they are there, they cannot see the things that are not correct. They are just in 
their IRB, they cannot find out what happens, so FERCAP survey maybe helps to find the 
incorrection [sic]. 
Simmel’s century old discussion of the stranger (1964 [1908]) remains apposite. Candea and da 
Col note that for Simmel, a visitor organises within themselves the ‘unity of nearness and 
remoteness involved in every human relation’ (Simmel 1964: 201) (Candea and da Col 2012:S6). 
The ‘organic disconnection’ that Simmel uses to describe the social distance is tied to the distance 
considered a prerequisite to ‘objectivity’. While I take this linkage up in Chapter 3, for now, I just note 
that the literal distance that the surveyor has traveled (from her/his country) is tied to the 
figurative distance, the ‘objectivity’ so desired for the survey.
The danger of distance, however, is that it reduces the knowledge of the ‘local’, of the ‘complexity 
of cultural variations, national laws, local medical and research practices and local knowledge’ that 
the fora were set up to accommodate, and SIDCER to unite. Sally considered it an advantage that 
international surveyors, were ‘people from outside the IRB’, who ‘come with their brand new 
eyes, have different ideas from different countries and compare to the process in their IRB, and 
find something.’ The other side of that distance, however, was ignorance, an ignorance that could 
not be seen to overwhelm the advantage lent by their outsider status. Authoritative distance, with 
the retention of a certain kind of knowledge, was key. Nonetheless, throughout the conversation, 
Sally stressed that the spirit of the survey had to be one of open-mindedness: ‘We want people to 
feel openminded to do these things not for exam or some kind of very serious audit, that is not 
the meaning of this site visit.’ Dr Sam, whose presentation opened this chapter, framed what Sally 
had called ‘open–mindedness’ in the language of culture. He thought arguments made everyone 
‘grow’, and went on to develop a metaphor about FERCAP’s role in Asia: 
FERCAP lives in a big house, but sometimes they don’t know the other culture is in the 
other house. Even though the house is big and has everything, [when you are] in [an]other 
culture you need to change and change your [Survey] regulations, depending on peoples 
culture. Can’t just say everything you’re right and other is wrong, it’s not the international 
survey. International survey you say right is right, but FERCAP survey has his regulations. It 
can be revised, depending on your culture. Sometimes, [members of the committee being 
surveyed] argue with the Surveyors opinion, ‘cos the Surveyor is sometimes too considerate 
about SIDCER Regulations. It’s good ‘cos all will grow up. FERCAP will become Asia’s 
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International EC association, cover all of the culture, not just depend on WHO 
regulations. Sometimes, FERCAP just believes the living room is best and everyone must be 
the same, but everyone has [their] own house and can go to the living room. The living 
room is the common regulation, but it is not the only regulation.
Choosing the house as his metaphor, Sam is giving rooms to the countries, and creating the living 
room as a common space, a metaphoric arena of commonality. It can also be used as a space of 
compromise. While a person-less objectivity was sought, both Sam’s suggestion that the Survey’s 
standards can be revised and Sally’s open-mindedness stressed compromise. Though the standards 
provided an external measure against which the committee was assessed, it became evident to me 
that the approach FERCAP took with its emphasis on friendship and mutual support meant that 
few could speak for the standards. ‘Is there any answer for this issue,’ asked Sally, ‘is there a right 
or wrong?’ She offered quorum — the number of people required to be present for a meeting — 
as an example:
If they answer quorum is four, and the Survey say it’s five, then the IRB is correct, because 
for them it is four. That kind of thing has a very clear answer. But if the issue is conflict 
over an idea or culture, for FERCAP it is our opinion, and we just take it out to discuss. It 
depends then on the IRB. 
Here both Sally and Sam are suggesting that the standards are all very well but ‘culture’ or the 
‘local’ matters. This also contained the potential for excessive externality — where objectivity falls 
into ignorance and thus to a loss of authority — a danger carefully noted by Surveyors. The lack 
of knowledge of context which gave objective strength could also be used as a weakness. As Sam 
put it,
I believe culture is the most important thing for ethical survey. You can’t say ‘In Taiwan I’m 
right’— and use Taiwan thinking and say it is right, if you’re in the Philippines. No, you 
look at what they believe is right. That’s what is so good about FERCAP, they use the local 
surveyor and if they say its right, by Philippine regulations, I believe I need to agree with the 
local surveyor.
But it is all too easy to argue that Surveyors be openminded. Doing open-mindedness is more 
difficult, and the responsibility for linking the objectivity of the foreign surveyor with the 
committee’s context falls to the Local Surveyor.
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Local Surveyor
In her opening of the Survey in Manila above, Cristina calls upon the ‘perspective’ of a ‘local’ 
surveyor; someone to act as an intermediary between the institution being surveyed and the 
foreign surveyors. Here, ‘local’ is national, since ‘local’ surveyors help provide an overview of the 
‘national context’. As Candea and da Col’s collection pointed to the term keguan, the view of the 
guest is countered by zhuguan: the subjective view, or the view as host (2012:S6). But it is a criteria 
of appointment set down by the SOPs of SIDCER that the person who serves as local surveyor 
‘has no attachment with the EC/IRB to be surveyed’ (SIDCER 2005). They are, in Sally’s words 
to 
serve as a resource person, meaning that the local surveyor must be familiar with the local 
language. The role of the local surveyor is one of great importance to the team, particularly 
for committees whose documentation is not submitted in English.
Chinese, Taiwanese, Thai and South Korean committees often used their own languages for 
documentation and while FERCAP regards it as a strength that they do not require committees to 
translate all of their records into English (a costly and time consuming exercise) the task falls to 
the local trainees and local surveyor to coordinate and translate the committee’s work so that it 
can be ‘seen’ by Surveyors. 
‘It’s really difficult being the local surveyor’, said Sally ‘you are stuck in the middle of the 
sandwich.’ She had taken the role of FERCAP’s local surveyor in Taiwan several times, and told 
me that she had felt a great deal of pressure. The work of translation not only requires a local 
surveyor to represent the country’s national regulations and ‘culture’, but also has the potential to 
embroil them in sometimes highly charged representations of the surveyors comments and the 
IRB’s responses. Surveyors from other countries, while “objective” also do not know “enough” 
about the local context, which some people, such as Sam, think should come first.
Sally had translated protocol documents and books of SOPs for the foreign surveyors, and 
performed a running translation for IRB members during the closing meeting. The members of 
the IRB, she told me ‘they are very proud of themselves, so they always question, challenge what 
you say.’ As I have suggested, FERCAP’s capacity to offer recommendation and critique to 
committees is both performative and negotiated. The feedback session at the conclusion of the 
survey is a time of vulnerability for the surveyors, as they make their comments. Some, as we saw, 
frame critical remarks with reminders of the friendship which is brought in to underpin a 
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supportive ethos, but Sally also recognised this as a pre-emptive mechanism. ‘We come as friends’ 
is stated at the opening of Surveys, she said ‘for their safety issue!’ ‘They make problems with your 
questions, say you are not an MD, what do you know? Especially if you do not have a PhD, they 
question more, because maybe they have a high SCI index.’ Her comments reveal not only the 
challenges of asserting authority but also how hierarchies are demonstrated. ‘The IRB gets 
defensive about your comments,’ Sally goes on:
they argue with you, and ask you to explain your reasoning. They want to do it their way, 
and if you suggest that this could help your IRB become better, they say no, I don’t think 
what you suggest is good.
Sally thought Taiwanese committees, composed of persons of senior standing in institutions, were 
intimidating, even if individually members are friendly. As she put it, ‘people in senior positions 
are asked to be on EC, and if they think you are criticizing them,’ she drew her breath in sharply, 
‘they don’t like it.’ Sally generalised her observation for me, saying senior persons were the same 
‘all across Asia: they all say they are open, but they are not.’ She recalled an occasion she had been 
translating a FERCAP surveyor’s feedback on SOPs to a Taiwanese chairperson and the 
chairperson became agitated. Speaking in Chinese, he had claimed that contrary to the 
recommendation of a foreign surveyor, the IRB’s SOPs were ‘perfect.’ It had been up to another 
trainee to translate back to the surveyors the view of the incensed chairperson who was coming 
close to dismissing the authority of the surveyors to make recommendations to his committee. As 
Selwyn argues, ‘the possibility of rebellion, betrayal, upset and sudden reversals of status, are by 
definition, always present,’ (2000:34) but in standard hospitality set-ups, it is the host whose 
moral authority must be accepted by the guest. Here it is the guest whose moral authority is being 
challenged by the host.
These challenges can pose difficulties for the local surveyors, particularly when they are called 
upon to translate for the lead foreign Surveyors. Walking with Edith, an IRB secretary towards the 
underground one evening in Taipei, we talked about recent surveys in the country. ‘Nobody 
wanted to do that survey,’ she said, mentioning a prestigious institution as we waited at a crossing. 
‘Why not?’ I asked her, curious. Shaking her head and waving her hands in front of her she said 
‘Just avoid! These people are grant decision makers, they are very powerful! So Dr Shang did it.’ I 
asked her why he, over anyone else, was able to do the survey. ‘Because he already has enemies, 
what is a few more?’ she told me. The exchange at the time highlighted for me the uncomfortable 
position that the “local” surveyor has in the survey system, but it also demonstrated the dynamics 
of ethical review as an inevitably embedded practice. Doctors practice at institutions, serve on 
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committees, make decisions. All serve on ethics committees in addition to another job. Just as 
ethics committee members worried about turning down the applications of influential colleagues, 
they worried about taking part in a survey of a grant awarding institution, in case their affiliation 
with a critical event (whatever its intentions to help) resulted in hurt feelings. ‘If there are 
problems, the chairperson of the surveyed committee will blame you for criticisms made. And 
people know each other,’ Edith said, glancing at me sideways as the lights changed to green. 
‘Taiwan is very small. If they don’t know them directly, if A doesn’t know B, they will know 
someone who knows B.’ This was why, she thought, the Taiwanese Department of Health gave 
very little notice for their own surveys: ‘So there is no time to influence anyone.’
For both Sally and Edith, a good survey depended upon the attitudes of both ‘sides‘ — the IRB 
being surveyed and the surveyors. The IRB had to be ‘really openminded and open to all 
comments’ and the surveyors had to ‘really understand the IRB and respect their speciality.’ Sally 
was critical of the attitude of those who thought they were already perfect, and saddened by it. She 
described such people as having ‘eyes on top of their heads’ (yǎnjīng cháng zài tóu shàng), indicating 
with her hands cupped on top of her own head. ‘So you see’, she lamented, bending forward at 
the waist so her ‘eyes’ pointed at me, ‘unless they bow, they cannot see.’ Together, the ‘local’ and 
‘international’ surveyors must find a way of making recommendations not seem like criticisms. 
 
Findings
I began this chapter with the Survey’s closing presentation of recommendations to the 
Committee. This is the point at which Surveyors remind the committee that they have not come 
‘to judge’. ‘We’re an approving survey’, they say, ‘we come as friends!’ The emphasis is revealing of 
existing concerns. One of the local trainee surveyors was filing with me near the end of the survey 
when the lead Surveyor reminded us that we were not ‘fault finding’. ‘Sometimes that is how it 
feels,’ he confessed, 
it is sometimes thought of that way. Even with good intentions, its hard to appreciate when 
you’re on the other end of it. You’re probably doing the best you can, and here comes a 
group of people trying to find out something wrong. 
‘Well,’ I said, ‘the committees do invite the survey.’ While acknowledging that the Survey was 
voluntary, he shook his head, gesturing at the lead surveyor who was hunched over his laptop at 
the head of the table:
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That’s why I don’t understand why it’s an approval or disapproval, if thats the purpose, to 
be supportive. Why not make recommendations and then return and see if there’s been an 
improvement? Helping, rather than [acting as a] supreme court?
The trainee points to the limits of helping when it is combined with the promise of recognition 
and the risk of non-recognition. Although improvement is always emphasised, no grade is offered 
on the committee’s work. ‘It’s not a competition about how is best’, said the lead Surveyor to an 
anxious committee in Manila. The attitudes of both Surveyors and Surveyees changed what the 
event was, she said:
It’s like if you’re a policeman, I’m not going to tell you my weaknesses. I’m going to try and 
cover everything up! We are not police! If it’s a surveyor, they can say, ‘I don’t know how to 
do this, what do I do?’ and FERCAP suggest. It’s a different feeling. Though you want to do 
better, the person who has come has come to evaluate you. You want to show your best, 
and sweep the bad stuff under the carpet. But with surveys its about quality improvement. 
Sometimes they don’t tell you, but because we’re like family already, I don’t feel so bad if 
you tell me my child is ugly! The surveyors come and say “your baby is ugly”, but there's a 
way to make the baby look nice. Because the surveyor has a plastic surgeon with them!
In this vivid description of transformation, the Surveyor is drawing on the ‘family’ metaphor 
explored above to encourage the revelation of ‘ugliness’ on the part of the hosts, and observation 
of it on the part of the guests. Relationships between Surveyors and Surveyees have often 
developed over several years, and the hospitality committees and surveyors show one another 
serves to ‘promote an already established relationship’ (Selwyn 2000:19). While sitting with 
Marisa, who had worked for some time with FERCAP and taken a role in establishing FERCAP 
surveys and trainings in China, I asked her about what she was missing in order to be taking part. 
We had been doing a survey for the previous three days, and she was comparing the time she was 
spending as part of the Survey to her daily occupation. ‘It’s such a different work environment’, 
she reflected, 
I can give my suggestions, I can be myself. For the first time, I feel free to laugh! In China, 
the work environment is very hierarchical. You have to hold political relations, even if you 
think something is right you can’t do it, because you’re not the one who decides.
Marisa’s comment is further confirmation that FERCAP differentiates itself from other models of 
audit, accreditation and recognition. ‘We ask them to take charge,’ explained Cristina. ‘The lead 
surveyor finds the evidence to support [recommendations]. They take responsibility.’ In her 
published summary of the volunteer program, Cristina writes that 
voluntary participation, relevance and local support are required for sustainability. [...]
Trainers and surveyors reduce the cost of conducting FERCAP programs in various 
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countries at the same time that it affords the volunteers opportunities to learn from each 
other and contribute to a common cause (Torres 2010: 50-52). 
From a coordinating perspective, this was considered ‘grassroots’, or ‘ownership’ of the program, 
and her role had reduced to become one of ‘keeping ‘an eye on quality’. Recognising that she 
could not attend all of the surveys as the demand grew, she told me that it ‘increases little by little, 
and there are the local — national — forums (FERCSL, FERCI, FERCIT etc see p.42). We use 
these people as surveyors, so they exchange in many different ways.’ The language of friendship 
and family permeates the recognition program: ‘You’re together for four days, sometimes a week, 
solving the same problem’, said one surveyor. ‘Surveys are an exchange, of ideas and practice’, said 
another. Cristina writes that FERCAP works:
to motivate people to volunteer and to contribute their efforts to accomplish the task of 
developing the capacity of ECs/IRBs [...] FERCAP is about taking responsibility for one 
another. Our forum is about a friend helping a friend (Torres 2010: 52-53). 
Since the end of my fieldwork, the Forum has established a ‘Help an IRB’ or ‘Adopt an IRB’ 
program, calling for volunteer trainers and Surveyors ‘to support ethical health research capacity 
building in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal and Vietnam’. These volunteers 
(and/or their institutions), write FERCAP, ‘are expected to shoulder the cost of their 
participation’ (FERCAP 2012). Let me explore a little more of what they participate in: the 
technicalities of the SIDCER ‘recognition program’, the standards upon which the Survey is 
based, and how these are imagined.
Technical aspects of the Survey
Marisa and I sat at the back of the board room in China, considering the expression on the face 
of the lead surveyor. She told me the survey were were undertaking wasn’t ‘as clear as our usual 
surveys’. Curious about how this compared with her perception of ‘usual’, I asked ‘How so?’ ‘I 
think they went for survey too soon’, she told me. Tapping the sheaf of documents on her lap, she 
reminded me: ‘They only changed the SOP in February. With their volume, only 10 per year, you 
don’t get the experience, you don’t learn how to do a good review’. Learning to conduct a ‘good 
review’ came with practice, which in turn came with a committee receiving protocols for review. 
The committee we were surveying was one of several in a hospital which was the site of limited 
research, and as such did not see many protocols. If the committee had waited a little, she 
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thought, it might have better ‘evidence’ of its capabilities in the form of meeting minutes, archived 
trials and ongoing files.
If finding means of creating objectivity was the focus of my attention above, here the creation of 
evidence comes to the fore. The work of Shapin and Schaffer (1985) and Ezrahi (1990) amongst 
others have shown us a great deal of shared techniques of authority between science and politics, 
the act of witnessing evidence being central to both. As we saw above, it is in the Lead Surveyor’s 
presentation that a Survey must provide evidence for its recommendations. It is as important for 
there to be evidence of good practice as it is for there to be evidence of error, to support 
‘recommendations,’ to explain why. During the introductory remarks for a survey in the 
Philippines, the lead surveyor remarked that the most important thing was to ‘find the evidence’:
if we make comments, we need to have some evidence. Otherwise, we prefer not to say 
it.[...] Everything you find, you write down as evidence. Use your camera to document. 
It is better to let them see the evidence, otherwise they don’t believe it. In the final 
report, we have to mention everything with the evidence. [We]] cannot make a 
judgement without evidence. 
The day would run on in this way. Photographs were taken of the offending documents - missing 
signatures on informed consent forms, missing dates on countersignatures. Trainees made 
diagrams of the committee offices, and leant over the shoulders of secretaries to scrutinize their 
databases. In the closing meeting, ‘evidence’ would be gathered together from the teams: ‘What 
protocol number? What page?’ Evidence was collected with the final powerpoint in mind,16 
details and references hoarded for each end of day summary meeting, and the ultimate feedback 
to the committee under scrutiny. Evidence did not simply serve the Surveyor’s “safety”, however. 
Take this Surveyor’s description of the Survey’s approach: ‘The approach is going to be evidence 
based. We survey the EC then we evaluate the ethical practices based on its adherence to and 
compliance with national and international guidelines.’ Borrowing from the corpus of ethical 
principles that the organisation teaches, the organisation is applying to itself and its Survey the 
same standards for its international operations as it expects for its ethics committees.
Recognition is based on five standards (Figure 13), and the assessment is structured around an 
evaluation of the quality attained by the committee in relation to each of them. Not only would 
the Survey be ‘evidence based’ but its methodology was described as ‘just like research 
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16  As Miller remarks (2003:61) for the Best Value quality control final meetings he observed, the use of PowerPoint to 
make final presentations is one of a number of factors that mediate the construction and aesthetics of the final 
document (Harper 1998; Riles 2001:114-42,  see also Tufte 2003).
methodology.’ At these events, as much as there was evidence based ethics, there was also an ethic 
of evidence which ran through the survey, and was inculcated into the teams who were auditing. 
Evidence was also oriented towards the making of an envisaged committee — positive feedback 
meant one resembled it, corrections meant deviation. During a break, my co-trainee and I were 
discussing how much there was to keep in one’s mind, even within our own designated area. He 
pointed at the lead Surveyor. ‘She carries it in her head,’ he said, meaning (I suggest), not only the 
knowledge or criteria of the Committee, but an image. What is desired is already known. This is 
‘not open ended journeying but anticipated destinations’ (Strathern 2004: 80). It is ‘just like 
research,’ but unlike the testing of a hypothesis, the collection of evidence is oriented towards a 
model already known. Cristina is attentive to what makes a good Surveyor:
They need to be observant enough to capture what’s important, they should have that sense 
of what’s important. Some people can see very small details but not capture the big picture.
[...]  Sometimes they are lost in the small details, and don’t see what’s wrong in the system. 
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Figure 13: SIDCER Recognition Standards
A social science background helps, seeing the macro-micro relationship, having a systems 
orientation. If you don’t have that background, that perspective, it takes a while. 
The ability that Cristina calls a ‘macro-micro’ view was of most importance in synthesizing 
findings. End of day meetings brought the teams together, building gradually — in FERCAP’s 
language — towards a full picture of the committee. Late in the afternoon of the first day of the 
Survey I attended in Beijing, Heijan, an experienced Chinese Surveyor who had served as 
FERCAP’s Research Fellow in Bangkok, described the process of the survey to the trainees. She 
explained that the team would split, the groups would be given different areas of responsibility to 
examine in greater depth, and they would report back at the end of the day. One team would look 
at the protocols, for instance, another at the membership records. The chapters of the 
committee’s Standard Operating Procedures would be divided between the groups for assessment. 
At the end of each day, the groups would come together and combine their findings in order to 
make recommendations. Perhaps because the program was newer in China, or because the 
language barrier was ‘thicker’, trainers employed two inventive metaphors for this work of 
synthesis. 
The first depicted how the survey would reach its conclusions (Figure 14). Heijan projected a slide 
with three Chinese characters, ? [mù], in the smallest font, was at the back. ? [lín] was printed 
medium size in the middle,  and ? [sēn], the largest, was positioned at the front. The first, 
meaning leaf, the second, trees, the third wood, she explained that ‘The leaves are the detecting 
method, the picture of the forest is the analysis - how we draw conclusions and necessary system 
thinking’. 
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Figures 14 and 15: Heijan’s Leaf and Elephant slides
Her second slide (Figure 15) was an image of a surprised looking cartoon elephant, surrounded by 
men in suits, all wearing dark glasses. One held a cane over his forearm, and had his arms 
outstretched over the elephant’s rump. Another sat on the elephant’s leg, holding the elephants 
tale with a confused expression. Another gripped its trunk, eyebrows expressing bafflement over 
his shaded specs. Around the image, eight large yellow question marks. 
Heijan warned us that, separated into our teams, none of us could:
expect to know the whole elephant. Each group is only touching only one part at the end of 
the day - you [in touching the part you do] don’t touch the tail or the head. Try to 
reconstruct form your observations and reports, what does the EC look like, what are its 
strengths and weaknesses? How does it do its work?
The image, referenced by Cook, Laidlaw and Mair in the Introduction, is usually used within 
Buddhist texts and teaching to demonstrate the futility of claims to omniscience. In its use here, 
blind men we find reinforced the idea of partial perspective. As surveyors, claimed Heijan: 
You will say the elephant looks like this, but you only have a part. But together, you’ll be 
able to describe what the elephant looks like. Different people see different things, they see 
from different parts. We collect every one’s opinion and truth, we put it together, and may 
get truth of whole thing. 
During the coffee break, I took the handout of the slides Heijan, and asked her to tell me more 
about the stories these slides referenced. The elephant story was about the move ‘from seeing all 
sides to arriving at a balance,’ she told me. She framed her explanation by pointing to a clipart 
image of scales of justice, which adorn many of the circulating powerpoint slides emanating from 
American literature on risks and benefits. ‘You must see risk as well as benefit,’ she told me, ‘you 
can’t just see risk or will say its all bad, can’t just see benefit, and forget the risks.’ As I was 
struggling to process how we had moved from the committee’s strengths and weaknesses to risk 
benefit analysis, Heijan changed tack:
Teamwork, it’s about teamwork for each may not see the whole, so not everyone can be 
completely right. The teams, bring finally together each part, and you finally get the whole 
picture. Everyone may not be completely right, but they may not be completely wrong. 
Based on teamwork, we can get to the truth.
 And the leaves? I asked:
The survey is so detailed! We look for missing signatures, dates, we look for checked boxes. 
How are we going to gather together everything everyone has learned? We need to make 
evidence, for system thinking, we won’t say, ‘The way you review this protocol is not good,’ 
we look at the process, on which procedure you need to improve. It’s Quality Assurance and 
Quality Control. The Survey is Quality Assurance, evidence, to give the system for Quality 
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Control. The leaves on the tree are the detecting method of the survey, where we get 
evidence. But the forest is our analysis — how we draw conclusions and use systems 
thinking.
The story fits with the Lead Surveyor’s comment ‘you see what you see, I see what I see.’ There are 
two points to notice however, in how Heijan has introduced difference into the combination of 
perspectives. First, through the concept of balance, she has moved from the survey’s practices of 
overview and assessment to those of the committee: a risk benefit assessment. The image of 
perspectives not only comprising the object under study but also holding both it and themselves 
in balance is one that jumps between the committee’s assessment and the assessment of the 
committee’s assessment. Second, she has situated in the person their particular ‘difference,’ the 
perspective they hold from their life experience or identity. It is this shift, (or mapping) of the 
effect of comprehension from a physical to a conceptual difference that I explore in greater depth 
in Chapter 5. For now, I move to one of the areas the teams are set to look at in detail: Standard 
Operating Procedures. 
Standard Operating Procedures
During a Survey, the teams into which the Surveyors split each take sections of the committees 
Standard Operating Procedures, SOPs, to examine. Surveyors regularly announce to committees 
that ‘You write what you do and you do what you write. Therefore SOPs should always be an 
ongoing work rather than a fixed document.’ 
For an ethics committee to operate without SOPs is considered a ‘major’ violation of GCP, and 
has the potential to render research data from sites it overviews invalid. Beat Widler and Allan K 
Johansen, both of whom have been supportive of FERCAP’s work, were employed together for 
over ten years, working on GCP auditing, training and compliance for Roche. In 2005, they 
presented joint findings of Roche GCP audits to FERCAP audiences, findings which were later 
turned into slides to illustrate commonly found ‘non-compliance’ issues to members (Figure 16). 
Cristina’s presentation on the role of the IRB/EC in GCP (Figure 17) builds on Wilder and 
Johansen’s findings with the following ‘common weaknesses’ found during the FERCAP 
Survey.Common to both is attention to written procedures, although in the time between Widler 
and Johansen’s findings of ‘no written procedures’ FERCAP had started emphasising to 
committees the importance of SOPs. SOPs provide a written record of the process, capable of 
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acting both as a description of what the committee does and instruction for its practice. The 
SIDCER Survey pays a good deal of attention to how they are written, what they contain, their 
‘consistency’, language and phrasing. Telling me about the attention to SOPs, one surveyor 
commented that:
in the old days, a lot of mistakes were made on documentation. But since then, we’ve had 
lots of training and SOPs, people are starting to recognise the importance of good 
documentation. I think we have good models now, people join the survey, and adopt. 
Modeling is a good method, so it’s moving even better.
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Figure 17
Figure 16
In 2005, four people17  created a draft template of SOPs for FERCAP which, surveyors say, has 
helped improve standards. The template has circulated amongst ethics review committees, been 
added to, expanded and modified according to national guidelines of the different countries, as 
well as institutional arrangements. Cristina acknowledges that: 
each ethics committee is unique, even if you copy the SOPs, something different comes out 
because you have different people, a different hospital. The composition is just like a 
person — just as each person is different, I have not seen two IRBs the same. I’ve seen over 
50. Every one is different from each other.
Templating and uniqueness exist in tension. In a recent interview with ClinPower News — an 
online website for clinical research the Middle East and North Africa — Widler, whose findings 
with Roche above informed FERCAP’s presentation, comments
Because I am a strong believer that we should share tools and best practices, in my opinion 
there’s no need that each institution has their own set of SOPs, templates and other 
elements of a quality management system but should start collaborating and using shared 
tools. In fact, a clinical trial is a clinical trial, the fundamentals are the same, GCP is the 
same for everybody and ethics is the same! Then of course you need to have the flexibility 
to adapt to the local requirements but there are common basics that we should share and 
pass from one to the other (Widler 2012).
In the ‘exchange’ of experiences which the network aims to foster, members exchange documents; 
Widler’s vision of shared SOPs is being enacted through FERCAP. After a training session in 
Bangkok which brought together members of many different committees I spoke with an attendee 
who had been in conversation with members of a well respected committee. ‘They gave us copies 
of their SOP!’ she said. Juntra, SIDCER coordinator, joined in, speaking approvingly of the 
attendees: 
Circulating their own SOP, that’s for me the best thing, they share experiences. I saw your 
SOP and people think, ‘This could help my committee, we don’t have that,’ and they have 
to go back and change [their] EC. ‘Now that’s one we’d never thought of, its a good one.’ 
In the section below I focus on a meeting in which one of my fellow surveyors in Manila returned 
to her own committee for the weekend SOP retreat to Balay Indang, an old ginger farm a few 
hours drive out of the city. She took with her what she had learned on the Survey about what the 
recognition program requires. 
Chapter 2: The Survey
88
17 Francis Crawley, from the European Forum for Good Clinical Practice, Juntra Karbwang of the WHO TDR and 
SIDCER, Cristina Torres of FERCAP and Sirinart Vasanvathana, Senior Pharmacist in the Office of Food and Drug 
Administration, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand.
It was four in the afternoon, and the air was cooling down. In a room awash with late afternoon 
sunlight, we strained to see the projection of the word document on the screen. There were seven 
women, four men, 5 laptops, and an ethnographer, who sat on a table corner eating the peanuts, 
taking furious notes. The ethics committee was preparing to ‘pull itself up’ to the standards that 
my fellow surveyor and I had seen through our participant observation in a FERCAP survey the 
previous week. Using her as a reference point (‘Do they want this?’ ‘Yes, they need that’), the 
committee in Balay Indang revised their SOPs with an almost excruciating attention to detail. Just 
as we began, I noticed that the woman next to me scrolling through a powerpoint presentation — 
the ‘philosophy of SOP.’ ‘Is that yours?’ I asked her. ‘No, no, I got it off the net.’ Peering over, I 
saw that the document was a powerpoint (Figure 18) written by a Dr Bhatt from Mumbai, in 
2004. It listed the need for SOPs as a regulatory one, tied in to GCP, providing a written record of 
the process, ensuring compliance with regulations and guidelines, ensuring quality of data, 
facilitating audit and inspection and (last, though surely not least) assuring global acceptance. 
While FERCAP has provided templates, writing SOPs is still difficult. Half an hour into the 
meeting, the committee came to a halt in the middle of the projected page, discussion centering 
around the following sentence: 
A major violation shall results in the suspension possible termination of conduct/approval 
of research after due process.
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Figure 18: Dr Bhatt’s 2004 SOP slide
The sentence is causing problems because the ethics committee is not sure of what it can do: can 
it suspend? Should it? The word is struck through, modified to the softer ‘possible termination.’ 
Can it actually stop a study? Or can it just withdraw its approval, meaning the study will have to 
stop anyway? What are the consequences of this action? ‘Ethics committee has no power to punish 
erring researchers. You invalidate the results [of their research] if you withdraw approval,’ says 
someone. ‘Suppose it’s not fraud, perhaps they made an honest mistake,’ says another. The 
committee’s layperson is a lawyer, and he is anxious that ‘due process’ be written in. The 
discussion, with different voices differently indented, shows the steps, the possibilities. SOPs are 
documents of the imagination, and here, in their making, we see that imagination being formed 
through a theoretical complaint being made about a trial the committee has approved: 
 
We ask them [the investigator] to come in and explain.
 But we have to have it [the complaint] in writing 
  If it’s major, then the chair has already suspended [the trial]. 
   No, its not automatic. 
This [complaint] can be used agains the PI, [can we really have it that] if anyone just reports, you 
automatically suspend? 
   I agree, you do not suspend just because - you’re assuming guilt before even asking them to 
explain.
But how can you police that? 
  Once you’ve heard their side. If you think its major, you’ll call an emergency meeting
   It’s a knee jerk reaction. 
     It can be used against you [as a researcher].
Which is why I don’t think it should be written down. We already [did the ethics] review. If higher 
risk, something going on, you can suspend. 
You think the one who calls would want to fill up the form? I don’t think we can require it, its like 
punching them. [...] You make it harder for them to complain. 
 Can we record the call? Legally, in the future?
  You have to think of it that way. We have to have a way even if we write it down, he 
[the complainant] has to sign.   
It cannot be just hearsay. It could become a legal case later on. We should protect ourselves also.
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You could have the patient review the request and have it witnessed.
  Properly documented. 
Yes, within a week must sign.
  No, a complaint should be valid even if it’s a year later.
Yes, but to come within a week once he made the call.
 But wouldn’t it be unfair to not do action because he didn’t sign the form, he just called 
in...
  We’re not lawyers! 
After this exasperated exclamation, there is a pause, during which someone notes that the form 
they had been planning to use to record complaints has no place for a signature anyway. In 
describing the process by which they want a complaint to be handled, the committee are forced to 
think through each stage. ‘We’ve gotta make it simple so we can do it ourselves’ they say, ‘we can’t 
make it so difficult we ourselves don’t understand and [can’t explain] when FERCAP interviews 
you!’ As the Balay Indang ethics committee argued into the night, they wrote and edited, wrote 
and re-edited the document. The clock neared midnight, my note-taking became infrequent. 
Halfway down a page near the point at which I gave up and went to bed, is recorded the 
humourous single line: SOP 1.2.1.2.2: If information is deemed insufficient, Chair makes request 
for additional information.
The slides at the opening of this section show that in the experience of a Pharmaceutical company 
(Roche) and of FERCAP, committees in the Asian region were struggling with creating SOPs. In 
its creation of templates and encouragement of sharing, FERCAP has supported committees in 
the making of their SOPs. On the first day of the Survey in Beijing, for example, the secretary of 
the committee presented her SOP revision record to the surveyor group:
Since the Ethics Committee was set up, we have adjusted the SOP four times. The first 
version was from 2007, October. But when I attended the FERCAP conference in Chiang 
Mai, I realised some things are not very reasonable, and not very correct. So when I came 
home, I adjusted the SOP. That was our second version, 2009.10. Then, when I went to 
Nanjing, I learned a lot, and made a big change to the SOP. That was our third version, 
2010.1. Then then I made alterations in preparation for the survey, 2010.03. Each time I 
edit, it becomes thicker. And now it is very thick, but I say we will do as SOP says, because 
it will give us more character, and we will be more reasonable as an EC.’
As the Secretary’s account and my field-notes from Balay Indang show, the orientation of the 
committees in their procedure modification is towards the FERCAP Survey. The FERCAP Survey, 
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in its attention to SOPs, is oriented towards creating committees which are GCP compliant. 
However, the observer versed in critique of audit practices might observe that at each new point of 
orientation, the measurements are taken as the goals (Hoskin 1996; Strathern 2003; Macintyre 
2000). Standard Operating Procedures are an abstraction of what committees do. As committees 
are occasionally told, there is no need to re-invent the wheel. I develop the tension between 
templating and local difference in the next chapter, turning now to the audiences for these 
achievements. 
International Guests and International Hosts
When Leslie spoke to FERCAP about Coast at the 2009 Conference, she noted that the USFDA 
was committed to checking up on sites conducting trials outside the US territory (see also HHS 
2001). She also noted that these check ups would be document based audits. When FERCAP 
conducts Surveys, Surveyors remind the surveyed committees that while they actually observe a 
board meeting as part of the SIDCER recognition program, all that an auditor will have to go on 
is the paperwork. Thus through the promise of the examination of paperwork, concern about 
documentation grows. Riles (2011:67) reminds us that documents travel across ‘cultural 
boundaries, forms of expertise, institutions, physical distances, by virtue of their material and 
aesthetic form.’ Bhatt’s powerpoint and the Thai SOPs are illustrations of the point. For some, 
FERCAP surveys are a precursor to hosting international research; for some, the hope is that 
accreditation will attract research to the institution. As Cristina comments: 
[The survey] has an impact on an entire research team. You can put the name on your 
website. I receive queries from sponsors who ask us if we’ve visited this EC and if we have 
recognised them. Sponsors like assurance that EC is doing their job. Thats how we do our 
work.
What can be said of ethics when it is international guests one hopes to attract? A Bertrand Russell 
quotation from the concluding slide of a GCP training in Manila gives us a starting point for 
reflection: ‘Ethics is in origin the art of recommending to others the sacrifices required for 
cooperation with oneself’ (Russell (1981 [1917]: 82). A woman a few rows away in the lecture 
theatre pushed him to comment. ‘I was thinking’, she said, ‘how to interpret it?’ The lecturer 
pushed against the lectern, looking down. ‘Um, well the way I see it we are all aware of ethical 
principles’, he began:
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And it really requires a lot of sacrifices. But there is a need for an external body to be able 
to tell us if what we’re doing is ethical or not. Because of the presence of the possibility of 
conflicts of interest. That’s my thought on that. We know that there are sacrifices that we 
have to undergo when we are involved in ethics but it has to be recommended by others, or 
to others. I don’ t know if that’s what Bertrand Russell meant, but [trails off]
’But why would you consider it a sacrifice to comply?’ asked another audience member. ‘No’ he 
said, ‘its not a sacrifice to comply, its a sacrifice of removing your interests in whatever study you 
do.’ The quote the lecturer chose is, in one reading, a Russell quip. It is a laconic reflection on the 
selfishness of ethics — of teaching to others the sacrifices they must make so they can work with 
you — given your principles, your ‘ethics.’ In this interpretation, ‘ethics’ is reduced to self-interest. 
But in the extract from my field-notes, the lecturer’s explanation carries quite another spin. The 
self is not the requiring self, but the sacrificing self; the sacrifice you make upon the request of an 
external body. This shift of subject position is revealing, as it neatly reflects the positions of host 
and sponsor countries in research. 
As many researchers are very aware, in order to undertake US sponsored research, the site, 
investigators and IRB must conform to American specifications. The export of these regulations is 
exactly — and non-ironically —  the requirement of the former interpretation: you must do these 
things so we can come to your country. A researcher I interviewed in Sri Lanka had been involved 
with a research project with Duke University in America. He made some perceptive, and revealing 
comments on the course he followed in preparation for the project. 
For their IRB, before being researchers we had to follow a course. They sent us the teaching 
material, [we] read, they asked us questions, we had to mark the correct answers and 
submit. They sent us all these documents — consent, anonymity, confidentiality, about 
minors, assent. They covered all areas with documents. We were expected to read through 
and answer the email questionnaire. What they really want is for us to be educated. They 
don’t want to find out how good I am, they want to educate me on research. I thought that 
was very good, because before we embarked we knew what is good and wrong. So we would 
not make the same mistakes. [We] would tarnish whatever institution collaborating with, if 
we did.
As Cristina’s pitch of the SIDCER recognition program to the Cancer Center in China showed 
(p.26) attracting research is no small part of achieving recognition. The researcher’s comments 
above about ‘tarnishing’ a collaborating institution added to the sacrificial spin of the lecturer’s 
interpretation of Russell illustrate just the frame in which the desirability of international research 
mingles with ideas about developing the host through the presence of the guest.  
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While FERCAP aims towards an equilibrium of a certain standard, tailoring its improvement 
recommendations towards each committee, some committees are seeking further, ‘higher’ 
recognition. In Taiwan FERCAP’s success (recognising over 21 committees in six years) left it with 
a problem. Having been the object of competition between committees, as Edith had explained to 
me, the question was becoming ‘what more can FERCAP provide? Further unique comments?’ In 
interviews, Taiwanese IRB members were concerned that FERCAP might lose its competitive edge 
to an accrediting organisation called AAHRPP18, the American Association of Human Research 
Protection Program, based in the USA. AAHRPP has, in recent years made inroads into the Asian 
market, accrediting a committee in Singapore, a high-tech post-colony which does not participate 
in FERCAP’s activities, as well as China (1), India (3) and Korea (3).19  Cristina reported a 
conversation she had had with Marjorie Speers of AAHRPP in Geneva: 
where she presented her accreditation program. I said our [FERCAP’s] approach was 
developmental and if a group is just starting up we try to help you achieve a level of 
competence. That is why we call it “recognition “ not “accreditation’. Their focus is 
institutional - the human protection program of the institution. So she said we complement 
each other, we are different. And I suppose we are. But in Asia they think of the US as the 
gold standard. It’s the WHO that’s important to us. That is where we derive our…
reputation, and some amount of, how to say, some sense of importance.
During my research, AAHRPP had begun to perform accreditation in Taiwan and South Korea. 
‘In Asia, if one gets [it], others feel pressure to get [it],’ commented Desmond, a researcher who 
served on an IRB in Taiwan. ‘Now that almost all the committees in Taiwan have been recognised 
by FERCAP,’ he told me, ‘some are trying to shift to AAHRPP. Now it has become the gold 
standard.’ From Desmond I got the impression that it wasn’t just the fact that one committee in 
Taiwan had succeeded in getting recognised by AAHRPP, it was the three others, in South Korea. 
His committee colleague Dana was sure there was an element of competition in the committees 
seeking accreditation. ‘We like competition,’ she said:
It’s our culture. Because, if you were independent, and I have AAHRPP or FERCAP and 
you don’t have, people will think your IRB not good enough, so that’s the reason why we 
have to get more and more.
In this quick sentence, Dana has mapped out a logic that I saw repeated again and again in my 
interviews in Taiwan, which I tried to unpick with the question ‘good enough for what?’ Dana’s 
reply was ‘quality of review.’ ‘For our thinking, we can say I’ve got an international recognition, 
you know I’m an international level.’ I pressed her on why she thought this was this important. 
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18 Pronounced “A-Harp”
19 Numbers of accredited institutions per country correct as of September 2012. 
‘For fame!’ she told me. ‘If people involved in IRB thing, they all know about FERCAP, if [you] 
get recognition, they’ll think you’re so international level quality.’ It was not just the opinion of 
others that mattered, though. Dana explained that when her committee was recognized, she felt a 
strong sense of pride. ‘I know how it feels,’ she said,
If I got FERCAP recognition, it means our IRB is well organized, our procedures are no 
problem. Just as some institutions proud of AAHRPP put accredit mark on their website — 
to show themselves they are excellent.
Although she raised them, she felt ambivalent about AAHRPP’s ‘excellence’:
I think AHRPP is too detailed. I don’t know the details, but because AAHRPP is American, 
from America, and regulations are not...not really subject to our country. I think FERCAP 
is OK because they can see the requirements, it’s not limited to just some countries, its very 
basic for procedures and archiving. If you finish FERCAP recognition, you get a whole view 
of IRB procedures.
Compare Dana’s explanation of accreditation with Edith’s, as she explains how it is that her 
committee is ‘good.’ ‘We have two certificates,’ Edith tells me ‘the international FERCAP on, and 
one from government. Because we have to follow the local laws and regulations in Taiwan, we 
need the Taiwan accreditation. And the other we want, the international, so we have got it.’ She 
pauses. ‘I know another system’, she says. ‘It’s an accreditation for the US, mostly,’ she tells me, 
‘but they have also done some in Asia: AAHRPP. [Committees] get AAHRPP because they are 
more strict than FERCAP.’ Edith’s perception of AAHRPP as ‘more strict’ lent it status but, like 
Dana, Edith wasn’t entirely sure of how this strictness took form. They had many criteria, like 
FERCAP; it had to be renewed every three years, like FERCAP; and she knew it followed a similar 
procedure. Nonetheless, ‘getting’ it was ‘very hard.’ Dana expanded on the topic, saying that while 
hospitals had FERCAP recognition, they were starting to think it ‘was not enough.’ ‘They wanted 
AAHRPP,’ she said. Dana linked AAHRPP’s appeal to the existing markers of quality that her 
committee had attained, and the motivations that had fueled them. 
I think we want to make sure our quality is very good and we want to have a high standard, 
and reach, and they can teach us more how to improve. It is for continuing improvement. 
[...] In my way, I think our committee is just the beginning, it is not mature.  
Dana’s colleague Desmond however, was skeptical of the success that AAHRPP would achieve 
relative to FERCAP, claiming that despite the appearance that it occupied the same niche, it was a 
‘different type of thing’: 
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FERCAP has recognised 50,20 AAHRPP has recognised 200 in the US territory alone. It 
wants to jump into the Asian market. You can’t apply a US standard though. The money is 
different, the structure, and the mentality are different. If you want something here you 
can’t use the US standard. FERCAP can operate because it doesn’t cost too much. They 
use rotating volunteers, it’s a good strategy. With AAHRPP, it’s ‘you pay, we send.’
What does Desmond mean when he says the money, the structure and the mentality are different? 
I listen as he tries to explain. First, the price tag on an AAHRPP evaluation will sway people, he 
thinks. ‘It is more expensive, therefore it must be better,’ he tells me. Then its origins in the USA 
carries cache. Furthermore, it will demand a great deal of work. The survey becomes an audit, in 
name as well as practice now, encompassing the committee, PIs of projects reviewed, officials of 
the institution and staff. Desmond thinks interrupting the work of such ‘high’ people for a 
foreign audit would be the most difficult task. Then there is the matter of the auditors themselves. 
‘They don’t accept anything no hotel, flight.’ His interpretation of such refusals was that — for 
Americans — it would amount to a conflict of interest. ‘They know if come to Asia they will be 
treat[ed] nice[ly], so they say no hotel, no meal, only cup of coffee. Not a banquet, not a souvenir.’ 
AAHRPP’s anticipated refusal to engage socially with the committees appears as the antithesis of 
the ‘mutuality’ that FERCAP is trying to foster. Drawing a comparison between FERCAP and 
AAHRPP, Desmond said that FERCAP was a foundation project, its intention to ‘build capacity, 
help build up from ground zero,’ whereas AAHRPP was ‘already at the top floor of that 
skyscraper, and it gives the sign of qualified.’ Desmond was critical, arguing that assessment 
external to the region (not just external to the country or the institution) might raise standards on 
the surface, but allow practices to suffer: ‘Other groups who validate: their mission is to evaluate, 
and that’s it. FERCAP is not about evaluation alone. The intention is to assist and recognise.’ The 
distinction drawn by Desmond between evaluation and recognition here references what Cristina 
(Torres 2011:50) has called the equity of FERCAP’s costings. A shift by more advanced economies 
to AAHRPP is move that would potentially destabilise FERCAP’s financial structure of taking 
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20 Correct at the time of Interview, 2012 recognition figures are nearly double that.
(donations) from the rich and giving (help) to the poor, since it was those who could pay who 
showed interest in migrating.21
AAHRPP is not the only means by which American standards, accreditation and systems were 
spread amongst the people I worked with. Several observed that it was ‘American money’ that had 
made them capable of doing the jobs that they do through funding six month trainings at 
Western IRB (WIRB) in Olympia, Washington (Figures 19 and 20). 
Figures 19 and 20: A certificate awarded to an International Fellow and a summary of the WIRB 
program 
 
‘American money is here’, commented one secretary, pointing to herself. Though the ‘centre’ is 
geographically east of most of the countries who look to it, Western is the name it takes for its 
location on American’s West coast. Its name also has the effect of carrying with it the conceptual 
orientation towards ‘the West’. Dana and Edith were not the only secretaries I met who had 
received training at WIRB (Figure 19). Cassandra, who had been to WIRB for an international 
fellowship keeps a photograph of her group of international fellows on her desk at work in her 
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21 It is also possible that some institutions may ‘leapfrog’ FERCAP and move straight to AAHRPP. AAHRPP accredited 
its seventh institution in Asia, Jehangir Clinical  Development Center, in Pune, India in September 2012. AAHRPP 
stated that 
the accreditations are the latest indication that organizations are embracing AAHRPP’s goal  of one set of 
standards worldwide — for CROs, independent institutional review boards, research-intensive universities, 
medical colleges, hospitals, and other entities engaged in research involving human participants. To attain 
AAHRPP accreditation JCDC had to show compliance with both India’s requirements for research protections 
and U.S. regulations […] JCDC CEO Pathik Divate [said] “We viewed AAHRPP accreditation as the logical step 
to take our program to the next level—for research participation, standardization and quality. We’ve also sent a 
message to the rest of the research institutes […] If  they’re serious about clinical research, they should be 
thinking about AAHRPP accreditation (AAHRPP 2012).
IRB office. When I asked her about the experience, she explained that WIRB was a ‘well 
established, well organised major company’, whose job was to review human subject research. 
Through the Fellows program she felt it was making a contribution to training Asian ethics 
committees, helping them ‘learn the best knowledge of IRB’. She told me that people sent there 
can: 
get the knowledge. When they come back, they can modify it, use the base of the 
knowledge to give suggestions or comments to the policy makers...They don’t want to 
influence our - they will not - they, when we were in Olympia, they encourage us, they say 
‘This is only for USA,’ maybe not subject to your country. 
Cristina had also trained at WIRB and knew the US regulations, 
I say I learned these things, but I see it from another perspective...The US regulations are 
not international regulations. That’s why when I make a presentation I give GCP, Helsinki, 
and also say this is the practice in the US. 
Surveys often exposed the limits of adopting American standards. At the close of a Survey in 
China,  surveyors were making recommendations on how the committee determined whether to 
classify an application as exempt from review. The survey had found a study involving genetic 
material which had been classified as exempt by the process the ethics committee currently had in 
place. The surveyors were concerned. ‘It is the job of the ethics committee to determine whether 
there is a [genetic] identifier or not. Exempt means you do not do the review!’ When the 
committee replied that it was something they had adopted as a result of their secretary’s time in 
America, the surveyor became annoyed. 
That’s something they exempt in the US, we do not exempt in our setting. They don’t get 
information from China and use it in the US. So don’t adopt OHRP,22  that’s for the 
American population. 
The lead surveyor stepped in to explain:
It’s because [Americans] have more regulations, they can control these things. They are 
automatically controlled by other mechanisms, especially HIPAA23. The US have an 
infrastructure to support and catch other things. They fall into other jurisdictions. 
The irate surveyor interjected ‘Records are covered by HIPAA law. HIPAA protects you. Do you 
have HIPAA? No!’ The lead surveyor smoothed once again: ‘Some of them [USA regulations] 
don’t apply because there is a different infrastructure. So you have to think about your ethics 
committee, in that case.’ 
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22 Office for Human Research Protections, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. 
23 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, (United States Congress 1996). 
Concluding remarks
Shyrock (2008) points out ‘[h]ospitality is always partially unseen. As a social performance, many 
of its most important elements are time delayed or acted out elsewhere’ (2008:59). His comment 
builds upon Pitt Rivers’ study, which observes that 
While a host has rights and obligations in regard to his guest, the guest [...] incurs [...] the 
right and obligation to return hospitality on a future occasion on territory where he can 
claim authority. The reciprocity between host and guest is thus transposed to a temporal 
sequence and a spatial alteration in which the roles are reversed (2012[1963]: 514-515, emphasis 
added)
The Survey is not only a form of standardisation that links locations across space: in time, as with 
Pitt Rivers’ observation, the roles are reversed. Surveyors — who themselves come from ethics 
committees — will be surveyed. Those being surveyed have the chance to learn to be surveyors. 
‘They’re surveyor in one place, surveyee in another. You’ll be surveyed yourself. The surveyor will 
come from somewhere, some other country,’ explained Juntra. Unlike the reversal in Pitt Rivers’ 
study above however, hospitality on one’s own territory does not come with a claim to authority. 
Pitt Rivers observes that ‘[h]ost and guest can at no point within the context of a single occasion be 
allowed to be equal, since equality invites rivalry. Therefore their reciprocity resides, not in an 
identity, but in an alteration of roles. (1963: 21). This forms a mutual interdependence, described 
as a ‘self-sustaining model’ because the groups relied upon one another to ‘keep the standard’ of 
the recognition program. The annual Conference was ‘like a reunion of family’ because, over the 
year, delegates have been working together, ‘visiting one country, visiting another.’ To Juntra, since 
all the surveyors had been ‘talking about the same goal that each one contributes to’, ‘instead of 
competing or being jealous, because of exchanging, people are accountable to one another.’ This 
‘accountability’ led to a common interest in the quality of the recognition program, so that the 
standards would not fall, and the value of the recognition would be maintained:
The recognised people say we need to keep up with quality - if one of us jeopardizes it....so 
they’re looking after themselves. They talk to each other and suggest ways to improve. This 
model is very good.
Juntra’s description of her intended outcome — that it creates a self sustaining system made up of 
equally invested partners in a dance of reversing places. In this, the survey program itself is at 
stake. If mutual investment in the quality of the recognition program leads to a mutual 
monitoring, there is also the question of what and whose standards are to have the final say. In 
the making-equal of surveyors and surveyees through the language of friendship, the edge of 
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authority of Surveyors diminishes. The threat of non-accreditation remains, of course, but the 
atmosphere meant that the surveyees were very willing to question and engage the surveyors in 
discussion about their ‘findings.’ Nonetheless the influence of American priorities is clearly felt:
It’s about power, influence. The NIH you see is funding research. WHO, maybe their 
presence is not as much. [We] see lots of US projects. WHO is seen as more humanitarian, 
not affiliated to one country. This one [US] there’s pressure for you to comply because 
you’re receiving money. The Americans also feel that their standards are the best.
Interest in becoming hosts to American research means there is also interest in being recognised 
by American standards. What FERCAP’s approach to standard making through mutuality shows 
up is the difference they perceive between their hospitality based survey and the attempts of other 
recognition programs to break into the Asian market. As Selwyn writes, ‘the rules and principles 
of hospitality stand at one remove from the principles and procedures of the market place,’ 
reminding us that both Mauss and Malinowski warned against interpreting the meaning of gift 
exchange in terms of trade (Selwyn 2000:35). I have shown how FERCAP differentiates itself, 
places itself ‘at one remove’ from audit models based solely on evaluation and the marketplaces of 
both committee accreditation and trial attraction. I suggest that the framing their program of 
mutuality through hospitality helps illustrate this difference more clearly.
Foregrounding the hospitality of the Survey has also allowed me to demonstrate what Candea and 
da Col (2012: S14) refer to as a scale-shift through reference to Herzfeld’s observation of an:
essential homology between several levels of collective identity - village, ethnic group, 
district, nation. What goes for the family home also goes, at least by metaphorical 
extension, for the national territory (Herzfeld 1987:76).
Homology here is more than metaphorical extension: surveyors applying the principle of gender 
balance as ‘ethics’, for example, want to see equal numbers of men and women both as Surveyors 
and as committee members. In the material above, like hospitality, objectivity appears to shift 
scale, applied to the committee meeting and to the Survey. The Survey, aware of its politics, 
borrows from the familiar scientific language of its participants the tool of objectivity. Through 
combining the views of each of the Surveyors into the corporate person of Dr Sam, and by 
amassing the ‘evidence’ that will be used to support the recommendations, objectivity emerges as 
a social strategy, to neutralize the dangerous tensions of critique. As Candea points out, ‘points of 
tension in practice coalesce around scale-shifts: when an individual’s action is taken to be 
representative of an entire group, or, conversely, when an entire group is seen to act against a 
single individual’ (2012: S46). Here I have shown how the emphasis on evidence deflects from the 
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possible insult of judgement. But in its familiar of evidence and through its mimicry of science, 
perceived as ‘good’ it leads to surveyors focusing on that which can be evidenced. This in turn 
encourages committees to regard evidence for decisions as essential. What is interesting about this 
instance of hospitality is that it is employed in a form of governance. How people handle the 
potential for critique causing insult is central to the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3:  The Rooms of Ethics
Shapin and Schaffer claim that in the English 1600s the question,’Where can I find a natural 
philosopher at work?’ would have had no single reply (1985:333). The creation of a ‘special 
professional space’, at least to one of their book’s protagonists, Hobbes, was a ‘threa[t to] the 
public status of philosophy’ (1985: 333). In this chapter, I show how a room assigned to an ethics 
committee is not just an anonymous office but is given meaning by the staff who work there, the 
committees who convene there and the Surveyors who visit.24  For the ethics work of FERCAP, 
however, the creation of a ‘special professional space’ is a criterion upon which the enterprise of a 
systematised ethics rests. To draw out the importance of a room let me first recount an encounter 
with a committee without a room. 
The first ethics committee meeting I saw when I arrived in Sri Lanka in early 2009 was being held 
in the Medical Faculty in Colombo and I saw it entirely by chance. Thirsty, and hoping to fill my 
water bottle before leaving the faculty, my colleague and I had stepped into the Senior Common 
Room in search of a water cooler. It was mid-afternoon, and the water of the monsoon rainstorm 
was pouring down the windows. ‘Looks like an ethics committee,’ I joked to her quietly, as we 
crossed the room across from a table piled high with paperwork, around which a dozen or so 
people were sitting. It was a joke, because less than two weeks into fieldwork, I was still very much 
focused on finding and getting access to these committees. I had no reason to imagine I might 
literally walk in on a meeting. Yet as I stood, filling the bottle facing away from the table, murmurs 
of the ‘benefits to Sri Lanka’, and talk of ‘risk’ drifted across the room. ‘You know, I think it 
actually is!’ whispered my colleague, having turned to face the deliberators at the table: ‘Here they 
all are.’ She had started research in the country over a year beforehand, and recognised faces I too 
would soon come to know. I filled the bottle slowly, wishing I could stay, but unnerved enough to 
leave, knowing that my own ethics application for research had been reviewed by that same 
committee in same manner it was now reviewing another just a few meters away.
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24  Sometimes, as in the example above, offices are connected to the boardrooms where deliberations happen. More 
often, the office designated for ethics committee work is separate from an institution’s boardroom which is used for the 
committee meeting. I pay attention to both spaces - as the survey does in its observation of both the office, and the 
ethics committee meeting.
That the committee were meeting in a common room which, while partially restricted by being 
‘senior’ was still open, had little meaning for me at the time. In an interview a few weeks later, 
during a discussion about capacity building, the first hints of a link between the ‘where’ of ethics 
— its physical institutionalisation — and its social robustness began to emerge. The term 
‘grounding’ might be useful in two senses here: both as a physical grounding in a room, and the 
grounding that an individual conversant in a field of knowledge. My interviewee, Dr Suraj, was 
the chair of a department at the same medical faculty. He been involved in establishing ‘ethics’ in 
the University, and was adamant that unless ‘local people have capacity to train others, 
institutions will not develop.’ We were talking about research ethics, and its presence in Sri 
Lanka. He drew his examples from histories of his own department:
Psychiatry was not a department in the 1970s. It was one person. Now, there are six. It is a 
separate subject in the undergraduate curriculum, people can get interested in it. It is like 
this local knowledge can develop. For example, there were all these dams built. One by the 
British, the French, the Dutch, all of them said, ‘We’ll come in and do capacity building, 
we’ll teach you how to do it yourselves, so Sri Lankans can do it.’ That never happened. 
His examples were a way of talking about how research ethics as a set of knowledges was being 
introduced:
Something happens in the UK or the US, someone gives a lecture, comes, goes away. That 
is useless. It is not of help to Sri Lanka. We need a group of people here, developing 
knowledge, discussion. Without indigenous institutions as the knowledge base, no subject 
will live.
Dr Suraj then proceeded to ‘ground’ a knowledge of ethics, and the potential for ethical thought, 
in all people. At the same time, he traced the ‘grounding,’ or institutionalisation of ethics within 
the physical buildings of the university: 
Suraj:  People feel ethics is exotic, it has experts. I don’t believe in that. If you really look at 
ethics in the world, it’s in every field. In medical schools, it is the case that in almost all of 
the classes the teacher knows more than the students. But that is not true in ethics - in 
ethics, both are equal. It is just that the student is not sensitized, they haven’t developed an 
analytical rational expertise.
RDJ: How might they do that?
Suraj:  It is a value system. You must value ethics as important. And then you are interested 
in it and learn. So it was a ‘sensitisation process’, people realising that ethics is related to 
clinical work and to policy. We started talking about equity systems, and public health, 
organised in different ways. This lasted five or six years. Lots of people were exposed. Ethics 
became something not alien, exotic, something to do with day to day work. At that time 
they had no guidelines, institution, workshop. So I got the WHO funding, books 
computers, training programs. I got that room.
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RDJ: Can I ask you why that is important?
Suraj:  Otherwise it is person, there is not a system. The ERC, I recruited  them, but unless 
we have commitment to the development of ethics....[shrugs]
Leaving the offices where we had talked, I stopped by the room he had mentioned. The tall 
wooden door bore a small printed sheet reading ‘Ethics Committee Room,’ and though the glass 
was dusty, through it I could see a pair of interconnected rooms. Paint peeled from the walls and 
wooden furniture was piled up against one of the windows. It was a site of disarray. When I asked 
around about the room, I was told that progress on its restoration was slow going, funds were 
difficult to find. The suggestion was that some of the barriers to financing the room were also 
barriers to the formalisation of ethics, but that with dedication it ‘would happen’, indeed, had to 
happen, in order for the committee to be surveyed by FERCAP. 
This all happened during my first stay in Sri Lanka. By the time I returned, just over six months 
later, the room had transformed. The space had been cleared, freshly painted and a new floor 
laid. It was filled with new furniture and equipment, chosen with the recent Survey in mind. On 
arrival, I went to find Madhubashini, one of the secretaries I knew, only to discover her in her 
new office, overhead fans whirring, brand new filing cabinets lined up behind the desks. Another 
secretary had been recruited to join her, and we talked about their experiences of the FERCAP 
survey. As I went to peer into the adjoining room, to which Madhubashini had just delivered 
some ‘short eats’ from the canteen, she blocked me with her body. ‘Confidential meeting,’ she 
said. 
For Suraj, the room was a change in the status and permanence of ethics in the institution. 
Unlike the people who carried the knowledge of ethics, who could leave, the room could be a 
container for that knowledge; it would remain. Anthropologists have long paid attention to the 
relationship between the arrangement of persons in space and the conceptual work that those 
spaces are made to do. We can recall Wagner’s diagram of the inversions in a Usen Barok Kaba 
mortuary feast (2001: 34-47), Mitchell’s Foucaldian treatment of the disciplined and disciplining 
spaces of colonial Egyptian schools (1988: 78-79) or Humphrey’s analysis of a Mongolian hut with 
its male and female domains (1974:26). In this chapter, I attempt a related approach to committee 
rooms, the physical arrangement of space and the conceptual and social relationships therein. In 
opening with Shapin and Schaffer’s work, a study that tracks the ‘nascent laboratory’ of Boyle 
(1985: 334), I am making a case that there is something akin to the ‘laboratization’ of ethical 
review processes. The room is at once a template and a unique space in an institution or hospital, 
and the Survey assesses both. In the language of capacity building, the space of the room is both a 
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marker of capacity and a capacity in itself, indicative of a change in the relationship between those 
who championed it and their institution. But I would like to suggest that there is more to be 
gained from the analysis of a physical room. As the chapter proceeds, I embark on an analysis of 
what happens inside the confines of the room, taking first the discussion of its physical 
boundaries during a Survey. Through this, we become aware of the room’s edges — how the 
discussions of people within it reference the world outside of it — and how what happens within 
it is translated for that outside. This translation I consider through the art of minute taking, the 
innovation of ‘realtime minutes’ and the visibility they offer both during the meeting and for 
future audits. Visibility is, however, of concern to some committees when it comes to making a 
decision. I detail decision-making devices, real and ideal, as committee members struggle with 
voting and consensus. Issues of visibility and concealment which link these three vignettes are 
brought to the fore in my closing discussion of Conflict of Interest, in which the invisibility of the 
relations that committee members may have (relations configured as interests) leaves the FERCAP 
trainers and committee members anxious. 
Room: for improvement
FERCAP is for improvement of IRBs, not pass or fail. If the IRB level is like this [holds 
hands waist height] we encourage them to improve like this [lifts hands above head]. If the 
IRB is like this [high hand] we encourage... There is still room for improvement. For 
example, if you do not have a separate room, you cannot be...[trails off]
Trainer at Survey Training 2010
Cannot be what? The trainer left his sentence hanging, communicating into the silence a sense of 
inadequacy through the absence of words. His comment occurred during a re-survey of a 
committee in Manila, at which the committee’s office became a hotly debated topic. I joined the 
surveyors on their trips into the office, accompanying not only my own team (we were set to work 
on reviewing protocols) but also the other teams as they examined the room. We received strict 
instructions before the tour:  
When you visit the office, everyone will check. Use your eyes. They should separate the 
active and closed files. That’s the purpose of archiving. The flow of the office and the job 
of the office staff: do they have a job description? Do the staff know what to do? If there’s 
only one office, maybe there is no confidential issue on [the staff]. If there is more than one 
[staff], who takes care of the lock and the key, who receives documents, who knows the 
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password, who communicates with the PI? In the office, you can take a protocol at random 
and then you check whether it is complete or not.
The visit would be a test by questions, visual examination, expectation: a checklist, distributed to 
the surveyors as part of their pack, guided questions as the groups entered the room. The ethics 
committee office in this Philippine institute was along a main corridor, and clearly labelled with a 
sign that hung out into the hall perpendicular to the wall. ‘Institutional Review Board,’ it read. 
We checked off the first box: ‘Is the location appropriate’? Was there an organogram on the wall? 
Yes. We were shown the technology: a fax machine and phone, a shredder, a photocopier and a 
printer. The surveyors photographed these for use as evidence in the summary powerpoint (Figure 
21)
The biggest problem on this survey in Manila was access to the room, and the things in it. Let us 
first deal, as the surveyors did, with the things in it. There are two highly sensitive areas in the 
office, the filing cabinet and the computer. What is sensitive is not these containers, or their value 
in themselves (nobody seems too worried about the computer being stolen) but what is within 
them, namely research protocols and the EC’s database of files. A surveyor asked after the seal of 
the IRB, the mark of an authentic review which is stamped on approved documents. The secretary 
explained she keeps it locked up, in a drawer. The security of these items is carefully guarded, and 
in a similar way, the space is too. I had signed a confidentiality agreement in order to be inside the 
room, because according to the secretary taking my signature, we would ‘see some very 
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Figure 21: Slide from closing powerpoint, evidencing the presence of 
the committee’s technology. 
confidential things.’ I asked her whether research proposals were ‘confidential,’ and she replied 
‘Yes!’ in a tone that implied ‘of course!’: ‘You might be working on something very new, or be in 
competition.’ The secretary unlocked the door and let us in.  As she did so, a surveyor asked her 
who else had the keys, and how many people had the password to the computer. She replied that 
she was the only one, implying that this was good — the room was secure. However, another 
surveyor was not so sure: ‘I’m not happy with just one girl having the keys, what if something 
happens to her?’ The lead surveyor shared his thoughts with me: ‘In Taiwan,’ he said, ‘we’re crazy 
for IRB. You have to sign your name if you visit, that is what they do in the US.’ I asked him why. 
‘Maybe you’ll steal,’ he said, seriously. I pointed out that in most cases, and on the 
recommendation of the Survey, files are locked in cabinets. ‘But we need to control people going 
into the office,’ he replied, gesturing to the door.
The main door to this Manila office opened onto the corridor. While the room, then, had its own 
door, which could be locked, it was partitioned off from a larger room with a five foot wall, in 
which there was another door. This second door, and the partition caused comment:
There should be a wall there! This is a confidential space, [it should have] only one door, 
not two. Someone could jump over the dividing wall, or get through the door from the 
other side!
The wall became a matter for a discussion when the groups came together at the end of day 
summary meeting. One group of surveyors (I will call them ‘A’) thought the partition ought to be 
made higher, ‘because you can reach over’. Others (‘B’) disagreed, arguing that the secretaries of 
the EC were sharing a photocopier with the office next door, and the door in the partition was 
convenient for them. 
A member of Group A said: ‘So she has to go out and round. We say “limit the access to IRB 
office from other staff’.” This was a direction to the person compiling recommendations in a 
powerpoint. She in turn paused on the bullet beneath, which to follow the layout, needed to be 
filled in with a reason for the recommendation: ‘If you are a mix of other people you cannot keep 
confidentiality,’ the person from Group A continued: ‘That’s why we want a separate building 
and independent structure.’ Addressing the typist at the powerpoint he instructed her to write: 
‘Partition should be higher.’ At this point the secretary of the committee being surveyed called 
out, as she was delivering documents to the usually closed end-of-day meeting. ‘But we only have 
one air-con!’, she said, ‘if you make it higher it won’t get through.’ The possibility of ‘reaching’ 
over the wall then turned into ‘jumping,’ and the familiar secretaries next door became altogether 
more sinister: ‘In that office before, researchers actually came in at night and looked for their 
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protocol.’ Group B protested. They had been shown by the petite female staff in the neighbouring 
office that the partition was far too high for them to reach over. With this, the matter was closed 
for the evening.
On the second night of the Survey, the partition came up again, because of new findings from 
Group B. One of group B’s members had spoken to the secretaries, who felt it would be difficult 
for them to comply with a raised partition or a wall. Raising the partition might be possible, they 
said, on the condition that the new, higher section was transparent. The secretaries’ spokesperson 
told the teams this was ‘because they only have one boss. They need visual access, so the boss can 
see if they’re sleeping!’ The following exchange then took place: 
A1: No, it should be closed completely. 
B: So there’s only one door? You want that? 
A1: Depends who will be on the other side.  
A2: I say close the door permanently. They can go out the real door. The entrance to the 
ERC should be separate. 
B: How can they close [the door] permanently?
A2: Throw away the key! It’s up to them to think how they can implement it. Before 
recognition, [we’ll] ask them to take photos. They should send evidence for us to see 
they’ve revised it. Maybe that wall - I will ask for a picture that they made it higher.
When, on the final day, the lead surveyor had finished his presentation, including the 
recommendation that the partition should be raised by ten inches, the ethics committee members 
were given the opportunity to ask questions about the recommendations. One of the secretaries 
asked why it was recommended that ten inches be added to the partition. ‘Please explain the 
rationale,’ she said.
A surveyor replied: 
It is better to have isolated, secluded space where no other irrelevant people can have 
access. Now you have two doors but the other side office has access. It depends on the 
composition of people in the other room. The partition is to restrict access, so there should 
only be one door. We think it is reasonable to keep the confidentiality of the room. In 
other IRBs if they share office space, they have to have mechanisms to keep the 
confidentiality of those people.
The chair then spoke on behalf of the committee.
Our building is overflowing with people and offices. There is no space for an exclusive IRB 
office. If we had a higher partition, someone can just climb back. We thought putting files 
under lock and key would suffice. The IRB is competing with other offices for desired 
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space, we’re bursting. It’s difficult to say it can be done. There is also a leak which has been 
unresolved for a year.
The surveyors answered: 
But the recommendation is not asking for more space! We know your constraints. The only 
recommendation is to make it more secure. Make the partition higher and correctly close 
the door. 
The disagreement I have recounted here speaks to the physical and symbolic segregation of ethics, 
not merely the claiming of space but the achievement of closing it and making it confidential. It 
was a repeated concern across Surveys I took part in: a separate room was preferable, but where 
space simply wasn’t available other measures were necessary. In one instance, a Survey coordinator 
announced to a hospital considering seeking recognition that they did need ‘something that 
separates, a door you can enter. You cannot have science and ethics together, there has to be a 
marked division.’ The outward appearance, and visibility of the room was also important: ‘This is 
the EC? But it’s called Science Research Admin!’
A common worry was the permanence of rooms acquired by ethics committees, and conversations 
often circled around a room’s limits. Archiving and the anticipation of future audits meant that 
space for the continually accumulating files and documents would always be in demand. Several 
offices I visited in Taiwan were described to me as ‘temporary’. Sitting with interviewees in the 
hallway outside one of these, I watched as they staked out what they would do, given sufficient 
budget: walking along imaginary new walls, encompassing the hallway and bay window into a new 
imagined archive area, claiming space. They drew up a new area with a table and a chairs for 
sitting and ‘educating’ PIs. The existence of room is a marker of having convinced the 
administration that ethics requires its own space, and the university that a committee needs 
financial support: the imaginary room that they drew up for me speaks of the expansion of ethics 
through its physical archives, but also its ambition to draw researchers into it.
The standardisation of procedures and practices is well documented (Brunsson and Jacobsson 
2000, Dunn 2005) but this is another access point: standardisation of a space as part of 
disciplining practice. This version of reproducibility is a carefully worked out standard, inscribed 
in the Surveyor’s checklists and in the weight of its arguments during the course of the four day 
visit. If knowledge of ethics committees travels through the survey, it finds its resting points in the 
rooms. What the ‘wall’ example illustrates is the tension inherent to the objective of the survey: a 
standardised room which takes in its context. The Surveyors are trying to make a room that can 
be context independent, while at the same time also trying to take in context dependency.
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Minutes
As the Survey demonstrated, in this world evidencing activity is as important as the activity itself. 
‘If it isn’t written down, it didn’t happen,’ surveyors say.25  FERCAP Surveyors go inside the 
Committee Room during a a committee meeting as part of the Survey, usually sitting around the 
edges of the room looking over the shoulders of the committee members (Figure 22).
They warn, however, that this is not standard practice amongst auditors from trial sponsors or the 
US FDA. If a committee is audited, the minutes will be the only record of meetings, ‘So it is 
important that [the minutes] capture what went on,’ committees are told. Under such 
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25  An almost identical phrasing was used by the Contract Research Organisation Monitor working on the trial 
documented by Simpson and Sariola (2012): ‘Things that were not normally documented had to be recorded according 
to the dictum: “not documented = not done.” In his view, if test results, examinations, the minutest of adverse reactions 
and observations were not recorded in writing, dated and signed, it would be the same as if they had never happened.
Figure 22: Surveyors observing a committee meeting, on tables surrounding the committee .
circumstances, documentation of deliberation is taken as indicative of whether the committee is 
compliant with GCP. As one Surveyor explained it:
when they audit, they look at the minutes. Are there missing things there? How did they 
arrive at decision? So is not just he/she said, its what you should do. Take notes, mark 
discussion points. Decisions should be based on discussion points. That is the expectation 
from the ethics committee. An ethics committee that works without minutes is not GCP 
compliant.
The accuracy of minutes can cause problems during a committee’s first Survey. ‘Unlike other 
areas,’ said a secretary from the Philippines, ‘where you can look at international guidelines, 
Helsinki, CIOMS,  there is not a guideline for minutes.’ 
During fieldwork, I noticed that some committee meeting minutes were being taken using a 
laptop, projected onto a screen at the opposite end to the chairperson. This practice was known as 
‘realtime minutes,’ and FERCAP encouraged it on the dual grounds of efficiency and accuracy. 
‘Everyone will be able to see,’ said one committee member. ‘Nowadays’, said another, ‘due to 
improvements in technology we can do a draft on the spot so members can already see what will 
be in the minutes. At the end of the discussion, we ask people if we missed anything.’26  A 
concession was made for languages where it is difficult to type fast enough to ‘capture’ the 
discussion. In such circumstances, minutes would be typed up using a recording and circulated to 
the committee members by email, the ‘old fashioned way’. Accuracy was cast not only in terms of 
committee members seeing whether their comments had been recorded, but also in terms of 
 Chapter 3: The Rooms of Ethics
111
26 This did not always meet with the intended success. As one Surveyor remarked of a Full Board meeting we observed, 
ʻ[The layperson] asked, does using these [contraceptive] pills lead to cancer? And instead of cancer, the secretary wrote 
abortion!’ Nobody on the committee noticed, but the Surveyors did. 
Figure 23: Minutes template
accuracy in discussion could be ensured by having the themes it would be important to minute 
already templated. Minutes templates are prepared, waiting to be filled in with discussion: ‘then 
nothing will be forgotten.’
FERCAP facilitated the ‘travel’ of this method through trainings. In 2009, the pre-Conference 
workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand a secretary from the Philippines had created a sample agenda, 
to guide minute making (Figure 23). She displayed an anonymized sample document which listed 
categories such as technical issues, elements of design, ethical issues, assessment of issues, further 
questions, and required modifications. This was considered easy to generate, ‘all my staff do it 
now,’ she said. It is a way, she noted ‘in the future, even if I’m not a member of the IRB anymore, 
to check what happened’. 
In her work, Stark suggests an ‘anticipatory perspective’ in the study of documentation, arguing 
from her study of American IRBs that 
board members’ sense of how the minutes of their current discussion would be written 
served as a social resource that they used to manage relationships - between each other and 
between themselves and researchers (2011a:252). 
She suggests that ‘unwritten minutes [...] steered the course of deliberation as it was still 
underway’ (2002:252). My findings here support her argument. It is clear that committees are 
aware of the possible future uses to which minutes of meetings may be put, even if the 
‘anticipatory perspective’ they exhibit is largely in anticipation of needing to anticipate.27 But with 
the creation of realtime minutes, rather than focusing on the deliberations of members and how 
they put their arguments across, I want to look at those who write the minutes during the 
meeting.
The creation of minutes is the work of the staff-secretary. The etymology of the word, with its 
roots in secret keeping, is particularly apt for the way Fiona and Karen, secretaries in the 
Philippines describe their work.28 When I joined the survey of their committee, Fiona was just 
handing over to Karen. During our interview, Karen she was laughing when she told me how 
difficult she’d found it to write the minutes. ‘It was a disaster!’ she exclaimed:
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27 According to the Code of Federal Relations (21 CFR §56.115a(1) and (2), the US FDA require, complete 
documentation. Deficiencies in record keeping can result in warnings, for example the Warning Letter issued to Teneo 
IRB (US FDA 2009), but as I have noted, the USFDA do not yet look at committees outside the USA.
28 Shapin and Schaffer note that the word ‘laboratory’ arrived in English usage in the seventeenth century, carrying with 
it apparently hermetical overtones: the space so designated was private, inhabited by secretists (1985:335).
I did not know what to write! I had to keep copying Fi’s notes. I had to write it down, so no 
notes were missing, but I couldn’t listen to them speak. I still get so mesmerised at how well 
they speak. At first, I couldn’t follow the thoughts. At the first meeting, the speakers were 
speaking, one would say something, one would clarify, another would tell another 
statement which doesn’t correspond to the other, you have to input another line […] I just 
couldn’t delineate as to where to start!
Fiona was sorting paperwork as Karen talked to me, but at this description she looked up. 
I think you need to follow. I was taught by Adelina how to take notes, and only get those 
relevant to the protocol. Other comments shouldn’t be part of the discussion, so you put 
them out of mind. So, each issue: what are the recommendations? What are the technical 
and ethical issues regarding the consent form? I categorise them in my mind during the 
meeting.
Karen explained that though she had a background in science, she found herself ill prepared for 
her secretarial role. 
At first I don’t know anything about ethics. I’m a biology graduate, I didn’t know what to 
expect in a review meeting, especially with doctors, professors, who kept saying things I 
don’t know. So I didn’t know what to write either. After that, [Fiona] taught me how to 
organise my thoughts and take down notes properly. Sometimes, they have very strong 
comments on one another, ‘I do not agree with your point!’ What do you do then?
In the ‘real time’ system, full board discussion is recorded by editing the speech of the committee 
members. As I have shown, a decision must be evidenced as resting on a discussion. But as Karen 
points out above, it is difficult to summarise a discussion as it develops. I know the difficulty 
myself, having tried to record by hand the discussions in ethics committees. Even with the 
flexibility that pen and paper afford over typed script on a screen; even with the ability to record 
expressions and gestures, multiply indent and annotate, it is difficult to say (from notes) how a 
decision is made, to track persuasion and rebuttal. Fiona took the opportunity of our interview to 
explain her thoughts not only to me, but also to Karen her new colleague.
Fiona: [to be a secretary] a person must know how to organize their thoughts well, and be 
able to multitask and remember. You learn how to divide your mind. Manage your mind 
and manage your time. Need to have good communication skills, and have confidentiality.
RDJ: How do you ‘have’ confidentiality?
Fiona: Like, we put a guard on ourselves - restrain ourselves from commenting, and remain 
silent, [to prevent] people asking follow up questions. If in this office, we share. If another 
office, no, because we signed [a] confidentiality agreement. 
Karen: The other office [staff] do not know what we are doing! They think we prepare for 
the meeting and we photocopy. They know how to appreciate [our work], that we’re always. 
They say ,‘What are you doing, why are you always so home late?’ Bosses don’t understand 
when I haven’t finished the work. They think its easy, write a letter, print, send protocols to 
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investigators. It seems easy. But when you’re in my place it isn’t work that requires 
intelligence, it requires time.
Fiona’s diversion of the conversation towards confidentiality recalls the attention paid by 
Surveyors to it in the room. Confidentiality appeared regularly, adhering to persons, times, 
material objects and spaces. I signed confidentiality agreements on entering committee rooms in 
Thailand, the Philippines and China; filing cabinets were under lock and key ‘for confidentiality’; 
computer record systems locked with a password ‘for confidentiality’. The concept had a curious 
flexibility, and occasionally, those presenting its use would trip up on quite where they were 
placing it. Due to its ubiquity as a principle, sometimes it seemed to cross circumstances even in 
the same example. During a lecture on ethics in publication, the lecturer below slips from the 
reviewer of an article for publication to a reviewer of a protocol in an IRB meeting, using an 
example from an ethics committee to illustrate his point about publication review:
Reviewers also have rights to confidentiality. In fact the reviewers of protocols, reviewers of 
articles for journal publication, their identities should be confidential. So I don’t know 
how you do your reviews in your institution, do you give up the name of the reviewer of the 
pap[er]... of the man[uscript]... of the protocol? When [our committee] was new some years 
ago, the staff didn’t know much about confidentiality. So she gave up the name of the 
reviewer to the investigator. The reviewer happened to be very, very good reviewer, with 
many, many comments. Seeming like the protocol will never be approved, of course the 
investigator wanted to question the reviewer. No! This staff actually gave the name of the 
reviewer. That’s bad, that is not allowed.
The slips in what reviewers review — the paper, manuscript, protocol — show the 
implementation of the principle of confidentiality slipping between circumstances. The reviewer 
of a paper does her job at the completion of research, the review of a protocol before it begins.
But let us return to the minutes Fiona and Karen are producing. As well as creating a far-future 
record for possible auditors, the minutes of a meeting serve another purpose: they are the guide 
from which secretaries proceed. Fiona and Karen are on the receiving end of inquiries from 
principal investigators, who are often in a hurry to get approval. 
Sometimes researchers don’t know that they will need ethical clearance and they request 
that their application is treated urgently. They think it’ll be easy, someone will review, and 
they’ll get it. I have to explain this is our process. 
Reference to ‘the process’ allows Fiona to deflect the blame for delay that PIs might otherwise 
place on her shoulders, but she finds herself in a mediating position:
The one who submitted [the protocol] thinks it can be expedited but the board thinks no. 
He keeps saying ‘Why? Why do I have to go through full board review?’ It is a challenge for 
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me, how can I say that board doesn’t agree this should be expedited? Sometimes I show 
[them] the standard operating procedures.’These are our criteria for expedited review 
considering your research. According to your board we cannot expedite because of the 
following issues.’ I just ask investigator to look at it. I give warning it’ll undergo full board, 
that this usually takes two to three months. I also say board may request you to modify your 
protocol so you have to expect [that]. I refer to chart on the wall to calm them — so we 
don’t have to explain every time they come. ‘Read our workflow,’ I say. 
In both spoken and written communication with PIs, she says: 
It’s very hard to be in the middle of everything - we have to satisfy both. Be transparent. 
There are the requests of both parties — I have to find the compromise so no one gets 
offended. To the investigator I say ‘Follow what the board tells you,’ but I break it gently. 
It’s very different comment from reviewer and give to investigator. You soften it. [The 
committee secretary] helps us rephrase. The contents don’t change, just the way… You use 
softer words. In meetings you usually hear harsh words. The members are outright. Not 
really, like last week, [in the meeting] someone said ‘This is scientifically unsound,’ but we 
cannot say that [to the investigator].
I’m interested in the changes that Fiona is describing. So what do you put in the letter?’ I ask her, 
‘The recommendations from the minutes?’ ‘Yes,’ she says, 
but we edit them. Just to make statements clearer, to make it….sound better. Sound softer. 
It’s better to give them….Well its the values of the Philippines. You get a negative 
perspective if you tell them something outright. We present it in a softer way, so they’ll be 
able to accept the criticism.”
Fiona reveals that she has learned how to distill points that are important from general discussion, 
writing only those as ‘evidence’ of a measured decision. These are recorded as the ‘minutes.’ She 
will then re-read the minutes and take the points, rephrasing them as she writes the letter to the 
Principal Investigator. She includes the comments from the evaluation forms of the reviewers, 
edited, in the letter. At each point, she tells me, the words are softened, made ‘less harsh.’ 
The few studies on ethics committees’ authority and legitimacy (Stark 2011b, O’Reilly et al. 2009) 
indicate that decision letters are one of the most significant vehicles for a committee’s activity, 
‘understood as a solution to the administrative problem that there is a need for a single 
authoritative ruling on the ethical standing of any application, but there are competing claims as 
to how that standing should be assessed’ (O’Reilly et al. 2009:258). Karen and Fiona describe 
tensions between researchers and the committee members in the making of that authoritative 
ruling. I now turn to the tensions that they must, in the real-time minutes, record: disagreements 
between committee members as they come towards a decision.
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Voting and Consensus: decisions and the visibility of opinions
In the committee meetings I saw with FERCAP I observed a variety of decision making tactics. 
The WHO 2009 booklet on Capacity Building in Research Ethics states that:
[m]ost committees make decisions through a process of consensus. This means that, instead 
of taking a vote and following the decision of the majority, they strive to make decisions 
that most people in the committee feel comfortable accepting (2009:22). 
However, the majority of committees I met with tended not to explicitly aim for consensus, even 
though it was acknowledged as the ideal. The following discussion from a training session in the 
Philippines lays out some of the difficulties. A committee member said that while she recognised 
in meetings ‘We have to have consensus, what if the group is not at consensus, but the members 
all have valid points?’ Cristina, who was running the session, responded: 
That’s the problem with consensus, if you do not vote [...] Consensus means you cannot 
vote. In Thailand, they table the protocol!29 Consensus means everybody agrees, or at least 
there’s only one who disagrees, but how do you know?
The question asker persists: ‘Isn’t it the point of having a diverse composition, to get diverse 
points of view? What if both points of view are valid?’ Cristina nods, but challenges back: 
But how do you make a decision? You have to arrive at a decision. That’s a problem. When 
there’s a difference in opinion, you arrive by voting. There should be something in the SOP 
that gives you a way out. You cannot be deadlocked. An EC is about decision making. 
Sometimes it’s like this: the chair sits there, the EC members are fighting and they finish 
then the chair says “approve”! But what did you approve? It has to be very clear, otherwise 
we cite that as a weakness. Decision making is very important to us as surveyors. The 
reviewer has no authority to make a suggestion [to the researcher]. It’s the full board. This is 
my problem in [Country X]: you give feedback and then they quarrel with the investigator. 
The investigator finds out you’re the one.[...]In full board your opinion can change, the final 
decision is a board decision, not an individual one. 
The difference revealed in this exchange between a consensus opinion and a board decision is 
subtle, but important. Consensus, the term used conversationally in my fieldwork, meant both 
the discussion and the decision: it was a process which contained a result. Discussion and voting, 
on the other hand, could be separated. In Cristina’s example, the board members are ‘fighting’, 
and then the Chair says ‘approve.’ She is using this as illustration of poor behaviour, since no link 
can be discerned between the discussion and the decision. 
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29 Used with the American meaning: to put the protocol aside and return to it in the next meeting.
In Stark’s detailed research into how decisions are made on IRBs in the USA, she writes that 
rather than consensus being the formal requirement and voting being the norm, voting is the 
formal requirement and consensus making is the habit: ‘group members act as if  they should each 
agree on a shared judgement that they all can get behind’ (Stark 2011a:236). Her observations 
brilliantly show how people persuade one another and how a committee comes to arrive at 
recommendations. What I want to look at here is how American models of open discussion and a 
consensus-vote (see also Guston 2006) are not easily adopted. 
A change in staff at a hospital in Taiwan had prompted the decision to send an administrative 
secretary to Western IRB for training. Edith, the committee’s long serving secretary was chosen, 
and she spent 6 months in Olympia, Washington USA at Western IRB. In our discussion, two 
years after her return, she focused not on her time in America but on the changes that she had 
implemented on her return to Taiwan: 
When I came back I just follow[ed] this way [they taught me] and have something to make 
the IRB more strong. And I did some SOP: now we have 30. In beginning, [we had] just 5-6 
SOP. Now, we follow it and we do the things right. Then we got FERCAP recognition to 
make sense of our quality quite good. 
Not all the changes Edith had tried to implement had been successful, however. In hopes of 
effecting greater efficiency, Edith tried to get her committee to change their manner of making 
decisions. She had watched and participated in committee meetings at WIRB during her training, 
and seen ‘the rule’: ‘[They] say ‘OK, did anyone have different opinion, or don’t agree. If [you] 
agree [with the proposed decision], say aye, and raise [your] hand.’ ‘When I came back,’ she said, ‘I 
tried to use this, but,’ she shrugged and shook her head:
I say OK, I know in some IRB in Taiwan we use voting paper and they just write, agree/
disagree. But I think this spends more time, you have to give the paper, calculate, collect. So 
after, I say, maybe we can use the raise hand. 
‘This way,’ she paused, ‘maybe not good.’ ‘Why not?’ I asked her. ‘If board member see every 
board member raise hand, maybe they just follow. So after,’ she said, brightening, “computer 
voting!’ I hardly needed to ask Edith whether this works better. ‘We don’t know who voted for 
which one!’ she said, with a big smile:
We just only have the number. 1 for agree, 2 for disagree. So they press, we don’t know 
[which] they press. Then maybe they have their own decision, not affected by other 
members. Another [good thing] is that its very quick — I just press enter, see how many 
agree.
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Decisions cast in the language of efficiency take in a variety of points and are the moment at 
which interpretation ceases.  I decided to ask Edith why raising a hand might be OK in WIRB, 
but not in her hospital. Her answer was considered, but she rested it initially on the idea of 
‘cultural difference’. ‘Because I think the culture is different,’ she said. 
In the West, people are more... They have their own opinion more stronger. In Asia, 
especially in my opinion we are more…[she gestures at me] Maybe if I saw Rachel raise her 
hand, maybe I follow because I don’t want to become the different person. 
For Edith and her committee, the moment of decision itself was a moment of uncomfortable 
interpretation which needed a solution. The invisible vote provided it. While all could vote 
equally under the invisible voting system however, opinions given in discussion could not be 
dissociated from the speaker. Edith spoke about the discussions her committee had at the same 
time:
Now in the Board Meeting they speak, they just say their opinion — I think ‘Good.’ 
Doctors, you know, it’s something different with them. Doctors in hospital think they are 
dominant [...] When I joined, they just….Now we have more time to discuss - since I joined 
the IRB. Doctors, they say ‘Oh, our meeting is quite long, why?’ Sometimes we discuss just 
one proposal for ½ an hour, sometimes more. Because every member they have different 
thinking.
Edith’s suggests that the ‘different thinking’ of every board member is an achievement of a 
particular sort. Her ingenious voting system creates the space for a difference between points of 
view that is assumed to exist, and permits the expression of it by removing the social visibility that 
would otherwise — she claims — hamper its expression. The ability to conceal a single person’s 
vote is also useful when one wants (or needs) to see the outcome of the vote as the decision of a 
committee: the decision retrospectively creates that which decided as single, rather than multiple. 
As Cristina emphasised in the training earlier, a final decision is a board decision. Similarly, when 
the lecturer slipped from the reviewer of an article for publication to a review of a protocol in an 
IRB meeting, he was at pains to remind his listeners that:
When your EC reviews, it is your committee that is reviewing, it is not just one or two 
people reviewing. The board speaks as one. So it is only the name of the chair of the IRB, not 
everyone, in that communication [to the PI]. It is a mistake to inform investigators or 
authors that, ‘Dr so-and-so reviewed and found your article questionable because of the 
following.’ OK?
During an interview with Chandeep, a Sri Lankan committee member, I found he wanted to 
make the point explicitly: ‘an ethics committee is not an individual its a committee.’ Procedure, he 
thought, would help a committee be a committee: 
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You realise that there are many factors making committees not work as committees. There 
is this thing called groupthink. People fall into line, perhaps because of who said 
something, say I say ‘blah blah blah’ and because its me who said it, or because a certain 
individual told that, people aren’t going to critique. I don’t think that’s real decision mode. 
Dynamics should be set in such a manner that all get the chance to speak [...] ethics 
committees should have an operating procedure to make decisions on consensus basis.
Chandeep’s description of a committee as a procedure reveals his assumptions about what a ‘real’ 
decision should look like. When he described to me the perils30  of ‘consensus’ he revealed 
concern with who makes a point and how that affects decision-making:
With groupthink, if there is a catchy personality, then the rest of the ideas…The role of a 
chair is to ensure there is good participation so there is proper consultative decision 
making.
His reference to groupthink reveals his education in an American bioethics tradition. William H. 
Whyte coined ‘Groupthink’ at a time when American tensions between individuality and ‘the 
dark forces of conformity and collectivism’ (Shapin 2008:120) were at their height. Bureaucracies 
were regarded as a threat for those like Whyte, who sought ‘to protect the creative scientific spirit 
that resided in the unique, autonomous, and free-acting individual’ (Shapin 2008:119). Whyte’s 
anxiety was with ‘rationalized conformity — an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group 
values are not only expedient but right and good as well’ (Whyte 2012[1952:114]). As Champney 
summarises: 
[t]entativeness and humility are needed in group processes, not only because a group can be 
unanimously wrong but because the unreconstructed individual (however much he may 
sand up the group bearings) has a vital role to play in the total picture (1952:384). 
This ‘unreconstructed individual’ is Whyte’s ‘layman, the what-the-hell sort of character who 
carries his center of gravity on the inside of him’ (Champney 1952:383). This particular reading of 
the layman puts an era-driven positive spin on the individual point of view in a group setting.31 
Stark uses transcripts of EC meetings to demonstrate how opinions are evaluated; how people 
persuade others, or fail to. Her concern is to demonstrate how, in the creation of ‘the social actor 
known as “the IRB”, documents liberate individual evaluators to make what they consider to be 
extreme judgements’ (2011a:235). She draws on a committee meeting she observed where Kevin, a 
junior researcher serving on the IRB found fault with the protocol of a more senior researcher he 
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30 Chandeep referenced the Challenger disaster as an iconic case of ‘Groupthink’. For an academic account see 
Vaughan (1996).
31 A more historically oriented thesis might look at contemporary concerns of IRB censorship raised by Katz (2007), 
Hamburger (2004) and the ‘New Groupthink’ (Cain 2012, see also Safire 2004) in relation to the concerns of this era of 
American history. Unfortunately, such a project is beyond the present work. 
knew. Citing his professional experience, he persuaded fellow members that a change really 
should be requested, but was reluctant to allow the board to act upon it, however, since he would 
be “dead meat” on campus. The senior researcher, he thought, would know it was he who had 
recommended the change. It was not calls upon his ‘duty’ to protect human subjects which swayed 
him to permit the change, but the fact that he would not be identified in the meeting minutes. To 
Stark, ‘the fact that individual opinions can be presented as the view of “the IRB” erases personal 
accountability’ (2011a:235), creating a situation in which documents enable the ‘impression that 
there is no one to hold accountable’ (2011b:71).
Where Chandeep wants a board decision to be made through a consensus in which ‘all get the 
chance to speak’ sometimes, committee members (particularly laypersons) felt slighted if their 
thoughts could not shift the tenor of conversation in a consensus oriented discussion:
Why end up with consensus? Why is my comment more or less valuable than someone 
else’s? Sometimes [my comments are] not taken well, not appreciated. I feel [my comment] 
is supposed to be out there, otherwise, why [should we] still get a diverse composition? Get 
doctors and that’s it.
Yet discussion is ‘part’ of what makes a committee a committee, according to the measures 
FERCAP has set down in the Survey. When I visited a committee meeting in Taipei, my host took 
pains to translate the conversation, and point out to me the kind of concerns that the various 
members were raising. A lawyer had asked questions about the validity of the informed consent 
form, a layperson had queried terminology. ‘Our discussion’, he said proudly, ‘is as good as 
America.’ However, as Edith discovered, applying standards, largely American, did not always go 
smoothly. 
Conflict of Interest: invisible relations
Another challenging standard was ‘Conflict of Interest’ (COI). During my visit to the Philippines 
in April 2010, I attended two FERCAP surveys and several trainings. On the opening day of one 
survey, Cecilia a chair of various national boards, explained to the surveyors and trainees some of 
the challenges of conducting ethical review in her country. Classing conflict of interests as an 
‘obstacle’ to quality ethical review, she lamented that in the Philippines: 
[w]e do not understand or easily recognize conflicts of interest. One time, we had a member 
in the National Ethics Committee, a very respected researcher who was also a head of a 
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health institution. He said, ‘I think our health institution should be exempted from ethics 
review because we’ve been doing research for so long.’ I said ‘OK byee!’ So its not very clear 
yet what this is all about. Since we do not recognise conflicts of interest, we do not manage 
[them].
In not permitting experience to stand over submission to ethics, Cecilia illustrated how both 
researchers and institutions had to adapt to the changes brought about by GCP and research 
ethics: neither experience nor seniority provided exemption from external evaluation. As the 
amount of internationally sponsored research increased in the Philippines, so did attendance at 
trainings on international standards. I joined a lecture in theatre 222 of the College of Medicine, 
where some forty or fifty course attendees had gathered for a presentation on Conflict of Interest 
by Dr Rodriguez, Professor of Legal Medicine and Ethics at the School of Law. His lecture echoed 
the concern that it was something ‘difficult to see’. The potential in Conflict of Interest which 
makes people anxious. It can — as Emory University found out — put you on the front page of 
the New York Times.32  In the same way as ‘confidentiality’ flipped from being a concept 
committees sought to ensure for participants in the trials that they reviewed to being something the 
committee itself must demonstrate, conflict of interest is a topic committees examine in the protocols 
review, and one which affects them directly. Although committees are tasked to consider the 
former concern, Canadian commentator Lemmens (2006:32) points out that COI has a vast 
reach. The assessment would include the clinical trial agreement between researchers and 
sponsors, the budgets of trials (particularly the incentives for the recruitment of subjects and any 
payments to them) publication agreements, the scientific validity of the trial, access to data and 
the publications that result. ‘Should RECs be expected to do all of this work’, Lemmens asks, 
‘indeed, are they capable?’ (2006:32). In his view, they ‘cannot take sole responsibility for 
unraveling the complex relationship between scientists and the companies that sponsor 
them33’ (ibid). The knowledge that brought committee members to their ‘expert’ role on the IRB 
was also the knowledge that made the exercise of this role problematic: if they knew the field of 
cancer, say, it was also likely that they knew who worked on cancer in their institute. Even 
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32 Despite 20 different COI policies in the University. (U.S. Department of Energy 2011).
33 The relationship can be even more complex, when, writing about India, Gulhati considers hospitals owned by drug 
companies, and their institutional  ethics committees, since there is ‘no legal requirement for investigators or members 
of the Ethics Committee to declare a conflict of interest [in India]’ (Chatterjee 2008: 577).
anonymized protocols, reviewers would probably be able to deduce whose protocol was under 
review34. Rodriguez described this social proximity as ‘bias’:
There is always this tendency of bias, when you talk about a committee who are all 
barkadas35  of the one conducting the research. You know our culture, Philippinos. Our 
barkadas, as medical students we are a close group, close friends there who went through 
thick and thin all throughout. ‘Hey, this is a proposal from Dr so and so. And I’m the one 
reviewing it?’ So there is always this potential. 
Rodriguez reminded his trainees that they will often know the applicants: ‘[w]e are faculty, same 
institute. It is a problem as much as you like them, as if you dislike them. You still feel something 
towards them.’ He also reminded investigators who sat on committees that they may know how to 
do clinical trials, 
but when you sit in the EC you wear a different hat because you are supposed to institute 
that check and balance. You’re supposed to present an alternative perspective, not the 
perspective of an investigator.
Those with experience of the clinical research environment were often considered useful people to 
have on ethics committees, so the appointment did not prevent them from conducting research. 
However, Rodriguez pointed out that ‘practically everything you do now you see a sponsor, a 
multinational corporation funding the researchers.’ He warned committee members to be careful: 
In the US, all members make a declaration about their investment. They think anything 
over $10,000, in WIRB36, if they do Pfeizer protocols. Those with stocks in Pfeizer have to 
leave the room. That’s how they look at COI [...]. In the US, it was said that the $10,000 is 
a minuscule, a negligible amount. But here in the Philippines $10,000 US dollars is really 
something.
Translating from dollars to Philippine pesos was an attempt to evaluate the amount of money that 
would cause an ‘undue influence’. Things got more complicated however, as money, he told us, 
was the ‘only tangible thing in the array of secondary interests. It’s always easy to address it 
because money is there, you see it.’ Other things were less visible, and required different forms 
and degrees of self awareness.
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34  I should point out that I am not arguing that this problem of finding relations in a committee is exclusive to the 
countries where FERCAP works.  A recent anonymous posting to IRB Forum, an ethics discussion group, made public 
a recommendation by Penn’s legal department to dissolve its internal IRB and use an external commercial IRB due to 
concerns about internal conflicts of interest (Corman 2009: 10). However, the existence of companies conducting 
ethical review in the USA does mean that the landscape is less personal: one could send a protocol away  to another 
more ‘independent’ committee. 
35 Filipino slang for a group of friends or peers. With thanks to Atoy Navarro for translation assistance.
36  Western IRB, based in Olympia WA has had significant interaction with FERCAP and ethics committees in the 
Asian region through its WHO funded developing countries training program. See Introduction.
Secondary Interests
 ‘We think of COI in terms of your perception’ counselled Rodriguez:
You are an ethical individual and therefore you can not do anything wrong. But that’s not 
the definition of COI. COI means that you are ethical [and] at the same time you recognise 
you have a different role and a different interest.
Recognising these different roles and interests meant being aware of ‘secondary’ interests — and 
with this, we entered the realm of the intangible. ‘We cannot come up with a researcher without 
conflict of interest,’ Rodriguez told us, ‘Life desires to have fame. How do we measure that desire?’ 
Secondary interests applied as much to ethics review committee members as to those who 
conducted research, but as I observed above, often these persons were one and the same. While 
those who sat on ethics committees tended to have an interest in research, interests were something 
different:
Problems occur when secondary interests dominate, unduly influence, distort, or corrupt 
the integrity of a physician’s judgement in relation to patient health (Thompson 1993) 
Fortune, fame, and family threaten the integrity of the professional judgement.37
So how are these ‘interests’ to coincide, to come into ‘conflict’? The extension of ‘interest’ reveals 
for anthropologists the starting assumptions on which COI disclosures are based. Anthropologist 
Chris Gregory, in revisiting anthropological readings of economist Adam Smith, finds them 
selective, focusing only on greed and rational self interest: the Theory of Moral Sentiment, he argues, 
is more subtle (Gregory 2011). Smith scholars such as Griswold (2006) and Bhanu Mehta (2006) 
would agree. Consider the passages of Smith selected by Griswold, writing on the imagination and 
its relation to self interest:  
The “natural misrepresentations of self-love can be corrected only by the eye of this 
impartial spectator” (III.3.4 cf III5.5) Moral self-consciousness requires that I “divide 
myself, as it were, in two persons” (III.I.6). The idealized judge is still a spectator - the stand-
in for “the public” (Griswold 2006:38). 
Based on these excerpts, Griswold argues that ‘the theatrical relation is thus internalized; we 
become our own public,’ concluding that ‘[o]ur understanding and moral assessment not just of 
others, but of ourselves as well, depend on an exercise of the imagination’ (2006:38). Through 
contrast with other ways of thinking about persons that we can see the contrivance of imagination 
at work in the concept of Conflict of Interest. As Strathern remarks, 
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37 See Thompson (1993) for the counter argument that conflicts are usually not illegitimate, indeed they are frequently 
necessary and desirable.
[t]he center is where the twentieth century Western imagination puts the self, the 
personality, the ego. For the ‘person’ in this latter day Western view is an agent, a subject, 
the author of thought and action, and thus ‘at the center’ of relationships (1988:269). 
Strathern is reflecting on a diagram (Figure 24) drawn by Maurice Leenhardt (1979 [1947]) which 
depicted his understanding of New Caledonian ‘personage.’
While this diagram works well for the way Conflict of Interest is imagined — locating a person by 
means of her relationships — for Strathern it revealed in visual form a limitation in Leenhardt’s 
depiction of Caledonian sociality. In her critique, Strathern observes that even in attention to the 
way in which peoples relationships make them up, the individual subject is foregrounded. She 
remarks that ‘Leenhardt’s star shaped configuration carries the one and same presumption: living 
within, guided by, driving, functioning as, or knowing through these structures of relationships 
must be the individual subject’ (1988:269-270). What COI makes explicit is the tension inherent 
in this model of the individual subject. While COI models do not re-imagine dividuality, they 
exist because of the recognition that people belong ‘to a matrix of radiating relations’ (2004 
[1991]: 68). The attention to relationships provoked by Conflict of Interest suddenly appears as a 
way of seeing people that looks a lot like certain proposals for theorising ‘social reality’: 
If we are to produce adequate theories of social reality, then the first step is to apprehend 
persons as simultaneously containing the potential for relationships and always embedded 
in a matrix of relations with others (Strathern 1990a: 10).
What is the difference between seeing people as always embedded in a matrix of relations and 
seeing these as ‘interests,’ contained within?
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Figure 24: Replication of the diagram produced in Gender of the Gift 
(1988) in which Strathern’s critique appears. 
Discipline
Rodriguez continued: A conflict exists whether or not decisions are affected. Conflict implies only 
the potential for bias or wrong doing. And the basic step that you must consider is failure to disclose 
is wrong.’  Participants in the training were encouraged to ‘think about’ what conflicts of interest 
they might have, with the lecturer assuring them that ‘half the problem is solved if the presence 
[of interests and their possible conflicts] is recognised’. Having listed various potential conflicts of 
interest — with conflict itself understood as ‘potential for bias or wrongdoing’ — disclosure was 
introduced as the next step. ‘Disclosure is the cornerstone of the Conflict of Interest guidelines 
and regulations,’ Rodriguez announced
You can keep it to yourself, but you will be taking a risk because once its discovered or if a 
third party disclose it, then you are in deep trouble. In the US it is a very big thing because 
I think the regulation carries a penal clause, meaning they can give a penalty. It’s not only a 
concept of ‘Hey, what you did was wrong.’ [...] It’s imperative that all clinical researchers 
would have this openness when it comes to Conflict of Interest. You simply cannot hide 
one or two and disclose the rest because eventually it will be discovered. That is a 
requirement that you alone can perform [...] So you might as well start by disclosing it.
According to Rodriguez, the revelation of conflicts of interest required ‘discipline’, as there was 
‘no other way for others to know’ if one was harbouring a conflict of interest around the table at 
the committee meeting. It would also, he implied, be difficult for those who knew to point to 
someone. ‘It’s a cultural thing, if we say “You have a conflict of interest, get out”, there will be 
hurt feelings.’ This sort of discipline, the revelation of internally held knowledge of relationships 
external to the committee, meant committee members were told they could not ‘be silent’, but 
had to ‘manage’ their conflicts ‘preemptively.’ We see here legacies of Durkheimian thought, with 
its public and private dimensions, both visible and invisible, external and internal (Durkheim 
1992, Ezrahi 1990). The ‘perceived relationship between inner and outer worlds’ (Strathern 
1992a:184) provides a model of human thought and action lends itself well to a consideration of 
‘interest’ in the phrase ‘conflict of interest’. Interests are not visible attributes, they must be 
declared, moved from internal to external. The focus for conflict of interest has moved, replacing 
an examination of relationships between committee members with an examination of one’s 
relationship to oneself (thought of as containing or composed of relations), by finding a position 
from which this can be viewed. I return to the work of Griswold (2006) above, as he traces Smith’s 
comparison, or conflation, of moral and visual judgement: 
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Smith [...] compares the process by which we learn to exercise balanced moral judgment to 
that by which we learn to make correct visual judgments. He has Berkeley’s New Theory of 
Vision in mind, a book of which he thought very highly. The basic idea is that just as I 
cannot gauge the correct proportions of objects of different sizes and at varying distances, 
except by “transporting myself, at least in fancy, to a different station, from whence I can 
survey both at nearly equal distances,” so too I cannot accurately evaluate the magnitude of 
my passions in comparison with another’s except by viewing them “neither from our own 
place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and 
with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either and who 
judges with impartiality between us” (Griswold 2006: 38)
On this point I wish to pause: there is more potential in the study of this point of Conflict of 
Interest than I can draw out here. The material resonates with the creation of objectivity in the 
Survey through the ‘distance’ of foreign surveyors, it parallels the moralisation of objectivity in the 
work of Daston and Galison (1992: 81) and draws ‘truth’ and representation together under the 
banner of moral obligation. For now, what I wish to draw attention to is how members are 
problematising concealment and revelation, for the duration of the meeting, as a moral act that 
only the individual member is capable of performing. For a committee, this requires thinking of 
people as already related: as individual committee members or researchers they have their 
relationships, and thus their potential conflicts, ‘built in.’
In the Philippine ethnography above, COI may not only jeopardize the ‘objectivity’ of a 
researcher, but also cast doubt upon the research enterprise itself. Members’ relationships outside 
the committee come to be constitutive of the trustworthiness of the committee as a unit. When a 
person discloses a COI, s/he will usually stand and leave the room. The recognition and 
management of COI can be evidenced by minuting that bodily action. Cecilia and Dr Rodriguez 
both indicate that for conflict of interest has the potential to inhere in any of the relations of 
which a person is made up. It can reside in their internal attributes (their ambition) and their 
relationships (through kin or money) which, during the committee meeting, are seen to be carried 
in the body of the (in)dividual committee member.38 As Rodriguez says, it is not that some of the 
people to whom one might be connected might be bad. Rather, it is that the connections themselves, 
unrevealed might cause difficulties. The distinction, as drawn by the lecturer, was that it is not a 
crime to have conflicts of interest, but to not declare them. Thus it becomes the responsibility of 
each member to scan their relations. This is the nature of their ‘disciplining.’ 
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38  I suggest they are thought of perhaps more as ‘dividual’ (Marriot 1976; Strathern 1988) at these moments than 
individual, since their ‘internal composition depends on external relations’ (Fowler 2004:26), an observation which 
perhaps, given my revisitation of Smith (re)complicates the individuality of the models from which notions of COI are 
drawn (see also Hess 2006).
Munro observes that ‘[w]here the consciousness of individuals is regarded as primary, [...] the 
tendency is always to re-locate relations inside these ‘wholes‘ — to the domain Kant called the 
‘universe within’ (2005: 256, references omitted). The ‘interests’ of which Rodriguez speaks are 
thought of to be both ‘out there’ in society and ‘in’ the individual. They are seen to be forces that 
move without people: financial interests, company interests, pharmaceutical interests. But it is also 
easy to imagine these interests ‘into’ persons, in their financial motivations, their ambition. 
Furthermore, if those interests are ‘in’ persons, then those persons can then come to stand for 
those things. ‘Conflict of Interest,’ I suggest requires a ‘holistic model of society in which specific 
interests would be located in relation to one another’ (Strathern 1988a:26), one where Ethics 
Committees are called to to ‘play a role mediating the interest of particular groups’ (Tupara 
2011:369). In Chapter 2, I showed how during the survey it is the company of others that makes 
objectivity possible. The views of Surveyors are de-personalised in their combination, making the 
Survey’s recommendations seem objective. Here, the possibility of concealed interior relations 
prevents objectivity. Relations — configured as interest — constitute rather than dilute bias.39 
Concluding remarks
I initially paid attention to space in this chapter because I wanted to highlight the way the ethics 
committee — in its physical, enacted form — constitutes a knowledge space. Drawing on David 
Turnbull (2002), we could think of the requirements of the space, oft repeated in surveys - a 
computer with a database, a fax machine, a printer, a photocopier — as ‘templates’ for the 
cathedrals of ethics, assembling standardizing, transmitting and utilizing knowledge. The closing 
reports of Survey project images of these pieces of technology as achievements of the space, the 
space the achievement of the will of the committee. The organisation has been convinced.40 
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39 Or, in Haraway’s terms, ‘embedded relationality is the prophylaxis for both relativism and transcendence’ (Haraway 
1996:440).
40 I am not suggesting that the ‘achievement’ of space is unique to Asian contexts, rather that as we saw above, hospitals 
and universities may need convincing. A parallel of the significance of ‘taking’ space for Ethics is found in the language 
of Auerbach’s report on an Amherst alumnus, Ezekiel Emmanuel, a bioethicist who took up a role at the US National 
Institutes of Health: 
Emanuel  [...] took one look at the government-issue green-hued rooms where NIH scientists did their work 
and [said] “That’s not the right environment for bioethicists.” Emanuel created a central common space. 
Under a giant conference table, he placed an Oriental  rug, and on the walls, he hung “real art”, he says, 
including African masks from his many travels to that continent. Emanuel  tore down walls to expand the 
bioethics department’s territory, and he has colonized other NIH institutes to add faculty to his 
department. (Auerbach 2009)
However, I do not want to over-emphasise technology. It is evidently embraced as an ‘ally’ of both 
ethics and audit in its facilitation of reports and minutes (see Strathern 2002b:308). Its mere 
presence in the photographed contents of offices is also used as a measure in the Survey. But 
Juntra, the SIDCER coordinator once told me that good ethical review is not a technology, and that 
any country can ‘have’ it, developed or not. I found the phrase repeated on powerpoint slides. 
What does this assertion mean? She tries to explain: 
What I want is [a situation where] everywhere they can analyse ethics issues in their country 
for public good.[...] If you don’t have electricity you can still run an EC. If [we’re] discussing 
efficiency, if you have lots of protocols, those technologies can help you work faster. But 
you can still can do it with everything manual. The way how you review [is] still the same, 
it’s based on same principles. You can’t follow up as completely as those with technology. 
It’s different from other types of Lab. If you don’t have technology, you can still function 
with paper and do it the old fashioned way. But the Ethics Committee is not a lab, that’s 
why if [they] don’t have technology, [they can use] paper, conservative way. They just have to 
organise the system differently [...]. Some EC could be recognised without a computer, as 
long as they review properly and follow up properly. 
First it is ‘different from other types of Lab’, and then ‘it is not a lab.’ Juntra slips easily between 
the descriptions, since to her, I suggest, the Ethics Committee is a way of thinking,41  supported 
by a certain arrangement of space. Standard Operating Procedures detail who (what kinds of 
persons) it must contain. These people are defined largely by their knowledges: a powerpoint 
listing composition of the Ethics Committee in Taiwan read ‘profession: layperson’. But despite 
strong appeals to templating,  (even in the form of discussion) there cannot be a template for the 
social life of those who form the committees. I have argued in this chapter that the ethics 
committee, as a group of people sitting around a table in a room, both relies on and denies the 
relations those persons bring to that room. Dealing with the personal that attaches to the official 
is problematic. A PI is one’s boss, a reviewer is also a colleague, those sitting around the table with 
you, deciding, are your superiors. By routing these concerns through the room, we arrive at its 
permeabilities. Indeed, the mechanisms of ‘Conflict of Interest,’ recognise the embodiment of 
those relations, as one must take one’s connections to those people out of the conversation by 
removing oneself from the room. Edith’s solution to the problem that connections cause when 
one is visible to another, is to make the voting invisible.
If we are usefully to regard the ethics committee as a laboratory then, it is not in the sense that it 
is experimental, rather in the sense that the enclosed space lends it a robustness, particularly in 
comparison with spaces where questions are not disciplined (e.g. Callon et al. 2009, and Callon 
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41 I explore this further in Chapter 5.
and Rabeharisoa 2008). Through the Survey FERCAP desire a system in a room that will produce 
replicable results: in the documents they look for consistency, they look for completeness, they 
look for discussion in the meeting. A room can be made and peopled with those who will produce 
replicable results, within the measures set. The ‘objectivity’ of ethics committee members is 
sought, demonstrating the ‘political action in the sphere of attestive visual perception’ (Ezrahi 
1990: 170) transferring from the physical to social world. Lamont’s work (2009) on the 
‘mechanics’ of deliberations shows that ‘technolog[ies] of evaluation around which evaluative 
cultures are intertwined [...] define and constrain possibilities’ (2009:23). This chapter is evidence 
both of the material and verbal aspects of her assertion.
I opened the chapter with Hobbes’ concern over the designated space for natural philosophy to 
point to his concern with its public status. I want to suggest that in the ‘attestive visual perception’ 
of the Surveyors lie links with the dispute about the witnessing of which Shapin and Schaffer 
document (2011[1985]). As the Surveyors bear (mutual) witness to the standards of one another’s 
ethics committees, the ethics committees bear witness to the science in the protocols on their 
table. This has not gone unnoticed by scholars (Hamburger 2004, Stark 2011b). What is sought is 
the ‘objectivity’ so desired by Hobbes and Boyle, witnesses to the making of a ethically sound 
science, but now — in the absence of ‘gentlemen’ (Shapin 1994), their society and assumed 
attributes (Handler and Segal 1990, cited in Strathern 2005a:44) in a way that is perceived as 
democratic. I develop this point in Chapter 5. 
In summary, the ‘ethics’ of this chapter has taken the form of walls, locked cupboards, well 
phrased letters, examinations of the self, standard operating procedures and organograms. But it 
is also the concerns in the room, the acting out of the concept of conflict of interest, and what it 
betrays about the sociality of a committee meeting. An editorial in the Indian Journal of Medical 
Ethics entitled ‘Ethics in Ethics committees’ (Jesani 2009) criticized the ‘silence’ on the operation 
of ethics committees. ‘Why is it’, he asked:
that even 30 years after ECs were first established in India, we do not have even 
experiential accounts (let alone systematic studies) on ECs in the public domain? Why have 
EC members not narrated the challenges and dilemmas they have faced, and discussed how 
to make regulations effective. Would doing so compromise the confidentiality of research 
and the ethics review process? Unless committed individuals find ways of speaking out on 
EC functioning, ECs will continue to function as secret societies unaccountable to the 
public and with poor public credibility. While specific information related to projects and 
individuals may be confidential, this is not true of the ethics review process itself’ (2009:2).
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I suggest that perhaps some of the issues raised above might begin to answer Jesani’s question. For 
example, we see his concern with confidentiality emerge as more than it might first appear. It is a 
bodily attitude on the part of the secretaries, it is my signature on a form at the door of the 
committee. It is the shredding of documents before sale of scrap paper, it is the height of a wall. 
The physical boundaries to the room combine with the attitudes of those who use it to form a 
combined assemblage: ‘They don’t know what we do’, remarks Fiona, speaking of friends in the 
office next door to her. Jesani’s complaint reveals the tension anew: confidentiality must be kept 
from becoming secrecy, a term not imbued with the virtue of the former (e.g. Easter et al. 2004). 
Here lies one of the tensions Jesani identifies: its bureaucratic secrecy and its public service, its 
every-man ethics and its scientific expertise. Although ‘[b]ureaucratic administration always tends 
to be an administration of “secret sessions”: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action 
from criticism’ (Weber 1946:233). This is precisely what Jesani queries. Returning to the text with 
which I open, Jesani’s comments also resonate with Hobbes’ claim that ‘the privacy of 
experimental space did its own political work’ (Shapin and Schaffer 2011[1985]:320). Jesani is 
asking whether “secret” work on behalf of the public is acceptable, particularly when, Stark 
reminds us, IRBs ‘change what is knowable?’ While I take up this theme again in Chapter 5, the 
next chapter rests with the difficulties encountered by Edith, Fiona, and Karen. I suggest that 
these stories relate to the modes available to people to make criticisms. Indeed, not simply the 
modes, the force that certain modes can take. This I develop through the comparisons of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Jury, the Ethics Committee and the Law.
I arrived at FERCAP’s Bangkok offices in March 2010 on a pink motorbike. It was not my 
intended method of transport, but the bus at Thammasat University had taken an unexpected 
detour and I had found myself on the wrong side of campus, lost. A secretary took pity, fired up 
her motorbike and dropped me off at FERCAP’s office. It was a modern glass building called 
‘Academic Affairs’ on the edge of Rangsit Campus and it also housed the WHO TDR Clinical 
Coordination and Training Center. When I walked into its air-conditioned atrium it was the 
lunch break of a training workshop. I sat amongst familiar faces who offered me tea and fruit. 
Their discussion was focused on how FERCAP was effecting change. Juntra was speaking: 
In the old days, people tended not to say that they couldn’t do something, there was a 
problem of losing face. Now the culture has changed. If they don’t know, they should take 
responsibility: “I should be trained on x.” That’s what GCP is about. I think FERCAP has 
done a good job in bringing this to a certain level. Before it felt like it was like a jury - to 
give a sentence. We have to change that perception. Your job is to get the investigator to feel 
they need your advice on that. They’ll come to you because everyone wants to do their 
research better. To change that attitude, which has been there for years. Many are better 
now.
Juntra’s reference to a jury resonated with something I had heard before. Six months earlier, I had 
been interviewing Harsha, a layperson on a Sri Lankan ethics committee. We had been sitting in 
plush executive chairs at the long, black boardroom table of her employer’s office, waiting for her 
secretary to bring us tea. As it arrived, I asked about her experiences on the ethics committee: ‘So, 
what’s it like?’ I said. ‘Well, Rachel,’ she began,
It’s like a jury. Sometimes, the common man’s view is taken up, and the questions that are 
asked by us three [laypeople] they are so non-medical. Sometimes, they give them ideas, they 
discuss while we’re completely clueless, they go into detail for us. Sometimes, our responses 
give them an idea of how the common man might react. For example, if there was organ 
donation or something, the questions we ask - for example, how explicit is it, is it usefully 
explained? What is its history? Has there been testing on normal patients? The cross section 
of members is useful, as in a jury. I wonder, sometimes, whether we’re just there to add 
acceptability to the Ethics committee.
Though the emphasis is different, the common comparison both women make is that an ethics 
committee is ‘like a jury.’ Juntra’s concern is with judgement and the relationship between the 
committee and its applicants; Harsha’s with the relationships within it, how different people deal 
differently with information, weighing it, making decisions, knowing why those decisions were 
made. My concern in this chapter takes off from both of these, forming a commentary on the 
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difficulties people experience sitting on ethics committees, and how they find ways around the 
negative connotations of judgement. The counter of a jury allows me to bounce comparisons 
back, illuminating in the process ways in which an ethics committee is both ‘like’ and ‘not like’ a 
jury. As the comparison progresses we see points that, approached directly, might slip away. I 
speak particularly of the model-like features of the Ethics Committee, how that model contains 
within it certain assumptions of what ‘society’ is and what it requires that concept of ‘society’ to 
do or be in order to operate. In negative comparison, I draw out the differing role of publics, 
expertise, laypersonhood and locality as a way of highlighting the ethics committee’s ideals. 
My interviewees were not the only ones to observe (or experience) a similarity between a jury and 
an ethics committee. To begin, I introduce a version of the jury-ethics committee comparison 
made by Carl Coleman. Coleman is an American lawyer who has worked closely with the WHO, 
and attended the FERCAP Conference in Shanghai. I draw on his conference discussion on the 
revisions of the WHO Silver Book (2000, 2011) below. At the outset however his academic voice, in 
conversation with fellow lawyer Lars Noah, offers us some points to think through what 
anthropologists will recognise as an old problem: social control (Ross 2009 [1901], Colson 1953, 
Gluckman 1955, 1972; Gulliver 1963, Strathern 1985). Their debate begins to reveal a division 
between governance through external sanctions, such as the law, and others considered internal, 
such as education and persuasion. I suggest that it is no coincidence that the discussion about 
governance through ethics recalls British mid-20th century public and academic debates on law 
and morality, given the replication of that era’s basic antinomies in the language now used to 
speak about ethics. In the second half of this chapter, I address the relationship between ethics 
and the law, as perceived by my interviewees.
The debate
Coleman’s article, ‘Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research’ (2004a) found a 
response in Noah, whose reply ‘Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?) Biomedical 
Research’ (2004) forcefully counters the jury comparison. ‘Why have IRBs at all?’ (Coleman 2004b) 
concludes the exchange. Racing across the pages of law journals, this academic disagreement splits 
open a dichotomy central to FERCAP’s concern with governance. In brief, Coleman (2004a) 
draws strong parallels between IRBs and juries, and suggests training committee members in legal 
reasoning and the use of written opinions. Objecting, Noah likens the IRB to a peer review 
system, arguing that IRBs should instead focus their efforts on ‘inculcat[ing] a commitment to 
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ethical behaviour’ (2004: 291). Coleman considers this wholly ‘inadequate’, stating that ‘this sort 
of vague directive to “do good and avoid evil” is so devoid of content that it provides no useful 
guidance for those genuinely concerned with protecting human subjects from unjustifiable 
risks’ (Coleman 2004b: 301). What is of interest to me in the disagreement — and the reason I 
spend time summarising it below — is their differing approaches to the committee as a tool of 
governance and how these approaches illuminate Juntra and Harsha’s experiences.  
Coleman’s article starts with a sense of suspicion, the kind that in powerpoint presentations on 
ethics usually takes the iconic image used on the ‘Human Guinea Pigs’ cover of Time magazine in 
2002 (Figure 25): a blonde woman in a green hospital gown, caged, with a drip feed hanging from 
the bars (Lemonick and Goldstein 2002).42
‘Americans’, he writes, are ‘deeply suspicious of medical research’ (2004a:2). Fear of being 
experimented upon, the deaths of healthy research participants and the revelations of ‘deep and 
pervasive problems’ in ‘systems’ (2004a:2) lead Coleman to ask how public trust in biomedical 
research can possibly be restored. His article suggests the reform of IRBs. His premise is that in 
the USA, ‘IRBs are engaged in a process of legal decision-making, insofar as they interpret specific 
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42 April 22, 2002, ‘At your own risk’ was Time Magazine’s cover story. More recent attention include a New Yorker 
article (Elliott 2008).
Figure 25: Time Magazine front cover, April 22, 2002. 
regulatory requirements pursuant to authority that has been delegated to them by administrative 
agencies’ (2004a:4). Hence his comparison with the deliberation of juries. Ethics committees, he 
says,  share with juries:
a reliance on general, impressionistic judgments unsupported by specific reasons; the 
absence of any obligation to explain or justify decisions; a focus on individual cases rather 
than general principles or rules; and the potential for inconsistent determinations in 
similar situations. Juries are also justified by the same values of localism and community 
input that underlie the current system of IRB review (2004a:16- 17).
The thrust of his argument is towards the reform of how decisions by ethics committees are made, 
with a particular focus on risk assessments. Using the similarities of form that he detects, 
Coleman outlines decision-making methods used in law, such as the use of written opinions and 
reasoning by analogy (Sunstein 1993, Brewer 1996). He considers how IRBs could take up some 
of these ‘strategies,’ and in doing so, makes explicit the parallels he sees between healthcare and 
legal-judicial systems (e.g. Hadorn 1992).
In the Introduction to this thesis, I pointed to the localism that the idea of ethics review capacity 
building held implicit. Recall that calls came for local capacity building (Bosch 2003) when it was 
felt that a review that was otherwise competent in Geneva would be inadequate or inappropriate 
in some way if it were done for research that would be conducted elsewhere. ‘Juries’, writes 
Coleman, 
are justified by the same appeal to local values and attitudes that underlies the IRB system. 
The most common justification for jury decision-making is the jury’s ability to ‘bring[] the 
common wisdom of the community to bear on the resolution of the private dispute’ and 
‘to legitimize that solution in the eyes of that community’ (Brodin 1990:15). These 
justifications mirror the emphasis on localism in the system of IRB review (2004a:18-19).
He points out that familiarity with ‘the actual conditions surrounding the conduct of research’, is 
thought to give local committees an advantage over regional or national review. Drawing on the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission’s 2001 report, he cites the former director of the Office 
for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) who writes that 
[i]t is local review by individuals who are in the best position to know the research at the 
site, the resources at the institution, the capabilities and the reputations of the investigators 
and staff, the prevailing attitudes and ethics of the community and most importantly, the 
likely subject population (Ellis 1994:31-32 cited in NBAC 2001:119). 
With the development of multi-centered trials, however, ‘local’ review often leads to many 
committees reviewing the same protocol, and changes demanded by one can have knock-on effects 
for others. I explore the implications of both the multi-centeredness and localism below. 
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Noah’s response to Coleman’s original article makes evident that they share a common concern 
in the operation of IRBs: ‘consistency and transparency’ (Noah 2004: 269). What they disagree on 
is how to go about ensuring these principles are adhered to. Where Coleman has advanced an 
argument that plays to the strengths of his legal background, Noah insists that the parallel to 
juries is problematic, and that improvement can come from methods that ‘do not necessitate 
mimicking the judiciary’ (2004:269). In an earlier article, Noah expresses the concern that: 
IRBs may become preoccupied with reviewing the niceties of the consent form and perhaps 
less concerned about their separate obligation to make independent risk-benefit 
assessments about the research protocol, confident that potential subjects can “vote with 
their feet” so long as the consent form contains all of the necessary information (2002:384). 
In his view, the comparison with juries is unsustainable, as he does not think IRBs ‘resemble 
juries except in the most superficial of ways’ (2004:271). He re-arranges the ‘pieces of a 
puzzle’ (2004:273) and offers an alternative comparison, suggesting that what IRBs ‘much more 
closely (and appropriately) resemble’ is ‘peer review mechanisms utilized by the scientific 
community’ (2004:268). He sets himself wholly against the ‘recasting’ of IRBs as ‘adjudicatory 
bodies’ (2004:267), a move which he says ‘may appeal to those with training in the law, but the 
scientists and physicians who staff IRBs will predictably — and I think appropriately — recoil at 
any such suggestion’ (2004:274). He suggests instead that ‘IRBs may do the most good by helping 
to educate researchers at an institution about the basics of federal law, as well as working to 
inculcate a commitment to ethical behaviour,’ with a 
flawless protocol crafted with extensive collegial input by an IRB following guidance from 
institutions around the country and accompanied by a thorough written opinion mean[ing] 
nothing if the researcher has not “bought into” the process (2004:292, emphases added). 
Coleman and Noah are talking specifically about American IRBs, claiming the common goal of 
‘human subject protection’ and asking how they can best work towards that aim. They sketch their 
answers between the poles of law-like enforcement and the encouragement of responsibility, each 
having sought to pull ethical review in their own direction. In the debate we have at least four 
versions of the comparison laid out already: that a committee is like a jury because it judges; a 
committee is like a jury because it deliberates and evaluates information; the committee is like a 
jury because of its localism; and a committee is like a jury because it performs a delegated legal 
role. What, then, are the problems of ethics committees that can be illuminated ethnographically 
through the jury comparison? I arrange the following sections around the implication of these 
four versions of the jury-committee comparison. Let us return to my opening observation at 
lunch, on campus in Thailand. Juntra tells us that ‘[b]efore, it felt like it was a jury — to give a 
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sentence. We have to change that perception’. Perhaps the jury comparison will help us find out 
why.
Judging
In 2006, the American press reported that Japan was embarking on ‘an experiment with 
democracy,’ with a plan to re-establish juries within three years. From 1928 to 1943, Japan had 
operated an ‘American style’ legal system, but a wartime lack of men (and it was only men who 
could serve as jurors) made the system impossible to sustain. 2009’s new saiban-in (“lay judge”) 
system promised consequences for the citizenry of neighbouring countries such as China, Taiwan 
and Thailand, all of whom were said to be ‘calling for greater involvement of citizens in their legal 
systems’ (Precht 2006). The international attention attracted by Japan’s ‘experiment’ included a 
seminar held by Cornell Law School,43  where the pros and cons of the new system were aired. 
‘Japanese people pay more respect to authority than to the individual and are afraid of being 
isolated by the majority,’ Kiichi Nishino, a former judge now at Niigata University was reported to 
have claimed; ‘[u]nless a juror is bold enough to disagree with the legal professionals, then this 
system is meaningless’ (The Times February 28, 2009).44   Professor of Law and Public Health 
Jeffery A. Fagan said he thought it was ‘a difficulty of human nature to argue with someone of a 
higher status’. These concerns seemed to be borne out in the comments of the first jurors on their 
experience: ‘I don’t like the idea of judging other people,’ said Mr Number Two, his and his co-
jurors code names designed to allay fears of retribution.
What the introduction of juries in Japan makes us aware of is that at no point in the IRB/Jury 
comparison in the American legal debate does status, hierarchy or even discomfort in making an 
ethics assessment arise. Yet these are issues of high concern for both Japanese and American 
commentators on the Japanese take-up of juries. From the material already presented in this thesis, 
we know that these problems have the potential to become serious, since in fulfilling the 
requirement for scientific expertise, reviewing members of institutional ethics committees will 
often know the applicants personally, as colleagues. In Chapter 3 we saw how Edith strove to find 
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43 Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, September 22-23 2006. Cornell Law School, Ithaca NY. 
44 More recently, Professor Nishino has commented that ‘The greater the burden people feel, the more reluctant they 
are to express their opinions. We should assume that fundamental problems with this system are hidden in voiceless 
opinions’ Japan Times Online May 30 2012.  
a way to comply with her American WIRB training, eventually introducing an electronic voting 
scheme which ensured each person’s act of judgement was concealed. We have seen some of the 
tactics used by Surveyors to soften the impacts of criticisms, with people creating a distance so 
that the Surveyor could be considered ‘objective’, avoiding the potential referencing or inflection 
of personal relationships through the fiction of a corporate person.45All these tactics also 
neutralize potentially hostile or fractious tensions associated with the problem of judgement. In 
the stories that follow, I focus on the education of the Principal Investigator as a strategy, a 
committee’s external means of dealing with the problem that (their) judgement causes. 
The PI of my research notes is a multifaceted character, cast sometimes as an enemy, sometimes as 
a friend. PIs can be criminal, such as those at Tuskegee (Rothman 1991, Reverby 2009), or more 
recently, the Hwang scandal in South Korea (Hwang 2010). More often, they are thoughtless, 
‘cold’, trained to think scientifically. At times they are objects of suspicion, such as overseas 
collaborators; they can be ‘important persons’ capable of swaying the ‘objective’ judgement of the 
committee if permitted to put their case in person, not in writing.
During a Survey in China a disagreement arose between Surveyors and committee members on a 
‘new practice’ that the committee had introduced, ostensibly to smooth relations between the PI 
and the committee. It arose during Criteria 3 of the Survey, ‘Completeness of Review Process.’ 
The committee being surveyed had introduced something they considered a ‘major innovation’: 
they invited the PI to present their protocol to the committee during the meeting. ‘We have an 
interaction with them and we've received a positive reaction to that,’ one of the committee 
members commented. Questions that arose for the committee could be resolved there and then. 
Having seen a Quality Management-inspired emphasis in FERCAP, we might expect the Surveyors 
to approve of the apparently efficient innovation.46 But they do not. 
International Surveyor: That’s good… It’s a good idea.
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45  Concern with judgement applies to both the ethics committee and to the survey. At times during analysis, the two 
would become confused in my mind, the styles, traits appearing to blur. This was as a result of how each was spoken 
about in the field:  ‘We are not police!‘ — a phrase uttered by  Surveyors who have not come to investigate potential 
(past)  crimes of the ethics committee but to help, in the hope that this spirit of cooperative support will  encourage 
committees to be open about their difficulties (p. 53). ’We are not police!’ — a phrase uttered by ethics committees who 
cannot, through lack of time and resources pursue the investigators, check up on them as they proceed with their 
research. Occasionally, commentators would begin by addressing their comments to the Surveyors, but end by  speaking 
about the working of the ethics review committee. In the study of an audit of an audit, attention to how the two were 
conceptually kept apart and where they collapsed into one another was a constant challenge. I return to the implications 
of this observation in the Conclusion.
46 Indeed, efficiency was one of the key drivers in a recent study into the presence of PIs during IRB meetings in the 
USA (Taylor, Currie and Cass 2008).
FERCAP: No, I think you should discuss first, and then invite the principal investigator. 
Documents should speak for themselves. It's not speaking for itself, then it should be 
revised.
SIDCER: Yes, the protocol should speak for itself. Decisions are based not on what you hear 
but what you read. Sometimes, you’re affected by the person presenting. In China, we 
always hear ‘famous famous’. You’re not looking at how famous he is, it’s the document he 
made. It affects your objectivity. He is famous, I’m not famous…Prepare questions first, 
don’t rely on what you hear. The only reason to do all this [have the PI present] would be 
that the documents not clear enough for people to make decision. We should encourage 
people to do more documentation, ‘cos thats what it is - that’ll be there forever. Sometimes 
you don’t capture what the person says, but it’s in the documents. You may say many 
things, just to convince me. You listen to Obama and he convince[s] you. Doesn’t mean its 
going to happen.
FERCAP: Sometimes their way of speaking influences you.
Local surveyor: You can document what the PI says at the meeting though?
SIDCER: But you’re documenting. It’s second hand. You ask [on] paper to say “we don’t 
understand,” it’s all documented. That’ll teach them. [It’ll be] a learning experience for 
investigator to do next time. Make it very clear. I’ve seen conflicts arise when not very 
professional - it becomes personal. That’s why you need objectivity - clarify what going to 
do. Lots of people who have skill to speak - politicians...
Local Surveyor: Politicians don’t need a protocol!
In the discussion about the jury in Japan, what was at stake was the possibility of a juror 
disagreeing with legal professionals. Here, the Surveyors are concerned that committee members 
will be swayed by the presentation styles of the researchers, persuaded to allow research to go 
ahead. As Stark (2011a:239) writes in her overview of the crystallization of the current American 
human-subjects review system, ‘researchers were increasingly removed from ethics deliberations 
because they came to be seen as contaminants, rather than aids, to sound moral evaluation.’47 
The other side of this concern is FERCAP’s focus on documentation as a technique of 
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47  Although see Stark (2008:784), which states that a more ‘radical’ move is to invite investigators to meetings, ‘an 
unwitting return to an internal  NIH strategy […] phased out 40 years ago.’ While the persuasive influence of PIs may 
have been removed, her recent work clearly delineates strategies by which committee members persuade one another 
through reference to  different types of authority: professional, personal and publicly available information. This 
comment hints at another arena of research which stands to be opened, although it is beyond the scope of this present 
thesis: the way  in which speech is moralised (Kipnis 1997:115) both by committee members and researchers. Kipnis 
terms this the ‘nonrepresentational ethics’ of speech. ‘In the West’, he writes, ‘an ethic of accurate representation entails 
both emotional  “sincerity” (accurately representing inner feelings in outward expression) and “honest” speech (accurate 
verbal  representation) (Kipnis 1997:104). In his discussion of laoshi (translated as “honest”) in China he discovers that 
‘[b]eing “honest” or “dishonest” was more than a matter of representation; it involved the purpose for which one used 
language. False representations were only “dishonest” if they were done for selfish purposes (1997:104). Further research 
could examine parrhesia (Foucault 1985b) on ethics committees. 
‘objectivity’48 The PI’s absence is an opportunity for education, turning the distrust in the PI’s 
tactics of persuasion into a (solve-able) matter of ignorance, in which good intentions could be 
preserved. As a Taiwanese doctor who had been working on an ethics committee for several years 
put it:
I think all PIs have to be educated and because they…Everyone wants to do the right thing, 
they don’t intend to do harm to patients. The problem is they don’t know how to do that, 
so we have to educate. That’s why I teach young investigators [...]They have to know patient 
rights and IRB and genetic study how to inform patient how to get informed consent, what 
is this, how to do the grant application. Older men — my age, nearly retired, 60 — you 
think that is not necessary, sometimes we take it for granted.
Education, then, is seen as part of the pre-emptive apparatus of the committee. The role of a jury, 
as the new Japanese jurors learned, is that of assessing the evidence presented and reaching a 
verdict. But in an ethics committee, the assessment is pre-emptive; no crime, except possibly that 
of omission, has yet been committed. It is thus possibility that motivates both the review, and 
‘education’ in the committee’s forward-looking temporality. The comparison highlights how an 
ethics committee regulates behaviour, and attempts to ensure ethical, moral action through 
intervention before the events that are assumed to hold potential for harm have occurred. Ethics, 
as a set of actions, a process, is in this view preventative. Its own potential lies in its scrutiny of the 
detail, its knowledge of the relevant size of samples or the necessary frequency of blood draws, its 
knowledge of the intended participants. Its potential as an activity both anticipates and is 
generated by the potential in research. 
For IRBs, it can seem that oversight duties grow, but their ability to enforce change is limited. As 
one surveyor put it, ‘an IRB doesn’t have police power, but it has to ensure things are right.’ As we 
have seen, ‘continuing review’ is a means by which this ‘ensuring’ takes place. While I have 
emphasised the necessity of decision-making, I would now like to foreground the erosion of the 
finality of decisions. Where trainers initially emphasised the history of bioethics, processes of 
deliberation and principles to follow, much more weight falls now on SIDCER Survey Criteria 
Four, ‘Continuing Review’. An ethics committee must still make a decision, but committees are 
increasingly being advised to limit the duration of their approval. The protocol may change in the 
interim year, and so may the researchers. They may become less committed, and the requirement 
for renewal is a means of keeping them not only under surveillance but also remind them of their 
‘duties’. This shift does not, I suggest, lie in the discomfort of judgement nor in finding ways to 
Chapter 4: The Jury, the Ethics Committee and the Law
139
48 e.g. Mahidol University, Thailand has a Change History document, which reports changes prior to the Survey 
included “9. Section 7.5 has been revised: (1) clinical investigator and ancillary staff may be called to EC meeting but 
are not allowed to stay during EC discussion’  (Mahidol FTM ECS-004-05, December 2011).
neutralize it through reducing its finality, for at the point of judgement, a permanent positive 
decision would be favourable to the investigator. What the committee gains through limiting the 
validity of its approval is a maintained connection to that investigator.
The difficulty of performing continuing review arises during a workshop in Bangkok, when I 
discuss the day’s sessions with an older man from a committee in the north of Thailand. What 
has he learned that was new to him, I ask? ‘Many breaches!’ he says, speaking of the cases we have 
heard. ‘I can’t tell whether it is just because they don’t know, or if they intended [the breach].’ 
‘How might you tell,’ I ask?
Well, if they get angry, defensive. We [IRB] have our reason, they have their reason. People 
we work with, we know them. Usually they come to see we’re right. If in working, they 
come across an issue they can come to the committee. Well, they can but not many do. We 
are trying to help them. If there are no problems after the process we just guess its OK, 
smooth, but it is not necessarily OK. Every week we see lots of projects come. But we don’t 
have the time to go and check up on them. We will not shock them [hitting motion] We’ll 
try to help! Well, very carefully. Go see them, ‘Hi , how is research going?’ Little by little, 
approach the point, ‘I heard someone went to IRB…’
The hope is that through education, PIs will come to ‘see’ ethics for what those who take part in 
committees see it as, a necessary protection of research participants: ‘human subjects.’ A member 
of an ethics committee in Taiwan spent an afternoon telling me about disputes between his 
committee and PIs. If staff and PIs ‘don’t have the same understanding and knowledge, then 
there is fight between the IRB and investigator,’ he told me. ‘We want them to know, to think it is 
very important.’ His approach was to cast the problem as one of an imbalance of knowledge, 
ameliorated through education: reason will prevail. Asked for his opinion on a dispute that had 
arisen in a local committee, he had informed his colleague that:
Ethical review by IRB is kind of business based on "reasonable" judgment. Therefore, I will 
not say which side of decision is right or wrong. But I think all can be discussed based on 
this reasonable person standard. I guess the IRB's decision is always of good intention, and 
sometimes might be a little bit exaggerated. The only effective solution for such dispute 
is continuing mutual learning between PI and IRB.
The education agenda therefore is directed towards a future in which judgement is hardly 
necessary, both the IRB and the PI have the same attitude and objectives, and the situation is 
marked not by tensions or disagreements about delayed research, but a by mutual understanding. 
We know, however, that this is not the case at present. 
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Deliberating: A continuous committee
Harsha, the Sri Lankan whose comments opened this chapter, had been a member of her 
committee for over a year. Coleman and Noah both acknowledge as a significant point of 
difference between a jury and an IRB that the latter is a ‘continuous body,’ ‘whose members 
decide multiple issues over an extended period’ (Coleman 2004a:19). Its comparative permanence 
contributes to the particularity of committee meetings as a social space, something I have begun to 
explore through attention to the room in the chapter above. Here, I examine that social space 
more carefully, arguing that during meetings, certain ideals of democratic decision making and 
notions of equality are acted out; ideals and notions which can cause difficulty for the committees 
I studied. I use the comparison with the transience of the jury to highlight some of the challenges 
of the ethics committee’s continuity. From Harsha’s initial comments on her very ‘non-medical’ 
questions, I present four interrelated conversations from fieldwork which detail how the issues of 
seniority alluded to above are hard to forget inside the committee room. First, my conversations 
with Peter and Camilla in Taiwan show the way the committee as a ‘continuous body’ in amongst 
a continuous body of colleagues requires careful management, and how ethics is regarded as a site 
of tension in professional affairs. I then offer the experiences of Vinaya and Malika in Sri Lanka. 
Vinaya uses her experiences in America to compare institutional cultures, which I then use to 
consider relationships on the committee. Malika’s approach as a reviewer allows me to compare 
the relationships committees build with PIs and applicants to the ethics committee. Together, 
their stories demonstrate another stage to what Edith is trying to ameliorate with the blind vote in 
Taiwan in Chapter 3: the effects of questioning one’s seniors and voicing opinions during 
decision-making.
Peter and Camilla
Peter, a Taiwanese researcher with whom I had spent time in China and Thailand, explained to 
me the dynamics of his ethics review committee meeting and the strains on its members. He had 
been involved with ethics committees for over ten years, and felt it was important for each 
member to air their ‘different thinking’ despite the tendency for this to lead both to lengthy 
conversations and ‘conflict’ in the boardroom where his committee held their meetings. He told 
me that the struggle in Taiwan was always in the boardroom, finding ways to reduce conflict 
between physicians and IRB members. ‘Conflict’ to him was not just conflict of interests but a 
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careful management of existing and future relationships. ‘You must have good relations with 
colleagues,’ he told me. ‘In clinical service, it is teamwork, you need other people’s help.’ But this 
reliance on teamwork, he suggested, permeated the boardroom, and caused problems. Committee 
members needed to be aware of the decisions the board took not only for the sake of patients, but 
also for themselves: ‘One day, if you disapprove something, maybe next time, “OK no time for 
you!” Some day they get promotion, they say “OK IRB, you have too much budget,” and maybe 
they will cut you down.’ The ‘they’ of Peter’s sentence is the researcher, who stands to lose time 
and possibly funds if his or her research is delayed or ‘disapproved.’ Peter did not think these 
problems were contained to Taiwan. ‘In Asia,’ he generalized, 
People’s relationships last from position to position, especially in older life. If there is 
someone you disapprove, if you kill the approval with your opinion, maybe they’ll say “I’ll 
revenge you.” Your operation can affect the project of the IRB. 
He had, in discussions with other FERCAP members, found that they too struggled with these 
‘same problems.’ Citing the Dr Hwang scandal in South Korea, he speculated that if committee 
members were under social pressures to succeed, ‘they might not check everything, approve 
something, and disgrace themselves.’ However, he said the committees had recently developed 
ways to ‘protect’ the committee members. ‘If there are 21 people on a committee, who 
disapproves, nobody knows.’ This provides another insight into why electric voting was so 
important in Taiwan: ‘you can show your different opinion and disapprove and nobody knows,’ 
he said:
Even in records of meeting, it doesn’t show who speaks. Before we had names in the 
minutes, now we use member A, B, C. So we try to use that. So, with the subject protected, 
[we] also try to protect our members. 
Peter’s protection of committee members through anonymizing the minutes echoes the concerns 
reported for jurors in Japan, and Edith’s invention of the blind vote so that hands would not have 
to be visibly raised. But some committee members feel that their opinion, and their assertion of it, 
is a virtue. I met Camilla, a Taiwanese former IRB member, in a hospital corridor, during lunch. I 
sat with my notebook on my knee, she rummaged in a backpack for some lunch and Peter, who 
was looking after me in the hospital that day, went to call his wife leaving us to talk. Camilla told 
me that she had just returned from a nearby hospital, where she gave a talk on Genetic Ethics. ‘I 
went to threaten them!’ she said, laughing. 
Because now, before you initiate genetic studies there are more regulations to be aware of. 
You need to focus more on privacy and confidentiality, more sensitive issues. So our 
government tries to educate people.
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Her focus on education was largely as a remedial practice, a slow change that she believed would 
manifest its success in better research. ‘I can’t tell how much they change,’ she told me ‘but 
gradually they change their thinking of ethics: 
Medical doctors, they think of research; [the] patient, who cares? A lot of MDs, their mind 
is set on research but not really ethics, but may have an idea how to do this ethics thing. 
They might not think of it at all, before someone convinces them. [The] medical doctor way 
- “I treat you,” their thinking is different.[...] Sometimes it is hard to change their attitude 
or thinking. Sometimes they still argue. It’s a long time process to educate these people. 
Even in a committee you find doctors still doing things very unethically - after all the 
education, I am always shocked that you still see these kinds of people around, still.
I asked her to elaborate on ‘these kinds of people.’ She shrugged, and told me she had been one 
of them: ‘When initiating a research we’d do unethical things, for consent - ignore things we were 
supposed to do. Just say “Hey, give me my proof - my IRB approval letter.” [They] forget everything 
about ethical things.’ Her criticism is aimed at researchers but she extends it to the committee — 
suggesting that under pressure, committees bend to the expectations and demands of their 
colleagues:
In our committee, the Chair is high. It’s very common here because of structures of 
hospitals or government or school. The hierarchy system is very strong and people are 
afraid to lose their job. Committee is a nice way to do this, ‘cos we have backup from each 
other. We can speak out. [We are] not afraid to have a “big mouth.” 
I said nothing, writing furiously. She reflected on what she said for a moment, then seemed to 
change her mind. Her account of the committee as a form of challenging authority through group 
discussion dissipated as she went on to reveal that it was her enactment of this ideal of speaking 
out that led to her becoming an ex-IRB member. ‘Well, I was kicked out!’ she exclaimed, with a 
wry smile.
They want smoothly run, obedient ones. [For me] it’s about whether, at the right time are 
you willing, to speak up for something. Especially for ethics. You’re supposed to speak up. 
That’s our principle. It’s the right thing to do, for myself and participants. You set your 
mind on the ethical thing and you do it. Not different to becom[ing] a martyr. I’m martyr 
of the IRB! Honesty, integrity, things you believe in. That’s our problem [in Taiwan]. IRB 
independence.
There are details of a case that she does not reveal, but the point is made. Not everyone is equal, 
nor able to speak in the same way. 
Vinaya and Malika
Asking questions was presented as problematic for some committee members in a similar way to 
showing one’s opinion. While most interviewees told me they felt confident to voice their views, 
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and comfortable speaking their concerns in committee meetings, Vinaya — a Sri Lankan ethics 
committee member — openly told me that she thought people were afraid to criticize their 
superiors. ‘They’re afraid for their careers,’ she said, ‘even if they think something, it is better for 
them to stay quiet.’ She served on a committee that had recently been reconstituted, ‘new faces’ 
brought in because the older group had been ‘dysfunctional.’ Comprising many ‘senior persons,’ 
the committee meetings had been poorly attended, with a minority doing the majority of the 
work. ‘It takes time to think about the proposal and check it,’ she said, speaking of protocol 
review. ‘Very few senior people have that much time.’ Having worked in the USA, she explained 
to me how her perception of authority and questioning had changed as a result. At home, she 
said, ‘asking questions may hurt the person, and the person being questioned regards it as 
something not good because you’re questioning your teacher or your elder.’ In America, she had 
found that people did not find question asking derogatory, and they don’t think it will ‘hurt’. 
Vinaya found this to be ‘a good way,’ but at the same time, she felt there was no respect for older 
people. A solution to the problem of question-asking, she thought, was blinding the review, so 
that the reviewers did not know the name of the person whose research was being reviewed. ‘I may 
be more free, then, to give my view,’ she said. What that view meant, however, she was not entirely 
clear about. In the end, she told me, it was the chairperson and the Dean who took the overall 
decision, ‘because everyone can’t take the decision, we can give our views, but in the end, they 
take the decision.’ She expressed doubt about whether the decisions being taken were ‘correct’: 
We look at whose research it is, so-and-so has been doing it for so long, influence, done so 
much for the country, they’re faculty, and at the same time someone is trying to start, they 
may be harsher on the evaluation of that research. That has big reputation behind it, this 
doesn’t. Animosities, maybe, or at the same time, friendship. There are large bloated egos 
in research.
In these two examples, the way ethics is conducted is affected by existing social relations, with an 
implicit critique being made by interviewees of this effect. But I often found that this equation 
was turned around, with ethics being used to manage existing social relations. A de-personalised 
approach — to employ standards that must be complied with — was considered an advantage, 
particularly when ethics review was being newly introduced to faculties. In Colombo, Sri Lanka, 
the Regional Collaborative Workshop held by our hosts and the ISBC project attracted attendees 
from several other universities and disciplines. One of the attendees was Malika, a social scientist 
at the Open University, who went back to her faculty to encourage the establishment of a 
committee in the humanities. When I interviewed her and her advisor, who had founded the 
committee, he explained that they had run a:
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step by step introduction of it, we made it known to everyone. In a sense, no proposal can 
deviate from the established mechanisms, it has to abide by the mechanism. There won’t be 
any different treatment because you’re my friend, or you’re my enemy. 
Relations — friends, enemies — find themselves circumvented through an appeal to ‘established 
mechanisms’ and the manipulation of the externality of rules. This is something we have 
encountered before, in Chapter 3 when Philippine secretaries Fiona and Karen used the 
organogram posted on the wall to mediate emotion. If an irate investigator visited the office and 
demanded to know why her/his application for approval had not yet been processed, they would 
be referred to the chart on the wall, in Karen’s words ‘to calm them.’ Rather than having to deal 
with the relationship one might have to the applicant, both must turn instead to a third party, an 
‘outsider’: the process.49 In these moves, the appeal to externality recalls the critical early role of 
the air pump, the ‘neutral instrument [which] factored out human agency from the product. The 
experimental philosopher could say, “It is not I who say this; it is the machine” (Haraway 
1996:431, Shapin and Schaffer 1985[2011]:77). During research I became sensitive, then, to the 
way in which contact between the reviewers of protocols, committees, and PIs was framed. Malika 
told me that she often contacted the researcher applicant in order to answer questions she had. 
I contact the person if the application form is not well written, I get some things clear. 
Some people process the application in a hurry if they want to make the deadline. Some 
don’t understand certain aspects of the ethical approval form. So in that sense, giving a call 
and getting50 is very effective. 
She did find, however, that PIs could be ‘defensive’, concerned about being penalized or delayed, 
and most were ‘afraid of being rejected by the committee.’ 
What Camilla and Vinaya’s comment about committees with ‘high up’ or ‘senior’ figures in the 
chairperson’s role indicates is that s/he may well play an important role in sustaining existing 
hierarchies within a committee setting. Discussions over who is chosen for the chairperson are 
revealing. As one Thai FERCAP conference delegate commented:
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49  Mann, in her study of jobseekers in contemporary Sudan, writes about ‘wasta’, an Arabic word ‘meaning both the 
possession of ties (a person can have wasta) and the person who intermediates on behalf of someone (a person can be 
‘one’s wasta’)’ (n.d: 3). She vividly describes a professor at one of Khartoum’s top universities who, having been 
repeatedly asked for job referrals and financial  assistance, had developed an ‘extra difficult’ test as ‘an excuse to reject 
wasta’. ‘When the person failed the test, the professor would simply have to show her the numerical  score and say 
‘Malish!’ [oh well!] It seemed that it was more difficult to argue when there was a number on the table’ (n.d.15). Mann 
notes that in such cases, numbers have a moral function: ‘they projected a form of professionalism impervious to 
sociality, the assignment of  numbers allowed managers to resist social and moral  appeals to ‘help’ and promised junior 
members of staff  the opportunity to escape personal or political disagreements with their superiors’ (n.d. 14). I suggest 
the repeated examples of appeals to — and the employment of — external lists, mechanisms, standards or flowcharts do 
much the same thing in these situations.
50 Sri Lankan English in which ‘getting’ includes reference to the thing which is acquired, in this case, the information 
missing from the application. 
I’m impressed when I go surveying in China, and I see that the president is the chair of an 
ethics committee. They get a lot of support! I go back home and I ask my director to be 
chair. But you have to balance that. What are the risk and what are the benefit?51
The ‘risk’ was articulated clearly in attempts to revise standards for committee composition during 
a FERCAP conference session (see also Chapter 5). The standard detailing the chairperson had 
specified ‘high level official,’ which raised the concern of a Chinese delegate: ‘Let’s say, what 
about middle level official? If you don’t perform very well, the president can remove you from the 
position the next day.’ A South Korean delegate, who had previously been keen to promote the 
profile of research ethics in his country, said ‘Actually the other idea was to get the head of the 
institution,’ but, he pointed out, ‘if the head of the institution is the chair of the committee and 
somebody wants to have a complaint against them, who do they go to? There’s nobody else to 
bring a complaint to.’ Cristina then intervened, noting that that the motivating concern was to 
‘ensure that the members of their committee felt free to express their opinions’ and weren’t 
concerned about saying something that might ‘risk their jobs’.
This overt concern with the consequences and intricacies of seniority is part of a wider trend seen 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Where in the West committees may struggle to achieve the authority 
necessary to issue ethics judgements (O’Reilly et al. 2009) it is often the case here that those who 
are appointed to the ethics committee are chosen precisely for their seniority, and hence, authority. 
Localism Revisited
In my overview of Coleman’s comparison of Juries and Ethics committees, I noted his attention 
to how local review arises as a particular issue in multi-center trials. By far the most complex of 
trial templates, the multi-sited clinical trial involves the same trial protocol conducted over a 
number of sites. These sites may be all within the same city or the same state; they may be 
nationally spread, or, as Cristina noted when pitching FERCAP’s program to the Cancer Center 
in China, they may be very widely distributed across different countries. In what follows, I draw 
attention to the use of ‘local’, watching as it shifts from meaning ‘in country’ to ‘in institution,’ 
with attention to the implications. While this section develops the concerns of those above, it can 
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51  Another example of the way in which language shapes and shifts arenas: is this management speak? Or is it ethics? 
More importantly, the speaker’s concern with ‘risk and benefit’ of the social  dynamics of having a director as a 
chairperson illustrates how the balancing of research risks and benefits that ethics committees are required to do is 
suddenly made to apply to how committees are themselves arranged. 
be seen as a prelude to the third section of Chapter 5, where I discuss in greater detail the make-
up of ethics review committees. 
Coleman’s emphasis on localism comes from the contemporary USA, where as he writes:
[t]he IRB system’s radical localism reflects an intentional policy decision by the system’s 
designers, who believed that the protocol review process must be entrusted to individuals 
familiar with local conditions and the attitudes of the population from which subjects are 
drawn (2004a:43). 
In his view, these priorities ‘mirror’ (2004a:19) the way localism of juries, cited as the ‘voice of the 
community’ (Friedman 2002:89) The ‘systemic’ emphasis on localism in ethical review, he says, is:
difficult to reconcile with contemporary sociological reality. While different parts of the 
United States clearly have distinct local or regional characteristics, developments in 
communications and transportation have made these differences far less pronounced today 
than they were when the IRB system was first developed (2004a:44).
He notes, therefore that (2004: 44) ‘the system’s emphasis on localism is already beginning to give 
way, due largely to practical considerations raised by increasing use of multi-site studies.’ Multi-
sited studies have caused discussion about the limits of an IRB’s duties: ‘do local IRBs have a 
general duty to prevent harm to research subjects outside their own institution’ if they discover 
problems with a multi-sited study asks Jansen (2005:10). They may not approve it, but how can 
they communicate with other IRBs that are reviewing it, to alert them to the problems they have 
detected? (Jansen 2005, Freedman 1994). In an article discussing ‘cooperative research ethics 
review boards’, Koski et al. write that the success or failure of any of the models the review 
‘ultimately depends on institutions’ willingness to relinquish some measure of autonomy and to 
trust Research ERBs that operate outside each institution’s primary community’ (2005:5). 
Similarly, Beat Wilder who has worked as the head of Clinical Quality Assurance with Roche 
commented at the FERCAP Shanghai Summit on multi-center trials in 2010:
When we do audits of ECs what they notice is that one of the root causes [of multiple 
review] is a lack of trust. What is done by one committee is not necessarily accepted by 
another. This is very common. Even in a very small country like Switzerland until recently 
every hospital, almost every hospital had its own EC and they repeated the whole review 
and they were extremely proud if they could find an error that this other EC hadn’t 
detected .. [this] was used as a justification that they need to repeat the review again and 
again across hospital and hospital.
This problem is replicated when multi-center studies become international multi-center studies. At 
the 2010 Conference in Shanghai, FERCAP hosted a pre-conference summit on ‘Achieving a 
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Harmonized Approach to the Ethical Review of Multi-center Studies’, which took the local review of 
trials as its concern. In the words of Robert Ridley, then director of WHO-TDR:
the responsibility of [multi-center] studies, by definition, rests with multiple organisations 
and multiple institutions. If you’re talking about multiple countries, you’re talking about 
different cultural and social aspects within the communities where those studies are carried 
out. So as the emphasis on ethical review practices increases globally, it becomes important 
to consider how we can cooperate to have a common or coherent approach to undertaking 
ethical review and determine what the responses to different issues are. 
The local review of trials is largely the raison d'être of FERCAP’s capacity building program and the 
SIDCER recognition program. As Juntra put it, a review elsewhere may be competent but the local 
issues can only be imagined. When one begins with this view, centralised IRBs appear at best a 
challenge, at worst a problem. Equally, the variable decisions of IRBs (Silverman et al. 2001) is 
regarded as a problem for multi-center trials, seen as a problem of inefficiency and wasted 
resources. Three solutions present themselves. The first is for countries to form what have become 
known as “Joint” IRBs: committees comprising members from several hospitals. These 
committees can review trials which wish to use several of those sites.52 An article describing the 
concept of the Joint IRB in Taiwan, Chern et al. (1998) describe JIRB as providing sponsors with 
‘a predictable approval time schedule. They have a “one stop for all” JIRB in 
Taiwan’ (1998:1277S). As the Taiwanese Joint IRB states (Figure 26), the joint review ‘can enhance 
human subject protection in Taiwan and also increase Taiwan’s competitiveness in attracting 
multi-center trials, even United States pre-New Drug Application (NDA) trials.’ Interestingly, for 
my argument, the authors describe the status of the  JIRB as ‘the same as that of local IRBs from 
the perspective of Taiwan’s Department of Health’ (1998:1276S), the JIRB itself requiring 
recognition from local IRBs.
The more recent Thailand Joint REC (Figure 27) also highlights the importance of a JREC for 
processing multi-center clinical trials which were 
previously submitted for consideration by the ethics committees of individual institute. 
Each institute has different process, procedure and standard that needs more resources with 
more time consuming. The joint research ethics committees will be able to strengthen 
efficiency and economically approved process that draws increasing research fund to the 
country.
The second solution is to return to that outside viewer, the third man: instead of trusting one 
another, committees can trust an accreditation program (e.g. Scott 2001, and for critique see 
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52 Existing similar models include Central IRBs in the USA (often commercial) and the Multi-center Research Ethics 
Committee (MRECS) of the UK (UK Department of Health 1997).
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Figure 26: English language summary of Taiwan’s JIRB
Figure 27: English language homepage of Thailand’s Joint REC
Busch 2011: 220). This is where the continuity of the committee shapes it into quite a different 
entity from the momentary formation of a jury. Again, this is precisely the point at which 
FERCAP works. A third solution is to network. Coleman argues that in fact, ‘many issues 
surrounding research are not location-specific, and that attention to local considerations is not 
inconsistent with more centralized review’ (2004a: 44). He takes as an example WIRB, who 
address the problem of localism through the use of consultants and local IRB liaisons. As their 
website states ‘[t]he use of […] consultants, as well as WIRB liaison with local IRBs where possible, 
allows WIRB to accurately gauge local attitudes and customs that could affect research.53 
Coleman’s example of WIRB’s program shows another side to the International Fellows program: 
in training Edith, Cassandra and many others, WIRB also acquires ‘a large network of regional 
representatives and local advisors’ (Coleman 2004a:44). WIRB (Figure 28) is an example of 
review:
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53 Coleman visited the site March 9, 2003. The image included here was taken August 9, 2012.
Figure 28: Western IRB’s FAQ, displaying answers about International Clinical Trials
conducted by centralized IRBs, including “non-institutional IRBs” that are managed by 
private companies. These IRBs attempt to balance consideration of issues common to all 
research sites, with attention to special considerations likely to confront researchers in 
particular locations. (Coleman 2004a:44). 
For Coleman, 
[t]hese developments appropriately recognise that many issues surrounding research are not 
location-specific, and that attention to local considerations is not inconsistent with more 
centralized review (Coleman 2004a: 44).
But there is more to this localism than knowledge of local facilities or staff. Coleman draws on 
Goldner (1993:95), noting that ‘IRBs were originally designed to “serve as a surrogate for the 
community at large”’ in a similar way to jury being ‘the voice of the community’ (Friedman 2002: 
89) as opposed to the voice of ‘formal law.’ Turning to that ‘voice of the community’, American 
author Abramson (2000[1994]) has argued that localism in justice can be problematic. He 
recounts riots in Miami which followed the death of an African American man during a 
motorcycle chase. He was shot by an Hispanic officer:  
A local jury convicted the officer of manslaughter, but a state appeals court threw out the 
verdict because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Florida authorities then went searching for a 
fair venue for a new trial. Tallahassee did not have enough Hispanics in its jury pool; 
Orlando lacked sufficient African Americans. After five shifts in the trial venue, the public 
had reason to wonder whether guilt in Tallahassee might turn into innocence in Orlando 
or vice versa: was jury justice so capricious? (Abramson [1994]2000: ix)
In contrast to Coleman’s focus on the familiarity of individuals with local conditions and 
attitudes — in other words, a member’s knowledge —  Abramson’s question ties the location of 
jury justice to who is present. His argument that it is ‘precisely because we all inevitably view the 
evidence at trial from perspectives shaped by the lives we live in America, diversity is important to 
the accuracy of jury verdicts’ (2000[1994]:xi). The implicit assumption here is that the lives lived 
are shaped by whether we are, for example, ‘Hispanics’, ‘African Americans.’ In addition, Fukurai 
(1996) notes that the U.S. Supreme Court ‘has recognised the racial background of prospective 
jurors as an important dimension for evaluating jury participation’, but points out that ‘the court 
has yet to give social class “cognizable” status’ (1996: 71). He consequently argues for the inclusion 
of ‘social class factors’ in the assessment of systematic discrimination in jury.
In the emphasis of local knowledge of ethics committees and the creation of centralised 
committees for a country, I suggest there are two things going on at once, an intermingling of 
what could be called logics of localism. The first is that the model which, in its concern with 
efficiency looks towards combined committees, particularly for multi-sited trials.  Coleman writes 
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that changes in America since the introduction of the locally based system mean that few issues are 
really in need of local (institutional) attention. When the model of having a single committee 
upon which several sites rely is transported, however, what can result in a committee for a 
‘country.’ This is evident in Taiwan’s JIRB and Thailand’s Joint REC. Furthermore, such 
committees retain their ‘local’ characteristic when viewed from a distance: Committees and their 
members are from the country, to an incoming international clinical trial they count as ‘local’ 
review. What Vinaya and Malika’s revelations highlight however, is though people on committees 
may be equally local, they may not be locally equal. In attention to the former issue, the latter 
receives comparatively little attention. 
The comparison of an ethics committee with a jury highlights this second point. I do not want to 
suggest that this is a problem particular to the committees I worked with: Abramson’s dramatic 
example, as well as Fukurai’s observations, open the question for the USA. Fukurai’s efforts to 
highlight “social class” as a “factor” in jury selection and decision indicates that peoples’ capacities 
for persuasion, their bodies (‘revealing skill, charisma and pathology’ (Law 1994:183) and the 
‘networks’ they can draw upon matter (Latour 1988, 1993, Strathern 1996b).54 What I suggest my 
analysis shows is that professionals represent their expertise and by extension, medicine. The 
laypersons represent ‘society’, but not their profession (whatever it may be). In this, the ethics 
review committee contributes to and sustains the asymmetrical relationships experienced by 
Vinaya and Malika. 
Coleman’s comparison of the jury and the ethics committee allows a productive analysis not only 
of the challenges presented by multi-sited clinical trials but also of the issues raised by them. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the IRB system struggles with Central IRBs given the assumptions 
about locality it borrows from the legal system. I explore these conundrums further in Chapter 5, 
through attention to ‘roles’ on the committee. 
A legal role?: Ethics and the Fixity of Law
A close comparison of the ethics committee and the jury has allowed me to talk about problems 
of composition of committees and the importance of location in contentions of the rightness of 
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54 Stark also arrives at the importance of persuasion in her analyses, terming the means by which committee members 
invoke public, professional and personal knowledge ‘warrants’ (2011b:22).
how much is known (and by whom). I now move away from that direct contrast, turning to the 
wider issues in the apparent poles of Coleman’s and Noah’s debate: the tension in the concept of 
ethics between compliance and aspiration, between external regulation and an exhortation to ‘do 
good.’ Their debate frames ethics review committees and juries as comparable on the basis that 
they are both instruments of the law. Indeed, as Stark (2011b) reminds us, in America, the ethics 
committee is empowered to make legally binding recommendations. This is not the case for many 
of FERCAP’s committees. In this section, I explore the aspiration for countries to implement  a 
legal framework, as this was expressed during the annual conference, and contrast it with the view 
of many of those I spoke to during research who did not feel that ‘law’ would be a suitable vehicle 
for change. In the final section, I explore some of the reasons why.
At the FERCAP conference in Shanghai 2010, I listened to the discussion during a session on 
alterations to the World Health Organisation’s ‘Silver Book’ (2000) which was undergoing the first 
revisions of its content since its initial publication. Subjecting the drafting of documents to 
ethnographic analysis has in recent years produced insight into knowledge practices. Riles’ work 
in ‘bringing together responses to documents’ (2006:27 emphasis added) foregrounds them as 
‘artifacts of modern knowledge’, central to contemporary organisations, position taking and fact 
making. By no means as deliberative as Riles’ conference — ‘it was not unusual to spend several 
hours on a single paragraph as delegates agreed to add a clause, to delete another’ she remarks 
(1998:389) — the conversations here took place in a single conference session.55  Carl Coleman 
was the lawyer who brought the draft to Shanghai for consultation, describing the long process of 
‘standard making’ as one of the WHO’s six core functions. ‘The advantage of working through 
WHO,’ said Carl, 
is that WHO has the power to convene, to gather experts from around the world and is 
recognised as a leader, so countries often adopt WHO standards as their own, or as a basis 
for their national laws and goals.
Carl emphasised that the draft was not intended as a replacement for national standards, rather as 
an encouragement for countries to develop their own. They were:
to look at this as a guideline for how standards could be adopted taking into account that 
there could be some variations on implementation but that the minimum floor of ethical 
principles should be the same everywhere.
In the segment of conversation I reproduce below, we see standards in the making, not fixed as 
they will come to appear in the final document. Discussion brings out opinion and positions, 
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55 One of many such sessions for the draft.
while actors attempt to modify policies that they hope to both achieve and use. The first standard, 
Carl says, is 
the broadest one, its speaking to the system itself and the standard is saying:
Relevant national authorities ensure that ethics review of health related research is supported by an 
adequate legislative and regulatory framework, that RECs are adequate to provide a review of all 
health related research exist at national, subnational and/or institutional levels. An appropriate or 
sustainable system is in place to monitor the quality and effectiveness of RE review. 
Out of the official language Carl draws three basic elements of the system: a legislative and 
regulatory framework, committees ‘that exist and are adequate to doing the review’ and ‘a 
monitoring and oversight system’. He then invites comments on the standard, and those which 
ensue demonstrate delegates thinking through the implications of the standard in their own 
countries. A delegate from the Philippines stands. ‘At present,’ he says, 
we actually don’t have the legislative, the laws, although we have Philippines FDA, we don’t 
have an FDA, [our] FDA is more of … although they’re all regulatory they don’t really 
function in a regulatory manner. I was just thinking how does one go about getting our 
lawmakers to pass laws that will create Ethics Committees for the conduction of ethical 
standards in each country? We have to lobby perhaps? Or if the lobby is strong, then I 
suppose the lawmakers will listen, but it’s a long and tedious process to make our 
lawmakers to make laws about regulatory frameworks such as this one.
Carl replies:
In fact that’s one of the goals of this document is to have something that in a lobbying 
effort you can say, ‘Well the international standard is that there must be a legal framework.’ 
So the hope is that this will aid that effort.
Cristina comments: 
In many countries, the developing countries, like where I come from [the Philippines], 
many do not have legislation but they have guidelines, no? So, Philippines have guidelines, 
so that’s the thing thats being followed. It’s not as if there’s nothing. India has guidelines. 
Sri Lanka has guidelines. Nepal has guidelines. So my question is would that refer to the 
system that you are talking about here: that the guidelines are accepted in the country and 
that’s the one thats being followed by the different RECs?
Carl shakes his head. 
My understanding is that the idea is that there should be a legal framework. That 
guidelines are good and guidelines should exist but that guidelines in themselves wouldn't 
meet the standard of a legal framework.
Cristina persists, since she is concerned that a number of countries that take part in FERCAP will 
not be able to reach this standard:  
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But in these [developing] countries, the guidelines are issued by somebody who has 
authority, like India, it’s ICMR that issues the guidelines; in Philippines, it’s the Philippine 
Health Research Ethics Board. In other words, these people have some authority but it’s 
not a law.
The question of understanding the different legislative and regulatory systems in which these 
standards aim to operate causes confusion. As the delegates try to fix the ‘levels’ on which things 
can be done it is clear that part of the problem is that countries do not organise their 
governments in the same ways. Are those who issue regulation authorised through legislation? If 
regulatory is less than legislative, is it sufficient? What counts as regulatory?  If legislators speak of 
the ‘duty of medical colleges to regulate,’ does that make them into regulators? The Sri Lankan 
delegate points out that in his country, legislation can only be made by government, which affects 
who the ‘relevant national authority’ being addressed is. 
So if we are to use this document as part of lobbying, to get governments to get laws 
enacted, then you must say ‘national governments should ensure’. It needs to addresses the 
government as the responsible authority in enacting the law. And I think that’s what is 
going to strengthen our hand if we are to go to government and say ‘Look, WHO is saying 
that you must do this.’ So I think we mustn’t undermine that because yes, the Forum of 
Ethics Committees in Sri Lanka (FERCSL) [...] have guidelines, but those have no legal 
authority and that is the reason why we have a lot of problems of enactment.
Indian delegates agree, arguing for regulations over guidelines, feeling the latter are ‘not 
mandatory so if people do not follow them you cannot take [give] punishment’. The delegate from 
the Philippines puts it best: ‘I feel the standards are supposed to be aspired for, not the standards 
conforming to what is reality but reality being improved to conform with standards.’
During FERCAP conferences, then, legislation is usually formulated as an absence, where 
countries with legislation list it amongst their achievements, marking routes of progress on 
powerpoints. From the perspective of the American commentator whose question to Cristina 
opened this thesis, it was considered remarkable that FERCAP is able to conduct its activities in 
the absence of legislation. From Leslie’s Sting story in Chapter 1 and the recent work of Stark 
(2011a, 2011b) it is evident that the law has a significant role in managing the social relations 
perceived in science in the American domain. But one could also argue it is a form of collateral 
(see Riles 2011), sought by science and ethics committees alike against negative possibilities. 
Depending on the amount of legislation on biomedical research in a country, committees wanted 
lawyers as their laypersons either to preemptively anticipate problems, or review those which 
might go against existing legislation. This varies a great deal across the FERCAP countries: where 
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Sri Lanka has a very light history of litigation against medical practitioners (Fernando 2002, 
Goonaratna 2005, Ruwanpura 2009), in China scholars report fear amongst doctors of 
performing complex surgeries because of possibility of a lawsuit (Zhang and Sleeboom-Faulkner 
2011:460).
During an interview with Lakmini, a Colombo University lawyer who also served on an ethics 
review committee, the topic of having ethics set in law arose. Lakmini accepted that from the 
point of view of committees, it would be ‘useful’ to have a legal means of ensuring that ethics was 
‘kept’ but she reminded me that the law was something static. ‘Here, it is archaic,’ she said, ‘not 
amended in years. What happens is society outstrips the law, and the law becomes redundant.’ 
This, she said, would cause problems were ethical principles to be enshrined in national law. The 
courts, she said, were slow and weighted.56 ‘Law,’ she said, ‘strives to divorce itself from ethics and 
morality,’ citing the debate in the UK over the limits of criminal law between Lord Patrick Devlin 
and Professor Hart during the 1950s following the controversial proposal of the Wolfenden 
Committee to decriminalize homosexuality.57
This raised huge issues for us, the divorce from religion — [the idea that the] secular should 
regulate morality and ethics with it. That’s the fear: when you fix law with morality, there’s 
the danger of having it be stagnant.
An interview with a neuroscientist in Colombo repeated the sentiment that ethics ought not be 
set into law, but his reasoning was that ethics, not ‘society’ changes. ‘As far as the law is concerned,’ 
he said, 
it is written there in black and white. Ethics is not, OK? It comes from within. And it 
changes over time, we see it in the world. What is ethical now was not ethical then, and we 
should keep up with that. We should be open to understanding the basis of what changes. 
And if we don’t keep up, we’ll get crowded out by other jurisdictions that permit 
something. We shouldn’t just say that shouldn’t be permitted and leave it at that and have 
Victorian attitudes.
‘What do you mean Victorian?’ I asked.
Well, you can’t be Victorian about it. At the last meeting, someone said, ‘We will create a 
Frankenstein.’ Those are antiquated views — as long as it is not unlawful, it can be done. If 
it meets criteria, and is properly monitored, and the parameters are set then OK.
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56 When we spoke in May 2010 Sri Lanka’s 35 year long civil war had recently ended, and the priorities of the legal 
system were weighted towards its aftermath.
57 The committee (1954-57) made proposals that prompted the now famous mid-20th century debate between Professor 
Hart and Lord Devlin, see Cane 2006 for details. The debate was also the origin of much of the ‘harm’ based discourse, 
see e.g. Feinberg 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990. 
But the ‘lawfulness’ of something in Sri Lanka is largely unknown. He tells me so himself: 
Our regulation is very weak and I dare say very grey. [...] The way I see it, there is no 
probability or possibility of that type of legislation ever coming out for several years, there is 
not sufficient awareness or focus. So it is important for ethics committees to try and work 
out modalities which might serve the needs of the research as a stop-gap. We can’t wait 
until Parliament or the Ministry of Health or whatever makes these regulations to start 
research, because it’ll never happen. That seems to be the primary problem the ethics 
committee has....do you permit people to engage in research and be competitive, or am I 
worried that the Buddhist clergy will come and protest against me? There is no public 
debate at the moment but all it takes is a tiny thing, just a little cinder and it becomes huge. 
I played the devil’s advocate: would not something ‘huge’ help his case, bring attention, 
awareness, focus and prompt legislation? His answer was revealing: 
Well you see, a public debate would not be rational debate. People will want to score points 
and gain votes. It’s the same with other things, they say tourism is destroying the culture in 
the villages or something. And let’s be frank, these issues are very complex and there are 
very few politicians with the brains to sit down and understand it: maybe one or two. As for 
legislation, I don’t think it will come about for a long time. That is why ethics committees 
play an important role, because they set down certain guidelines which will be used and 
drafted if the government comes to make laws. They’ll look at what is existing and use that. 
That is the heaviest burden the ethics committee caries with them. I can’t see any 
bureaucrat sitting down to draft guidelines. The committee is the best possibility at the 
moment. The composition has doctors who are highly regarded, modern in their thinking, 
it is a diverse group and composed of people of all religions, communities and ages. 
The neuroscientist’s comments echo Cristina’s wish to see FERCAP lead not through agitation of 
the masses58 but through the education and support of professionals.  They also reveal a further 
‘burden’ on committees operating in the absence of governmental support.
Both the lawyer and the neuroscientist held that rather than law producing change, it was too 
fixed to adapt to changes in ‘society’ over time. The temporality of ethics — ‘when’ ethics was 
from (not just where) — was a point raised several times in discussions. When one of my Sri 
Lankan interviewees told me that the Ethics Review Committee was ‘quite an old concept,’ I 
thought she was referring to the relatively early establishment of committees in Sri Lanka during 
the 1980s (Dissanayake et al. 2006). However, what she meant was quite different. An inclination 
towards thinking in ethical terms was, she argued, already present in Sri Lanka: ‘the thought is 
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58 They also echo the debate between Lippmann and Dewey (recounted by Marres 2005:217) in which we are reminded 
that ‘issues call  a public into being’. Jasanoff (2005) makes this point symmetrically, arguing that political cultures shape 
how science is conducted at the same time as changes in science and technology create styles and modes of political 
culture. 
there already,’ she told me, ‘[but] without realizing the values are there, we copy and follow 
whatever comes from developed countries, thinking it is good. I think we must find our own 
values.’ The interviewee had trained as a lawyer, and explained what she meant by referencing an 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case on the contestation between Hungary and the 
Czechoslovak People’s republic over the resources and control of the Danube. The judge in the 
case, a Sri Lankan, had used the following story as a way of explaining the long heritage of the 
concept ‘sustainable development’ in Asia: 
Long ago, I don’t remember the period, monks were sent from India to Sri Lanka, to do 
preaching here. When the monks came, the king had gone hunting. They told him, “Don’t 
kill animals. You must be the guardian of the people, the animals, the land water and air. 
You must not destroy or spoil them.” The ruler agreed, and undertook to protect [them]. 
Now, the judge cited that incident. He said “We don’t have to look to the Stockholm 
declaration, we have the conventions already in our system. It is you who must search for 
them.” We have that, already, in Asian culture.59 
The sense that ethics was already somehow located in ‘culture’ (cf Sariola and Simpson 2011: 518) 
led some interviewees to opine that it could not be codified. A Sri Lankan doctor told me that
a code to implement ethical principles is absurd. It would be sad if it goes to that level. 
While you can have regulations and guidelines, sanction based [law] should not be there. 
Professional bodies and ourselves should enforce it. Of course it is a subjective thing. It’ll 
depend on cultures, it is not something that a rigid legal system can say what is right. In a 
group among ourselves, the group will know. 
He laid his understanding of ethics out for me: 
At the highest level, is the criminal. State is the other side. For example, if A kills B the 
state makes a case against A. It’s beyond the individual, it is a crime against society, society 
persecutes the perpetrator. Then there is the civil level. Say A and B have a land dispute. 
The damages are paid from A to B or vice versa. There is a code of law that mediates the 
whole thing. But ethics is at a lower level, where there should not have a third partner to 
enforce. What is the right thing? Humans should have the judgement in themselves to do 
this.
The doctor’s idea of ‘levels’ at which law and ethics intersect reveals his conviction that while law 
should mediate large scale disputes, ethics, at its ‘lower level’ pertains to and should come from 
‘human’ judgement. Legislation on ethics, in this view, would be out of place.
While the focus in these examples has been Sri Lanka, as we saw with the comments to the 
revision of the Silver Book, the idea of legislating for ethics carries force elsewhere. During an 
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59 In 1997 Justice Weeramantry, a Sri Lankan, was serving as vice-president of the ICJ, and the contribution is recorded 
in ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Summary of the Judgement of 25 September 1997)
interview with the chair of a committee in Taiwan, he explained that he believed research there 
had ‘progressed fast’ because they had ‘used law regulations to do regulation’. The advantage, as 
the chair saw it, was that this had ensured that ethics was ‘not only for moral problem’. Again 
using the language of levels invoked by the Sri Lankan doctor above, he said that using legislation 
as a ‘level of regulation’ above that of ‘moral issues’ and turning ethics into ‘law issues’, meant 
ethics could ‘live on the level of these issues,’ and the government could ‘use this power to push 
ethics’. By elevating ethics to the ‘level’ of law, the chairman said, investigators were made to take 
it seriously: ‘We believe research and ethics here will develop fast and live on a very high level.’ 
The take up of ethics has been described by these interviewees in a language of ‘levels’, from the 
governmental as the ‘high’ and the personal as ‘low’. But the high and the low do not simply 
represent opposite valuations of ethics: while the Taiwanese interviewee made ethics ‘high’ and 
commensurable with law, many of my Sri Lankan interviewees placed a value on ethics as being 
more of a personal, ‘low level’ quality that could not, and should not need to be codified.  
While Coleman and the Taiwanese interviewee above have sought and framed ethics as a matter 
of law, Noah and the Sri Lankan doctor above both associate the law with an objectionable de-
personalisation, inadequate to the ‘aspirational’ qualities they attribute to ethics. According to this 
line of critique, by setting ‘the minimum standards of conduct’ (Aubert 1979:34), the law instills 
‘a morality of obligation, not one of aspiration’ (Fuller 1964 in Aubert 1979:34). Similarly, the 
USFDA summons an idea of ethics which goes beyond mere compliance with the law: 
‘responsible research is ethical, not just compliant…Because the regulations are the ethical floor, 
not the ceiling’ (New Research Challenges Newsletter 2011, see also Goodyear et al. 2008; 2009 
Declaration of Helsinki (WMA)).60 Ethics, it seems, is expected to be something more than just 
compliance, or just law. 
Concluding remarks
‘It’s hard to imagine how Americans could fulfill their role as democracy advocates any better than 
helping the Japanese become jurors,’ wrote Robert E. Precht in his 2006 IHT Opinion piece, 
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60  In 2008, the USFDA declared that clinical  trials performed outside of the US no longer had to conform to the 
declaration of Helsinki (DHHS 21 CFR part 312). Goodyear et al. (2009: 1559, emphasis added) argued that ‘despite 
assurances by the FDA, GCP is not an ethical code, but a procedural  regulatory manual based on the regulatory 
frameworks of the US, Japan and Europe. Thus it is a description of existing procedures, not an aspirational document.’
where he recommended an exchange program in which ‘Americans can visit Japan and share their 
jury experiences and Japanese can also visit American courthouses and talk with American jurors.’ 
Just as the jury was seen as a turn towards democracy in Japan (a politics encapsulated in a 
form61) ,I have in this chapter begun to give voice to the assumptions that travel with the 
committee’s bureaucratic form. While ethics committees are not seen as cornerstones of 
democratic participation in the law, they do contain principles of representation, equality of view 
and voice.
This proximity between law and ethics as modes of governing gave rise to Coleman and Noah’s 
debate. Coleman reports that ‘a 1996 General Accounting Office study found that IRBs are are 
overburdened, underfunded, insufficiently prepared, and often too willing to rely on investigators’ 
good intentions as the primary method for protecting subjects,’ (2004:11, emphasis added) a 
situation he finds untenable. Despite Coleman’s and Noah’s disagreement on how it is that 
subjects should be protected, I suggest that the anthropological insight here can be to the way in 
which the debate is cast. The poles of Coleman and Noah’s debate re-emerge in the ethnography: 
governance through external legal mechanisms or through inculcating and encouraging ethical 
behaviour? These are the issues of legal anthropology, being replayed out of debates on social 
control, in debates on the nature and use of IRBs. In her essay Discovering Social Control, Strathern 
observes that anthropologists were drawn to the study of social control because ‘they appear to 
validate the act of describing behaviour as an endeavour separate from the behaviour 
itself’ (1985:112). The resulting studies, which find social control ‘in institutionalised form’ 
allowed anthropologists to find the law ‘set apart as a realm of interaction which deals with, 
modifies and above all comments on other realms’, a move which was a ‘hierarchical analogue to 
the activity of describing society as such’ (Strathern 1985:112). 
I suggest that the ethics committee — in design and implementation — is a replication of the 
Western idea that law and regulation is about external structures of governance; one realm (ethics) 
which comments on another (biomedical research). Ethics, in Chapters 2 and 3, is presented as a 
set of behaviours brought in by FERCAP, codified in Standard Operating Procedures, rooms and 
discussions. But the material in this chapter has explored the limits of this view. What the Sri 
Lankan material in particular presents is an idea of ethics not as compliance with the law, but as a 
personal orientation, a point which is echoed for example in the USFDA’s concern with a turn 
towards conscience, not compliance (Kahn and Mastroianni 2001, Taylor 2007). These are themes 
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I develop in Chapter 7. For now, in the light of the data provided in this chapter, I want to ask 
again how is it that committees set up in Asia are composed and run? What is this space, in which 
all must be equal, but some are afraid to speak? As Shapin (2008: xvii) asks, ‘What relations 
obtain between the authority of knowledge and the character of knowers?’ I explore this question 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: On Roles and Perspectives 
At the 2010 FERCAP conference, Dr Dipika, a member of an Indian Ethics Committee, 
described a new monitoring procedures she had helped to implement. A death in a study, coupled 
with a new SOP for the monitoring of studies approved by the committee, had led to the 
innovation of EC members visiting sites, speaking to staff and patients. By doing this, they hoped 
the monitoring would keep better track of studies, and help ensure good conduct. But the 
monitors had found a startling number of problems, and Dr Dipika listed them for her audience: 
the protocol being used was not the same as the one approved by the committee. The informed 
consent sheet in use had not incorporated the requested amendments of the committee, patient 
signatures were missing. ‘How can we rely on this data if the signature is missing?’ Dr Dipika 
asked her audience. Worse, English speaking patients had been given Hindi informed consent 
documents, a translation that had not been approved by the ethics committee. All this led Dr 
Dipika to cast doubt on the data being produced by the clinical trial: ‘I don’t know what the 
integrity of the data is,’ she said.
Rather than expressing concern for the findings of the monitoring study, the discussion following 
her presentation took issue with the right and capacity of the ethics committee to do 
‘monitoring’. A WHO representative said: 
I congratulate you that your EC is really committed in terms of monitoring, it is very 
competent in terms of monitoring, and if it’s an ICMR requirement, OK, but I don’t think 
it is a WHO-TDR requirement, and it’s not going to be easy for other ECs to do this 
because it’s very intensive and requires expertise. 
Others agreed: ‘I don’t think even 1% of the people in this room can do that. It is intensive and 
expensive’. Speakers worried about adding more tasks to those carried out by what are, in Asia, 
largely volunteer based positions. This delegate tried to make her concern felt as gently as possible: 
I’m just, in my opinion, because I do monitoring, I train the monitors, I train EC members. 
I know how hard and difficult it is, to already just sit there as a member of EC to do the job 
they’re supposed to be doing well. So if you add another task to members of EC, say do what 
you do, details of being audited, that is another expertise. For me. 
A colleague of Dr Dipika’s spoke up in support of the initiative. In her view, Ethics Committees 
could, and should, also do ‘monitoring‘: ‘A clinical monitor does it different[ly], this is EC 
monitoring, from the ethics perspective,’ she concluded. 
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The argument that ethics requires — and can enact — a different viewpoint, premise or way of 
seeing, as Dr Dipika’s colleague suggests above, is one that has been made by research ethics 
committee members and trainers elsewhere in this research (see Chapter 2). My central question 
in this chapter concerns ‘perspectives,’ and what they reveal about conceptualisations of ‘society’. 
The chapter is split into four parts. The first deals in detail with the committee as a group of 
people sitting around a table. I extend the discussion that emerged around the validity of Dr 
Dipika’s monitoring exercises, the problem posed by a view from ‘an ethics perspective’, and 
examine how committees are formed by, arranged around, act upon and make statements which 
all, in varying ways, rely upon the concept of perspective for their validity. If a monitor from an 
ethics committee can enact a different perspective from a clinical monitor, what happens when we 
examine the constitution of that ‘committee’ perspective? I begin with members of the committee, 
and the way in which the work of committees is constituted thorough the language of 
perspectives. The method is discussed by Mol (2002) whose book, she says, ‘does not speak of 
different perspectives on the body and its diseases. Instead it tells how they are done’ (2002:vii). 
What does it mean to ‘do’ or practice a perspective? For Mol and athlerosclerosis, the practices are 
slicing, colouring, probing, talking, measuring, counting, cutting, preventing. She pushes away 
from epistemology, ‘concerned with references, […] whether representations of reality are accurate’ 
and towards ‘the way objects are enacted in practices…[and] the way in which problems are 
framed’ (Mol 2002:vii). From the chapters so far, we have seen that the ethics committee explicitly 
brings together ‘different perspectives’ as an exercise in representation, and thus appears to be 
very much about, in Mol’s terms, “the epistemological”. Using a conversation with Cristina and 
Juntra about a water bottle, I show how the ethics committee is a device which frames problems, 
and ask what it might mean to ‘do’ perspective in a committee.
In the second part of the chapter, I look at the committee as a form for managing the problem 
that ‘no matter how many perspectives are assembled, they all create perspective’ (Strathern 2004a
[1991]:108). I consider the techniques that the committee uses to contain the potentially infinite 
expansion of perspective and still retain a claim to legitimacy. In section three, Reflect, Represent, 
Have Knowledge Of, I again take up the conference discussion on the modification of the WHO 
Silver Book discussed briefly in Chapter 4, this time focusing on Standard Two, which deals with 
committee composition. In turning to the ideal make up of a committee, this conference 
discussion summons three relations between ‘society’ and the committee: reflection, 
representation and ‘knowledge of.’ An ethics committee is considered to already be in a 
relationship of obligation or duty to the ‘society’, as well as containing it. Participants in research, 
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taken as individual through their single bodies, or multiple as communities, societies, nations, 
reach endpoints both in a general ‘humanity’, and the specific ‘human’ subject of research. How 
does the ethics committee position itself relative to these conceptualisations?
In section four, I develop the consultation material to show how various perspectives, which come 
to be understood as emanating from society, transform into roles in the course of the consultation 
discussion on that draft. The role given to those who hold the perspective of a ‘layperson’ 
provides an example of this process. The example of the layperson, in conversation with section 
three, also helps me develop themes raised in the previous chapter: reconciling the idea of an 
equal conversation about ethics with the need for an expertise-laden scientific assessment.
A table and a plastic bottle
Let us start with the committee in its most simple description: a group of people sitting around a 
table. A conversation from another instance of people sitting around a table, a lunch table this 
time, provides a story through which we can understand what this ‘simple’ image carries with it. 
At a GCP training at Thammasat University, Juntra, Cristina and I were discussing decisions in 
ethics review committee meetings. It was a theme I had been interested in exploring since the 
outset of research, curious about how decisions were described as being made and how they were 
negotiated in practice. As trainers, Juntra and Cristina thought it was important for committee 
members to not only draw on their expertise, but to bear in mind the patient, protocol and 
contribution of the research to society. From this breadth, Juntra’s first concern was to avoid 
discussions which led to position taking: 
In a debate, if you adopt a position, you take that and see if you win or lose at the end. You 
won’t compromise your position. But it’s not about winning or losing, that’s not a good 
attitude for an Ethics Committee.
Cristina agreed:
It’s not who you are, [if you take a position] you won’t be moved, so it’s not what you really 
think. Real life is about decisions, not hypothetical unreal stories. In an ethics committee, 
everyone should think: ‘How could we come up with a decision appropriate for that study 
that will be the best for people taking part?’ The minute you take positions, you try to 
protect them. All you have is that position. If, instead, all of you have one position, how to 
contribute to the protocol — if you have that position, you can have your eyes open for 
another’s view.
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Juntra, who was sitting opposite me pointed to the water bottle between us. ‘I can’t see the other 
side of your bottle,’ she said. ‘Our job, is to ask “how can we describe the whole bottle?”’ Cristina 
nodded, saying: 
Heijan62  has a nice picture of this. There are three blind men and they are all holding 
different parts of the elephant. There’s this elephant and you touch different things, one 
has the tail one has the foot. And you say the elephant looks like this, but you only have a 
part. But together, they’ll be able to describe what the elephant looks like.
Ethics committee meetings invariably take place around a table. Indeed, a regulator at the 2009 
FERCAP conference fixed them there with the remark that committees ‘can’t be two people in a 
corridor, but a meeting around a table’. The table is therefore part of making the committee 
meeting recognisably a committee meeting. Juntra intends the bottle between us as the applicant’s 
protocol, forcing the bottle into view not only from the literal perspectives of those around a table 
at an ethics committee meeting, but also their figurative perspectives. That she and I can literally 
see different sides of the bottle is equated with the different (figurative) ‘perspectives’ that the 
members on the committee will bring to the discussion: they may have clinical experience, they 
may have knowledge of the law. When Juntra uses the bottle she is calling on a literal example of 
perspectives to illuminate a figurative perspective. In an ideal discussion, we describe the whole 
bottle — the whole protocol — and what it looks like seen from all sides. The imagined objective 
of Cristina and Juntra’s committee view on the protocol is one which finds resonance with ‘a kind 
of cubist presentation in which every side of the object is presented simultaneously to us in a 
single — though ‘general’ — perspective’ (Holbraad and Willerslev 2007:334): the decision of the 
ethics review committee. 
It is when figurative perspectives become positions that Cristina becomes critical: ‘the minute you 
take positions, you try to protect them’. When, during a mock review at a training in the 
Philippines the trainer announced that ‘in ethics committee, you can change your mind as you 
discuss,’ the statement was greeted with applause. ‘It is not like a debate, where you stand by what 
you believe, no matter what,’ she said. In thinking through her response to the idea that tolerance 
might be an obstacle to the open discussion of controversial issues (Trosset 1999), Strathern 
(2006: 192) observes that 
while you can hold a viewpoint and relay it, you cannot argue from one. In order to argue, 
you need to have detached yourself from - divided yourself off from - competing positions 
that you might otherwise (in some other life) have occupied.
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Cristina’s comment on ‘positions’ echoes this observation, and is critical of such detachment. 
What Cristina is recommending instead is the holding of a common perspective (‘one position’): 
that of improving the protocol. Using the water bottle as she does, Juntra is using figurative 
language to get around what Holbraad and Willerslev see as the stumbling block to a ‘view from 
everywhere’: that ‘we can never actually see things in their totality, simply because seeing in its 
nature is embodied and therefore perspectival’ (2007:334). But what is the embodied nature of 
ethics committee decision-making?
Bodies and decisions
In Chapter 3 I recounted a moment during a Survey in the Philippines when Cristina was asked 
by a trainee, ‘Isn’t it the point of having a diverse composition, to get diverse points of view?’ She 
responded with the importance of decision making: ‘When there’s a difference in opinion, you 
arrive [at a decision] by voting […] You cannot be deadlocked. The Ethics Committee is about 
decision making.’ 
We have seen why it is socially advantageous for the anonymity of the reviewer — their point of 
view — to be concealed within the ‘full board,’ but here we see another reason: ‘In full board 
discussion your opinion can change, the final decision is a board decision, not an individual one’. 
In Chapter 3, I showed how opinions voiced in committee rooms become notes, become letters 
that change protocols. We have also seen how the arrangement (and disciplining) of bodies in 
physical space betrays ideas at work (cf. Mitchell 1988: 78-79). Even though Juntra is locating the 
perspective in the body, her figurative location of perspective is in the minds of the attendees, 
differently trained, with different knowledges. In an ethics committee, perspectives are thought to 
be brought in and made present by the bodies of the room. They are, like the table, the materiality 
of ethics. What it makes visible with regard to those sitting around the table is how perspective 
becomes tethered to identity. An ethics committee is not, for example, arranged with a circle 
around the chairperson, nor could it take the form of stage and seats: the idea is not that the 
chairperson is superior in wisdom or knowledge to those who accompany him/her. This in turn 
demonstrates the concern of the form with democratic reasoning. Yet as we have seen above, 
members of ethics committees are persons often chosen for their seniority. How to reconcile these 
things?
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Mol observes that, 
perspectivalism puts doctors and patients on a par, with a great divide between them, 
because they cast their views from different angles. The traffic across the doctor patient 
divide attracts much public attention [...] A perspective from one point of view differs from 
that of the other (2002:20-21).
Commenting on Mol’s work in The Body Multiple, Strathern observes that Mol
deliberately takes this conceptual stance against the widespread language of fragmentation 
that perspectivalism generates, for perspectivalism (I would add) rests on a mathematics 
that seeks to resolve the world into discrete entities: a unit that does not seem to hold its 
parts together seems thereby to fragment (Strathern 2011a:92). 
The sense that the discrete unit ‘global clinical trial system’ may not hold all its parts together —
that it may fragment — has been a concern voiced at the FERCAP Conference, inspiring Koski’s 
image of the finely woven silk cloth we saw in Chapter 1. When attendees are prompted to 
imagine how this global system works, and their place within it, capacity is being built. Imagining 
is the skill. The same can be said to to occur here, on the ethics committee itself. The parts of the 
committee, chair, secretary, laypersons, reviewers and experts learn how reviewing works. This 
observation allows me to return my attention to what that ‘form’ of the ethics committee allows. 
As Strathern puts it, 
the idea of there being numerous perspectives and viewpoints ‘on’ phenomena implies that 
one could ideally formulate some kind of summation of all possible views, or at least a 
framework or perhaps a generative model for the production of the perspectives themselves 
(2004:108). 
Perhaps such a generative model might rest in the constitution of the committee, as a theory 
linking identity, representation and perspective, with the objective of producing a balanced view. 
But such a balance is itself fragile because of the potential for the proliferation of perspectives 
arising from ‘a constant sense that any one approach is only ever partial, that phenomena could 
be infinitely multiplied’' (Strathern 2004a[1991]: xiv). Too many perspectives, or too much 
representation, could lead to an infinity of impossibilities: research could be impermissible for any 
number of different reasons. Cristina’s recommendation of a common position acts as a limit to 
re-description, a way of bringing to rest expandable narratives (Strathern 1996b:522). When she 
responds to a question about diverse composition and diverse viewpoints by emphasising the 
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importance of making decisions she is pointing to is one method of delimitation. The limit of 
time is another and the mapping of the figurative ‘perspective’ onto the body is a third.63  
The one and the many
In assembling many views and combining them in decision-making, the committee is a device of 
Euro-American pluralism, ‘ontologically grounded in one world and many viewpoints’ (Strathern 
2011a:92), what Latour terms mononaturalism (2004). Differences in viewpoint are no longer 
visible in the ‘one voice’ of the committee,64 and yet they remain necessary for its ‘legitimacy’. To 
do the work it needs to, the committee must be both a composite of many perspectives 
(representative), and a single voice (authoritative).  
The group of people assembled in an ‘ethics committee’, are charged, then, with making a 
decision. More information can be collected, but the aim is a final decision. The combination 
into single-ness allows it to speak ‘as though’ it were ‘one.’ Corsín Jiménez explores this 
phenomenon in his study of baroque forms of thought (2010b) where he takes up Hobbes’ theory 
of representational personification as a political innovation that ‘brought about a political 
transubstantiation: the Many became the One, which contained, but also transcended, the 
Many’ (2010b: 38-39). Citing the historian Noel Malcolm (2002), he observes that this 
‘transubstantiation’ resulted in ‘a curious structure of argument that requires two different ways of 
seeing the relation between the individual and the state to be entertained at one and the same 
time’ (2002: 228, see also Shapin 2005). This fits with Stark’s descriptions of her IRBs as 
declarative bodies, voices of the state (2011a: 250) speaking as “The IRB.” While I am not 
speaking of the state here, there is nonetheless a version of representational politics at work, and I 
suggest a version of this ‘structure of argument’ is repeated when an ethics committee must be 
both one who stands outside to assess ethics, and made up of many points of view. For the 
committee to work, it must be seen twice: as Schaffer writes of representation in politics and 
pictures, ‘[y]ou have to see each member of the group in its own right. At the same time, you have 
to see the group itself as a singular thing (2005:196). Juntra’s water bottle story suggested that the 
ideal view taken by the committee is one from everywhere. Holbraad and Willerslev write that if 
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‘IRB members use latitude each time they apply a regulation, which might make the range of possible 
decisions seem nearly limitless. Yet the ways in which IRB members go about making decisions is systematic 
because of the constraints of their social configuration’ (2011b:66).
64 As Rodriguez put it, in Chapter 3; see also Stark 2011a.
the view from everywhere is ‘constituted as an ideal from which all perspectives are felt to be 
deviating in some degree’, the ideal ‘tends to be experienced as a motivational invitation to 
change one’s position, so as to get a better, fuller, or more optimal view of the perceived 
object’ (2007: 340). They conclude that ‘not all perspectives are of equal value’ (ibid). We have 
seen suggestions of this in the chapters above. I now explore the creation of positions from which 
to view protocols, attentive to the values placed on ‘perspectives.’
In Chapter 3 I showed how Conflict of Interest can expand from ‘interests’ — construed in a 
purely financial manner — to cover such things as curiosities, ambitions, beliefs and knowledges. 
Conflict of Interest declarations are described as ‘within’ oneself: the committee member is the 
only person who can reveal their relationships, ambitions or beliefs. They are, for the purpose of 
COI, ‘part’ of oneself. Colin, a lawyer I interviewed in Sri Lanka, illustrates how this composition 
of the person informs and intersects with the form of the ethics committee. Discussing his fellow 
committee members, Colin said:
They’re from different backgrounds, it’s a good composition of people, diverse backgrounds 
and those who have done well for themselves. They’re not reliant on others for work, 
they’re not worried about what other people think, so it makes for healthy discussion. At 
the moment, the committee is looking at guidelines for stem cell research. It’s an old 
argument, what should be prohibited and what restricted and at our last meeting, there was 
a lot of give and take, looking at the moral and religious issues to have a fairly objective 
discussion. 
‘Objective’? I asked.
Well, people left their beliefs at the door. I don’t think people’s personal beliefs should 
have anything to do with what is being discussed at the table. [We are] not there to pass 
religious judgements. It is a question of what is lawful, and what can be done. The point is 
that members of ethics committees are not of any particular faith, unless they need to be 
for the purpose of representation.
What is Colin saying here? How can one leave ‘personal beliefs’ at the door, and yet be present for 
the ‘purpose of representation’? He is placing a positive valuation on the diverse ‘backgrounds’ of 
the members, but finding one part of that ‘background’ problematic. This is worth exploring 
carefully.
Wedika, a committee member from Galle, in southern Sri Lanka, commented that his committee 
was ‘more confident’ if it comprised several different disciplines. His committee had just added a 
statistician to its ranks, and he said that they found she was able to comment on the mathematical 
appropriateness of the sample size of a protocol, relative to its scientific aims. Using this as an 
example, he argued that a variety of perspectives would eventually be good for trial participants. 
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There were, however, limits to Wedika’s desire for variety. While a statistician was a fairly 
unambiguous positive, and a lawyer was also considered to be important, clergy posed a problem, 
causing me to recall my conversation with Colin. ‘They are important too,’ Wedika said, 
struggling:
but it’s difficult to have lots of people coming — you lose control. Which religion are we 
going to choose? Then we have to give equal [weight] to all: Buddhists, Christians, Islam. 
They have their own areas they are very concerned about. If all three are there, I find, I feel 
some research projects might not go through which should not be the case. 
As Wedika saw it, these additional perspectives would clog research possibilities. Were the ideal of 
equal representation actually enacted in the Sri Lankan town where he worked, he thought a great 
deal of research would stop:
They may go on minor details, say, ‘In our culture, our religion, this should not be asked or 
questioned or investigated.’ Research will all end at that point [...] If monk would sit in our 
committee, none of the animal research would be possible. They bring in teaching of 
Buddha, nothing will proceed — though we have thought of having [them on the 
committee].
He did foresee some possibilities for including such perspectives, albeit in a rather contradictory 
fashion:
If we have such people, they need to be educated enough in ethics, so the religious thing 
doesn’t apply to the proposal itself.... Until we can have a panel of educated clergy, better 
not to have [them]. 
Embarrassment was another difficulty in including non-medics: ‘Even with the lawyer, it’s 
difficult. It is not possible to invite them and then not accept that person’s opinion, because it’s 
embarrassing to then disregard it.’ At the same time, he worried about ‘losing the social part’ of 
research: by concentrating on one issue, ‘we medics have blinded ourselves to other things’.
These two interviews give a sketch of what a non-medical person who sits on an ethics committee 
in Sri Lanka is thought to be. The comments depart from the expert/layperson dichotomy of 
Euro-American studies of science, in which the literature on democratic of participatory decision-
making shows roundtables, open fora and consensus events are ‘intended to involve the lay public 
in decisions’ (Weingart 2008:141, see also Maranta et al. 2003, Joss and Durant 1995 although see 
Flear 2009). In Chapter 3 we saw how certain ‘parts’ of an abstract ‘society’, imagined as external 
to the committee, are seen to inhere in the person and the ‘interests’ they hold. Here, as a 
layperson in Sri Lanka, if I leave my own Buddhism at the door, I must recognise that I am there to 
‘represent’ wider society too, since that is what the ethics committee as a device demands of me. 
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Shedding my personal religion, I come to stand in for a generic social concept of religion, one that 
is put ‘outside’ the committee (which has concerns for ‘all’ of society), and is re-channeled into the 
committee through me. Am I then an individual as ‘an internal constellation of plural elements,’ 
as conceptualised for example with Conflict of Interest, or a ‘life’ ‘merographically conceived as 
belonging to many external systems’ (Strathern 1992a:167)? The Sri Lankan material I have 
discussed here shows both versions in use. People are brought in to ethics committees on the basis 
of a ‘merographic image of the individual person as a part of diverse systems of domains beyond 
him or her’ (Strathern 1992a:167) — but some of these domains are cut off. What the committee 
as a form effectively creates, I argue, is a space in which all perspectives are notionally present, but 
the relative value of these perspectives is predefined, pre-weighted. Some matter more than others. 
I now want to look more closely at the creation of the ideal in the first place, through the new 
WHO Standards.
Represent, Reflect and Have Knowledge Of
Riles (2006) observes that a document is a means; it points to an end beyond itself. Under 
discussion in the grand hall in the Hotel Equatorial, Shanghai, the draft of the new WHO 
Standards (2011) certainly hoped for an end beyond itself. Carl Coleman, the lawyer whose 
articles framed the previous chapter, was presenting the draft to FERCAP for consultation. ‘Let 
me preface this,’ he began: 
by saying the standards are all phrased in the same way: phrased as describing a state of 
affairs that would be a good state of affairs, the way things should be. There’s no verb in 
there, such as ‘should’ or ‘must’ or ‘encouraged’. It’s simply saying that in an ideal world, 
this is what happens.[...] They’re describing the situation as it should be. The question in 
evaluating any given system is whether in fact this description is being satisfied.
A document that intends to bring the system into being by describing it is, I would suggest, a 
powerful mode of description. In this examination of the production of ‘authoritative 
knowledge’ (Jasanoff 2005:19), the story I compose from the meeting takes up the question of 
what an ethics committee should look like, and how that description — one we already know as 
‘ideal’ — is reached. Carl tells us that this description of the world as it should be is also a world 
that can be measured. A discussion of standards forces a description of the ideal, and of the gap 
between the ideal and what people consider practicable. The first problem the FERCAP attendees 
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raise is medical expertise. The second, developing out of the first, we might initially gloss as ‘social 
expertise.’ Let us look at the discussion surrounding the second Standard. Carl introduces it as:
moving from the system to the entity that is establishing the REC, which could be a 
national or subnational entity; it could be an institutional entity. The REC is [he reads 
from the screen]
“appointed according to a charter or other document which establishes the manner in which members 
will be appointed. The appointing official ensures that the REC has a multidisciplinary and 
multisectorial membership, that its composition includes both genders, that it reflects the social and 
cultural diversities of the communities from which research participants are most likely to be drawn, 
and that it includes individuals with backgrounds relevant to the areas of research that the committee 
is likely to review. Committee members recognise the limits of their knowledge and seek external input 
where necessary, particularly in relation to research that involves participants whose life experiences 
may differ significantly from those of the committee members.” 
Carl summarises the Standard as being about ‘a diverse representation on the committee and it 
goes into a little bit of detail about what diversity means.’ He asks for questions and Vasantha, the 
Senior Deputy Director General of the Indian Council of Medical Research65  raises a hand. ‘Of 
course’ she begins, 
[the standard] only talks about backgrounds relevant to areas of research the committee is 
likely to review. It’s not always possible. That’s why you need consultants, experts who are 
attendant to the committee to do the expert views.
The session chair points out that this is addressed in the next sentence, that committee members 
‘recognise their limitations,’ but the chair thinks it’s important that the standard notes that 
‘individuals have backgrounds relevant to the areas of research’, even if this is not always going to 
be possible. Carl agrees, and takes up the point:
I think part of the question is what the purpose of the standard is, the way this was 
discussed it was a standard to describe the ideal. Ideally you would have representation from 
all the areas of expertise. In reality, that may be a standard that is going to be difficult to 
meet in a lot of cases because the committee just doesn’t have a lot of options to draw from. 
That’s where the next sentence about limits of knowledge would come in.
Vasantha worries that by making ‘representation from all areas of expertise’ mandatory, it 
becomes impossible for committees, particularly those in developing world settings, to achieve the 
standard.66 At this point we are about to shift from the limits on available scientific expertise to 
the limits on a committee’s social knowledge. To solve the problem, the chair proposes a link 
between sentences. If ‘committee members recognise the limits of their knowledge and seek 
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65 Whom we met first at the Regional Collaborative Workshop, in Chapter 1. 
66 Finding ways to ensure ‘appropriate expertise’, from all areas is indeed a challenge in developing world settings, and 
is acknowledged by documents such as the 2005 Nuffield Discussion paper. I develop this important point below. 
external input where necessary’, perhaps this will help? But for Carl this linkage produces a new 
kind of problem : ‘[t]he sentence wasn’t intended to apply just to expertise, it was also intended to 
apply to community representatives.’ There is a pause. Cristina speaks first: ‘I think I’d still 
emphasize that an EC should have the expertise to review the types of research it reviews,’ she 
says:
If it has no expertise it should not review it, no? I like this guideline because it emphasises 
that this EC should have expertise, otherwise what’s your business accepting that protocol? 
And you seek external input where necessary. That’s the consultant.
Vasantha notes that she expects the protocol to have already undergone an expert scientific 
review,67 to which Cristina rapidly responds, ‘We don’t assume that, that’s just India!’ which raises 
a laugh. At this point, an invited speaker from the USA raises a hand. The chair motions for him 
to speak. ‘This is only a suggestion’, he begins. ‘Not imposing?’ jokes the chair. ‘Just a suggestion’, 
he repeats: 
When it says that the appointing official will ensure that [the committee] reflects the social 
and cultural diversity of the committees, you imply that you must have representation from 
that participating population you are doing research in. Perhaps it should say that they 
ensure that they have knowledge about social and cultural diversity. Not every REC has an 
HIV infected person on their board, nor do they have poor people, or others from these 
vulnerable populations that we’ll do work with. So it may want to say that rather than 
ensuring the committee reflect the diversity, that the committee have the knowledge of that 
diverse population.
‘I see your point,’ replies Carl, tentatively: 
I think that’s probably something we should discuss a little more, because I think there 
were some people who felt very strongly in previous versions that the committee should 
include, or strive to include those people, though it may not always be possible.
In enlarging on a problem which started in the possible limitations of medical expertise in 
developing countries, the discussion has suddenly shifted to what kinds of knowledge are 
sufficient, who might possess them, and how both people and knowledge should be made present 
on a committee. ‘How can we get those people from that community?’ asks one audience member. 
‘I think it’s about having the relevant knowledge,’ continues another, ‘I think it should say that, 
“The committee should have the relevant knowledge, rather than the committee itself reflecting 
those…”’ We reach a point where this change is being contemplated, when Carl speaks again: 
I’m not sure everyone would agree with that. I see your point, but I’m thinking of the 
comments we received on earlier versions of this. There were a lot of people saying that 
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67 See above.
there wasn’t enough in the existing Silver Book to emphasise that this isn’t a committee that 
is looking at the community and making decisions for it but that it is a committee of the 
community. At first it said something like ‘represents’ and then there was some concern that 
that was a little ambiguous and what does it mean to represent a community? So reflects was 
seen as a little bit... But knowledge of is almost expressly saying that its people who are not [of 
that community], it’s someone from the outside who knows of.
Li Ling, one of the Chinese delegates suggests ‘emphasis on the cultural or community 
consideration of the committee composition,’ worried that unless this is specified, it will be 
ignored. Cristina replies to her, returning discussion to the layperson:  
It’s about the layperson not a community representative. [The standard] says that members 
whose primary background is not in science or research should be appointed in sufficient 
numbers to ensure that they feel comfortable voicing their views. And that was intended to 
emphasise that you shouldn't just have a token member that is the community or a lay 
member, but there really should be a critical enough group.
The shift from sufficient breadth of scientific expertise to ‘social and cultural’ issues provokes the 
invocation of three distinct terms: reflects, represents and ‘has knowledge of’, each carrying its 
own connotations. Why do these words and terms matter? 
As I suggested initially, the creation of the standard is a powerful mode of description. While 
Vasantha’s concern with the scientific whole can be fairly readily supplied with ‘experts’ and 
‘external consultants,’ the breadth of ‘the social’ is less easily satisfied. From the discussion above, 
we have (at least) two types of person for this category: the layperson and the community 
representative. The deliberation over which of these to use reveals questions about who these 
‘others’ are to be, and how this ‘social’ field is to be ‘brought in.’ How are their qualities 
described? American literature on the topic is clear: 
While no committee can represent all elements of the community where research will be 
conducted, the REC must be capable of assessing the impact of the research on the 
community and determining whether the research is relevant in the local setting. This often 
leads to the inclusion of REC members who do not have a scientific background but are 
professionally grounded in the community, such as a member of the clergy, social worker, 
teacher or nurse. [...] They should exhibit commitment, knowledge and concern for their 
communities. The nonscientific and community representative members must be given the 
same level of respect as their scientific counterparts (River and Borasky 2009:50).
Li Ling’s intervention allows Cristina to reframe the problem of representation as one of the 
committee’s expertise. This in turn becomes a question of quantity: ‘you shouldn’t just have a 
token member that is the ‘community’ or ‘lay member’, but there really should be a critical enough 
group,’ Cristina says. 
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Quantity is the reason given for a recent innovation, community advisory boards (CABs), which 
provide another approach to involving non-scientific persons in committee decisions (Diallo et al. 
2005, Quinn 2004, Weijer and Emanuel 2000, Thaitawat and Chinaworapong 2008). A 
researcher who worked with a CAB in India said during the 2009 FERCAP Conference that:
CABs can be conceptualised as an intermediary between the community and researcher. It 
gives them strength of argument, because on a REB/ERB/ERC, a community member 
might not have the strength to make their presence felt, they might be intimidated.
Researchers try to ameliorate such intimidation when conducting research. Consider these notes 
from a discussion at a workshop in Canada in 2005, following presentations on community 
consent in the ‘Promotion of Equitable Research Practices’: 
One way to achieve informed community consent is through community REBs. Then it 
will not simply be a traditional band or tribal leader consent — one person who decided 
for the group — but a more balanced consent. It is an epistemological question: are we 
individuals first or members of groups? The answer seems to be neither, and this is the 
problem (Lemmens and Archibald 2006: 63).
When confronted with community consent, the certainty of the researchers (and of their ‘ethics’) 
in the primacy of the individual evaporates. Anthropologists are likely to recognise this 
‘epistemological question.’ Strathern writes that the concept of ‘society’ construed the 
individuality of its members as primary; individuals first, their relationships second (Strathern 
1996a:62). What the apparent problem of “applying” principles of individual informed consent to 
others reveals (again) is that — as anthropologists have long known — the individual is a particular 
way of thinking about the person (see also Corrigan 2003). In the closing of her contribution to the 
1989 Manchester debate, Strathern puts the consequences strongly: ‘The unfortunate outcome of 
conceiving of society itself as an entity has actually been to make relationships seem secondary 
and not primary to human existence’ (Strathern 1996a: 55). Informed consent is the ground upon 
which this tension becomes most evident, and has garnered a large share of academic attention 
(Sankar 2004, Reubi 2012, Molyneux et al. 2005). But effects of this mode of thought are far 
reaching and, I suggest, sustained and promoted through the way in which research ethics is 
framed. When the individual whose consent must be sought is not found, indeed the concept not 
found to hold, researchers look for groups. Groups then require representatives, and the problem 
recurs.68  If representation is the outcome of a Euro-Americanism that splits one reification 
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68 Sometimes they find themselves caught up in loops, where in order to research problems of informed consent, their 
own research regulations require them to obtain informed consent from participants, in order to talk with them about 
why informed consent may not be suitable.
(individual) from another (society) in order to recombine anew and this fails the committee, what 
then of ‘reflect’?
In an interview with Carl nine months after the consultation in Shanghai, he clarified that the 
draft at the time (September 2010) read ‘reflects,’69 for ‘practical’ reasons: 
Will you be able to find people who truly represent? ‘Having knowledge of’ might mean 
anyone who has read a book. The reflect is more in-between. ‘Represent’ - you’d need to 
find someone who could speak on behalf of the entire group. ‘Reflect’, you could be a part 
of the group, or it means you’re somehow part of it, it’s not necessary for you to stand for 
everyone, you’re not necessarily typical. But ‘reflect’ also goes some way to preventing a 
total stranger... So we had to try and find a word... Everyone will interpret [it] in a different 
way, not everyone will read it this way for people who wanted the word represent it helps 
them, and so in a way it serves both sides. It doesn’t say that they do... [it] comes on a little 
weaker.
Carl’s later analysis reveals assessments about the adequacy and type of ‘knowledge’ desired from 
persons on an ethics committee. It also makes a careful distinction between types of learning. 
Book learning seems too little — the person could be a ‘total stranger’. Representing seems too 
much of a demand, indeed, perhaps impossible. Sometimes, for Euro-Americans, ‘simply 
‘knowing’ about other perspectives may [...] be regarded as a respectable end in itself’ writes 
Strathern (1999:252). But the discussion around the revisions of the Silver Book suggests that this 
is not one of those cases. In discovering the inadequacy of “having knowledge”, we are led to ask 
for what purpose it is inadequate, and what is instead required. What is desired is no longer the 
characteristic of knowing something, but of being something: being ‘of’ or ‘from’ that community, 
being a patient with a disease that is under discussion. The ‘ideal’ standards describe not only a 
broad range of persons in whom scientific expertise resides, but also types of people. Though the 
standard was ultimately published using the term ‘reflect’ (WHO 2011), the first ‘guidance’ point 
for Standard Two states that:
Members include individuals with scientific expertise [...] and lay people whose primary 
role is to share their insights about the communities from which participants are likely to 
be drawn (WHO 2011:8).
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69 It has since been published with that phrasing (WHO 2011).
Laypersons
In ethics, the process by which a decision is made is as important as the outcome. For a 
decision to be ethically legitimate, it must be made in an open and inclusive process that 
takes into account the views of all stakeholders. (WHO REC Basic Concepts 2009: 22)
An ethically legitimate decision, the Basic Concepts guide implies, might be a difficult thing to 
achieve. What is it, and how can it arise? The guide demands ‘openness’ and ‘inclusiveness’; 
focusing on the decision as process. Here, building on Colin and Wedika’s comments (p.168), I 
explore further the kinds of things that laypersons are supposed to do and be. The layperson is a 
well-established figure in Euro-American discourses of public engagement with science. Maranta 
et al. argue that this figure is 
not a sociologically comprehensive representation of lay persons but rather an action in the 
knowledge production which ascribes epistemic and functional competences to lay persons
(2003:154). 
Recognisable renditions of laypersons are distinguished by their medical ignorance, and in 
standing in contrast to the medical members of the committee, they assist in creating the latter as 
experts (Strathern 2004b, Michael 1996). In the sections below, I explore both the theory and 
lived experiences of laypersons.
i) In Theory
‘Doctors are all trained the same, so they think the same’, said Wedika, the Sri Lankan ethics 
committee member who argued above how a (particular) variety of perspectives would improve a 
committee. In interviews, I often found laypersons were deemed a necessary check on the ‘single’ 
view of medicine. In the publication resulting from the consultation above, further guidance 
accompanying Standard Two reads ‘Committees are large enough to ensure that multiple 
perspectives are brought into the discussion’ (WHO 2011:8) and elsewhere, WHO publications 
assert that a diversity of backgrounds on a committee ‘can help ensure that [...] judgements are 
not inappropriately dominated by a single perspective’ (WHO 2009:13). 
One of the ways documents attempt to ensure a multiplicity of perspectives on committees is to 
make decisions made in the absence of a layperson invalid. This is achieved through specifying 
quorum, the minimum number and type of persons required to be present for a decision (WHO 
2000). But laypersons cannot just be present. We know from FERCAP’s Survey’s expectations 
(Chapter 2) that they need to speak. In addition, according to an American Research Ethics 
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Training Curriculum, ‘[t]he nonscientific and community representative members must be given 
the same level of respect as their scientific counterparts’ (River and Borasky 2009:50; emphasis 
added). But how can this ‘same level of respect’ be ensured? That it needs to be specified already 
implies that it may not always be given. At a training in the Thailand, Cristina reported a 
conversation she’d overheard in Taiwan, between a layperson and a doctor, both of whom sat on 
an ethics committee. ‘How can a housewife debate with a philosopher?’ asked one trainer:
She was just a housewife, and someone asked her, ‘Why are you bothering yourself to 
come? There’s not much money in it.’ She said, ‘When I’m at home, nobody listens to me. 
Here, what I say makes a difference.’ That’s the nature of the people. Once they get that 
pleasure, it’s hard to explain what it is.
The difference between a housewife and a philosopher was, to the trainer, obvious. But these 
definitions (and sense of hierarchy, it seems) need to shift. Juntra tells me that in FERCAP 
trainings:
We always tell the layperson, ‘You’re equal.’ Yes. In Thailand it was really strict before. Now 
I say, ‘The only place you’re equal is that table.’ Lots of professors don’t like me for saying 
it, but they can’t say anything against me, I am one [a professor]! They can’t say anything to 
me! Professors feel they know lots and feel others know less. That’s a problem. It’s not about 
your profession... People confuse between their profession and Ethics Committee. Now we 
are discussing the framework, on the table it’s about risk benefit, and everyone talks about 
that. Not how you do surgery, that’s your expertise. We should have the same goal: credible 
review. Each one contributes a different aspect. I contribute expertise but I should listen to 
the social aspect. At the beginning that was tough, but they got used to it.
The ideal social situation in an ethics committee room is, Juntra admits, out of the ordinary for 
many committee members. Imagined as a set up for the enactment of an ‘open and inclusive 
process’, it is also a de-professionalising move for the medical professionals, who are used to being 
listened to and respected.70 While Juntra asserts that ‘[e]veryone in that room has the same right 
to say anything,’ a ‘right’ does not always translate into an action, hence the Survey’s criteria for 
observation during the surveyed committee meeting’s board meeting: does the layperson 
participate? Still, she reports ‘improvements.’ Since the SIDCER recognition lasts three years and 
the program has been running since 2005, renewals, or ‘resurveys’ are now being done with a 
number of the early adopters. Now, she says:
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70  I draw a parallel here between the expertise role given to medics in the ethics review process and that of the modest 
witness given by Boyle to gentlemen in the English 1600s. As Shapin and Schaffer put it, ‘[w]itnessing was regarded as 
effective if two general conditions could be satisfied: first the witnessing experience had to  be made accessible; second, 
witnesses had to be reliable and their testimony had to be credible’ (2011:336). For the former, the principles we see 
here. For the latter, see Chapter 7. 
Committee members talk about something reasonable. Everyone should be able to follow 
the discussion. Its not just two people discussing and the rest just sitting there. And the lay 
person has to understand too. Before, we’d see the layperson intimidated not really saying 
anything. Now [in the resurveys] they’re participating! Before they were afraid, scared to ask 
a “stupid question,” but now they want to give their opinion. Perhaps they see their 
contribution making a significant difference.
While the laypersons may now speak (and this listed as a measure of the success of training) this is 
of course not proof that they are listened to. As Jasanoff argues for evidence in a courtroom 
(1998), it matters not only what evidence is presented, but also that the ‘eye that frames [it] must 
be certified as authoritative’ (1998: 714). When laypersons speak in the ethics committee, they are 
supposedly ‘equal’, their thoughts given ‘equal respect.’ But this does not happen automatically. 
Juntra tells me that the trainings ‘gave room for [the layperson] to contribute, and grow. Before 
there was no room. Without training, committees said “I need a layperson,” but they let them be!’ 
In her view, committees cannot just ‘let them be’; indeed ‘growing’ the layperson has been one of 
FERCAP’s main interests. Creating a ‘role’ for the layperson is an aspect of this. As one trainer 
commented: 
After the training they realize there’s a role for this person, not just for the sake of 
requirements. Because others don’t know what [their] role is about. Once everyone has the 
same training [it works better]. If only one person goes to training, how can they come back 
[to their committee] and say ‘[the layperson] has a role’?
The question of how a housewife can debate with a philosopher is reversed: what is at stake now is 
not how the housewife can become sufficient to the philosopher’s demands, but how the 
philosopher can learn to hear the housewife. Measurement, however, is never far away: ‘I think 
training brought about change [but] there is the question of how to prove it,’ Juntra says. 
When you observe an EC meeting, you look at the dynamics. If she doesn’t speak her 
mind… You look at what they do. We [also] look at protocols they reviewed and see how 
they deal with each protocol. Say we review 20 sets of minutes and none of them mention 
this aspect of layperson, its never in the minutes.
She also notes that the Survey recommendations usually contain a note for the laypersons: 
We always say [they] should ask the layperson to review the consent forms. Then they have 
their own checklist, we say ‘a not medical’ person should comment [on consent forms]. 
That defines a very specific role for them.
That ‘very specific role’ does not, however, require a very specific person. Explaining the layperson 
to a group of trainees in the Philippines, Cristina said: 
A layperson doesn’t mean someone literate. Can be a lawyer, a monk. [...] In some 
countries they use a patient representative. ‘Layperson’ means someone who does not 
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belong to the field of medicine. Define it in your SOP so it will not be difficult to find.[...]
In guidelines you need a layperson, and an unaffiliated. If that person is not there, you’ve 
not got quorum. You cannot make decisions if there is no layperson and no unaffiliated. 
They can nullify your decision.
Cristina is less concerned with the detail of the layperson than with defining a role for them. They 
cannot ‘belong to the field of medicine’ but their difference from medical members is less 
important than their presence. Without them, legitimate decisions cannot be made. Although 
Cristina says the layperson may be illiterate, the examples she chooses are highly qualified 
professionals. I want to tentatively suggest that, though she does not use the term, her choice of 
these professions stems from a particular way of thinking about ‘society.’
In the previous section I showed that in informed consent we see hints of the legacies of theories 
of ‘the individual’ and ‘society.’ As we saw, ethics struggles with community consent because it 
cannot decide whether persons are members of communities or individuals first. In Strathernian 
terms, informed consent struggles because of the primacy of individuals over relations in Euro-
American ways of thinking. In the same way as informed consent makes this primacy evident, I 
suggest that the ‘role’ of the ‘layperson’ too is revealing; a site that makes evident the concept of 
‘society’ at work.
Strathern’s work shows how the English theorising of ‘society’ produced their idea that ‘[s]ociety 
allotted roles to its members’ (1992:158). Cristina revealed the results of the allocation of roles at 
the conference in her offhand definition of ‘capacity building’: ‘[c]apacity is always specific to a 
role. You have to define, like each person has his role in society. You cannot be good for all, you 
do a specific role.’ Society is the basic metaphor here: capacity as specified into roles, is made 
thinkable by a pre-existing model of society organised in terms of roles. The original context of 
her definition came vis-a-vis the ‘role’ of ethics in a global system of research. In invoking a ‘role in 
society’ in her explanation, Cristina moved easily between a role in society and the role of ethics 
in a global system of research. The idea of ‘role’ is clearly operating in multiple contexts, on 
multiple actors, at multiple scales. I suggest this same mode of thinking about roles applies to the 
ethics committee. This particular abstraction of society about which Strathern writes ‘proliferated 
others — religion represented society, law represented society’ (Strathern 1996a:52). Cristina’s 
invocation of ‘a lawyer, a monk’ uses professions which descend from these commensurate 
domains, repeating precisely the other abstractions proliferated by the society abstraction. The 
lawyer or the monk are, because of this way of thinking, able to stand for ‘society’ on the ethics 
committee. 
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ii) In Practice
We have seen what the guidelines and FERCAP suggest for a layperson. What about those who 
serve under this designation? In May 2010 I interviewed Jaya, a trainee lawyer in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka. She had been attending committee meetings for a few months when we spoke, and she 
classified herself as a ‘layperson.’ In her answer to my question about what that meant, she told 
me: 
It’s like this. A person from [a] high background doesn't really understand what goes on in 
normal people’s lives. In my office, there is a senior lawyer, and he went on a bus for the 
first time in his life the other month. It was a five hour journey but he’d always traveled in a 
private car. He was saying that there were people crying, [he was] complaining about the 
music, people with baggage, being sweaty. And I thought, ‘That is just once in your life, we 
face it everyday!’ That sort of person, until they actually face it, doesn’t understand. You 
need people who are sensitive to that issue! So we are people [on the committee] who 
represent average people in society.
For Jaya, her life experiences marked her as ‘normal’, in contrast with the doctors on the 
committee she attended. She likened the lawyer in her office to the doctors who, due to their 
‘high background’ could not understand everyday reality. The ‘difference’ of the layperson’s 
thinking seems to be the mark of their contribution. At trainings, lectures tell medics, ‘You 
should be proud to help a lay person,’ ‘they need to be empowered.’ And when laypersons 
addressed one another, they said:
we should be proud of what we are and what is our perspective [...] It’s not about clinical 
practice, it’s about research ethics. The technical part is the clinicians. Research ethics is 
where should be no difference between a clinician and a lay person [...] What you study is 
not how to do better surgery, it’s about beneficence and justice. You should be at the same 
level as far as those principles are concerned.
But it is difficult to keep the conversation in these domains when certain knowledges triumph. 
While ‘different thinking’ is valued, they cannot be too different. For some, it can be an 
uncomfortable position to sustain. Harsha, the Sri Lankan layperson whose comments opened 
Chapter 4, said: 
Medical people, they humour us when we ask layman questions. But they may not respect 
and consider us if continue to ask dumb questions. If our questions are well informed and 
human, then its OK but if they’re completely ignorant, idiotic - I always wonder if what I’m 
about to ask is idiotic -then they’d like to discuss it and educate us. We always think twice 
though, it’s not kids play, we need respect of equal stature, or what you say won’t matter, we 
could be brushed aside. [...]The fear of inadequacy is always there.
The question Harsha is asking herself is ‘how naive is too naive?’ What kind of naivety will result 
in the loss of her status as useful layperson, and render her voiceless? How can she maintain her 
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fragile ideal of equality? Her position is not enviable. Harsha is, in her day job, a successful 
advertising executive; she is clear in her thoughts and articulate in her answers to my questions. 
Her education brings her into the circles of the doctors who invited her to participate on the 
ethics committee and while she maintains that she thoroughly enjoys the meetings, there is a 
shadow of something that she cannot collapse into. Her role is to “represent” laypersons, and she 
can do so because she is one, from a medical point of view. But she cannot provide too good a 
representation of them; she cannot be ‘completely ignorant.’ For all her ‘ignorance’ can be seen as 
an epistemic competence (Maranta et al. 2004, see also Michael 1996), her ability to continue to 
interact with the ‘medical people’ demands a certain fluency: she must remain ‘well informed’, or 
risk losing the (necessary) respect of the medics.
Other ‘lay’ members foreground their capacity for empathy as knowledge, such as Barbara, who 
worked in translation and marketing in Taiwan: 
Sometimes, I feel very angry about the doctor, not concerned about the patient. It’s not 
their fault, they go through a science point of view to see the experiment. I’m glad I’m an 
IRB member so I can help the patient, to protect them. So it’s more like a mission for me 
now.
Her friend, who was sitting in on our conversation over a cup of tea, raised her eyebrows. Barbara 
laughed. 
She [the friend] knows, I’m kind of picky about some details. Too picky maybe. Why don’t 
they think about research? Because they think it should be more cold blood, more science 
style, more powerful. Sometimes, if want to do research think the patient will listen, so you 
should be grateful I’m going to help you in the future. ‘Cos I’m doing for your own good, 
so you should do whatever I tell you. Sometimes I think they believe its no harm - this is 
everything I do every day, easy, not harmful. [...] Its like a mouse, white mouse. How can 
they create those strange clinical trials?
This is not protection of a human subject who can “vote with his feet” (Noah 2004:384, see 
Chapter 4 above); in her foregrounding of the relation between an investigator and their patient, 
Barbara is reminding us of the particularity of the relationship between patients and doctors in this 
part of the world (e.g. Chin 2002). I suggest that the paternalism which informs patient-doctor 
relationships cannot be upset by ‘layperson’ in a committee, and that in the attempt to formulate 
committees which take on board the ‘lay’ view, what they actually reinforce is the attitude of 
custodianship committees have over patients.
At the end of the opening conversation about the water bottle, Cristina inserts Heijan’s image of 
the blind men and the elephant. This is the same story Heijan used in Chapter 2 to explain the 
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operation of the Survey to trainees in Beijing. There it was used to suggest that through 
teamwork, Surveyors could form a whole overview of the committee under study. The Survey 
could take the different parts of the committee into the different parts of itself, and at its final 
meetings, re-compile them. In Heidi’s words, this might bring them to ‘truth’. But when Cristina 
mentions it here, we are not talking about the Survey. We are talking about a committee, its 
meetings, and its decisions. The image has leapt scale, in part because the ‘reality levels’ (Latour 
and Callon 1981:298) in use by FERCAP do not hold; the ‘level’ at which the Survey takes place 
(overviewing the Committee) mixes with the ‘level’ of the Committee itself since the techniques 
they apply to their objects are so similar.71  When used to talk about the ethics committee rather 
than the Survey the social mathematics of the parable are different; the change in scale matters. 
While the story is used to point to the partiality of knowledge, also it relies on an external 
position of knowledge: the elephant is standing in for an unknown, since we and the King both 
know what it looks like. An image (glanced-at-and-understood) of the story (told in linear time) 
exploits the difference in knowledge between the viewer and those depicted. Only the king and 
the viewer of the image are equal; everyone else is ‘blind’. Cristina’s use of it as an image 
equivalent of Juntra’s water bottle example simultaneously equalises and differentiates the 
different participants in the ethics review; they are each equally blind to the elephant, they each 
hold a different part. As an organising metaphor for the ethics committee, the story of the blind 
men draws out the simultaneous equalisation (all the men are blind) and differentiation (each has 
a different, unique part of the truth). However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, this is a state 
of ideal contradiction which is difficult to achieve in practice. 
A tale of two microcosms?
The sections above detailing who should be on a committee, and why, illustrate how the ideal 
committee is contested. Does one convene a committee which, in Carl’s words, ‘isn’t a committee 
that is looking at the community and making decisions for it but that it is a committee of the 
community’? Does one emphasise the equality of participants, aiming for a conversation in which 
everyone is of equal standing? Or does one emphasise the need for scientific expertise, in the 
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71  I have remarked before on the way in which ideas are replicated and shared between the Survey  and the Ethics 
Committee. I return to this observation in the Conclusion.
knowledge that unless research is scientific, it is not ethical, a principle commonly cited by 
FERCAP. While ideal committees are being designed, ideal circumstances cannot answer. 
The term I want to use to denote the activity I perceive in the committees resulting from the two 
priorities above is ‘microcosming.’ ‘Microcosm’, from the Greek mikros kosmos, or little world, is 
used to describe something ‘encapsulating in miniature the characteristic qualities or features of 
something much larger,’ (Oxford American Dictionary), of imagining one thing miniaturised 
inside another. This term I propose to use as descriptor of a strategy applied by my informants: to 
be clear, I intend it as a means of drawing attention to their sets of strategies or techniques, in the 
way Callon and Latour intend the term ‘macro-structuring’ (1981). The logic of the macro and the 
micro is an artifact of the logic under study. While the term is mine, it describes a productive strategy, 
attentive to replication, scaling and the movement therein. Microcosming not only contributes to 
making ‘society’ as a partner with whom ‘science’ can converse, as an aggregate that can be 
represented, but it is also constitutive of the scales upon which ‘society’ and the ‘individual’ are 
thought to exist. Furthermore, it attends to the relationships between them. Microcosming 
becomes about making a macroscale object present at the interpersonal scale. How can you bring 
‘society’ into conversation with a person? The presence on the committee of a particular version 
of ‘society’ is perceived as a miniature, drawn from a ‘larger’ imagined externality. 
Building on Chapter 4, I want to suggest that there are two types of microcosming going on in 
FERCAP’s engagement with committees. The first concerns the committee itself as a microcosm. 
The second involves an image of ‘society’ contained within a person, who comes to represent 
society on the committee. In the work of microcosming, committee members simultaneously 
bring into being society ‘out there’ and its presence in the room, either as the committee or in a 
person. I am talking of two different techniques to materialise this macroscale entity in a face to 
face situation. One is to see it in the layperson, the other is to see it in the committee itself. They 
result in ways of doing an ethics committee which, I suggest, are distinct from one another. The 
sections which follow reflect on the implications of the distinction I am drawing.
i) Cross sections and non-experts
At a FERCAP training in Chiang Mai at the 2009 Conference, a trainer sought to highlight the 
‘synergies’ of committees which, she said, were ‘supposed to be a microcosm of society where 
people have different backgrounds and trainings.’ In this description, the ethics committee is 
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explicitly imagined as a ‘microcosm,’ albeit an ambiguously faithful one, of ‘society.’ Why is 
‘society’ being microcosomed in this way?
Social historian Duncan Wilson writes that, following New York Times’ 1972 revelation of the 
Tuskegee study in the USA, ‘Yale lawyer Jay Katz argued that fundamental questions needed to be 
asked about the nature of authority assigned to physicians’ (Wilson 2011:199). Katz claimed that 
‘doctors possessed no unique expertise that justified making them the sole arbiters of medical 
ethics, and proposed that patients and experimental subjects should be safeguarded through ‘the 
more active participation of non-scientists in research decisions’ (Katz 1972a: 606 and Katz 1972b: 
1, cited in Wilson 2011:199). Arguments such as this, Wilson argues, led to a profound shift in 
the locus of governance over biomedical research.72 Within two years of the Tuskegee revelation, 
Wilson observes,
President Nixon responded to controversies over human experimentation by establishing a 
fixed-term national commission for the protection of human subjects in biomedical and 
behavioral research. The act that established the commission notably stipulated that no 
more than five of its eleven members should be doctors or scientists, with the majority 
drawn from philosophy, law, theology, sociology or the general public (Wilson 2011: 126).
In the USA today, debate continues about the ‘politicization’ of bioethics (Brown 2009, see also 
Moreno 2005, Caplan 2005). In defending the President’s Council on Bioethics (PBCE) from 
accusations of politicization, Leon Kass, its former chair, stated that:
The Council has been “in microcosm, and in the best sense of the term, a political body,” 
because of the way it has sought to incorporate diverse perspectives, avoid expert jargon, 
and engage the public (Kass 2005: 247; 228, original emphasis, in Brown 2009:43). 
I suggest that it is a version of this model of a bioethical council which led the speaker at the 
Chiang Mai training to frame the committee in the way she did. While publics have not been the 
focus of my research, nor of this chapter, in my observations of the way a committee is imagined 
as microcosmic there is — implied — a macrocosm from which that microcosm is drawn. When 
bioethicists look for ‘public opinion’, ‘representative’ committees are convened, or specified 
sections of ‘society’ consulted (Strathern 2005b). Here, the ethics committee needs to sufficiently 
make whole a fragmented outside whose diversity needs to be ‘represented.’ When representatives 
are found and arranged onto a committee, it can be thought that in the single voice of this 
committee’s decision, ‘science’ and ‘society’ speak together Strathern however (2005b: 476) 
remarks that
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72 The further repercussions of which I discuss in Chapter 7.
we would do well to be wary of the kind of co-production of knowledge that hypothecates 
society as a partner [...] An abstract notion of “society” [...] is pre-emptive. It demands 
demonstration rather than investigation; it will require performance, representatives and 
evidence of its presence in people’s calculations. 
There is a further dimension to this recurrent tension in the normative democratisation of 
expertise (Weingart 2008, Jasanoff 2003), and I want to analyse it by returning to the jury 
comparison made in Chapter 4.
Cristina argues that ethics should not be a specialist activity, that it should be the kind of 
conversation that everyone on the committee can follow. In this committee the different 
backgrounds of members are valued, a ‘cross section’ is sought. In discussing the jury in the 
previous chapter, I raised the importance of classifications of persons and their knowledges. In 
2007, UK barrister Helena Kennedy represented Shuja Mahmood, a man accused of involvement 
in a plot to cause explosions in London using ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The BBC reported her 
closing speech to the jury: ‘because you are drawn from the public at large you represent 
something more — you signify law is not left to lawyers or judges; it is not some specialist 
preoccupation’ (BBC 19th February 2007). Kennedy’s concern that ‘law is not left to lawyers or 
judges’ repeats a distinction made in ethics, when Juntra says an ethics committee meeting ‘is not 
about your profession’ (p.177). Both juries and ethics committees must deal with hierarchies of 
expertise, types of person and knowledge. Sometimes, both insist on the value of non-specialism. 
Let me unpack. 
While the jury is a great deal older than the ethics committee, they hold in common a Euro-
American tradition of equal civic participation. It seems as though both Cristina and Helena 
Kennedy are arguing for the same principle: that both the law and research ethics should be 
accessible to everyone; it matters that they are decisions that could be understood by all. Through 
their principles of composition, both the committee and jury contain the essential fiction that 
‘society’ can be made to speak. What differs is who it is that makes up ‘society’ in each of these 
groups. It was because a jury was supposed to be a ‘cross-section’ that, when in early 2002 in the 
UK, Louis Blom-Cooper QC ‘argued that defendants should have the right to be tried by a panel 
of experts instead of a jury’ (BBC 16th April 2002), there was a rapid response from civil rights 
groups and barristers (Home Office 2002). Blom-Cooper had claimed that ‘the question of 
evaluating evidence in the courtroom is a professional job, it’s not for amateurs’ (BBC 16th April 
2002). During the response to this suggestion, the Bar Council framed this as a matter of public 
trust: ‘the public trusts the jury system, the government needs to show it trusts the public’ (BBC 
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14th July 2002, The Observer 14 July 2002). Public trust and confidence is precisely what 
Coleman (2004:49) and Koski both desire for science, and ethics committees are posed as a route 
to it. I suggest that as states borrow from science techniques of knowledge for their legitimacy 
(Ezrahi 1990), the technique of transparency is beginning to be applied to ethics review 
committees. 
The reason usually given for the ‘closed’ nature of an ethics committee meeting is that of 
confidentiality. However, pursuing the jury analogy, Coleman argues that confidentiality concerns 
‘should not be used as a shield to limit the public’s ability to participate in and oversee the 
decision-making process’ (Coleman 2004a:50). Indeed, he goes as far as to claim that ‘both IRB 
deliberations and their written opinions should be open to the public’ (Coleman 2004a:50). In 
the USA, committees are federally mandated (Stark 2011b:72) and like Coleman, Stark speculates 
on the closedness of IRB meetings (2011b:35-37). She writes that ‘[m]any questions raised about 
declarative bodies as a tool of government have gone unanswered precisely because administrative 
bodies work outside of public view’ (2011b:36) and argues that:
decision makers are persuaded by different forms of evidence for administrative choices 
made behind closed doors than in decisions made publicly, with doors flung open, TV 
cameras rolling, and full transcripts available (2011b:36).
In Shapin and Schaffer’s account of early experimental science, Hobbes and Boyle famously 
disagreed over what counted as public witnessing. Haraway writes that Boyle’s ‘open laboratory’ 
and its offspring evolved as a most peculiar ‘public space’ with elaborate constraints on who 
legitimately occupies it (Haraway 1996:431): ‘What in fact resulted was, so to speak, a public space 
with restricted access’ (Shapin and Schaffer 1985:336). That questions are starting to be raised 
about the closedness of ethical review is significant when one remembers Stark’s succinct 
summary: they can change what can be known in their review and revision of protocols. The 
consequences of this I develop in the analysis below. 
ii) Laypersons and Expertise
If the committee itself can be taken as a microcosm, what of the second kind of microcosming? I 
suggest this was seen in Colin and Wedika’s comments on the inclusion of ‘laypersons’ on their 
Sri Lankan committees. In his study of the ‘epistemological commitments underlying American 
conceptions of individualism, politics and public action,’ Ezrahi (1990: 201) notes ‘the idea that 
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the life of every individual is in some respects a microcosm of the life of the community.’73 This 
imaginary of society/community-in-the-person allows commentators to turn away from the 
imaginary of ‘segments’ of society being represented on the committee to a person ‘in whom’ 
society/community is contained. Ensuring the presence of ‘society’ in ethics committees then 
takes the form of the layperson: a person whose expertise is precisely their inexpertness, their 
normality, everyman-ness. In the section on the significance of the terms ‘reflect’, ‘represent’ and 
‘have knowledge of’ above we begin to discern that who one is, and how one knows something both 
matter. The detail of the slippage in discussion shows two outsides: the professional realm of 
medicine, which seeks representation though expert knowledge, and the remainder, imagined as 
society, with its cultural and ‘lay’ specificities. Making standards that describe a committee 
sufficient to both of these is, as Vasantha notes, practically impossible.
This microcosming has a ‘type’ of committee associated with it, one more concerned with the 
scientific soundness of research. The problem of scientific soundness arose during the discussion 
related above (p.172), where Vasantha commented that, in India, they expected research to have 
gone through a technical (or ‘scientific’) review prior to reaching the ethics committee. The 
tension has been noted before, most clearly in follow up discussions to the Nuffield Report on the 
ethics of research in developing world settings. The follow up document reported that
During discussion, there was broad agreement that both the scientific quality, and the 
ethical issues raised by the proposed research should be reviewed but there was 
disagreement as to how this should be achieved. Ideally, and where feasible, it was suggested 
that these review processes should be separated (Nuffield Discussion Paper 2005: 48).
Desirable though the separation may been, it is not always ‘feasible’. 
In Kenya for example, a scientific committee usually reviews the scientific protocol before it 
is submitted to an ethics committee. If the scientific committee does not have enough 
expertise, an external Kenyan expert is sought to review the protocol. In a much smaller 
country such as Fiji, there are not currently enough suitably qualified experts to make it 
possible to create two separate committees. One suggestion was that it might be more 
appropriate to specify that a REC has a duty to ensure that there is adequate review of both 
the ethical and the scientific aspects of a proposal, rather than stating how this should be 
achieved (Nuffield Discussion Paper 2005: 48).
During my time with FERCAP, trainers repeatedly argued that if research is not scientifically 
sound, it is not ethical; that no risk to participants can be justified if the results will not be 
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73  With a remark which has relevance to the struggles members of committees found with voicing their views, Ezrahi 
(1990:202) quotes the Americanist Sacvan Bercovitch (1981:13, 32) stating that “elsewhere, to be independent was to 
challenge society, in the United States, it was to  be a model of consensus[...] representative selfhood bound the rights of 
personal assent to the rites of social assent.’ 
scientifically valuable. In several countries where FERCAP works, national bioethics committees 
have little force, there is little legislation, media coverage of biomedical issues or litigation. In 
some places, hospital or institutional ethics committees may be the only point through which 
international applications for research pass. As such, the scientific members and their expert 
knowledge come first, upholding the maxim that unscientific research is always unethical. The 
priority of this version of the ethics committee is to oversee good science; create publishable papers, 
monitor research coming into a country from overseas. Ethics committees’ attention to matters 
considered scientific can frustrate: ‘[c]linical researchers are exhausted by the demands of ethics 
committees that seem more concerned with the science (which they cannot necessarily judge) and 
editorial control of patient information sheets than with ethics’ (Warlow 2004: 241). How, and 
where the distinction is made is an ethnographic question. It is of the committee in this mode 
that Juntra is thinking when she expresses concern about the lack of doctoral qualifications in 
some countries where trials are to be held, or when Chatura, a committee member in Sri Lanka 
tells me that they spend most of their time discussing methodology, criticizing proposals:
When you think about it, [research ethics is] a highly technical subject. You can’t just walk 
off the street and be a good ethics committee member. Just because they are clergy or a 
teacher, doesn’t mean they can come. I don’t agree with taking one of each kind and saying 
everyone is represented [...] Some methodologies are unethical because if research is not 
scientific then it is unethical to subject people to risk.
As Shapin and Schaffer (1985[2011]:336) note, ‘democratic ideals and the exigencies of 
professional expertise form an unstable compound.’ At the same time as FERCAP works to bring 
perspectives together on an ethics committee with the principles of equal contribution and 
common discussion, it also re-creates the separateness of those views. Shapin and Schaffer’s 
witnesses of science acted as ‘transparent spokesmen [...] whose only visible trait was their limpid 
modesty, they inhabited the culture of no-culture. Everybody else was left in the domain of culture 
and society’, writes Haraway (1996:431). The separateness resurfaces in Chatura’s comments on 
the technicalities of research ethics.  It is the extent to which committees, through witnessing the 
ethics of a protocol, are acting as modern-day witnesses to science (Shapin and Schaffer 2011
[1985]) that causes complaints of censorship (Hamburger 2004). Stark’s work ‘Behind Closed Doors’ 
is a valuable contribution to the study of how committees do make decisions. However, when the 
witnesses of ethics are also witnesses of science (Nuffield 2005: 48), when their decisions not only 
rely on the scientific expertise of members but are also about the science, we see arise a situation 
which gives double meaning to the making of ‘good science.’
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In closing, I want to draw attention to the question of what (and where) gets chosen for one’s 
macrocosm. It is a question suited to empirical study. Laura Stark’s work on committees as 
‘declarative bodies’ concerns itself with the way they are ‘empowered by governments to make 
decisions without consulting citizens’ (2011a:233). In my own work with FERCAP, I have not 
found it to be the case that ‘citizens,’ ‘the public’ or ‘society’ are invoked or thought of as needing 
to be consulted; nor that the committee is a device which, though its decisions, is used to make 
science accountable to society. The authority of most of the committees I worked with did not 
come from an imagined ability to represent the considered opinion of a population. ‘Society’ is 
present, nominally, in the second microcosming, laypersons, but the work of the committee is 
more akin to Noah’s peer review mechanisms (2004:291).74 In Singapore, Holden and Demeritt 
(2008) expressed concern that the focus they encountered on ‘the international marketability of 
research results’ and the ‘highest international standards’ (2008:81) drew from a macrocosm 
which was, for Singapore, mis-located and mismatched. As they write, 
the bioethical model being put into practice in Singapore anticipates a certain state-society 
relationship in which the populace is invested with a series of rights, both individual and 
participatory, such that it can give active asset to new and novel forms of science and 
technology (2008:82). 
When Holden’s interviewee, who worked for Singapore’s national ethics committee, pointed out 
the absence of ‘autonomy’, replacing it instead with ‘respect for the individual,’ Holden and 
Demeritt were — at their own confession — ‘flummoxed’: what, they asked, was ethics without its 
‘guiding principle’ of autonomy?’ (2008:82). They argue the ‘the mapping of ICH guidelines onto 
Singaporean society defies the very logic of those guidelines,’ that it was not about the meaning of 
‘autonomy’ for committees or the Singaporean state: ‘as long as the consent forms are signed and 
the paper trail is clear, there should be no qualms about what it all means’ (2008:82). 
Here I am concerned with the meaning already in the making of the paper trail. In comparing an 
ethics committee with a jury, I found that neither in judgement nor discussion are all perspectives 
equally valid, even if they ‘should’ be. This is also what Stark finds in America (2011b:38): 
Is everyone equally an expert in IRB meetings? In theory, the answer is yes. In practice, 
however, the answer is no. […] Cordoned off from traditional avenues of public oversight, 
declarative bodies have been imagined as democratic by virtue of their design. Each 
member is expert in his field; each member is equally valuable. 
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74 The proximity of peers to one another causes the problems we have seen in previous chapters.
While FERCAP works to ‘educate’ committees on the role of the layperson and tries to measure 
the impact of their approach in terms of whether or not the layperson speaks, this cannot be an 
indicator. The layperson needs to be “heard” and this is difficult to measure. We have seen that 
both ‘laypersons’ and scientists or experts need to ‘learn.’75 Thus I would suggest that the capacity 
FERCAP builds is a matter of seeing problem as they are framed by the makeup of the committee.
Concluding Remarks: Limiting Endpoints
When Dr Dipika asserted that a monitoring checkup on a trial from ‘an ethics perspective’ was 
both a right and a different kind of monitoring from that carried out by Clinical Monitors she 
prompted a discussion which revealed limits to her actions as an Ethics Committee member that 
would otherwise have remained invisible. She prompted others to define and delimit areas of 
action considered to fall within the role of one set of actors or another; a ‘cleavage’ in knowledges 
(Mol 2002: 20-21), here between ethics as ‘lay’ knowledge and the expertise of clinical monitoring. 
I have attempted to show how a version of this cleavage between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ operates also 
within the committee. Like the idea of ‘role’, and the image of the elephant, it moves (scale). The 
committee emerges as a means of controlling the formation of perspectives, holding things in 
place. It is bound by time, particularly in Asia where committees are made up of volunteers. It is 
limited by those chosen to be on it, those who sit in the room. As a form it contains multiple 
views but in acting as a committee it must arrive at a decision: a committee decision. The ‘one 
voice’ (Chapter 3) with which the ethics committee speaks takes a single body, sometimes the 
Chairman, sometimes the stamp of “The IRB” (cf Stark 2011a: 235). This both lends authority to 
the image of combined and considered views, and conceals the identity of those who have swayed 
the opinion in the meeting. In this “corporate” sense, the committee members are less themselves 
and more the features of many. 
Many scholars remark on the Western origins of bioethics. Part of the impetus for this study was 
to examine the consequences of the fact that, as the ISBC proposal put it, ‘most of the concepts 
and international regulatory principles in use continue to be derived from Western cultural 
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75 After arriving at this analysis I became aware of the conversation between Mol (2011) and Strathern (2011b) on this 
point (see also Jensen 2012) but do not address it directly here.
values’ (Hess 1995, 2007, Nader 1996, Harding 2006)’ (ISBC 2007). ‘So long as all the ethicists 
are in the North and the South is just the recipient of ethical principles, nothing will change!’ 
writes Bhutta (2002:118). As an example of how it is not just principles but processes which are 
affected by Western cultural values, Maori health researcher Tupara (2011:374) notes that with 
regard to collective consent, ‘ethics committees are unlikely to facilitate arrangements for 
collectivity if it is not part of their standard assessment protocol or accepted practice.’ I have 
developed her observation through my focus on the form of the research ethics committee, 
arguing not only that its form, composition and ideals of operation owe a great deal not only to 
Euro-American ways of thought, but also that it replicates the tensions that constituted 
anthropological analysis for a large part of the 20th century: the micro and the macro, society and 
the individual, local and global. 
Furthermore, I have explored the implicit distinction which treats the form of the ethics 
committee as separate from the ‘western’ origins of ethics content; as though it were in some way 
neutral. My analysis points to the effects of form, the way the ‘committee’ organises and creates 
the conditions for a behaviour that is recognised as ‘ethics’; work I have sought to make visible. 
When regarded as a frame for action, this is not the limiting endpoint of the research ethics 
committee, but its limiting starting point. 
As a prelude to Chapter 6, let me extend my focus on limits. In my analysis I have suggested that 
the capacity being built is not just to do with histories of ethics or even modes of thinking, but 
with the inseparability of those modes of thinking from the form of the committee. What emerges 
is sometimes imagined — as Wedika put it — as a dialogue between those who speak for everyday 
people, and those who, through their training in medicine have ‘lost’ that way of thinking. In its 
purpose and modelling, the committee simultaneously assumes that viewpoints are comparable, 
and works towards ensuring that they are. The possibility of misunderstandings at the committee 
table was expected, indeed desired. Misunderstanding and discussion would contribute to debate, 
considered as a necessary component (measured in the Survey) of what an ethics committee was. 
But that the misunderstandings might not be the same misunderstandings is not something that 
can be entertained or desired (Viveiros de Castro, 2004:9 cf Roy Wagner 1981:20, see also Crook 
2007 and Strathern 2011b). Instrumentalised, misunderstanding could always be resolved, 
viewpoints were always comparable. There was an implicit understanding of misunderstanding as 
reconcilable. Put differently, differences could be resolved. I turn in the next chapter to how 
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FERCAP handles this resolvability, by looking at the arranging work difference is made to do and 
how differences are themselves arranged. 
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Chapter 6: Comparison makes a difference
Respect for cultural and socio-political differences is important. Members involved in the work 
focus on the common task, rather than on their political and cultural differences. They begin to 
see each other as friends and co-workers despite their divergent political and cultural background. 
Asia is a land of contrast and diversity but the FERCAP experience is about a common goal.
Reflections on the FERCAP Experience: moving forward with partnerships and networks. 
Cristina Torres 2010:52
To ‘misrecognise or fail to recognise (cultural difference) can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone [or a group] in a false, distorted and reduced model of being, 
research cannot be “difference-blind”. 
Charles Taylor, 1992, cited in Values and Ethics: Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Health Research, NHMRC, 2003, Australia. 
What is the ‘cultural difference’ referred to in the quotations above? In this chapter I explore the 
idea of cultural difference in FERCAP’s work, how it comes to matter and how it is used. In 
Chapter Two I used Sam’s idea of a house for the region, calling the living room a common space. 
Here, I look first at the making of Asia as a region, and the role comparison plays in this activity. 
How does FERCAP hold the region steady? 
‘One thinks of comparisons because other people do,’ writes Marilyn Strathern (2004: 69). 
Though she is thinking of the work of other anthropologists (Leach and Leach 1983, Herdt 1984) 
what captures my attention in this chapter is the comparisons FERCAP members are making 
amongst themselves, about themselves and between themselves. ‘And how is our ethics?’ was one 
of the first questions asked of me during my fieldwork, as I spoke to a Sri Lankan about my 
interest in dual-ended (UK–Sri Lankan) ethics review. It was a question of comparison which 
might have prompted me to embark on a series of my own comparisons using the implicit units of 
the question: nation states, and the ‘cultural and socio-political differences’ therein. I could also 
have fallen back on obvious categories, comparing the operation of ethics review committees, 
national legal and regulatory frameworks or others used by FERCAP and its surveyors — indeed, 
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comparison (with their own committee, the committee they know) is one of the ways in which 
surveyors envision capacity building taking place. 
During fieldwork, I reached a point at which these questions — and the world of graduated 
achievement and evolutionary progression they implied — appeared obvious and natural. I had 
gained an ethnographically informed understanding of ‘how things are’, but as I moved between 
places I became concerned about the kinds of assumptions I was carrying, courtesy of this 
imaginary. Certain places seemed more central to ethics, other places more peripheral. Sometimes 
this was because there were more people, sometimes more committees, sometimes simply a single 
person with a lot of energy. Jensen (2007) remarks that the apparent size of a place — large, small, 
central, peripheral — comes from correlating the large with importance, something ‘regularly 
taken as a solution to the problems of sorting perspectives when one moves between 
contexts’ (Jensen 2007:837). ‘The idea’ he writes, ‘is that if relevant scales were observed, the many 
different places, opinions, and contexts visited could be properly sorted and evaluated’ (ibid). This 
was a model of knowing places that I recognised, and as a pattern of thought it had consequences: 
centers appear as obvious sites of knowing ‘more.’ This chapter attempts to work through the 
consequences of de-centering these models. What are alternative ways of approaching the 
comparisons made within FERCAP, without replicating the co-imbrication of space and 
importance? How to pay attention to the instrumentality of similarity and difference, their un-
fixedness, and the role comparison itself plays in the making of geographies of similarity, 
difference and significance? 
I take as exemplars Mol and Law (1994), Riles (1995, 2002) and Jensen (2007), in whose work 
there is a consistent effort to challenge academically accepted descriptions upon which arguments 
and interpretation are built. Mol and Law (1994:641) describe theirs as ‘a paper about the 
topographical presuppositions that frame the performance of social similarity and difference,’ a 
paper I take here as a sampler over which to sew not narratives of a varying disease, but the pre-
packed notion of ‘cultural difference.’ Jensen (2007) builds on Strathern (1991), Wagner (1991) 
and Callon and Latour (1981) to consider the scales adopted by anthropologists and sociologists 
in coming to terms with social activity, with the reminder that ‘the researcher is no better located 
to observe the proper scales than any other actor is’ (2007:847). Using Callon and Latour (1981), 
he argues that the challenge is no longer that of traditional social theory: ‘how to sort good from 
bad representations of society’ or achieve ‘calm observation and distant overview’ (2007:847). 
‘Rather than being neutral observers of scales’, he writes, ‘sociologists, as are all other actors, are 
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inevitable participants in the construction of scales — in their very efforts to analyze and describe 
those scales used by other actors’ (2007: 847). When the anthropologist starts paying attention to 
questions such as why, and to whom size is important, without the reliance on the stories that 
seemed to explain these features away as obvious, new vistas emerge. The languages of both scale 
and comparison start to look like instruments employed within the ethnography itself.
There are certain things that comparison ‘makes’, almost immediately. Thévenot opens an essay 
(2002) on the mutual implication of ‘things’ and ‘persons’ in moral or political evaluations with a 
quote from Hannah Arendt. 
A seance where a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly, through some 
magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons sitting opposite each 
other were no longer separated but also entirely unrelated to each other by anything 
tangible... a world without things that are between those who have it in common, as a table 
is located between those who sit around it, a world with no in-between which relates and 
separates men at the same time (Arendt 1998:53 in Thévenot 2002:53).
One of the problems with dealing in terms that denote, foreground or are themselves ‘difference’ 
is that difference is usually taken as a separating notion. One thing is not another. It is different 
from it. Thus difference is posed as a barrier to common goals. One tactic has been to ‘celebrate’ 
difference, in order to turn upside down the potential problems that it causes (Strathern 2011a). 
But this is always slightly surprising to commentators, who are working with, rather than against, 
the implicit values in words like ‘relation’ (Strathern 1995c) or here, ‘difference.’ When Choy 
(2009) comments on Mathews’ (2009) ethnography of ‘unlikely alliances’ between Mexican 
scientists, nature spirits and indigenous industrial forestry (1926-2008), there is a hint of surprise 
that the research has demonstrated ‘how a global alliance comes together through — not despite 
— cultural, epistemological, and geographic difference’ (2009:89). A common language, can, of 
course, conceal.76  When FERCAP says it is not doing bioethics (see Chapter 1), not only is it 
refusing questions of moral philosophy which appear to have no answer, it is also sidestepping 
bioethics discussions that center on difference. I suggest FERCAP’s approach is instead to create a 
space in which the detail of cultural ‘difference’ may continue by foregrounding the detail of other 
aspects of ethics review. Returning to the table in Arendt’s image, the region operates as the 
separating-yet-joining object around which members of FERCAP are gathered. But how is such a 
situation created and sustained?
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76  ‘Co-ordination’ in higher education, for example, facilitated between European countries by the Bologna Process 
sometimes creates differences which then become disguised by a common Bologna language (Dahl et al. 2009). As with 
the ‘common language’ of GCP, plans have been made to export the Bologna model  (known as Bologna Global) to 
other parts of the world (Zgaga 2006)
Regions (networks, and fluids): an Asian Bioethics?
What if ‘cultural difference’ were to be considered the anaemia (Mol and Law 1994) of FERCAP? 
In their paper, Mol and Law ask questions about anaemia by asking about blood, space and 
anatomy, about textbook definitions, numbers and measurement. Most of all they enquire into 
the location of anaemia. Where does it get located, when evoked? (1994:644). How does it travel? 
They look at Africa, they look at the Netherlands. They look at the different equipment, people, 
haemoglobin concentrations. In analysing the work that goes on in stabilizing ‘Asia’ as a region in 
more than geographical terms, I will look at the different committees, surveys and trainings. As 
Strathern has long remarked, the making of difference is a social act (1988:96) — something also 
achieved through comparison. ‘If the social is indeed made in the associations (and separations) 
that people make,’ she writes, ‘then comparison itself is one way of making the social. Not making 
it appear but making it. It is at once a social activity and an act of social analysis’ (Strathern 
2009:17). It is with these thoughts and questions that we might begin to get at some ‘critical 
approaches’ to knowledge relations (ISBC 2007) as we trace the ‘associations and 
separations’ (Strathern 2009:17) built up in how the idea of ‘cultural difference’ circulates in 
FERCAP.
The first of Mol and Law’s topologies is ‘regions’, in which ‘objects are clustered together, and 
boundaries are drawn around each cluster’ (1994: 643). Leo de Castro, a philosophy based 
bioethicist who served on the first FERCAP steering committee in 2000 and as FERCAP’s Vice-
President in 2003, begins his article ‘Is there such a thing as Asian Bioethics?’ with a question which 
clusters: ‘[w]hat would it take for a bioethics to be Asian?’ ‘Two things seem naturally to come to 
mind,’ he says. ‘Firstly, Asian bioethics must be peculiar (or contain features that are peculiar) to 
Asia. Secondly, Asian bioethics must be common to Asians’ (De Castro 1999: 227, see also 
Sakamoto 1995). Within the ‘region,’ however, difference ‘in bioethical thinking’ proliferates. He 
finds other scholars there before him: ‘[h]aving identified distinguishing features of East Asian 
and Ibero-American bioethics, both Fan [1997] and Drane [1996] are quick to point out the 
variation in bioethical thinking within each region’ (De Castro 1999:229, emphasis added). 
When Mol and Law ask whether there is such a thing as anaemia, they trace it through references, 
objects, comments and locations. They ask how regions are generated and boundaries drawn, such 
as the ‘Africa’ where anaemia is both more frequent and more severe than in the Netherlands. 
They answer their own question with the reply that ‘when a region is defined, the differences 
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inside it are suppressed. They are minimized, or ‘marginalised’ (Mol and Law 1994:646). In order 
to create an ‘Asian bioethics,’ work must be done on generating a region, but the emergence of 
differences ‘within,’ and their suppression, complicates. As de Castro comments, 
Being peculiar is necessary because, if Asian bioethics - more particularly, the features that 
make it Asian - were not peculiar to Asia or to Asians, there would not be much sense in 
distinguishing Asian from non-Asian bioethics [...] It seems natural also to suppose that 
Asian bioethics should have features shared by Asians. For if there were no such features, 
there would be no special reason to speak of a bioethics as Asian. There would be nothing 
to unify Asian bioethics. But, how far can these requirements be expected to hold? How 
much peculiarity and commonality can there be? (1999:227)
For de Castro, ‘the existence of variations or of different orientations and divergent views across 
countries within a region’ (1999:229) raises some questions about the idea of a shared regional 
perspective. ‘Of what importance are the shared features’, he asks, ‘if they do not amount to a 
unified theoretical system or a single coherent perspective?’ (1999:229). Hongladarom, a Thai 
philosopher who has participated in bioethics symposia, struggles with the same framings as de 
Castro. Recalling an event on ‘Dialogue and Promotion of Bioethics in Asia,’ he comments that 
he said
that there was no such thing as Asian bioethics because Asia was a very large continent 
containing highly diverse cultures, histories and traditions that made it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to find common elements that could define the ‘Asian’ in Asian bioethics 
(Hongladarom 2004).
With ‘Asian bioethics’ explicitly foregrounded, both commentators find it difficult to adequately 
‘suppress’ the differences within the geographical region in order to create a sense of region. They 
are faced with the question of where ‘cultural differences’ begin and end. De Castro tells us he is 
not the first to struggle: prominent Hong Kong philosopher bioethicist Ruiping Fan (1997) 
‘acknowledges that Buddhism, Taoism and Shinto have all combined to bring about variations in 
bioethical thinking from country to country, or from area to area’ (cited in de Castro 1999:229). 
We are now not only dealing with countries, but trans-national belief systems variously 
‘combined’. 
Nonetheless, my interviewees demonstrated the utility of thinking in terms of regions. Moving 
identification ‘up’ a level from nations to ‘Asia’ not only allows for but also enacts the 
encompassment of difference. If I am told that ‘AAHRPP doesn’t understand Asian people’s 
thinking,’ then the speaker, to draw out the difference, has called on a region, against an 
(American) organisation. ‘Asian-ness’ was considered both as a FERCAP asset, and an explanatory 
device for its success. In the world-system of SIDCER regions, between which comparisons were 
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made, dire conditions ‘in Africa’ were usually evoked (though this did nothing to detract from the 
need for improvement felt and generated amongst FERCAP’s members). As one employee of 
TDR who attended the 2009 FERCAP conference put it, 
We’re not so worried about Asia. Or South America. They’re GCP compliant, most of 
those countries already have laws about clinical research. In Africa you have these 
committees that just sign and they don’t know what it is they’re signing to. Ethics isn’t just 
about learning to write, it’s having it in your mind and that’s not the easiest thing.
At the same time, such comparisons render ‘difference to that other’ the thing which is held in 
common. Countries in Asia, goes the thinking, have more in common with one another than 
they do with any part of Africa. Asia, ‘clustered’ (Law and Mol 1994: 643), is not ‘like’ Africa: a 
boundary can be drawn. Occasionally during fieldwork, lunch tables provided an arena for 
trainers to be implicitly compare Asia with Africa through their criticism of training and capacity 
building work there, where they saw foreign groups and individuals who threw money around, 
traveling business class, expecting per diem expenses and taking advantage of one another. ‘The 
fortunate ones - ones who go abroad, get an education, do well, they are not caring for their 
people. They are using the people to get more money for themselves they talk a lot’. Through this, 
trainers reinforce ‘Asia’, and thereby FERCAP, as different.
 Mol and Law tell us that ‘[h]aemoglobin levels are not the same all over the world. In one region 
more people have anaemia than in another. And these anaemias are also more severe’ (1994:646). 
They then tell us that these are regional facts, formulated in a topology, ‘a topology in which there 
is one region in which anaemia is “oh, well,” a region which is distinguished from another where 
it is a ‘very concrete problem’ (1994:646) How can this help us think about the enrollment of 
‘cultural difference’? Let me return to the activity to which research ethics is a response: scientific 
research. Scholars of western scientific practice and discourse have remarked that the sciences 
occupy a particular space, thought of as ‘cultures of no culture’ (Martin 1997, 1998; Traweek 
1988) in which facts are discovered. Despite work in STS which shows how facts are made, 
mobilised, and allied (Latour 1987) in western discourse on science, the space of debate for ethics 
hinges on the ‘legal and social’, not ‘culture’. Science is ‘unmarked’, its cultured view (Haraway 
1988) disguised, its natives in the West homogenised. Concerns about ‘culture’ arise when science 
‘travels,’ particularly in multi-sited clinical trials (EMA 2012). In other words, the discourse of 
western bioethics is a topology in which ‘cultural difference’ is ‘oh, well’, but in these elsewheres 
(such as Asia) ‘culture’ is invited to be a ‘very concrete’ problem. This is what seems to be at stake 
in the question ‘Is there an Asian bioethics?’ Yet de Castro observes that the pursuit of a coherent 
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Asian bioethics against ‘the alleged imperialism of Western concepts and bioethical principles’ sets 
up a trap: 
In the attempt to characterize an Asian bioethics that is significantly different from Western 
bioethics, we can easily commit the mistake of universalizing (among Asians) a single Asian 
ethical perspective (1999:234).77
FERCAP’s regionality causes two seemingly opposed challenges: to make particular the 
international guidelines that circulate in small silver (WHO 2000, 2011) and blue (WHO 2002) 
books and to support, if not articulate, Asian approaches to these guidelines as each country 
under its gaze seeks to establish and run committees. The use of Taylor’s work in the opening 
quote from the Australian report — to fail to recognise (cultural difference) can inflict harm — 
reflects the potential with which FERCAP deals. Indeed, a committee’s ‘localness’ and attention 
to ‘difference’ is part of the agenda which seeks to build ethics review capacity in the first place 
(Lancet 2003, Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002). One might imagine that given the difficulties 
of finding ‘common’ elements, FERCAP’s solution might be to simply not talk about difference 
within the region. But this far from the case. Invoking differences and similarities in differences 
and similarities can have social effects: again, as Strathern puts it (2009:17), not making the social 
appear but making it. To ask when the nation matters and when it does not, for example, is to ask 
when the scale of the scaling-device ‘nation’ is relevant. The national is but one type of difference, 
easily enrolled but strategically flattened. This is where Arendt’s table is useful. Countries in the 
region are thought as are separated yet joined, and this, I argue, is what is at stake in FERCAP’s 
‘Asian-ness’, in its talk of family (Chapter 1). Thus as Mol and Law write of the ‘complications’ in 
pinning down anaemia, certain differences ‘can simply be treated as a complicated and ever-
present backdrop’ (1994: 647). But the finding and use of difference is not a neutral activity. 
Gregory Bateson (1972) noted that humans use a wide range of different differences, and I would 
add that it is at different times that different differences come to matter.
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77  Drane (1996:56) points out that universalising (among Westerners) also occurs, and that within what is known as 
Western bioethics ‘different orientations and divergent views co-exist and compete with one another’ (1996:56); it is not 
as though ‘Ibero-American bioethics is [...] a self contained unified theoretical system providing a single, coherent 
perspective’ (de Castro 1999:229).
Physical Space: on centers and peripheries
Mol and Law’s second ‘space’ is ‘network space’, in which ‘distance is a function of the relations 
between the elements and difference a matter of relational variety’ (1994:143). In this space, 
‘proximity isn’t metric.’ ‘“Here” and “there,”’ they write, 
are not objects or attributes that lie inside or outside a set of boundaries. Proximity has, 
instead, to do with the identity of the semiotic pattern. It is a question of the network 
elements and the way they hang together. Places with a similar set of elements and similar 
relations between them are close to one another, and those with different elements or 
relations are far apart (Mol and Law 1994:649). 
The way in which SIDCER breaks up the world into regions such as FERCAP allows regional 
space, but at the same time, within and between these regions, network space brings places closer 
together and further apart. In network space, for example, New York and London are ‘closer’ to 
one another than London and (say) Durham — despite geographical distance. I want to add this 
sense of network space to Jensen’s request that we (as readers) suspend our ‘commonsense notions 
of scale’ (2007).78  In an article on the development of an electronic patient record system in 
Denmark he uses three interviews: one with a representative of the Danish National Board of 
Health, one with a nurse, and one with an informatician at a hospital. The reason he wants us to 
suspend our commonsense notions of scale stems from the automatic ‘size’ of the actors listed 
above. He observes that plans for the patient record system are conceived of as formulated in 
political offices (macro), in order to be disseminated (‘rolled out’) at hospital wards (micro) (2007: 
883). Jensen points out that the people in his story do not ‘seem equal’: 
One actor seems large, connected to things powerful and important, which has to do with 
the ‘macro’ development of the national health infrastructure, related as his work is to 
issues of policy and bureaucracy, whereas another actor seems small, her work 
comparatively mundane and trivial in its ‘micro’ concern with drawings on cardboard 
(2007:834).
He explains that in the history of sociological thought there have been many attempts at 
connecting the separate poles of macro and micro in order to get analytical purchase (2007: 834). 
Efforts have been directed at reconciling the poles, or exploiting their ‘interactive potential’ (2007: 
835). Indeed, we find a similar concern in discourses of research ethics and bioethics (Simpson 
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78  I have also taken inspiration from Annelise Riles’ analysis of legal letters pertaining to land claims in nineteenth 
century colonial Fiji (1995), an essay in which she attempts to  manufacture for the reader ‘a rhetorical situation that will 
allow us to apprehend our taken-for-granted notion of scale’ (1995:41). Riles aims to show how scalar language, encoded 
in the expression of English and American lawyers, reformulated ‘far off’ issues as relevant and important to the (then) 
nascent field of international law. 
2004a). The ‘macro’ and ‘micro’, the international documents and how things are ‘on the 
ground’ (to use a common Sri Lankan phrase), seem doomed to separation. In this space, an 
anthropological account might be of value. It is, but perhaps not in the way we expect (i.e. 
throwing ‘local’ light on ‘global’ problems). The next part of my argument draws on fieldwork in 
Sri Lanka, where I employ Mol and Law’s ‘network’ space, in which distance is a function of the 
relations between elements (1994:143) alongside Jensen’s suspension of commonsense notions of 
scale.
From a village in Sri Lanka, I knew that Colombo was the center for research ethics. Scaled ‘up’ to 
the region, the center became Bangkok, and ‘up’ again Geneva, or the US NIH. In thinking about 
my own movements in the region, I developed a discomfort with my easy acceptance of these 
stories of center and periphery as I had come to understand them. During a presentation on the 
concept of FERCAP to a Chinese Ethics Review Committee interested in taking part in the 
recognition program, I heard Cristina neatly lay out the ‘natural topography’ of ethics in 
biomedical research: 
The whole idea is to develop capacity of ECs so they’ll be able to comply with regulation 
requirements because drug development is a very much regulated activity and in GCP the 
ERC is supposed to play a role. The Survey will help you comply with regulatory 
requirements related to drug development. The guarantee for a good clinical trial is 
oversight, but it’s hard to do at the regulatory level. For example, China is such a big 
country there is no way the SFDA will be able to monitor each and every one. But the 
Ethics Committee is institution based, so it makes it possible to guarantee grass roots level 
quality in a Clinical Trial. So we say the foundation of a good clinical trial is really ethics, so 
we try to convince. Its a duty based ethics, [we] say its a duty to be ethical, scientific. I think 
the idea is that we police ourselves, not that the regulators tell us what is wrong with us. We 
form a group of Ethics committees and act together to ensure we act ethically and ensure 
ethics is being carried out in each institution. That’s the concept. It’s a purely voluntary 
initiative, we’ve been quite successful in the region. We’re expanding our presence in 
China, we’ve started some ECs in China, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Korea. All this 
together we adopt some common standard and we try to evaluate each other.
The ‘levels’ of this statement seem obvious: a big country, difficulty monitoring ‘grass roots’ level 
activities. Cristina shows how FERCAP tackles this problem, first through ‘policing ourselves’ and 
second through ‘acting together.’ What the naturalness of these suggestions obscures is the very 
(Western) understanding according to which `different levels of information' really exist out in 
the world: for example, between one level of the (large) national organization and another of the 
(small) nurse in the provinces (Jensen 2007: 838). The levels westerners (and anthropologists) 
habitually use appear under examination, particularly when juxtaposed with Melanesian 
knowledge practices (Jensen, 2007: 837, citing Strathern 1991:xiv). Jensen suggests that we follow 
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‘how different places and different people are variably connected and how actors engage in a 
constant deployment of their own scales’ (2007:833). Calling this a ‘fractal’ approach, he reminds 
us that it is ‘crucial to refrain from relying on a specific prioritized scale with which to evaluate all 
other actors, for the point is precisely to learn from those others about the intellectual, practical 
and moral scales they work with in order to build social relations and spaces (2007: 883). 
Returning, then, to Cristina’s comment, she moves from the observation that ‘China is such a big 
country,’ to the Ethics Committee as institution based, before arriving at ‘convincing’ people of 
their duty to be ethical, to be scientific. Here she reduces the ‘size’ of the object she is dealing 
with, from the nation to the individual. It is a scale-in-the making that would be easy to miss, 
since it so closely resembles how a social scientist might go about ‘contextualising’ the work of one 
ethics committee within a national arena: of course the committee is ‘smaller’ than China, or the 
SFDA! One is linked to the ‘macro’, the other to the ‘micro’. Were the framing and description 
changed, the SFDA might, in other circumstances be cast as large, powerful. Yet here it is distant, 
small, made so by Cristina’s focus on the physical size of Chinese territory, and the suggestion that 
it would be unable monitor ‘each and every one.’
John Law has remarked that ‘we need to understand the where as relationalities too.’ 
‘Euclidianism,’ he comments, ‘is simply one version of the doing of location’ (Law 2008 on 
Woolgar et.al. 2008).  My ethnography is full of moments where location is non-Euclidian, where 
the decisions of doctors in Tuskegee (Rothman 1991) or Woo-Suk Hwang’s use of his laboratory 
assistant’s ova in his research (Hwang 2009, Kim 2009) become part of a canon recounted over 
video-link connections to rooms in Sri Lanka; ‘macro’ issues in ‘micro’ settings, ‘small’ events 
made ‘large’. These stories become collected, housed as Latour (2005) would observe, in offices, 
video archives, course materials, textbooks. Jensen’s fractal approach demands that ‘belief in such 
distribution of the large and the small, according to obvious and commonsense social scales, is 
suspended’ (2007:837). The consequence? ‘Importance, relevance, size and scale would then 
viewed as enacted categories’ (ibid). Let me illustrate from experience. 
My research in Sri Lanka was a thread of physical continuity in the social continuity of following 
FERCAP surveyors around Asia. With four separate arrivals and a research period totaling seven 
months, the structure of my research in Sri Lanka provided ample opportunity to examine 
changes both in the field-site and in my perceptions of it. The renovation of the ethics committee 
room between my first and second visits, for example, was all the more dramatic for my absence 
(see Chapter 3). As I became more familiar with the work of FERCAP, the questions I asked of 
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ethics committee members and researchers in Sri Lanka became informed by a perception of 
absence, generated by my increasing familiarity with ethics committees elsewhere. This sense of 
absence mapped onto a sense of peripherality, an elsewhere informed not only by the 
ethnographic desire to be where things were happening, but also the sense that things come from 
elsewhere. Sri Lanka, a key research site and locus of much of my research activity, had become 
“small,” less important. Although I did not realise it at the time, that sense was also being 
reinforced in the interviews I was conducting. The image of a capital and its periphery comes 
complete with a ready-made conceptual schema of international, modernising cities and protected 
rural backwaters. 
Sri Lankan public discourse carries its own temporal mapping of the country, largely reinforced by 
nationalist Sinhala desires to protect the villages (Spencer 1990, Brow 1990). Speaking from 
Peradeniya, a University town in central Sri Lanka, one researcher explained that the distance to 
the capital Colombo was marked not only in kilometers but time:
To go to a one hour meeting, you have to spend four hours on the way there, and four on 
the way back [in your car]. Colombo is only 100 kilometers, it shouldn’t take that long. But 
it’s a busy road, you get caught in school traffic.
It seems like a very practical issue: the distance grows as the quality of the roads reduces. The time 
required to make the journey grows with the volume of traffic, it results in inconvenience. 
Participation in events from locales outside Colombo drops. The Peradeniya researcher above tells 
me he was the only person on either of the committees he attended who wasn’t based in 
Colombo. Events organised for training in ethics, such as those run by FERCAP’s ‘child’ in Sri 
Lanka, FERCSL, often suffer similarly low attendance from those based outside the capital. As 
one researcher based in Galle79 said to me, ‘they send it [the announcement] across, but people 
don’t often go, it may be that we have to organize it here and get a resource person to come’. 
Researchers in Galle were more explicit about how the distance affected their interaction with and 
understanding of ethics. ‘It’s easy for people in and around Colombo,’ said Renuka, a member of 
a southern Ethics Committee,
but for us, Colombo, it’s one whole day, three and a half hours up, three and a half hours 
down, for a one hour meeting. So that is how far behind we are, with them briefing us. Not 
in learning, sharing of information. It is a drawback, that geographically we’re not in the 
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79 A city on the south-west coast of Sri Lanka, approximately 70 miles south of Colombo by road. At the 
time of research the coastal road took between 90 and 120 minutes, or almost three hours by train. Since 
the end of my research, a new Southern Highway has been constructed, which may speed up road travel 
between the cities.
same place. For example, on Saturday, there’s a workshop on clinical ethics, but none of us 
are able to attend.
We are beginning to see what Mol and Law remarked upon as the way ‘network elements hang 
together’ (1994: 649). If people don’t travel, the speakers say, then neither does knowledge of 
research ethics. It gets stuck because of the roads, because of the school traffic. ‘Three and a half 
hours’ becomes a measure of how far ‘behind’ the geography makes them. In this mapping of 
knowledge onto distance, and the mapping of distance onto authority, if Colombo was a centre, 
then there were more distant centres, greater than it, referred to often as the ‘outside.’ 
Recalling the early days of research ethics in Sri Lanka, Renuka told a story in which ‘people 
recognised the importance, meetings and things came from the outside. It became a popular 
thing.’ But it is difficult to keep the interest up. For the committee in Galle to function well, 
Renuka said she would like to see ‘[us] all coming under one umbrella, being focused and 
uniform, and it would be nice to have two people dedicated, participating in conferences and 
keeping up to date.’ The temporary (1-2 yrs.) nature of committee appointments, as well as the 
fact the work was additional — and often secondary — to existing research and teaching burdens 
meant that she did not feel ethics was the ‘primary concern’ of anyone involved. ‘None of us are 
really committed to this. We all have our own primary work, this comes after all that, concurrent’. 
She thought progress might come through designated personnel, but, she said:
it requires a huge mind shift. It depends on progress in other parts of the world. If 
Colombo is going to progress rapidly, we can’t lag behind. They’ll be a parent body, we’ll be 
a sister institution and partners. The problems we have we can refer to them, while 
maintaining autonomy. For example, having a statistician. 
The progress-spatial map is drawn directly here: from Galle the view is of progress elsewhere, rapid 
progress in Colombo and a fear of being left behind both by the capital and other countries. But 
what might that progress look like? Further interviews revealed a reliance on those who travelled 
internationally. ‘I learned a lot from Dr A. She has traveled in the region on the subject’, said 
Bartholomew, a pathologist on an ethics committee in Galle. ‘She’s always coming back from 
Bangkok, saying “I was there and they had these documents. These were the protocols that had to 
be maintained.”’ Proximity isn’t metric. In this reckoning, Galle is further from Colombo than 
Bangkok, since the latter two are regarded as sites of ethics knowledge. To repeat Mol and Law’s 
point, ‘places with a similar set of elements and similar relations between them are close to one 
another, and those with different elements or relations are far apart’ (1994:649). For 
Bartholomew, individuals traveling to conferences elsewhere was one mechanism, people arriving 
Chapter 6: Comparison makes a difference
205
was another. ‘There should be some standards coming from somewhere’, he said. It is to the 
nature of that ‘somewhere’ I now turn.
Measuring up
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, a good deal of American literature, training and 
standards circulate in the region. Due to the International Fellows training program, amongst 
those with whom I worked, Western IRB in Olympia, Washington, is viewed as a centre of the 
“gold standard” of ethical review. The US NIH are developing Asian centres of clinical 
monitoring, and the US based non-profit organisation AAHRPP is exporting its accreditation 
scheme. FERCAP, as outlined, maintains an awareness of these processes and procedures, but 
distinguishes specifically American laws and regulations from international standards and 
declarations. The influence of the UK, according to one FERCAP trainer, was limited. 
Comparing it with America, he said ‘America has Fogarty, Harvard, they are sponsoring and 
spending millions establishing training programs abroad. The UK? No.’ Countries were seen to 
make centres, in the institutional sense. Funding patterns for centers were associated with 
particular types of human resource management, which were perceived as having national 
characteristics. Sumalee, a Thai researcher who had worked in laboratories in the US, UK and 
Thailand in Bangkok and received funding, compared the attitudes of British and Japanese 
funders to international research. ‘Wellcome is really for the British working overseas,’ she said. 
Their centres are still controlled by British scientists, not local. In Bangkok, it is still a UK 
base because the center’s top director is British. Why can’t it be Thai? In Vietnam, it’s the 
same. It’s controlled by the British, why not the Vietnamese?
She queried the objectives: ‘why not increase the capacity of the people in the country to be able 
to do that, to collaborate with scientists in the UK?’ she asked:
Maybe it’s the nature of the British. I think the Japanese let go. In Africa, they let locals 
take over and collaborate from their country. [They] give freedom for [the] center to work 
with others as well. It should be that way. You should not feel you raise this child for 
yourself - you should raise the child for the world — let the child choose what is best for 
them. 
The point being made by Sumalee is about capacity building through research, phrased as 
‘developing’ and also about how scientists are ‘measured up’ on scales of scientific development 
(e.g. Royal Society 2011). I suggest we can usefully view comparisons made by and within FERCAP 
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as a means by which one thing is measured against another. In the section above, I showed how 
seeing ‘[i]mportance, relevance, size and scale… as enacted categories’ (Jensen 2007:837) gives us 
purchase on how social space is actively made, and makes us attentive to comparison. So how is 
‘resizing’ done? Here, I take three examples of the resizing of relating, or comparing. The first 
concerns FERCAP and the Asian branch of UNESCO, both based in Bangkok. One would 
assume that UNESCO would take on a ‘large’ presence, but here we find it reduced. The second 
returns to the relationship between FERCAP and AAHRPP,  and links in to national ambitions. 
The third concerns FERCAP’s relationship to the WHO and its authority to recognise, or accredit 
ethics committees. 
During research, I noted that UNESCO was very active in Asia with bioethics education 
programs, conferences and meetings, (e.g. Ten Have et al. 2011) but the one of its main 
contributions, the 2005 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Bioethics (UNESCO 2005), 
was not often part of FERCAP trainings. When I commented on this, people shrugged. ‘They 
want it cited,’ remarked one trainer, 
but my problem is that there is very little about research ethics. They are initiating bioethics 
committees, meaning every country should have a bioethics committee, not a research 
ethics committee. And the bioethics committee would consider things like environmental 
ethics, education ethics, health would only be one of the things that should be subsumed 
under bioethics.
Sensing that the breadth of bioethics meant health would become too ‘small’ (a proportional 
resizing), I pushed the point. Why did this matter? The trainer recalled a ‘stakeholders workshop’ 
in Geneva:  
Everyone was there. WMA, CIOMS, FERCAP, AAHRPP, UNESCO. We [FERCAP] were 
saying that the World Health Assembly, the health ministers of the countries of the world, 
that they should come up with a statement that they’d uphold research ethics. UNESCO 
said, “You don’t need that, we have the declaration. We have covered everything.” For me, 
they are coming up with motherhood statements, statements for the common good. 
“Universal declarations” don’t address our concerns related to whether you should allow 
this trial or not. 
The tension between ‘bioethics’ and ‘research ethics’ is evident, but what I want to press is the 
comparison which aims to make the ‘universal’ smaller. The declaration simply does not do the 
job she needs from it, the ‘motherhood statement’, deemed to have ‘covered everything’. As its 
supporters try to make it ‘bigger’ in Geneva, it is being ‘reduced’ in size by the trainer in 
conversation with me. Its ambition makes it too big to be relevant. We have encountered ‘sizing’ 
before, with FERCAP compared with, and, in places, falling short of the American accreditation 
Chapter 6: Comparison makes a difference
207
association AAHRPP. Proportional logic is an evaluation employed to demonstrate, and make, 
importance (Corsín Jiménez 2009, 2010a 2010b). In Chapter 2 Cristina described to me a 
conversation she had had with AAHRPP’s Marjorie Speers, explaining that it was the WHO that 
were ‘important’ to FERCAP:
That is where we derive our… reputation, and some amount of, how to say, some sense of 
importance. In the WHO set up, they do things vertically. So the left hand doesn’t always 
know what the right hand is doing. You’ve got a Malaria stream and HIV and TB and so 
on. They make it an issue. Say we’re not actually WHO.’  
Is is this last question, another matter of proportional reframing, which catches my interest. 
Discussion around the question of whether FERCAP ‘is’ WHO turns on a distinction between the 
two terms80 ‘accreditation’ and ‘recognition.’ I probed this distinction further in an interview with 
a FERCAP surveyor in China, who came up with another reason: 
Well, inspection is something that is done by a regulatory authority. And an audit… may 
be, well it’s more in depth. It is trying to analyze what went wrong. Now, accreditation, that 
is more in terms of compliance with good practices, but in FERCAP we call it recognition. 
Partly because they ask us from whom did you get the authority to accredit?
Who is ‘they’? I ask.
Oh, people. So now, it is more politically correct to say recognition. So we do not threaten 
the national authorities. They say local authorities are to do the accreditation, and it is the 
work of national regulatory authority. In China, there’s even an issue that what we’re doing 
is illegal! 
FERCAP’s authority to ‘recognise’ was also brought into question through the relationship 
between Taiwan and China. Taiwanese involvement in FERCAP has been extensive, its uptake of 
the recognition program swift. ‘Taiwan is with FERCAP and they don’t like that,’ comments the 
Surveyor. Where Taiwan aims to be recognised as outside of China, separate and distinct, that 
relies upon FERCAP being part of, or ‘inside’ the WHO. To my interviewee, this provides 
another motivation: ‘People ask them why they trust FERCAP and they object to Taiwanese 
involvement [in FERCAP].’ The doubt, perhaps, stemmed from it permitting Taiwan such free 
involvement. My discussions with Taiwanese participants in FERCAP led to the revelation that 
while few international organisations would recognise Taiwan, or deal with it separately from 
mainland China, FERCAP did. Added to this, Taiwan had far more committees recognised than 
mainland China, which in the eyes of some was an embarrassment. In a struggle to be ‘large,’ 
China is geographically large but with (comparatively) few committees recognised, whereas Taiwan 
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80 Much like the tension between clinical monitoring and site visits which provokes the response to  Dr Dipika’s 
conference presentation which opened the previous chapter.
is geographically small with (comparatively) many committees recognised. The question of who 
encompasses whom works both for China and Taiwan and for FERCAP and the WHO.
 As Cristina said above, the WHO is a vast complicated organisation and there is no ‘right answer’ 
to whether FERCAP ‘is’ the WHO. She acknowledges it is in part though WHO-TDR funding 
that FERCAP derive their ‘reputation’, but it is telling that as we conclude our conversation, she 
dismisses the question:  ‘I never claimed that I am a WHO employee!’ What is interesting for this 
analysis is how the comparisons make a difference.
In these three stories, the fate of UNESCO’s declaration, AAHRPP and Taiwan, we have 
examples of proportional resizing with consequences. In his attention to the resizing work of 
proportions, Corsín Jiménez takes as his reference point Galileo Galilei, whose discovery of the 
moons of Jupiter had relativised the importance of earth and man. In old age Galileo lies in bed, 
blind and infirm, with the reported lament that he, ‘who had enlarged the universe 100,000 
times,’ was ‘shrunk to the size of [his] body’ (2004:1) Corsín Jiménez comments that ‘the universe 
may be of the same size for all but not all people measure up to the universe in the same 
way‘ (2004:16): sometimes, as with Galileo, ‘measuring up hurts’ (Corsín Jiménez 2004: 16). This 
measuring (up) can be applied to the way countries were assessed for their degree of 
‘development’. As a development oriented, capacity building organisation, FERCAP is, as Cristina 
states above when she contrasts her organisation with AAHRPP, ‘trying to help [committees] 
achieve a level of competence.’ But all those who volunteered as trainers or surveyors knew of 
huge regional variation. Cristina told me she tried to ‘articulate the perspective of a developing 
world country.’ She was aware of how she could ‘adjust her language’ to serve her purposes: 
Like when I’m in Korea, I say ‘You should help. You have a model, you should help other 
countries in the region.’ I don’t say which ones, but since you have an advanced economy, 
you should play a leading role in setting up models, developing a better system. The 
developed ones are Taiwan and Korea. China is developing, or what they call an ‘emerging 
market’. I have to modify the discourse and do presentation. I always tell developing 
countries that there should be no difference in quality of review. It is not an economic issue 
not a technology issue. But you do have to modify they way you present.
On matters of regional hierarchy, those who do not participate in FERCAP can tell us almost as 
much as those who do. One researcher I spoke to listed Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and 
New Zealand as ‘non participants’. He could understand Australia and New Zealand not showing 
much interest, he said, but the other two? ‘Well, they are very good,’ he said, ‘maybe because they 
were British colonies, they have no problems for the language’. ‘Too high up’, said one ERC 
member, of Singapore, deploying height as a language of superiority.
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Japan was termed a ‘different case’ within FERCAP. Personal friendships had led to individual 
members being involved — such as the chairperson — but no surveys took place. Criticized for 
being more bureaucratic than ethical, one FERCAP surveyor commented that she ‘didn’t get the 
impression that they looked into the essence of the protocol. The paperwork was perfect, but not 
the content. It’s process, not just procedures on paper’. Another pointed out that since Japan had 
national guidelines, a FDA which monitors, ‘they don’t think they need it. They took part in the 
ICHGCP, along with the EU, USA and Australia, which aimed towards harmonization among 
those countries.’ I probed the notion of a ‘different case’ with some questions. In response, he 
initially suggested I ask why committees in South Korea and Taiwan had sought recognition, since 
to him, the trials those three countries sought to host were the same. Gradually a sense of 
hierarchy emerged. ‘Well, it’s partly pride. They can’t take being criticized by a lower country. It 
would be an insult.’ A Taiwanese man, he had participated as an international surveyor on the 
FERCAP survey, and said ‘[t]hat’s what happened in Korea. When we saw speakers from 
Philippines, Thailand, audience just went out of room. “Why should we listen to these guys, from 
countries not as good as ours?”’ This brought him round to the point he had been struggling to 
make about Japan’s lack of participation. ‘They’d never allow people from South Asia to survey 
them!’ he concluded, slightly exasperated at the anthropologist for forcing him to state the 
‘obvious.’ ‘They’re Number One! For their self pride, they couldn’t have surveyor from India. 
USFDA but definitely not other Asia[n] countries. That would be intolerable to them’, he said 
flatly.81 ‘The top can improve by USA FDA but not by India or Thai.’ He had visited Singapore, 
and reported that he once asked them, ‘Why are you not active in FERCAP,’ to which he received 
the response ‘“We are a developed country!”’ 
So I said so are Taiwan, and Korea… but they [Singapore] only like to be seen affiliated with 
the US. That’s why they have AAHRPP in Singapore and Hong Kong! And now they 
[AAHRPP] are also entering Korea… Some big professor from Korea asked me, ‘Why [do 
you] stay with FERCAP, they’re not better than us.’ So they propose to go to AAHRPP. So 
there may be a competition.
In this sizing and re-sizing of countries, just as Cristina is aware that she can talk ‘up’ to countries 
with funds and well-established research environments, she is also aware that she has the capacity 
to foreground similarity, as she does in the quote with which I opened this chapter. This is a 
technique I saw used elsewhere, particularly during a Survey in Beijing, when a surveyor had 
remarked with great respect on FERCAP’s arrival in the Chinese capital. Aware of tensions 
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81 Another instance of fractality, where social hierarchies within committees transfer without difficulty onto hierarchies 
between countries.  
between China’s capital and second city, Shanghai, where FERCAP had already become 
established, she threw an arm out to her co-surveyors from the Philippines and said: 
We all have our Asian roots, and many of us have Chinese roots… Maybe our only 
difference is our language we speak — if you look at us, we all look the same. We share the 
same goal and values and would like to protect human subject in research, and do scientific 
research!
Here the Surveyor is drawing on migration between countries in Asia as a basis upon which to 
highlight shared goals. In a moment of tension, it levels. Another powerful leveller is the idea that 
ethical review is ‘not a technology’ (Chapter 3, see also Torres 2011:52). Where I heard this view 
reinforced, it was usually surrounded by contrasts between countries which categorized degrees of 
development, within and outside of Asia. These differences in degrees of development meant that 
while developed countries were considered capable of financing their own capacity building, 
developing countries required support. As the FERCAP Research Fellow Arthur put it, 
The standards are the same, whether developing or developed country. Developed 
countries, they can finance their own capacity building, but developing countries need 
support. We can try to facilitate money for Nepal and Bhutan. Doesn’t matter if [the 
country is] developed or developing, [it] can be of a par with Western standards.
Surveyors who had traveled with FERCAP to other countries sometimes expressed surprise or 
shock at what they encountered, or the orientations one country seemed to have towards another. 
The comparisons which members of FERCAP undertake contribute to and build on its 
developmental ethos. When a surveyor from Taiwan thinks about the funds required to support a 
survey team, he tells me ‘that kind of money, for Johns Hopkins it’s a piece of cake, but for 
Cambodia? It’s so expensive.’ Thus FERCAP work to subsidise Cambodia’s participation. How 
FERCAP ‘measures up’ to AAHRPP depends on where one is looking. If committees in South 
Korea and Taiwan move to AAHRPP, it diminishes FERCAP’s ability to subsidise countries like 
Cambodia, and it in this sense that measuring up ‘hurts.’
In this illustration, comparison and scaling matter in FERCAP’s exercise of capacity building. 
Munro reinforces the point: 
Scale does not exist autonomously as it does with the western conception of levels of 
wholes, such as the tripartite set of society, institution and individual to the contrary, it is 
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arguable that changing scale — the effects of ‘magnification’ or ‘diminishment‘ — is 
precisely a demonstration of ‘capacities’ (Munro 2005: 257).82 
I suggest that the comparison done by FERCAP members as constitutive of Mol and Law’s third 
space, ‘fluid space’, in which ‘difference....isn’t necessary marked by boundaries. It isn’t always 
sharp. It moves....[in] a fluid space, elements inform each other. But the way they do so may 
continuously alter. The bonds within fluid spaces aren’t stable.’ (1994: 662-663) I explore this 
further below. 
FERCAP’s comparisons
FERCAP’s Research Fellow, Arthur, worked with Cristina in Bangkok, assisting with the ever 
growing documentation, administration and organisation of Surveys across the Asian region. His 
experiences had given him cause to reflect on the differences of the countries he had attended or 
arranged trainings and surveys in. ‘The idea,’ he said, 
is you get to know an idea of the context of the countries in terms of how do they go about 
ethical issues? Concepts like justice autonomy and beneficence, but what do these concepts 
mean for these countries?
The comparisons made by FERCAP resemble certain versions of anthropological approaches to 
comparison. Commentators like de Castro, and implicitly FERCAP, pose the region as a site of 
difference to an external other: western ethics. In a recent anthropologically informed collection, 
analyses grouped together under ‘Asian Biotechnology’ (e.g. Ong and Chen 2010) take on 
national characteristics. Wahlberg’s review (2011) provides a concise summary of chapters that 
include ‘an analysis of the:
‘Koreanness’ of fallen stem cell scientist Hwang Woo Suk who had suggested that dexterous 
Korean chop stick users had sharpened the cell work done in his laboratory; capacity 
building efforts to bolster an ‘Indian’ clinical research infrastructure as a way to attract 
lucrative multi-centered clinical trials to the country; ... [and] the demarcation of ‘Chinese 
DNA’ as a measure of ‘Chineseness’ where the ‘introduction of genomics since the 
1990s...adds another spin to the discourses and practices on China’s ethnic categorization 
(Wahlberg 2011: 492, references removed)
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82  Corsín Jiménez offers us a description of this process through his own writing: ‘[y]ou may be reading this and 
thinking ‘this is not very  interesting’. If that is so, you are in fact re-proportioning your ideas against mine by ‘sizing 
down’ my views’ (2004: 16) He attributes the movement in the proportioning to  capacity: ‘You are… moving integrally 
through such orders with a sense of capacity (and the term is not arbitrary, for capacities are magnitudinal  categories) 
(2004: 17)
In our interview, I listened as Arthur talked about how his training in history informed his work. 
‘Histories give you a broader contexts on why these things are happening,’ he said:
In the Philippines, when we talk of ethical issues, it’ll always be rooted in how the 
Spaniards or Americans did health research. The first ethical issues will always be rooted in 
a colonial experience. For Japan, their particular context is from WWII, they have ethical 
issues that may be traced, connected to WWII Japanese experiments. If you look at Korea, 
Dr Hwang is a product of how they do academic atmosphere and culture in Korea. There, 
everyone needs to discover, and so there is a lot of research and not much… basically there 
are particular contexts why.
What interests me here is Arthur’s final comment, ‘a context why’, giving context as reason. It 
may be a turn of phrase, even a slip, but in the historical lens, the contexts (unlike in Frazer’s 
work (see Strathern 1987: 266)) are precisely that which is juxtaposed, and, in a curious reversal of 
the assumption that contexts contain cultures, culture forms the ground for the idea of context. It is 
this which, I suggest, aids FERCAP in sidestepping ‘cultural difference’ for ‘common goals.’ Let 
me explain by way of an example. 
Jenny Reardon’s work (2001, 2005) on the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) reveals the 
challenges faced by scientists as they sought to ‘sample and archive human genetic diversity’ by 
collecting specimens from ‘distinct indigenous groups around the globe’ (Reardon 2001:357). In 
the controversy that followed, Reardon found, it was the framing and bounding of groups which 
caused endless problems, demarcations on a complexly ‘structured field of competing 
differences’ (2001:361). ‘Populations’ could not be kept stable, since the boundaries between 
‘society’, ‘culture’ and ‘biology’ (boundaries which Reardon observes ‘did not exist in the 
world’ (2001:366)) all produced different answers to the question of what a ‘population’ was. 
Wastell’s findings on ‘diversity’ offer a germane critique: 
there is no such thing as a diversity that does not emanate from a project of 
measurement’… Diversity is ‘not something that is ‘already out there’ waiting to be 
described and ordered. It is made by systems which operate through the estimation, 
valuation and proportion of entities - as apprehended by the system itself (2001:186). 
These systems — which can be projects, (the HGDP) professions (the medicine which treats 
anaemia) or organisations (FERCAP) — shape what is differentiated, and how. For example, also 
discussing the Human Genome project, Strathern observes ‘an organisation of knowledge whose 
aim is totality generates instances of its own descriptive process (mappable places)’ (1995: 163). In 
the chapters above I have demonstrated the generation of instances of ‘mappable places.’ They are 
not genes, but offices and practices, efforts that encompass, or come to be encompassed by, 
national or regional agendas. For Strathern, what is interesting about the HGDP is ‘not so much 
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that natural science creates universal objects of knowledge out of local instances; rather in that 
incommensurability disappears.’ (1995:163). What is held constant — the similarity — is that 
there will always be a context; that there are contexts is what is alike. This is what Arthur reveals 
when he brings ‘context’ forward. ‘You cannot have a black and white view of things when you 
don’t understand the context, the country,’ he said, of surveyors. 
Some trials which would in one country be considered risky might be seen to be beneficial 
to the population, depending on the context. There’s not a universality of particular 
instances and issues. [There] should be contextualization according to country. For 
example, FERCAP cannot just get people to sit and comment on how an EC do their job 
without knowing the country context.
He allows the fact that there are ‘contexts why’ to stand as the figure against a ground of ‘cultural 
difference’. Context aids this ‘fluid space’, it allows for a ‘difference [that] isn’t necessary marked 
by boundaries. It isn’t always sharp’ (Mol and Law 1994:662) since the FERCAP system does not 
set out to foreground that difference. I return the quote of Cristina’s which I opened: the 
FERCAP experience is about a common goal (Torres 2010: 52). Here I have shown how that 
experience is choreographed. In this shift from ‘cultural difference’ to ‘context,’ we are also 
encouraged to focus on similarity over difference, or ‘common goals.’ In the concerns of the 
Survey and in the borrowing of techniques of standardisation and measurement from natural 
science, in the rooms of ethics, incommensurability disappears. In this observation I realised, as 
Sarah Green realises in her ethnography of ambiguity on the Greek-Albanian border, it was ‘the 
ambiguous sameness that made the difference, not just the differences’ (2005:14). In Epirus where 
she worked, the growth in number of European Union funded signs in their landscape signifying 
development projects which bespeak a break in ‘how things are and how things seem’ (2005:37). 
‘Whereas in the past, it might have been nations and their nationals’, she writes, 
now it seemed there was a particular standard for evaluating the aesthetics of the diversity 
of culture and nature, a standard that made it possible to ‘package’ each people and place 
into something distinct and unique, which could nevertheless be classified and would be of 
interest to tourists to visit (2005:37). 
Anthropologists have begun to research the implications of this ‘packaging’, with Herzfeld 
(2004:2) writing that ‘even ‘diversity’ can become a homogenous product… the particular is itself 
universalised.’ Is something similar occurring through research ethics? 
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Gaps
Let me return to the opening of this chapter, where I refused the obvious form of comparison 
between countries, a form that would probably be of use to those wanting to know the status of 
ethics compliance across different countries.83 I rejected it in order to study a form of comparison 
ongoing in the material. We have seen countries compared. What, then, does the ‘cultural 
difference’ in the quotes that opened this chapter become? What happens to it? I turn to Annelise 
Riles’ review of an ethnography of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (2002), in which there is 
— as in both bioethics and research ethics — a strong sense that context matters, the ‘local’ is 
valuable, and culture is the object to which one pays attention in order to understand a situation. 
Here are her observations on different kinds of frames for ethnographic knowledge: 
Consider what happens to ethnographic knowledge in the hands of the ADR expert: The 
authors point out that the ADR rhetoric of commitment to contextual understanding of 
the cultural facts of disputing is rarely honoured in practice. This in turn creates a 
rhetorical problem for the authors: If their essay actually engaged with the ethnographic 
literature in great contextual detail, it would become unintelligible to its target audience of 
ADR of practitioners because the latter are interested in general arguments about the 
nature of their engagement with the particular, not in the particular per se. What we have 
here is an example of the aesthetics of user-friendly expertise: Detail disappears and is 
replaced by a gesturing toward detail (2002:617).
I am not suggesting that a ‘respect for cultural difference’ is mere rhetoric, or that committees who 
work with FERCAP do not honour the idea. I have shown that they do. But FERCAP’s problem 
resembles that of the authors whose book Riles reviews: committees are not so interested in the 
particular. As we saw in the previous chapter, their members are not bioethicists, few have 
‘bioethics’ training. They are primarily doctors, who have trained in research ethics. And although 
the details of research ethics are very much what FERCAP works on (the details of SOPs, the 
details of offices and of meetings) in matters of ‘contextual understanding of the cultural 
facts’ (Riles 2002:617), I suggest that gesture towards detail is precisely FERCAP’s tactic. Rather than 
prescribing in the domain of ‘cultural facts’ or exploring ‘cultural difference,’ it works with the 
detail of the form of the committee: how the discussion should take place, who should be on a 
committee, what its offices need to have. The ‘recipes‘ — in the form of SOPs — acknowledge 
‘context.’ It is the premise upon which ‘local’ capacity building is founded, and as such, forms the 
ground, not the figure of FERCAP’s work. It is this which constitutes the separation between 
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83 As the Bhutanese delegate perceptively noted when commenting on my nascent research plans during the 2009 
FERCAP Conference.
bioethics and research ethics, so that learning about doing ethics review can happen anywhere. As 
one conference delegate tells me,
We can learn from FERCAP or US NIH, program, any, so we don’t actually have to have 
FERCAP people go abroad to learn nowadays. People get PhDs in London, the Hastings 
center, this kind of bioethics more and more people for them its not a big deal, if you have 
so many successful models such as WIRB. So we have seven fellows, in Korea 30-40 fellows 
from WIRB. Of course they have to modify it when they come back to Asia, that’s not 
difficult.
To bioethicists such as de Castro working on the ‘details’ of cultural difference, the idea that 
modifying ethics learned in the West upon return to Asia is ‘not that difficult’ would be hard to 
fathom. But such a statement is possible, plausible even, when cultural difference remains the 
background against which FERCAP can foreground models, SOPs and the form of the 
committee. Returning to ADR, Riles suggests that it is not (just) that 
standardised solutions have replaced specific ones. Rather, in these new technologies we 
encounter the standardisation of the specific: The expert’s manual become a kind of formal 
tool of its own — one can take it anywhere — but it acknowledges and even points to its 
own gaps; it makes room for the inclusion of local conditions and specificities. It 
incorporates in advance the critiques of the anthropologist by gesturing at repeated 
moments to the local, the particular, the need for translation and adaptation, and by 
translating our analytical perspectives [...] into technical factors to be taken into account by 
the expert [...] The particular becomes quite literally a gap in the expert form, something 
imagined, prefigured by expert knowledge itself (Riles 2002: 617-618).
Riles describes here the ‘gesturing’ which the anthropologist looking at the rolling out of ‘ethics’ 
across a region might conduct, perhaps through comparing its uptake in different countries. I 
suggest that the ADR ‘experts manual’ has kin in the template SOPs which FERCAP supplies to 
committees. These templates ‘acknowledge and even point to [their] own gaps’ (Riles 2002:617). 
This has the effect of neutralising ‘difference’, and making it the concern not of FERCAP and its 
surveys but of the committees themselves. It may even be something assumed to be already in 
their possession. As something the apparatus of ethics review already takes into account, 
‘difference’ lies in the gaps (Riles 2002). This happens again, in ethics committee discussion. These 
gaps are also built in to review, in part again through SOPs and in part through learning the form 
in which ethical issues are to be discussed. The format of thought is visible in trainings on ethics 
review, as one trainer states: 
In Western societies autonomy is of higher value but Eastern societies sometimes we give 
higher value to beneficence. So now the culture of the community is going to take effect. 
What is of higher value to the community, that’s how the ethical dilemma is resolved. For 
example, X finished her bioethics degree in Australia. One of the ethical issues that was 
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presented to them was whether you should take care of your parents. She said, “In my 
culture it not an ethical dilemma, it’s a duty.” [Your] perspective is different depending on 
the culture where you come from. The decision is going to be different.
When the trainer proffers the ideas of autonomy and beneficence she is citing the principles of 
the Belmont Report (HHS 1979), an inaugural document in American bioethics, which 
recommended the measured balance of justice, risk, nonmaleficence and beneficence. It 
recommends an evaluation of balance between those who bear the burdens of research and those 
who benefit from it, the maximization of benefit and the minimization of harm. The focus of the 
speaker is on the difference of the decision, what one committee decides is not the same as what 
another decides. But what is also evident is that this difference can be rationalised into the 
framework of proportional balance: the mode of deciding is the same. The duty of caring for your 
parents translates into beneficence, autonomy is rebalanced. ‘Duty’, which may have quite a 
different quality cannot be calculated in this pre-existing equation. Recall Cristina’s comment 
(Chapter 3) to a trainee wondering about consensus, and the possibility that both sides might 
have an equally valid point: ‘you cannot be deadlocked, you must make a decision.’ The ethics in 
FERCAP’s capacity building program, like development, has ends (committee decisions, GCP 
compliance) in sight.  Rather than endlessly opening up possibilities, questions, and the problems 
with which this chapter began, the need for ‘action’ requires that they be closed down (Riles 1998, 
2001, Yarrow 2011:171). The critical purchase afforded by the approach I have taken has no such 
goal in mind.
Concluding remarks
Viveiros de Castro (2004: 11) declares that ‘since it is only worth comparing the 
incommensurable, comparing the commensurable is a task for accountants, not anthropologists’. 
Strathern suggests the anthropological ‘trick would be demonstrate noncomparability’ and in 
doing so, ‘cancel any easy assumption about anthropology’s own self-sufficiency as a single 
analytical language’ (Strathern 1988b: 95). I have tried to cancel this sufficiency assumption by 
another means: by demonstrating that it is ethics committees who must be accountants, not 
anthropologists.84 It is they who must make commensurable, and be commensurable with one 
another. The former, as I have attempted to demonstrate, is an activity achieved through language 
and comparison; the latter is part of FERCAP’s work of standardisation through its recognition 
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program. The comparison of this chapter is not the kind of comparison in which members of 
FERCAP, or the medical ethics world, are engaged. In the dissertation so far, I have attempted to 
show how much of what happens is dependent on the ability to make-comparable. By this I mean 
that comparison for FERCAP is a means of organising difference, an organisation which operates 
by removing the focus from it. Made attentive by Mol and Law’s work on anaemia (1994), I have 
been able to explore the co-existence of spaces formed by the scaling, sizing and proportioning 
work of actors in the field.
I have shown many ways of doing comparison, and shown that they do different things. An 
anthropological response is to see what is produced in the juxtaposition, the employment of a 
‘critical pause’ to see what happens when one thing is placed next to another (Gingrich and Fox 
2002, Strathern 2002a). It is clear that members of FERCAP use comparison - deliberately and 
not - to shape the social world of research ethics. In not comparing the countries to which this 
research took me in the same language of scalar achievement as used in the field, my attention was 
opened to a different way of ‘doing knowledge.’ Yarrow’s comments on anthropologists amongst 
development workers are apposite: ‘differences between academics and development experts,’ he 
writes ‘are not simply disagreements: they are not simply different views or perspectives on ‘the 
same’ basic questions and issues’ (2011: 171). For him what is ‘[a]t stake are different ways of 
making questions and issues apparent; different ways of ‘’doing’ knowledge’ (ibid). In the 
separation of research ethics from bioethics, the prioritisation of form over content makes 
FERCAP’s international project possible. But if this is an arena of standardisation and 
measurable, auditable ethics, what happens when ideas, such as that of duty, don’t fit schemas?  
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Chapter 7:  Locating Ethics
Making codes is one thing; transforming them into forms of life, quite another. 
Jasanoff 2005:175
People is the hard thing. If they don’t have a quality culture, its very difficult. People tend 
to do the same old thing. And they cannot change. It has to be a long time, starting when 
you’re young perhaps.
Juntra and I were conversing in Bangkok in late March 2010, a time at when “Red-
Shirts” (National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship) had filled the city and would, 
in the weeks to come, occupy large parts of the capital’s commercial center. We were discussing 
quality, a theme in the trainings we were attending that day. She drew on contemporary events to 
make her point: 
I want to go to the market, how do I go? There are demonstrations, how do I get there, 
what are the possible ways I can go? I need information. Are there any obstructions? I 
choose the best one to get there according to the situation now. So I get information, where 
are the demonstrators now? I look at a map. I look at the risk of the three ways to get where 
I want. I choose the best. It may not be perfect. How can I manage to go there in the 
shortest time. Quality culture - that’s the culture of your thinking. The shortest time, and 
the cheapest way.
She gestured around us at the university buildings.
There is a quality culture of people working here: when they go home, they switch off the 
fan. If there is no quality culture, they wouldn’t do this: ‘I don’t care.’ Quality culture is 
about the whole organization, not about you. People say, ‘I use a piece of paper and then I 
throw it away.’ Quality culture is to reduce waste, it is an organisation on top of your 
thinking. I use two sides [of paper]. Whatever you do, you have it in mind. It’s very hard, 
hard to define quality. But you have to define what it is. I have to get quality culture into each 
person.
What is Juntra talking about when she says she wants to get quality ‘into’ people? What is this 
thing which is not ‘about you’ yet must be ‘inside’ the person? Scholars have paid attention to the 
language that has accompanied the growth of audit, but few anthropological writings have 
addressed ‘quality’ directly. We see critical engagement with ‘Best Value’ (Miller 1998) and audit 
itself (Power 1994, 1997; Strathern 2000) but other terms languish, like ‘good’ or ‘best practice’, 
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perhaps because of their apparent obviousness, being taken ‘at once as evidence of [themselves] 
and perceived as a layer added to others’ (Strathern 2004b:10, although see Riles 1998). Quality 
—or in this case, strategic quality — is another of these self-evident terms. To unpick its meaning, 
we might ask why and how Juntra would try to get quality ‘in’ to people. What might this effort 
require, and what might be the result? 
In previous chapters, I have explored how ethics comes to be located in standards, minutes, 
rooms, protocols, decisions. This chapter explores the ‘ethics’ people locate in themselves and 
others, how this is imagined, and its effects. In Chapter 4, I began to highlight a division in the 
discussions surrounding the relationship between law and ethics. In thinking about methods of 
governance, there is a move between external measurements and internal. Quality, as Juntra 
describes it above, exemplifies the phenomenon: she offers a divided union between an internal 
disposition (‘the culture of your thinking’) and an external measurable which can be tested and 
judged. Might the success of ‘quality’ as a rhetorical instrument lie in its exploitation of this 
dichotomy? It is measurable, but it also depicts an internal attitude or state: ‘the difficult thing is 
the people.’ This binary also pervades much of the contemporary commentary on governance. 
The status quo is summarised succinctly by Simpson (2012:157):
Within the rationality of neoliberalism, the objective is to re-position government such that 
it no longer governs the people but governs the governance by which people govern 
themselves. Rose, following Latour suggests such ‘action at a distance’ is achieved through 
an intensification of surveillance, management, monitoring and the use of expert 
discourses on the one hand, and on the other, the creation of new subjectivities shaped by 
the urge to empowerment, responsibility and autonomy in all spheres of life.
While producing a further comment on the workings of neoliberalism is not my intent, the 
material presented here does speak to the concerns articulated above. It also offers a critique, wary 
of the antinomy into which an analytical divide between interior and exterior might fall. 
Established as independent fields, ethics and bioethics have their own disputes, narratives and 
commentaries. What I aim to bring to these discussions is an anthropological reflection on 
invoked modes of virtue, moral knowledge, conformity, responsibility and accountability; re-
framing old questions upon which extensive anthropologies of the twentieth century have been 
written (Douglas 1992, Evans-Pritchard 1937, Frankenberg 1972, Gluckman 1972, Barth 1959, 
James 1988). The dichotomy of interior and exterior itself — a split replicated in the ethnography 
and in analysis — must ultimately come under scrutiny.
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Quality
In Chapter 1, the story of Coast provoked the comment that in Asia, ‘the system does not exist.’ 
As such, audit-like regimes are introduced in the knowledge that FERCAP must first convince and 
persuade, rather than adjudicate85. As Cristina put it in her summary of FERCAP’s activities, 
‘EC/IRB members need to be convinced about the importance of their task for them to exert 
their utmost effort’ (Torres 2011:52). In convincing, it must get things ‘in’ to people. Quality has 
further qualities: it can be called upon in management. In her role as the head of the TDR’s 
Strategic Quality Management (SQM) Unit,86 Juntra not only favours the term ‘quality’, she can 
push its use in the World Health Organisation. ‘There is a clear need to implement the principles 
of strategic quality management in health research to prevent failure, maximize the utilization of 
available resources and ensure consistency and credibility of results,’ she writes in TDRnews, the 
organisation’s newsletter (Karbwang 2010:24). In the biomedical research industry, quality moves 
closely with audit. As Bhatt and Pradhan (2007:15) put it, ‘the fate of a drug molecule depends on 
the quality of the research data generated…[and] an audit of a clinical trial provides the sponsor 
an independent review of the quality data generated by the trial.’ Both quality and audit are now 
moving closely with ethics. I asked Juntra about how she thinks about ethics and quality, trying to 
understand in what way they occupy the same frame. She used herself as the example through 
which to explain the relationship:
I should learn from mistakes, but maybe I don’t see it. I forget. So have to measure 
performance. If I don’t perform well, I should improve. I need to measure. If I correct 
unsystematically I don’t know which is wrong. […] I may train people but is the training 
good enough? You need to see evidence. If not, just do training and think its OK, because 
you just wanted to “do training”. If I give a lecture on the principle of good practice in 
ethical review, what is my measurement of you? How do I know you have learned? I can ask 
you, give you an exam or an exercise. But I have to define what I expect, what is my learning 
objective[…] A lot of time don’t know what we’re looking for, so its difficult to measure. 
Same as going to the market - you’re buying dinner, if you have a list, you go to this section, 
buy this, that, fast and get what you want in a short time. If not, you buy things and you 
don’t know what to do, [it] doesn’t make a meal, [it] becomes junk. If you don’t have 
anything in mind, [you] buy many things, [but you] don’t get what you really need.
Measurement is clearly key. Juntra’s recursive descriptions pass from the measurement of the 
activity (ethical review) to the measurement of the learner (‘how do I know you have learned?’) to 
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education).
86 Responsible for the quality of TDR–supported studies.
the measurement of the training (is training good enough?) to the identification of learning 
objectives. Quality is potentially present at any of these moments; an orienting principle for 
designing and implementing the survey, in addition to being the thing that surveys seek in 
committees surveyed. In other words, quality is a measure of ethics, and ethics is a measure of 
quality.
We might say that here, ethics is ‘part’ of the Strategic Quality Management efforts, of SIDCER’s 
‘Strategic Initiative for Developing Capacity in Ethical Review.’ Through Juntra this principle and 
priority has been taken up by FERCAP. Using language which recalls the images of fragmentation 
in Chapter 1, Juntra observed that:
until now, quality management was often fragmented. For instance, there was a quality 
check at the start of a new research project in the grant selection process, and another at 
the end through peer review publications. But during the balance of the research process, 
quality management was frequently left to researchers and their institutions (Karbwang 
2010:24).
During revisions to the standard operating procedures for survey teams, Juntra used a metaphor 
to describe the way in which the group doing the revisions should aspire to quality in their definitions 
of quality. ‘Do not just say “I will make a pen,”’ she said. ‘I will say:
“I want a yellow one with a red bottom, five inches long.” It’s not [an attitude of] “any pen 
will do,” we want that pen. And if we’re talking about surveyors, we need to define the 
quality of the survey and the surveyors. Otherwise its just another routine thing.
Juntra would perhaps have got on well with Geertz, for whom culture ‘is best seen not as 
complexes of concrete behaviour patterns — customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters —… but as 
a set of control mechanisms — plans, recipes, rules, instructions… — for the governing of 
behaviour’ (Geertz 1977:44, cited in Strathern 1985: 111). SOPs are a good example, described as 
‘recipes’ in Chinese Ethics training documents (Figure 29). Thus when doing ethics depends on 
quality, surveyors take up the language of quality improvement with gusto. At a FERCAP training 
prior to a Survey in Manila, April 2010, I heard this statement from a Surveyor: ‘We believe in 
continuous quality improvement. Therefore there is no perfect EC, we will always find something, 
some weakness that we will make recommendations about.’ FERCAP surveyors have passed this 
language on to committees seeking renewal of their recognition status.87 On a visit to an IRB in 
Taiwan, I received an office tour, and the secretary handed me a thick folder filled with the 
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documents from their recent Survey. The hospital’s powerpoint slides listed the IRB’s SWOT 
analysis:
W [weakness]: continuing dialogue between the PI and IRB needed to ensure the PI’s 
positive attitude toward IRB functions and responsibility.
T [threat]: owing to tightened standards reinforced, the number of research protocols 
submitted to this IRB for reviewing may be reduced temporarily; for the long run, however, 
we believe that the sponsor and PI would recognize, appreciate and benefit from our 
continuous insistence on quality. 
These tensions between IRBs and PIs I have discussed already (see Chapters 3 and 4). What 
interests me here is the ‘continuous insistence on quality’: quality is something that must always 
be striven for, but chained as it is to the terms ‘continuous’ and ‘improvement,’ it can never be 
arrived at. The term used to describe FERCAP’s work, ‘capacity building,’ suggests a kind of linear 
progress. This is how Surveys first appear: as efforts to see committees reach a certain standard, be 
recognised through the FERCAP/SIDCER program, and then continue to work towards re-
recognition. But the introduction of higher standards and changes in regulations and guidelines 
suggests that this process may not easily be considered complete, indeed, if no committee is ever 
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Figure 29: Image taken from Chinese Ethics 
Training Book
perfect, then their condition is one of infinite improvability. The sociality of this potentially 
infinite project is visible in the operation of the Survey (Chapter 2), when the Surveyor 
announced there was no perfect ethics committee. But it is also visible in trainings on trials, as 
illustrated in this comment in a Philippines GCP training: 
Should results of non-GCP compliant studies be published? It boils down to GCP. From 
the research protocol up to publication [...] Remember, there is no study that is perfect. 
Who can do a perfect study? Nobody except God probably. No investigator can claim that 
his study is perfect and fully, fully 100%. Sapagkat kami ay tao lamang, because we’re just 
people.88 We’re just human beings. We’re bound to make mistakes.
In this researcher’s experience, GCP monitoring, of the kind which was the subject of debate at 
the opening of Chapter 5, also prompts a sense of judgement and blame. The researcher 
explained how he had felt when a monitor came to visit his site during the conduct of a multi-
sited clinical trial in the Philippines.   
The first time we were monitored we hated it. We were debating. ‘Why are you doing this?’ 
we asked the monitor, ‘Your role here is to help!’ But they did want to help — so in the 
end it becomes good, a good study. We were like that for the first visit, but then there was a 
second visit. [...] You start blaming each other in front of the monitor. There was a third 
visit, and by the fourth visit, we came to like the monitor.
Just as Surveyors declare there is no perfect committee, GCP trainers declare there can be no 
perfect study. This is, in part, because it is the same people who are doing both. The researcher 
above who initially hated his Clinical Monitor is a member of an ethics review committee. Their 
clinical experience informs committee decisions about clinical trials but, I suggest, it also shapes 
the way in which ‘ethics’ is developed and implemented.
While my discussion so far has focused largely on ethics review committees themselves, the 
economics of research and narratives of personal and national productivity are never far away. 
One trainer told me that she aimed to motivate her students: ‘By the end of the session, ‘[I want 
them to] think “[There are] many things I have to do! Many things in need of change.”’ Juntra 
remarked that at trainings, there is an imperative to pay attention: 
You are contributing to your country, using resources properly. People who come and don’t 
want to learn should feel ashamed, they are wasting their nation’s resource. If I go and I 
don’t pay attention, I feel guilty because the organisation has paid for me. You should feel it 
yourself. I’d like that to happen to everyone. Shouldn’t wait for people to evaluate you, but 
evaluate yourself. If I’ve been sleeping, I should feel bad. 
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The neoliberal commentary with which I began encouraged the link which this section has 
developed: between measurement and morality. Porter’s work (1995) has so clearly shown that 
measurements are far from apolitical. Where there is morality in the measurement, there is also 
measurement in the morality. Quality, like ethics, becomes a value to believe in, and something to 
be advocated for. Made deliberate, conscious, it can be practiced. But what is that is being 
appealed to, such that this move to quality consciousness might happen? What might be ‘in’ 
committee members already, being elicited or invoked? Following on from these questions, the 
next section explores the concept of duty, first invoked in this thesis’ opening vignette in 
Cristina’s remark ‘If you do not do your duty, you are not a good professional.’
Duty based Ethics
The duty-based approach in research ethics was also clearly understood in the East Asian 
setting that is clearly steeped in the Confucian tradition of beneficent governance and 
grounded in the Buddhist principle of selflessness (Torres 2011: 48).
While we have seen above that Juntra would like to get quality ‘in’ to people, I also want to 
suggest that FERCAP trainers aim to elicit something from them. Cristina calls on Confucianism 
and Buddhist principles to suggest that duty was ‘clearly understood’: perhaps ‘getting things into 
people’ is dependent on something already being there. The language of duty-based ethics 
prevalent in FERCAP is perhaps supported through Dr Koski’s presence on the SIDCER advisory 
board, and his participation in the Forum’s conferences. When Koski describes the finely woven 
silk cloth which I used in Chapter 1, he says ‘[t]he individuals and entities engaged in human 
research constitute a matrix of overlapping roles and responsibilities that together serve to ensure 
that the duties are satisfied’ (emphasis added). His subsequent slide (Figure 30) draws duty out 
from its Kantian roots towards the Belmont Report. 
East Asia is not the only place where FERCAP works, and existing emic uses of the concept of 
duty within the countries covered by the network has received longstanding, if intermittent, 
academic attention (Doniger O’Flaherty and Derrett 1978, Lassoff 2009, Peletz 2011). This work 
on duty in the region stands in contrast with the rights based discourse which, scholars note, has 
been foregrounded in bioethics (Annas 2005, 2010, Fenton and Arras 2010; see also Bhatia 2000 
and Carnegie 1996). Given this, we cannot assume that the ‘duty’ invoked by Koski resembles that 
which will be understood by FERCAP members or effective when invoked in trainings. Perhaps 
rather than a ‘boundary object’ (Star and Griesemer 1989), the term is more usefully imagined as 
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a boundary concept (Allen 2009, Löwy 1992), employed as a idea around which different parties 
can congregate, ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs [...] yet robust enough to maintain a 
common identity across sites’ (Star and Griesemer 1989:393). Furthermore, duty as a boundary 
concept operates as ‘a means of translation [...] key in developing and maintaining coherence 
across intersecting social worlds’ (Star and Griesemer 1989:393). Despite their emphasis on 
making things explicit and their attention to detail, FERCAP do not say much on how they 
intend the concept of ‘duty’ and I suggest that by leaving its meanings implicit, and using it only 
occasionally, the idea of ‘duty’ helps FERCAP achieve ‘coordination without consensus’ (Kimble 
et al. 2010). I would suggest that Cristina is aware of this, and her linking duty to Confucian 
governance and Buddhist principles reveals only one part of the boundary concept’s properties. 
The specificities of the invocation of duty across the region in which FERCAP operates will be 
diverse. 
Recalling Noah’s argument that perfect documents mean nothing unless the researcher has 
‘bought in’ to the process (2004:292), one committee member commented ‘Yes I’ve done six 
months at WIRB but unless you keep it in mind, the training is nothing. It is up to you.’ I suggest 
then, that the idea of duty is a resource that FERCAP draws upon, and I am interested in what 
‘duty’ appeals to. FERCAP’s capacity building work extends beyond documentation, Surveys and 
training, they seek to build capacity through appealing to duty and responsibility; in some places, 
such appeals are practically the only tools available. Speaking of a Surveying trip to Francophone 
Africa, one Surveyor said: 
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Figure 30: Dr Koski’s Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities 
slide.
They have practically nothing. No PhDs. So in the Ethics Committee of the National 
Health facility, they make decisions on what drugs to come in for testing, which ones to say 
no. I ask how they decide which to have, but they have no evidence to support their 
decisions and drugs for testing are everywhere. There are no standards. I said, ‘Maybe you 
need some people?’ The most that they have is a Masters degree: can you imagine, you’d be 
the authority of the country? How can you expect others to take responsibility? That’s what 
ethics is about. Even in daily life. It’s about responsibility. Before you accept responsibility 
you have to know what [your responsibility will be] about. If its beyond your capacity, you 
have to gain that capacity first. You should ask, ‘How can I best contribute?’ That’s why in 
GCP you have to state very clearly what each [party’s] responsibility is about. So the person 
can see, ‘For me to take responsibility I need this training.’
This Surveyor’s configuration of a committee member looks for responsibility towards others (trial 
participants) in the framework of GCP, which in turn foregrounds responsibility for oneself. The 
Surveyor’s comments evoke the idea that in duty ‘it is not specific conventions that are the object 
of the exercise but a specific orientation of the person’ (Strathern 1992a: 153). From this sentence 
two separate paths emanate. In this thesis we have seen how measurements are only considered 
effective if their goal is pre-specified. These are the conventions which can at once be measure and 
goal (Hoskin 1996). But in the same way as research ethics separates form from the content of 
bioethics, Cristina’s use of duty releases ethics from ‘specific conventions,’ focusing instead on the 
orientation of the person. One orientation she knows they have in common, and the direction of 
her appeal, is the professionalism of the professional.
Professionals and Professionalism
Here is an extract from my field notes.
We need some consensus, otherwise we stay in a grey area where decisions are not made. Ethics is very 
important for society, but it shouldn’t be a stumbling block for decision making.
It is July 13th 2009, and we are at the National Science Foundation in Colombo, Sri Lanka. We are trying 
to discuss the formation of ethics guidelines for the professions. “We” are scientists of differing stripes, 
architects, medics, engineers, microbiologists, and we have been talking for some time. Our objective is to 
ascertain whether cross-profession professional ethics can be established, and if so, what they will look like. 
But this ‘consensus’ is proving elusive and it is hard to find ways to make decisions. ‘Decisions can be made 
depending on the values we agree upon in the society,’ offers someone. But this is difficult too, because 
‘society’ is not thought to be present. We have only professionals, and scientists. We brought them here to 
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formulate principles they consider internal to their disciplines. Another speaker tries to find new common 
ground. 
When trying to discuss guidelines on the formulation of ethics I think its easier if we take a common 
thing. I feel there are two main things. One, will the outcome harm society? If yes, then it is not 
suitable, it’s not ethical. The other is will it harm the environment? On these we can base our effort. 
Then it comes to transparency. Then the right to information. Next piece is accountability. An 
individual is accountable to their boss, to a university head, to ministers, to the president. At the end, 
the president is accountable to society and the people, as an elected leader. So, basically the question is 
whether we are maintaining social responsibility.
Social responsibility, however, opens a new set of issues. Ethics and responsibility, the speaker has suggested, 
intertwine, and the presence of the president in the chain of accountability configured by the speaker causes 
further problems still: 
In totalitarian regime, questions are not asked, because we’ll be shot. You implied we’re responsible up 
a chain to the president, to the public. No! We’re responsible to the public, otherwise it is like a 
totalitarian regime, where if we have to be prepared to go public on something which differs from what 
the president wants to say, once in a while, one of us will be shot.
Locating and fixing ethics, as found by those in the discussion above, is no easy task. As an 
opening on my discussion of professionals and professionalism, it presents a slice of what was a 
heavy, complicated discussion, raising more questions that I can hope to answer here. But its 
richness is suitable, since it reveals what is at stake in the dichotomy between professionalism and 
audit: are ethics ‘in’ s/he who is willing to speak up, even at the risk of being shot, or are they ‘out 
there,’ in the powerful abstraction of ‘society’? 
Ethics committees, Dyer and Demeritt remind us, ‘are part of a wide sea-change in the governance 
of professional conduct. Until recently,’ they claim, ‘research ethics were treated as matters of 
personal and professional integrity’ (2009: 47). Professionalism is presently enjoying something of 
a renaissance (Friedson 1994, 2001; Miettinen 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Creuss et al. (2004) draw on 
the work of William Sullivan, a medical sociologist, to support their view that:
[n]either economic incentives nor technology nor administrative control has proved an 
effective surrogate for the commitment to integrity evoked in the ideal of professionalism 
(Sullivan 1995:16, cited in Creuss et al. 2004, see also Freidson 1994).
I say renaissance, because there was a time when being (a) professional was not enough. Looking 
at the UK, Duncan Wilson, an historian of biomedicine, has charted the factors that ‘fostered 
outside scrutiny of medicine,’ with an aim to show ‘how particular individuals fashioned 
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themselves into “ethics experts”’ (Wilson 2012:195). ‘The new regimes of external oversight, like 
bioethics, were not simply the product of the conservative demands for audit and accountability’, 
he writes, ‘but also depended on the presence of individuals and professional groups willing to 
define themselves as the new arbiters of best practice’ (Wilson 2012:196). In the USA, Stark traces 
‘how the moral authority to decide how to treat research participants was relocated from 
professions to the state and reinvested in procedures rather than ethics principles’ (2011b:7), 
although she suggests that ‘group review was invented, justified, and expanded less by “outsiders” 
like bioethicists and activists than by researchers themselves’ (2011b:7). As it professionalised 
(itself), bioethics kept intact the idea of the profession, to which research ethics is now returning.
Koski, whose image of a finely woven silk cloth opened Chapter 1, began a webinar with the 
complaint that ‘there is little direct, measurable evidence that the heightened burden [of review] 
actually increases the effectiveness of protecting human subjects, or improves the quality of the 
research itself’ (Koski 2011). He turns to an article by Taylor (2007) which was published in the 
industry circular IRB: Ethics and Human Research in which Taylor concludes, based on interviews 
with members of Canadian IRBs, that:
in the absence of empirical evidence regarding the quality of REB review, those interviewed 
said they rely heavily on the integrity of the researchers and professed a cultural norm that 
the integrity of researchers not be questioned (Taylor 2007:11).
In their research on review boards, Beagan and McDonald write that though '[a]lmost all of the 
participants believed, often passionately, that ethics review is effective [...] the empirical evidence 
offered for or against such claims was scant' (2005:66). Sugarman (2004: 495) would produce an 
evidence-based ethics that, ‘[s]imilar to evidence-based medicine,[...] would emphasize the 
importance of data in informing decision and decision-making about the ethical issues inherent 
in clinical medicine and research.’ Thus Beagan and McDonald find it ‘paradoxical that those in 
the health professions base their practice on evidence-based standards except in the case of ethical 
review’ (2005:67). In his webinar, Koski, rather than developing the measures Sugarman, 
MacDonald et al. require, concludes that the absence of ‘evidence’ actually brings something else 
to the fore:
[W]e simply have to say, all right, if we’re really talking about integrity, if integrity is what 
we’re falling back on in hope that that’s what is actually going to protect human subjects, 
[then] of course that’s what Henry Beecher89 says. [I]t’s really the integrity, the well trained, 
well intentioned investigator, doing the right thing, that provides protection for human 
subjects, not  a committee, not regulations. It’s the individual integrity of scientist, and of 
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89 Henry Beecher (1966) wrote a now famous paper revealing ethical problems in American research. 
course, if we think that we’re going to be able to continue to do things the way we have for 
30 years and expect to come up with a different result, we’re deluding ourselves, and we’re 
legitimately criticised on both sides of this debate that we’re really not being rational in 
what we’re trying to do.
For Koski, not being “rational” means not paying attention to the “evidence”: 
The professional investigators have perhaps the most important role of all. But the system 
we have developed over the years has somehow in a sense conveniently overlooked that. To 
put it another way, some have argued that ethics committees themselves, or the IRBs/REBs 
have in fact taken over the responsibility for the ethical dimensions of research at a time 
when we should be looking to our physician scientists to take on more responsibility.
One way for physician scientists to take on that responsibility, he says, would be to undergo an 
examination as an ‘ethics professional’. Separate from reviews of the committee, in this model 
individuals are certified for their competence in ethics. He advocates a shift from a ‘culture of 
compliance to a culture of conscience,’ and his talk focused on how that might be achieved. 
Where we are today is in the compliance domain, where so much of what we do is driven 
by our desire to ensure that research is going to be reviewed and performed in compliance 
with regulations. Regulatory compliance is the floor for all Human Subject Protection. 
Because if you go below that you’re breaking the law. That means you’re a crook. And 
certainly this is not where we want to be, and yet this is where we stay ‘cos its the only thing 
we’ve known how to do. It’s not where we want to stay.
The result of a move from a ‘compliance domain’ to a ‘true performance domain,’ he says, would 
be trust: research that is trusted ‘not only by the participants but by society, sponsors, everyone.’ 
His statements here are part of his formulation of a move from ‘compliance to conscience,’ 
developed during his tenure as the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP)’s founding 
Director in Washington (Koski 2001; Whalen, et al. 2003):
Under a professional system, investigators who fail to meet their responsibilities lose their 
privileges. If you don’t do it right you don’t get to do it at all. That seems to be a very 
powerful way to motivate people to do things right, it works in medicine, it works in law, 
and other fields, there’s no reason it wouldn’t work in research. [...] There would also have 
to be personal accountability. Rather than shutting down an IRB or suspending a FWA, 
thats not the issue it really needs to get back to the individuals who are doing the work who 
need to be held accountable for how that work is going to be done. 
As Busch remarks, linking certification arguments to trust and the management of risk 
(2011:203), certification can be thought of ‘as a displacement of trust as predictability’ (2011:214). 
At the webinar, Koski sees ‘certification of individuals, accreditation of institutions and programs’ 
and other ‘validation tools and ‘instruments’ as ‘crucially important’: 
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These are tools that the public has become comfortable with and come to rely upon in 
terms of knowing that a system upon which they must depend, either for their own 
personal safety or their health, even though they may not know all of the intricate details, 
they know someone who does know all of the intricate details is overseeing things.
Koski is talking about certifications such as the Certified IRB Professional (CIP), an American 
professional certification I first heard about from Edith, a secretary of a committee in Taiwan. She 
had taken the exam but failed. ‘There are 250 questions on the exam!’ she told me. When we 
met, she was trying to decide whether to sit the test again. When I asked her why she wanted it, 
she paused. ‘To become a professional? When I’m in the IRB, I want to have the test, but its been 
two years [since I was a WIRB fellow]. I can’t remember the US regulations,’ she told me. She was 
quiet for a moment, then said, 
Just like IRB, this qualification is just for the name. In Taiwan, 5 people here have the CIP, 
and they tell others it is very difficult. Many tried and failed, even famous profs who have 
conducted Clinical Trials. [They] just thought ‘Its just about clinical trials and ethics.’ I 
think they failed ‘cos CIP is about CFR, which is US regulations. So, not very important 
for Asia people. But if you say you have it, people will think you’re good.
The CIP is promoted by the American professional association Public Responsibility In Medicine 
and Research (PRIM&R). Originating in dinner groups of people trying to stay on top of 
burgeoning regulations in the 1970s ‘when there was no such thing as a professional research 
administrator’ (Selwitz 2009) the organisation has seen ‘management of […] human subjects 
committees become not only an accepted but also a respected profession’ (Selwitz 2009). 
‘PRIM&R are different from FERCAP,’ Edith told me: 
They really provide education, and they earn lots of money [though doing it]. One day can 
cost $600USD! They know how to make money, they go to each state, they provide Ethics 
101, 201. And they encourage the CIP. It costs $438. You need to prepare, study. No 
Americans fail, only foreigners, because of the language barrier.
Since the CIP was based on US regulations, neither Cristina nor Juntra had taken the exam, ‘they 
said it’s not so important for an Asian country,’ remarked Edith. But last year, she said, they had 
‘tried to imitate the CIP, make an exam model’ (Figures 31 and 32). This was the CERP, 
Certification for Ethics in Research Proficiency, proposed during the FERCAP conference in 
2008. Based on ‘credentialing’ and focusing ‘specifically on the individual’ and their ‘current 
knowledge in an international and specialised area of practice’ (Lee 2008), passing CERP would 
allow successful candidates to use the designation after their names. 
But it didn’t work,’ said Edith, ‘nobody wanted to take it. There was a meeting in Taipei, but only 
a few people came. There were more speakers than audience!’ Edith thought while it was a good 
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idea, the low uptake was largely because it was not (yet) a formal requirement. This reminds us of 
something not made obvious in the direct comparison between the CIP and the CERP: that 
research ethics is not a profession in Asia in the same way as it is in the USA. In appealing for 
FERCAP members to be good professionals, I suggest, Cristina is referring to their existing 
professional identities, as medics and scientists.   
Let me return to the opening vignette from the Sri Lankan National Science Academy, where 
scientists gathered to discuss cross-profession ethics. They were troubled by the location of ethics. 
Is it found ‘out there in society’, sought and found through survey or consultation (Strathern 
2005b) or does — should — it come from within? To the ‘levels’ of Euro-American thinking 
(Callon and Latour 1981, Strathern 1985) these are sensible questions. Indeed, not only does 
ethics — in its language of informed consent and ‘benefits to society’ — echo it, but 
anthropologists too replicate the dichotomy, resting arguments upon the notion of ‘levels’ at or 
between which actions can occur (Callon and Latour 1981). This they owe to a twentieth century 
imagining of sociality, laid down initially by Durkheim:
Society was held to inhere in the “level” of organizing principles, not in what was being 
ordered; levels were literally conceived as of a different order from persons concretely 
imagined as so many individuals. Hence the central problematic of midcentury 
anthropology: the relationship between individual and society. Each comprised an 
irreducible perspective on the other (Strathern 1992b:105) 
This irreducibility left the speakers in the National Science Academy at an impasse. In a 
Durkheimian frame, it was possible to view society as the source from which morality — or the 
‘general’ ethics sought by the vignette’s speakers — should spring. Society, like the professions, 
could serve as an ‘external constraint’ (Durkheim 1995[1912]). FERCAP’s duty based ethics and 
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Figures 31: slides from Lee 2008.
“moral force” is an appeal to professionals; a response to an environment where a call to uphold 
(professional) integrity may have greater effect than a call for accountability. Accountability 
requires an agreement between those who hold a committee accountable and the committee’s 
recognition of that authority. Despite talk of a ‘return to the professional,’ faith in the regulatory 
capacities of ‘the professions’ in some countries where FERCAP works is slight. As an interviewee 
in Sri Lanka put it, ‘most of the time, the professional association isn’t there. Most of the time, 
it’s just conscience. The Medical Association cannot go behind every single person.’
If I have argued that Cristina’s appeal to professionals is aimed at their existing professions, it is 
due to the fact that ethics committee work is an activity overlaid upon people’s existing jobs. 
However, this is not to say there is no activity recognisable as professionalising. As Edith said, she 
wanted to sit the CIP herself, to become a professional. In an essay on ‘Remaking the moral 
person in China: implications for health,’ Kleinman observes that the medical profession, ‘like 
the legal, architectural, engineering, and other professions, is self-consciously professionalising 
with greater attention to best practices, training standards and public responsibilities’ (Kleinman 
2010:1075). This version of professionalising — best practices, standards — was only one of the 
kinds of professionalising I observed during my fieldwork. There was also something far more 
interesting going on: with their understanding of how committees ‘work’ across the region, 
FERCAP’s project with ethics committees was beginning to specify — in informal spaces — the 
kinds of skills and attitudes that will aid the realisation of their vision.  A pre-conference training 
in Chiang Mai in 2009 brought under discussion the personal and professional qualities and 
responsibilities of the two parties most directly responsible for the management of ethical review 
committees: Secretaries and Chairs. About sixty people from across the region had gathered in a 
side room of the Imperial Mae Ping Hotel in Chiang Mai, Thailand to hear each other present. 
The South Korean Expert Secretary General had included in her presentation certain personal 
qualities that secretaries were encouraged to possess or develop in order to do their jobs 
effectively:
[Must have] Responsiveness: act quickly and reliably.
[Must do] Balancing: IRB is actually a compromise activity in terms of ethics. If you have 
high abstract standard you can’t approve any proposal. You must have a good sense of 
balancing.
[Must be] Gentle:  keep people around you happy, but be strict.
[Required character involves] Integrity: it is very hard to have authority. You need 
discernment, accountability, sense of balance. I talked about attitude, virtue ethics or 
principle. If you have good virtue character you will be a good secretary.
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These are qualities that blur the boundary between professional and personal characteristics, 
describing the ethics-of-the-self characteristics of those who would administer the work of 
committees. I explore this inculcation (Noah 2004) through looking further at what FERCAP 
trainings aim to achieve. 
Belief in Ethics
At a FERCAP Strategic Planning session in Shanghai, June 2010, meeting attendees were 
preparing powerpoints for use in trainings. During the first session after lunch, Juntra was 
comparing versions of the FERCAP logo in order to select one for a standardised powerpoint: 
‘This one is nice, but the letters are not nice. When the proportions are wrong, it’s not the logo 
anymore! It should be a flame, like this, it should go up.’ I took the opportunity to ask about the 
logo in more detail. ‘It is the flame of enlightenment,’ she told me, ‘to revive and fan a passion for 
ethics and research.’ Her description encapsulates how ‘ethics’ can be simultaneously thought of 
as an international system of committees and a state of mind. ‘It’s the same as when you change 
your paradigm,’ she told me. ‘This thing may be obvious for some person, but others can’t see it 
until they cross that line.’ We were sitting opposite one another around a table at the workshop, 
and she put her hands on her laptop screen that formed a barrier between us. ‘It’s hard to explain 
when you don’t cross [gesturing to her side of the screen] when you’re on this side [gesturing to 
my side of the screen]. However much I tell you, it doesn’t mean anything until you cross the line.’ 
My face must have betrayed confusion, because she continued with another example. ‘Do you ride 
a bicycle?’ I nodded. 
You can ride a bicycle now, but before you could, why [was it] so hard? Do you remember 
that first time? That moment, the first time you ride the bike, you remember. That’s why I 
try to find examples, what does it mean, when you can’t do it, you can’t do it, you can’t do 
it, then you suddenly can do [it]. Take that moment.
Some trainings were thought to produce this effect more than others. Cristina, who had been 
following our conversation, warned the others present not to expect the participants to reach this 
understanding immediately. 
At the beginning the participants wouldn’t care. Then they start to listen. It [the workshop] 
is one of the most transformative. At the beginning they don’t care, then they hear… You 
see them change.
FERCAP trainings are not merely targeted at making students realise their own ignorance and 
seek to overcome it, rather, the aim is a transformation of attitude, or in Juntra’s terms, 
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‘paradigm.’ Many of my interviewees agreed with this view. During a lunch-break on a GCP 
course in Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok in April 2010 I was talking to Cathy, a committee 
member from Bangkok about the presentations we had seen that morning. My head was full of 
the changes that were taking place institutionally to accommodate international 
recommendations, and some of the difficulties experienced in implementing rules and 
regulations. Cathy nodded along, but in a pause, she pointed out something she thought I hadn’t 
quite grasped. ‘There is one thing you haven’t mentioned’, she said: ‘the integrity of the 
researcher’:
No rule can write it all, to cover every aspect and every speech of the doctor to the patient. 
Only the integrity of the doctor and that will control good or bad science and research. 
Regulators cannot do what integrity and the culture of a faculty can do.
It was this institutional ‘culture’ which Cathy hoped would be passed between members in her 
institution: 
When you are young staff, and you haven’t come to an ethical issues course and you don’t 
know much. Still, if someone told you ‘This is the rule,’ even if you don’t know yet you will 
not avoid a rule or do something against it or behind the backs of others. So first you 
recognise that it is a rule. Then someone says there are ethical issues, and if someone has a 
good integrity, to be a good doctor, they will go to the course. And start to understand it. 
That’s when they start to understand ethical; you become ethical not just in your rules but in 
your life and your mind.
What Cathy makes very clear is that there can be no rule that governs social interaction, for 
wherever we look — the conference, the room of the ethics committee, the survey and of course 
(most obviously) doctors and patients — the relationships cannot be reduced (to rules). More is 
hoped for in this enculturation than rule following; in my focus on standardisation I had — for 
Cathy — missed the point. ‘Regulators cannot do what integrity and the culture of a faculty can 
do,’ she said, ‘people need to want to be good.’ Her reaction to the standardisation we were 
learning about in our GCP sessions was to root action in the staff, not in the rules.
In FERCAP trainings, learning to see ethics, to really understand, is felt to lie beyond their 
activities implementing and training committees. We have seen hints of this already: this thesis 
began with a moral value placed on acting through belief, not through policing. Sri Lankan 
bioethics advocate Sumathiupala pushes for education, but not just a change in how much is 
known: 
By creating awareness among the research community, this ignorance [about ethics] can be 
defeated. This can be done by guiding researchers to do quality research because they believe 
in the ethical framework: you should promote ethics because ethics produces good research 
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and you should become an ethical researcher because you believe in it and not because 
somebody has started to police you (2006:S78).
This idea of belief in an ethical framework interested me. At the opening of a Surveyors training, 
one Surveyor described his transformation and how FERCAP had helped him ‘see’ ethics in these 
terms:
Well, before 2005, I’m just like you, some of you. I sit in the audience for the first time 
when Cristina came to [City X] to give a symposium on SOP. I was not an IRB member in 
that moment, so I had no idea, though I knew what it [ethics] was. Then I had a chance to 
learn a lot from Dr Torres and Dr Juntra. So thanks to them, we had the opportunity to 
visit WIRB for six months. And after that Cristina gave us a lot of chances to visit other 
IRB, a kind of field trip. So we learned from the book then we learned from reality.
These moments, in conjunction with the language of ‘belief,’ prompted the single occasion on 
which I addressed ethics and religion directly with Cristina and Juntra. We were having lunch 
together in Bangkok between training sessions and I asked about their experiences across the 
region with religion and ethics. Cristina responded: 
Each religion is thinking about the common good. No matter what your religion, it’s about 
the good for the other person. In the Philippines, I say its not about Catholic dogma. The 
idea in EC is to respect how a person thinks. That’s autonomy. Respect his conscience, how 
he thinks. How you relate it to your belief system, well that is one area Asians are different - things 
are not in boxes.
In emphasising the distinction between ethics and ‘Catholic dogma’ Cristina was focusing 
implicitly on general principles abstracted from religions and applied in an ethics committee 
setting. Commentators point out the difficulty of separating religious and ethical thought, even 
down to the language used for the concepts (e.g. Hongladarom 2004 on the Pali roots of Thai 
ethics language). What interests me is the expressed need for this distinction, the claiming of a 
space for ethics which is not conducted in the language of religion. Previous chapters have shown 
there are a great deal of parallels between the spaces of thought of ethics and religion: justice, right 
and wrong, fairness, balance, empathy, compassion, even conversion. In many ways it is not 
surprising that modes of thought and behaviour that resonate with the religious should be seen in 
the way people talk about ethics. Merographic thought (Strathern 1991, 1992) makes ethics seem 
part of both the secular (medical) and religious domains, fully encompassed by neither.90  The 
domain of medicine and the activities of biomedical assessment and audit are a site of unusual 
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90 Humour is one means by which I saw this communicated: Catholic surveyors who attend churches while abroad on 
surveys joke that ‘you can follow the same all over, you know where you are, it has SOPs!’ More intriguingly, teacher-
pupil relationships bind with ethics when a student asks whether eating a balut, a fertilized chicken egg with a nearly-
developed embryo inside, was unethical. A Surveyor asked whether he had managed to reverse the unethical side of 
having consumed his own by eating himself the one his teacher had refused.
convergence, a place where one’s personal ethics and ethics of the self (Laidlaw 2001, Foucault 
2000a[1981], 2000b[1985], 2000c[1988]) can be brought in to comprehend and enact the form of 
ethics in use by biomedical research.
The medical interventions that ethics committees assess are, after all, interventions on the body. 
Discussing Rosalind Rey’s work on pain during the enlightenment, Asad (2003) argues that ‘the 
secularization of pain signals not merely the abandonment of a transcendental language 
(“religious obsessions”) but the shift to a new preoccupation - from the personal attempt at 
consoling and curing (that is, inhabiting a social relationship) to a distanced attempt at 
investigating the functions and sensations of the living body (Asad 2003:48 cited in Hirschkind 
2011). This shift is perhaps evident at the intersection of research and treatment, particularly in 
countries newly adopting multi-sited clinical trials, with their requirements from sponsors and 
auditors. As Simpson and Sariola put it for an Australian sponsored trial in Sri Lanka, ‘[d]octors, 
who might otherwise follow their disposition as healers [...] are no longer operating in craft-mode 
but are recast as mechanical and meticulous monitors of the body and its functions’ (2012:565).
But perhaps a ‘transcendental language’ is not as abandoned we might imagine, reappearing 
through ethics not with religious obsessions but those of quality, audit and monitoring. Much of 
what is described above is what we would recognise as self management, where ‘the manager…gets 
internalised: externally imposed control becomes internally generated motivation’ (Martin 
1997:241, cited in Strathern 2004: 10). The internalisation — a relocation — of control, and 
change into motivation — a conversion — has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Those attentive to 
audit (Power 1994, 1997; Strathern 2000; 2004, Pels 2000, Brennais 2006), organisations 
(Foucault 2004[1977]) and work policy (Martin 1997) have remarked on this re-placement. 
However, there is a prior question that governance demands: in order to govern and in order to 
make people into what you want them to be, you have to have an idea of what those who you wish 
to influence already are. You possess an idea of what was long termed ‘human nature.’ As Sam 
put it in the car as he drove me from a noodle bar where we had eaten breakfast, ‘America has 
Belmont, Europe has Helsinki. We have Confucius. It just depends if you want to do it or not.’ In 
his equation of the declarations of Belmont and Helsinki with Confucius, Sam is elevating them 
to the status of philosophies which provide resources through which to understand ‘ethics.’ 
However, Sam’s view, these documents revealed profoundly different reasons for having IRBs in 
Asia and in the West, focusing on the fusion of personal character and regulation. What he 
Chapter 7: Locating Ethics
237
argued, as he approached this statement, is that Americans have a different idea of what rules are 
for: 
In USA [they] use IRB to limit and regulate research because [they] believe humans are bad, 
personality is bad. In Chinese, we believe the personality is good but sometimes we need to 
have regulations. So we give a lot of regulations for people because everyone knows 
regulation is good for research subject. But in our education system we already put ethical 
education in our primary schools, through to university. 
In Chapter 4 I showed that not everyone with whom I spoke agreed that Law, as a separate realm 
of social control, was where ethics should lie. Interviewees in the preceding chapters have opined 
eloquently on ethics coming from ‘within,’ ridiculing the notion that ethics should take 
documented, fixed form. One scoffed at the idea that it ever could: ‘it’s like saying someone is 
beautiful...How can you prove you are right?’ While both Koski and this speaker are applying the 
standards of evidence to ethics, the former seeking proof that ‘ethics‘ — the committees and their 
procedures — are working, the ‘ethics’ spoken of by the latter latter does not lend itself to such 
methods of proof. If, however, ethics is viewed as a set of measurable processes, then it can be 
proven. It is on this distinction that FERCAP’s work hinges. It does not seek to prove it is ‘right’ 
about the content of decisions: its trainings are concerned with ‘sensitization.’ Instead, it audits, 
measures, codifies and checks the processes. Providing evidence for an ethics review is the focus of 
the survey; providing evidence for the efficacy of ethics review is another concern (McDonald  and 
Cox 2009). But the other focus made evident by Koski is the changed practitioners. FERCAP’s 
objective is not merely to measure, reorder and record; they seek to transform people by ‘putting 
things into them,’ ‘making them see’ and eliciting a personal response. 
What the ethnographic moments presented reveal is the way in which these terms simultaneously 
rely on, and collapse into one another. ‘Ethics’ is slippery. What, for example, holds quality and 
ethics apart? We see how both quality and ethics are infused or made possible by “belief,” how 
ethics itself can be thought of as a form of belief or state of mind resulting in a transformation; 
how GCP and ethics map uncomfortably onto one another. In his ethnography of derivatives 
traders in Tokyo, Miyazaki (forthcoming) stretches the concept of ‘arbitrage’ as far as he can, in 
order to find its edges, examining its ‘extensibility’ by extending it to a point at which it is no 
longer extensible. This he describes as an analysis that takes arbitrage as a ‘modality of engagement in 
a historically specific location and time’ (ibid). Here, I have placed ethics in an analogous role to 
arbitrage - a term that marks an activity conducted as part of one’s professional working life, but 
also that people also apply to their own lives. Similarly,  the chapters of Miyazaki’s ethnography 
unfold, we find traders discussing not just trading in terms of arbitrage their lives, futures, 
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interests, from UFOs to hypnotherapy clinics. By drawing attention to this spread, Miyazaki shows 
how ‘arbitrage became a principle, that is, a principle of capitalism and even of life and mind’ as it 
extends ‘from external objects to internal matters,’ following through the ‘epistemological and 
ontological problems that have shaken the integrity of the category itself’ (forthcoming). I would 
suggest that what is called ethics does not support the integrity of the category, rather, its 
successful uptake is precisely because it can be renamed according to requirements. In appealing 
to quality or duty, trainers can still be understood to be talking about ethics. But the 
‘extensibility’ (Miyazaki’s term) of the category means that reflection upon it challenges a clear 
separation between one’s professional working life and one’s personal values, beliefs and priorities. 
Exemplifying the challenge ethics poses to clear categorisation, one conference presenter 
commented, ‘Ethics is not definable, not implementable because it is not conscious. It involves 
not only our thinking but also our feeling.’
While there are ‘IRB professionals’ in certain parts of the world, for most in Asia, the role is a 
voluntary one, on top of existing duties or work. In an historical view, during the 1980s ethics 
emerged as a defined field outside of medicine, initially as bioethics in the US and UK, 
subsequently research ethics (Wilson 2010, 2011). Such an exteriority Wilson argues (2012) is part 
of the exteriorisation associated with audit. If making ethics into a profession is not what is 
meant, and the desire for personal qualifications seems low, then what is FERCAP’s engagement 
with the professional about? I suggest that the critical public, thought present Euro-American 
models through the ‘accountability’ function of audit, are substituted by the professions in 
Cristina’s invocation. The profession model encourages accountability to one’s fellow 
professionals, something of which one is already a part. The mutual implication of committees in 
the survey take is another example of the way in which professionals become constituted through 
others, becoming what one might call dividually professional. Such a model requires of them not 
only the enactment of a form of public accountability turned inwards, but also a form of personal 
transformation, rendered most memorably in a description of a chairperson I heard during the 
2009 conference: ‘A chair cannot tell people to be ethical if he or she is not ethical. You cannot be 
having an affair.’ Turner reflects that for Durkheim, ‘[m]orality and moral force is always to be 
discovered in ’something that goes beyond the individual, and to the interests of the group he 
belongs to’ (1992:24). I suggest that this is what, in her recourse to ‘moral force,’ Cristina is 
pushing for. The good professional is a good compromise: it can accommodate both the scientific 
goal oriented measurement, and appeals to duty based ethics. Duty can be invoked in a way which 
employs the ‘moral force’ of a (professional) community, be that the nascent community of 
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FERCAP’s ethical professionals, or the biomedical professions from which most members of 
committees come. One way of reading the placement of ethics as a duty in her statement ‘if you 
don’t do you duty, you’re not a good professional’ is to see that Cristina’s ethics is professionalism, 
the separation collapsed. For all the work of externalising ethics ‘outside’ of medicine and the 
concomitant rise of audit, idea of ethics is shifting back towards ethics as something located within 
the practicing professional.91 
Pels’ (2000) analysis of the shifting ground of anthropological ethics makes it possible to better 
interpret the narratives of the professions here. He argues that the ethical code which attends to 
the ethos of self-auditing is aligned in some cases with the production of marketable selves. While 
this is already the case in the USA, it is also becoming so in Asia. The example of the CIP serves 
different ‘technologies of self’ from those addressed to professional duties oriented towards a 
public domain. It is also the division which has implicitly structures the thesis, moving from ethics 
committees as an “external,” recognisable form of governance) to ‘ethics’ as people’s “internal” 
reactions and convictions. Drawing upon MacIntyre (1984), Pels reminds us of the concept of an 
ideal towards which every person would strive, which he suggests is missing from contemporary 
ethics. Where striving for ethics blurs with striving for quality, I suggest a dimension of 
MacIntyre’s ‘lost element’ pushes forward. Quality demands that when committees are surveyed, 
they commit to being ‘the best we can be’, in a regime that recognises no possibility of completion 
or perfection. The concept of concept, the language enrolled is that of belief, as in the powerpoint 
closing statement from a Taiwanese committee: ‘Our belief: To pass the accreditation of SIDCER 
is to affirm our IRB’s unceasing improvement.’ Unceasing improvement harnesses ethics and 
hope in anticipation of and engagement with an infinite project, a project which is not just an 
abstraction. Inspired by the materiality of ethics it becomes anchored in specific futures, 
materialised in dreams towards which people work. These I explore in the next, and final, section.
Dreams
Technocratic thought goes hand in hand with dreams: dreaming is an act of setting oneself 
apart from the world as it is lived day to day. It is small-scale personal utopianism, 
predicated on a distance between the world as others see it and the world as it could be 
(Riles 2011: 178).
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91 Compare, for example, the Reith Lectures of Ian Kennedy (1981) and Onora O’Neill (2002), the former using them 
to argue for the place of outsiders in ‘establishing standards which doctors must meet’ (Kennedy 1980c:2), the latter 
using them to claim that systems designed to ensure public accountability simply deepened the mistrust they sought to 
remedy.
In order to draw together the themes of this thesis, this closing section juxtaposes dreams for the 
future of ethics review held by ethics committee members in Sri Lanka, America and Taiwan. As 
with Chapter 6, the intent is not national comparison, rather the nature of the dreams 
themselves, these acts of ‘setting oneself apart from the world.’ I suggest that together, the dreams 
reveal more than the imagined systems or structures of an international research regime; they 
reveal a desire for certain kinds of people. 
Boyer complained in 2008 that few anthropological studies ‘took seriously the place of desire, 
fantasy and anxiety in the production of expert knowledge’ (2008:43). Two recent publications 
address this absence. In Collateral Knowledge (2011), Riles pays close attention to the legal 
documents that make up the ‘collateral’ on financial agreements between banks in Japan and the 
rest of the world. She also pays close attention to the hopes and dreams of Sato, her key 
informant. The event which structures her narrative is the introduction of a new technology in 
banking transaction, Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), which for Japan was ‘part of the path 
to an advanced economy regulated according to “global standards” (Shukuwa 2002) (Riles 2011: 
174). The parallels to medical science are hard to miss; the economy around biomedical research is 
substantial, growing and efforts to standardise standards of quality and evidence to serve the 
internationalising aims of drug development companies have been evident since the opening 
chapter of this thesis. What has also been evident is the flexibility, or the ‘elasticity’, the 
extensibility of the word ‘ethics.’ Miyazaki (forthcoming) has conducted long term research 
amongst Japanese financiers, and he too has met dreamers. Tada and Aoki, the pair we follow 
through his book, are arbitragers in a derivatives trading team. What Miyazaki carefully draws out 
of their dreams is the way the central concept in their working lives - arbitrage - overflows its 
‘work’ based meaning and comes to structure their relationship to capitalism: their belief in it, 
commitment to it, and ways of abandoning it.  
Ethics, I suggest, runs a similar course, threatening (as it has in the chapters above) to collapse 
into other terms. As an activity, it is flooded with risk assessment, balance sheets of benefits, 
conflicts of interest yet we have seen the ‘belief’ in ethics which FERCAP employs to foster 
support. In his work, Miyazaki shows that the ‘virtuality of finance theory (such as arbitrage) 
produces a second order of virtuality (such as personal dreams).’ I suggest that the virtuality of 
research ethics, abstracted even out of bioethics, also gives rise to a ‘second order of virtuality’: the 
dreams below. A vision of the world ‘as it could be’ comes forth as a strong motivator in this 
ethnographic material. We are now familiar with Juntra’s vision in which, through SIDCER, 
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FERCAP incorporates good ethics as part of a system approach to clinical trials, themselves 
contributing to improved medical research and ultimately better quality of life for patients. As she 
put it herself, ‘that’s always your vision. In 2012, when I close my eyes…I have energy because I 
want to see Ethics Committees in different countries recognised by criteria we set out. Every year I 
count and I am happy when it increases fast.’ In Riles’ view, a collision of dreaming and 
technocracy is not as unexpected as one might think. She observes that this kind of thinking fits 
well with what Geertz long ago termed a “model for” rather than a “model of” (1973:93). For her 
interlocutor Sato, much of the appeal of the RTGS project lies in the ‘effects on the character of 
people in the market’ (Riles 2011:175, emphasis in original). Let us take a further look at the kinds 
of people the dreams of those involved with ethics reveal. 
Bartholomew’s Dream
Dr Bartholomew Shar served on an ethics committee in Sri Lanka. During our interview, it 
became apparent that his ethics review committee work was strongly influenced by the training 
he’d had in a branch of standardisation: not GCP but ISO — International Organization for 
Standardization.92 Working with genetic and laboratory data, he knew a great deal about ISO 
standardisation and the effects it could have. If figures were wrong, not only could there be 
consequences for patients and public health policy in the country, any research being done might 
suffer. Inaccurate figures could, however, be fixed. Our interview charts the mingling of two 
dreams. What is of interest is the way ideas from the first, more realised, dream of laboratory 
standards in Sri Lanka seemed to make possible — and desirable — his second dream: 
standardization in ethics. 
I began our conversation by asking Dr Shar to describe what he did on his ethics committee. 
‘Well, we take a file like this,’ he said, holding his hands four inches apart to indicate the volume 
of paperwork. ‘I review in my area, how much blood needs to be collected, what is routine, 
volume and timing issues, transportation, genetics and social issues.’ The remit he has just reeled 
off is an expanding chute, beginning with vial of blood and ending with ‘social issues.’ To 
illustrate, he links those ‘social issues’ to a particular case, re-grounding the concerns of his 
committee.  
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92 According to their documentation, the ISO is a network of the national standards institutes in 164 countries, 
coordinated through a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland. It is a ‘non-governmental organisation that forms a 
bridge between public and private sectors’ (ISO 2012).
For example, a thalassaemia93 carrier. Someone comes with a proposal to detect, but are 
they going to inform those from whom they took the samples? The garment factory girls, 
they have a [thalassaemia] prevalence of 3% or something, but when you really do have that 
prevalence data, what will you do? If you convey that they are a carrier, there is no 
counselling adequate. It affects marriages. Sri Lanka is…a very Asian country. Marriage and 
these things are very serious. Once you are having an affair, it seems you will marry, the 
social pressure is there. If you are married, even though probably there will be dispute, or 
you are not matching well, the majority choose to continue marriage even though it’s hell. 
It’s not like in your country where it is not necessary to suffer for life. The question comes 
because of sociocultural differences between countries. When we consider ethics, it’s 
similar to something hand in hand with human rights. Whether it’s Australia, Africa, US, 
UK, I think research ethics should be the same internationally. It’s a sort of standardisation 
of research for an acceptable level. So for example, if there’s a lab diagnostic test, we have 
accreditation - it comes from the Sri Lanka accreditation board. I’m an assessor. If we 
accredit, the certificate will be accepted. It’s ISO15189, the standard for medical quality of 
diagnostic tests for that lab. It means its the same as any lab, anywhere in the world.
What I want to emphasise in the extract above is the transition in this narrative from thalassaemia 
to diagnostic laboratories, via a standardised model of ethics. Bartholomew was not simply 
making a comparison between the systematisation afforded by ISO standards, he was making the 
processes of standardisation equivalent, thus changing the capacity of those objects for variation. 
Put differently, in his view, a scientifically designed manner of measuring and controlling 
laboratory machinery had produced a desirable state of global inter-changeability, accountability 
and trust. Despite his emphasis on the difference in marriage and courting practices (‘It’s not like 
in your country’), he seems to suggest that the same would be appropriate for ethics. Consider the 
things that an Ethics ISO would solve for him: 
[For the laboratories] we get international recognition and when you come to hospital, 
don’t have to worry about the quality of the service. If you have your own level of 
guidelines, of you differ from other countries, how much the gaps can be a problem, not be 
acceptable. Expect standard up to when diagnose diabetes should be same, between USA, 
UK, Sri Lanka. So its the same with ethics. If we try to stick to own principles and 
guidelines, we’ll try to avoid some aspects of guidelines practiced in other countries. This 
might be advantageous for our researchers in a way but considering internationalisation 
and globalization, will it be acceptable internationally?
Again, in the crossing over of biomedical models (the diagnosis of diabetes) with ethics, 
Bartholomew is applying principles from ISO training to what he regards as an equal problem of 
international standards. He went on to tell me how his training in laboratory standards had come 
about. A cabinet paper, presented under the Ministry of Science and Technology, had established 
a Sri Lankan accreditation board, (SLAB), which received funding from a Swedish Government 
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93 A group of inherited blood disorders affecting the production of red blood cells. Occurring at a high frequency 
throughout South Asia, the disease  poses significant challenges in terms of public health.
grant (Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) via the Swedish Board for 
Accreditation and Conformity Assessment, (SWEDAC)). Trainers from Sweden arrived and 
stayed in Sri Lanka for three weeks, assessing, guiding and supervising. They offered 
qualifications, through an examination which Bartholomew described as ‘continuous 
surveillance.’ ‘They were behind us when we were conducting assessments, walking without saying 
a single word. At the end of the day, they would say, “These are the inadequacies.” They raised all 
the nonconformities, and we corrected all of these things.’ Bartholomew qualified as a technical 
assessor and consultant. He began accrediting laboratories in September 2009, in accordance with 
ISO 15189, an international standard for the quality of laboratory testing. But the mutual 
recognition that the training and assessment had ensured would expire. ‘You can do this, but next 
year, even in the next six months, you have to improve,’ he said. The acceptability of variation in 
laboratory accuracy and ethics fits his vision of how research in his country is changing:
We are a fast developing country. The next step is research. We need to characterise our 
patients, diseases, compare the therapeutic efficacy of drugs invented elsewhere. Lots of 
factors can influence each disease. Even for reference ranges we depend on a textbook. We 
chose the Western figures from these books — is it correct? We can see from experience [a 
blood measurement is] usually 12-14, but we don’t know if it’s nutritional, or due to ethnic 
difference.
The interview had moved rapidly in the direction of his research, but he seemed to think we were 
talking about ethics. I listened: 
If you’re going to publish research in thallasaemia, you need HPLC94 to label a patient as 
thallasaemic. It’s the diagnostic, all over the world, an accepted method. What’s available 
most of the time [here] is a semi-quantitative method, cellulose acetate. So then we can’t 
publish.
‘Why not?’ I ask him.
The diagnosis remains only a possibility. It’s not a confirmation. [...] We need that final 
diagnosis, so then it can have an impact at national level. [...] When we go internationally, 
especially for journals, they maintain the highest standard, the research published is of 
good quality. Suppose that we have a machine that is not calibrated, not certified, not 
maintained as per the manufacturing instruction. But it gives results. So I analyse blood 
sugar. Using my machine I may be near my target value. But I may have an accuracy error 
and this error will be there for all, everything I measure. So you need external quality - you 
don’t know the value, the external body does. It will interpret and send a report, [they will 
say] ‘Your value is out of range, so repeat and confirm’ [...] Even a pipette has to be 
maintained and standardised to get accurate values.
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94 High Performance Liquid Chromatography Testing, used to separate and identify compounds in 
mixtures.
As Mol and Law point out as they look for anaemia in Africa, ‘it is possible to arrange things 
‘there’ [Africa] so that numbers about the population are created’ (1994:650), but as one of their 
interviewees says, 
[i]n tropical medicine as a whole the laboratory is a problem, because a laboratory isn’t just 
a laboratory. It is a system of people who work there, who are stimulated, controlled, a system 
of quality checks (1994:651). 
Busch notes that ‘development organizations have begun to realise the difficulty of keeping 
standards for things and those for people apart’ (2011:26) (see also Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000, 
Loya and Boli 1999). Extrapolating from his experience with ISO quality review, Bartholomew 
insisted that the ethics review committees should themselves be reviewed. 
We have a lab here, we get accreditation, they come and see if the accrediting body is 
sticking to guidelines and protocols. Do we have protocols to start with? I am sure if we’re 
to say we’re an ERC, to give approval on projects, we should also be reviewed. They’d have 
to see if we’re doing it in a proper way. Those things — chemistry protocols — will have to 
be there. Sometime researcher might find fault with members of committee. To be 
transparent, we need proper documents there.
Suddenly, the link is back:
If it’s in a document, we can say, if the checklist fits it’ll be correct. If these things are 
uniformly maintained, one researcher won’t be annoyed. If we come under the umbrella 
[they will say] if you’re going to be our member, you need this. They give us the documents. 
That should be uniform to the country, region, globally eventually, one fine day, if you had 
applied to any ERB, if one granted, then all others should have granted. Should be 
uniform, nationally, then regionally, then globally.
I pushed Dr Bartholomew a little further on his vision for ‘uniformity’: 
There’s uniformity with FERCAP. The Colombo ERC has links with various outside 
agencies. They’ll be very big body and we’ll come under them. If they say ‘You need this or 
that,’ they’ll help us make sure we keep up with standards that regulatory body would want. 
It’s a big job providing technical know-how.
His concern was that, without this, different committees would become known for their decision-
making tendencies and the phenomenon known in the USA as ‘IRB shopping’ (Candlis et al. 
2006) would emerge. ‘You might say Galle ERC very strict but if [you] send to Peradeniya, much 
more lenient, maybe a similar project [would be] given approval.’ He had a plan for counteracting 
this effect. 
The first step should be the national. Central ERC or board - some system should be there. 
When we have national standard, then should go internationally.
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Arguments have been made for ethics as a technology of imperialism (Angell 1988, Benatar 1998, 
Nundy and Gulhati 2005, see also Lurie and Wolf 1997) suggesting that when committees make 
decisions based on or compliant with international principles, they are not taking ‘local’ values 
sufficiently into account. Sometimes it is suggested that committees do this to attract research, at 
other times committees are cast as ignorant, ill informed, corrupt or simply for show. Responses 
have come from those onto whom ethics is considered imposed. Edward K Mbidde, Chairman of 
the AIDS research committee on the Uganda Cancer Institute suggested it was somewhat 
‘imperialist’ of Angell and others to think that they knew what was best by seeking to override 
decisions made by local ethics committees (Mbidde, cited in Macklin 2001: 25, cited in Simpson 
2004a):
Thus, the idea that local ethics review bodies may produce verdicts that are inconsistent 
with those that would be produced in Western contexts has prompted the suggestion that 
the experience and competence of local ethical review boards may be lacking when it comes 
to dealing with issues thrown up by research on human subjects or the introduction of new 
technologies. Such an assessment fails to recognise that local bodies may arrive at different 
outcomes than their Western counterparts, yet do so using competences that are more 
closely linked with local cultural values. However, this is not to say that just because 
decisions are made locally that they are good or right decisions (Simpson 2004a: 8). 
There is a distinction between all committees having the same structural procedures and all 
committees making the same decisions. One of the risks of reducing guidance to the ‘mechanics’ 
of decision and leaving the content of ‘ethics’ to others is that in this split between ‘Bioethics’ and 
‘Research Ethics’, the standardisation of form also becomes the standardisation of content. Dr 
Shar’s dream, it seems considerations of locality would be done away with altogether. Is it possible 
to imagine ethics as an ‘immutable mobile,’ turned into a set of rules, or a scientific analysis? Dr 
Shar is suggesting such a thing is possible, and that a model from scientific medicine can be 
trans/imposed upon values in the same way as it can upon blood cells. ‘African medicine is quite 
like medicine in the Netherlands if haemoglobin measurement is transported in proper working 
order,’ write Mol and Law:
If the bits and pieces within the haemoglobin network are held in place. This is the point 
of the immutable mobile. The laws of Newton are as true in the Gabon as in London if the 
structure of bits and pieces that makes it true in London is successfully transported from 
Europe to Africa’ (1994: 652). 
They are building on Latour’s Pasteurization of France (1988) in which he demonstrates that ‘the 
laws of inoculation are the same in a farm in Pouilly le Fort as they are in the École Normale 
Supérieure in Paris so long as the farm is turned into a research laboratory’ (Mol and Law 
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1994:652). What network must hold for the regional surface of ethics to be folded? In Dunn’s 
study of the normative power of EU standards in Polish pig slaughter, she notes that the standards 
have become key tools of the ‘transition’ in eastern Europe because they claim to have a 
kind of disciplinary power that makes economies and producers commensurable. By using 
a single metric (here the ability to transmit regulation from international bodies to the level 
of the firm) to compare and rank states, firms and goods, standards make unlike things into 
comparable units (Dunn 2005: 183).
I have suggested that while FERCAP work hard to avoid prescription, as we have seen in Chapter 
6, its orientation to detail is specifically targeted. Meetings designed to seek consensus on ethics, 
in the case above around the need for professional guidelines in Sri Lanka, face numerous 
difficulties. The ‘location’ of ethics became a problem in a different sense, revealing the 
dichotomy in thought between locating ethics ‘in’ the person or ‘in’ ‘society’. In discussions which 
seek to take in the ‘international’, as we saw in Chapter 6, the difficulties encountered become 
based on national and cultural distinctions. It is by reflecting on these that we see how finely 
FERCAP walks between proscription and standards. Comparing biomedical ethics to Wilson’s 
description of human rights as ‘one of the most globalised political values of our time,’ Simpson 
anticipates a comparable rise for biomedical ethics, ‘a transnational logic that aspires to 
universalism and consistency of application that can be found in the spaces between and above 
nation states’ (2004a:9). In FERCAP, the consistency of application comes from principles that 
seem like neutral management issues: SOPs, quorum recommendations, the writing of minutes. 
They do not advise on what they term the ‘moral philosophy’ or ‘bioethics.’ Bartholomew, in his 
mapping of biomedical accuracy onto ethical standardisation uses the reliability gauges of 
laboratories as a metaphor for relativity. He is describing the problems encountered by Mol and 
Laws’s anaemia doctors, when they write that ‘[h]aemoglobin measurement, it turns out, is not 
immutable. As its devices and techniques move from the centre to the periphery, their truths 
become progressively less “reliable”’ (1994: 652). His chosen analogy collapses the standardisation 
of measurement in laboratories becomes the standardisation of ethics in committees around the 
world. When ‘smooth ethics’ is tied to innovation and industry, other imaginings can emerge, 
such as Dr Koski’s below. 
Chapter 7: Locating Ethics
247
Dr Koski’s Dream
Standardisation, whether GCP or ISO, is open to comparisons. The analogy below I first heard 
Koski’s dream as part of an online webinar held in December 2011.95 He was developing his point 
about professionalism which I referenced in Chapter 7:  
To my mind, its not with IRBs, it’s really a responsibility that should be borne by those who 
do the research, sponsors, institutions, and investigations, rather than the EC. We all know 
that having rules and regulations can’t by themselves protect human subjects from risk and 
potential harm. It’s only how these rules, regulations, guidance, principles are actually 
applied. Whether or not they’re taken seriously by those who are doing the research. 
Developing his point about how this could be achieved, he asked audience members to imagine 
another kind of system.
I’m going to ask you to just suspend your disbelief for a minute and imagine the possibility 
of a global network that includes perhaps 120,000 clinical research sites, each one of which 
is fully accredited by independent accrediting agencies, according to international 
standards, standards that are established by the public working in conjunction with 
regulatory authorities, ethicists and others, so we have a truly global standard for quality 
and safety that’s accepted around the world. Each of these accredited sites would be staffed 
by a fully trained and certified professional research team. These sites would be connected, 
interconnected through a very robust webpage information system that would allow 
realtime capture of important performance information but also important safety 
information so that we’re continually watching to see how things are done, continually 
monitoring adverse events, pharmaco-vigilance, in order to truly do something that if 
there’s an early signal for potential harm to research subjects with a class of drugs that we 
identify those before harm is done and take steps as appropriate to fix that. All of these 
independent sites would operate under a fully integrated and accredited human research 
protection program, the exact model for that we don't know but perhaps something that 
would involve various levels: a central review in combination with local review, not that 
there’d be dual ethical review, but perhaps a centralised ethics and scientific review that 
would work in tandem with local review to determine whether or not its appropriate to do 
a study in a particular location. We’d start with the assumption that any research study that 
might be done globally in fact would be ethical everywhere that it’s done and the only 
question would be not whether its ethical or scientifically sound but that it be appropriate 
for the standards prevailing in local community and the resources available to do it. The 
model that I’ve just described to you in terms of a global network is in fact very much in the 
limelight these days through an initiative we started about 2 years ago, called ACRES, the 
Alliance for Clinical Research Excellence and Safety. 
This description of a dream network is the outcome of the macro-structuring I described in 
Chapter 1, the smooth running international research with global reach. Koski continued, like Dr 
Shar, developing an analogy by which his dream could be understood. 
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95 The audio was made available through Xtalks, an online archive, and what quotes I use were transcribed from there.
ACRES is working to build this kind of global clinical research network based on a model 
that’s derived from the global air transportation system. You know, back in 1945, the 
airlines realised that in order to be able to fly planes safely around the world, and get 
people to be comfortable flying on them, they were going to have to be able to have a global 
network of airports that allowed for planes to take off in Boston and fly to Brussels before 
they go on to Mumbai and Singapore and know that every place a plane was going to take 
off and land it was going to be handled through the same kind of SOPs and procedures 
that are accepted by all of the stakeholders to ensure that it’s going to be done safely and it 
doesn’t matter there’s a system so there’s no confusion about how its done. Over the years 
the organisation known as IATA, the International Air Transport Association has worked 
to build this kind of network and we know today that although the global airlines are every 
bit as competitive as the global pharmas, you know. We know drug research today is very 
much an international endeavour. If we had a new system that was based on the model of 
professionalism that I’ve described before, with the adoption of standardised policy and 
procedures for safety, we’d have the opportunity to completely revolutionise the way clinical 
research is done around the world today. 
The analogy is not unique. During the FERCAP Conference in 2008, Dr Beat Widler, then 
working for Roche gave a presentation on ‘Promoting Human Subjects through the Risk 
Management Approach.’ He opened with the familiar Time Magazine slide (‘From this image of 
perception’), moved to an image of Florence Nightingale (‘to this assurance’) and followed with 
this:
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Figure 32: Dr Widler’s 2008 FERCAP Conference Slide on Promoting Human Subjects 
through Risk Management Approach
Where Ethics shifted to measurement through Dr Shar’s analogy in the dream above, here it is 
elided with safety. Its absence from the acronym (ACRES) is only part of the shift. In Dr Koski’s 
comparison with global air transport, as with Dr Shar’s comparison with ISO measurements, 
concerns are regarded as so analogous that differences between them are erased. Here, the 
unspoken concern alongside safety is trust, the trust of the public, thought lost. The real time 
reporting of data and the safety of planes offers a working model. In his linkage of air transport 
and ethics, Koski is putting forward three principles: ‘Technology, complete and accurate 
information, and trust.’ This is a triangulation Corsín Jiménez (2011) observes in the work of 
DiPiazza and Eccles (2002) on corporate ethics and reporting and Max Gluckman (1972) on 
African divination and the allocation of responsibility. He remarks that we anthropologists have 
long puzzled over these concerns. 
While in this thesis I have demonstrated some of the ways that objectivity has been sought, made, 
manipulated as a technique both of scientific and of political power, the machines of objectivity in 
this dream far surpass the mimicry in Surveys or even ethics itself. The network is not one of 
active people but of passive watching as the technology reports. While we can not call Koski’s 
dream ‘small scale personal utopianism,’ such as that possessed by Sato, it certainly supports Riles’ 
claim that dreams sit along side technocratic thought. In an imaginary where human components 
face standardisation at every stage, is it really any surprise that it is a machine that, in the final 
measure, looks over them? Koski knows that ‘integrity’ of researchers has previously been the focus 
of reports on the conduct of research (IOM 1989; NAS 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1989;, National 
Research Council 2002; Wellcome 2005[2002]). Much of what he recommends has been said 
before: 
individual scientists in cooperation with officials of research institutions should accept 
formal responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the research process. They should foster 
an environment, a reward system and a training process that encourage responsible research 
practices (NAS 1992: 13). 
Yet integrity is hard to measure, what standardised test can chart something which only offers hope 
because of its exteriority to the logic of audit?
Sam’s Dream
During interviews with ethics committee members at the Tzu Chi General Hospital in Hualien, 
Taiwan an alternative to ethics committees was offered, tied closely to the education of doctors, 
changing not only their training but also their formation as physicians. The interviewee began by 
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lamenting the quality of research that was being done, suggesting that the doctors were ‘well 
intentioned’, but quite ‘thoughtless’ when it came to patient comfort and safety. ‘Some day we 
will produce better doctors, our Silent Mentor program will help with that.’ I asked some follow 
up questions about this program, mostly pursuing my interest in the relationship between ethics 
review and how researchers were regarded. I learned that in the early 1990s, Taiwan faced a 
massive shortage in cadavers for medical training purposes. Students were struggling to learn gross 
basic anatomy. Then, in 1995, a person who ‘felt she had received a lot from society,’ donated her 
body. This act did not go unnoticed by the hospital’s Buddhist founder, Master Chen Yen, who, 
according to my interviewee said 
If we could utilise a program as interface to bring out the best of medical students and 
inspire face to teach students best and use the program to educate people in society that 
every phenomenon has meaning: getting born, getting sick and getting death has meaning.
When Edith, observing the interview, saw my interest in the Silent Mentors program, she 
arranged for me to visit the unit and have meetings with several of the program coordinators. The 
visit took place the following day. I was greeted by representatives sharply dressed in navy blue and 
white. The tone was professional — I was a welcome international guest, who had come to find 
out about the innovative cadaver donation program. The corridors on the perimeter of the second 
floor were bright and airy. A kind of mummification process meant that cadavers could be kept in 
a central temperature controlled room, which my guide revealed by drawing a curtain. I was given 
a view of the darkened space in which embalmed bodies, wrapped in white, rested on narrow 
metal shelves. There was an extended moment of reverent silence as we gazed in, and Sam closed 
the curtains again. In a low voice, Sam told me that students come here, and in a tone indicating 
surprise said, ‘They even talk to them.’ We walked the perimeter, looking at the posters and 
poems, statements by donors and letters from students. Su Chen was one of the Silent Mentors 
whose extraordinary life caught my eye.
Teacher was sold by her step-father to a Taiwanese opera group. Since then, she had been 
making living by performing at the temples and theaters. Her graceful movement and 
beautiful voice won her the leading role. At the age of 17, she was forced to give up her 
career and become the mistress of a Taiwanese Mafia Boss. Unfortunately she needed to 
bear the financial responsibility to support her husband’s luxury lifestyle. Working 
diligently, she gradually expanded her green onion stall into a market with 600 stalls. After 
her friends and husband took over her business forcefully, she indulged herself in excessive 
drinking. Since becoming a Tzu Chi volunteer, she had found the new meaning of life and 
wished to encourage the frustrated people by her story. She determined to be a silent 
mentor and to keep on helping others.
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Why had the students found out about Su Chen’s life in this detail? Why were the walls lined 
with photographs of donors, and the stories of their lives? Why did the organisation insist on non-
anonymous donors? 
Students are required, in the summer before the course, to learn about donors’ lives through 
home visits to the families. Then a memorial blessing ceremony is held, where the four medical 
students stand opposite the family members, around the anatomy table where the body is placed 
(Lin et al. 2009), Buddhist nuns lead the ceremony with chants. ‘The body is open so that the 
family can take last look’, Sam told me ‘You hear the crying and mourning. At the time, students 
face great pressure’. During the dissection classes, the stories and pictures that the students have 
gathered are projected on screens and classes begin with ‘students respectfully and humbly 
greeting the cadaver.’ They are encouraged to think of the cadaver as a teacher, and some students 
address the body directly. Writing in the British Medical Journal, Lin et al. describe the program: 
The actual dissection course lets students connect their ‘teachers’ to their biographical 
profile, which rests at the dissection table to serve as a constant reminder of the underlying 
human story. This custom also promotes mindfulness of the teacher’s life experience that 
may manifest physically. Meeting donors and learning about their lives fosters humanistic 
values in students, such as gratitude and respect in light of the donors’ selfless giving 
(2009:1439).
At the end of the corridor in Hualien, I was shown into the Great Body Teacher Memorial Hall. 
The lights came on as the doors opened, illuminating rows of small crystal boxes, crafted in the 
shape of the Hall of Still Thoughts by a master Taiwanese craftsman. ‘The ashes of Silent Mentors 
are placed here. Students sometimes come and visit them’, Sam told me. ‘They come to visit the 
silent mentors and thank them, some tell me that they confide their difficulties and feel that the 
silent mentor will continue to look over their shoulder as they work. 
In an interview following my tour, the clinical director of the Silent Mentors program, who had 
taken the English name Ben explained some of the reasoning behind the Program to me in this 
way: 
There are two parts to being a doctor, one part is a healer, the other is being a professional. Its 
based on a social contract, between medical society and the whole society, that is medical 
professionalism....the base of medical professionalism has three points. To practice with skill, 
knowledge and with morality to service others. However, morality and service are becoming 
weaker and weaker. How do you design a curriculum to help students learn morality and 
service to others?
He, and other members involved in ethics review repeatedly told me about a change in doctor-
patient relationships. Barbara, the lay member on the committee from Chapter 5, considered it 
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part of her role on the IRB to ‘change the atmosphere between medical people and patients. 
‘Because right now,’ she said ‘the relationship sounds like more commercialized — I pay you, you 
use me. It used to be friends, family doctor [...] So have to change relation — doctor, nurse, 
patient, family. They should be friends, like family.’ Barbara thought this change in attitude had 
been in part inspired by research practices. ‘They think it should be more cold blood, more 
science style, more powerful.’ Part of George’s solution to designing a course to ‘help students 
learn morality’ was the Silent Mentors program, which he described as containing a ‘hidden 
curriculum’: ‘We need more good doctors, not more famous or fame making doctors. So we want 
to train the student to respect, not just by lecture or television, but by this kind of role model’. 
The role model was the Silent Mentors themselves. 
Towards the end of an interview with one of the program coordinators me this back to the reason 
I was in Hualien at all: Ethics Committees. He had been using a powerpoint presentation 
designed for an international audience to help me understand how he saw the relation between 
silent mentors program, spirituality and modern medicine. As he explained to me:
To study medicine is a kind of spiritual practice. So physicians have to reflect how to 
contribute to society. If every physician can learn this, there is no need for the IRB. I’d like 
to use the surgical department, I’d really wish we can, by this foundation, train more and 
more good surgeons and serve the society and make IRBs unnecessary.
The link between training and the obsolescence of the committee illustrates a different place of 
hope for the future of ethical research, which falls not in audit but another kind of watching. By 
transferring the ethics to the researchers, the committee would write itself out of existence. George 
hopes to replaces a committee with a person, through a process which renders the external 
cadaver internal, intended to govern and censure reactions. It anticipates a future, invisible patient 
who will be the recipient of the trainee doctor’s care. What comes to the fore is the question of 
what an ethical subject is, and what regulation becomes in such a regime. I am reminded of Riles’ 
discussion of the introduction of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system in Japan, during 
which, she tells us, debates raged over the correct involvement of the state in financial markets. 
Deregulation, in her story, was ‘framed as putting an end to state interference in the market’, but, 
she says, 
[i]n practice it entailed not so much an end to state intervention as a transformation of the 
role of the state, from a visible quotidian force to a less visible but arguably far more 
consequential role of shaping the very nature, preferences and objectives of the private 
actors who populated the market. This is deregulation as transformation rather than 
disappearance (Riles 2011:186). 
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What Sam’s dream reveals in his dream is a version of ethics which, like Sato’s hope for more 
rational actors, is directed at altering those who practice, so that through them changes come 
about. In the comment by the Silent Mentors trainer, he is innovating towards making ethics 
committees obsolete.
In Chapter 1, ethics review had been detected as a weakness in the system, through a view of the 
system as an ‘integrated and objectified whole’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983, Riles 2000, 
Stinchcombe 2001) The ‘integrated and objectified whole’ looks rather different from George’s 
point of view, starting with not the relationship between investigators or sponsors and ethics 
committees but, as he does, with that between doctors and patients. I have argued that at the same 
time as FERCAP is pushing for legal regulation and the systematisation of ethics, it is also, 
inspired by the turn towards professionalism in the West, encouraging the creation of an ethos of 
responsibility. George has a very similar objective, only that he is not orienting the responsibility 
toward bureaucracy but toward the cultivation of that responsibility in the student. The final 
dream is the closest we have come in this study of ethics to the patient: the Silent Mentor 
becomes the archetypal patient; all patients. We might ask does this ‘really work?’ Does it actually 
change the attitudes, and more importantly, the behaviour of students as they go on to become 
doctors? While these would be good questions for further research, they are also revealing in 
themselves. What is interesting to me about the Silent Mentors example was that it suspended the 
monitoring of people, and moved the site of that monitoring into their professional personas, 
through their training. That the dream existed was the point.
Concluding Remarks
The Ethics Committee is, as I have established, a recognisable form of governance, standing 
‘outside’ and ‘above’ the actions which it is supposed to regulate (Strathern 1985). But the 
versions of ‘ethics’ presented in this thesis target actions differently. In the stories of this chapter 
there are very varied versions of utopian futures for biomedical research, ranging from all seeing 
computers to ISO standards under which all committees would give the same result. Each of the 
views on the future of ethics above reveals in its answer to the problem of governance an answer to 
the question of what people are thought to be. Cathy and Sam see regulation as secondary to the 
desire of a researcher to be good, to behave well. A question posed by Scott (1998) is what utopian 
dreams leave out, eliminate, mangle. In Chapter 6, I employed Riles’ analysis of Alternative 
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Dispute Resolution (ADR) to suggest that by not attending to the cultural specificities, by putting 
difference in the ‘gap,’ FERCAP’s region-wide operations became possible. Scott would argue that:
the lack of context and particularity is not an oversight; it is the necessary first premise of 
any large-scale planning exercise. To the degree that the subjects can be treated as 
standardised units, the power of resolution in the planning exercise is enhanced. Questions 
posed within these strict confines can have definitive, quantitative answers. The same logic 
applies to the transformation of the natural world (1998:346). 
Dr Shar’s dream of an ISO ethics — made vivid through his analogy with the standardisation of 
laboratory procedures for blood sampling techniques — offers this kind of ‘natural world’ 
planning for ethics. The search for definitive answers is a feature not only of the biomedical 
research enterprise as it spans the globe, but also of our time:
A recurrent theme of Western philosophy and science, including social science, has been 
the attempt to reformulate systems of knowledge in order to bracket uncertainty and 
thereby permit the kind of logical deductive rigour possessed by Euclidean geometry (Scott 
1998: 321). 
Scott writes that ‘[t]he aim of Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarians was [...] to reduce the study of 
ethics to a pure natural science’ (1998:321), citing Bentham’s hope of: 
every circumstance by which an individual can be influenced, being remarked and 
inventoried, nothing…left to chance, caprice, or unguided discretion, everything being 
surveyed and set down in dimension, number, weight and measure’ (Bentham, in Scott 
1998:321) 
Dr Shar and Dr Koski’s dreams show the perils of running ethics so close to science; they 
demonstrate the ease by which modelling — whether of ISO standards or aircraft protocols — 
attaches to and becomes a model for thinking about ethics. Crucially, the spread of ‘evidence 
based’ rhetoric goes beyond the evidence desired in FERCAP Surveys, in anticipation of audit, 
and even beyond the ‘evidence based ethics’ (Sugarman 2004, Emanuel et al. 2004) which hopes 
to prove the efficacy (or not) of ethical review on Human Subject Protection. In medicine, the 
linkage of ‘good evidence’ with ‘efficient data management and swift retrieval’ (Ecks 2008: S80) 
has led to projects such as the Cochrane Library (Lambert 2006a: 2613) through which ‘short 
texts try to give quick answers to quick clinical questions […] To bring this information into 
everyday practice, EBM supporters lobby for the use of computers that can be taken along on 
ward rounds’ (Ecks 2008: S80). It is a model being replicated for ethics, oriented towards answers, 
with online resources designed at ‘building capacity’ of committees in developing countries. 
During the last FERCAP conference I attended in 2010, a presenter promoted a collaborative 
project promising ‘quick and reliable access to information,’ an ethics version of the Cochrane 
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collaboration. Such projects give fuel to Molyneux and Geissler’s cautions (2008) about  ethics 
guidelines. They express concern that on the one hand, ‘rather than fostering genuinely ethical 
research, there is a risk that detailed rules and requirements may prevent ethical thinking’ and on 
the other, ‘rules and regulations may enable researchers, funders and institutions to side-step the 
more fundamental ethical issues of the politics of poverty and inequality, which should be at the 
core of the public health agenda’ (2008: 692). For them, ‘[w]ell functioning ethics review boards 
should not be blindly applying principles and guidelines but should rather be drawing on them in 
a scholarly skillful way to ensure a balanced approach in considering each study’ (2008: 692, 
emphasis added). Whether the mode of medical ‘answers’ will work with the different pushes 
towards ‘evidence based ethics’ remains to be seen, but the ethics committee as a form, though it 
is designed for decisions, it is not designed for answers. As Scott writes:
An oral dialogue[...]is alive and responsive to the mutuality of the participants, reaching a 
destination that cannot be specified in advance. A written text, even if it takes the form of a 
philosophical dialogue, is a cut-and-dried set of codified rules (1998: 323). 
This is the challenge faced by FERCAP as it seeks to ‘operationalize’ and support committees in 
their use for the (written) principles and guidelines set out by the WHO, CIOMS, Nuffield and 
Helsinki. As those who seek to demonstrate FERCAP’s efficacy know only too well, ‘[f]ormulas of 
efficiency, production functions and rational action are specifiable only when the ends sought are 
simple, sharply defined and hence measurable’ (Scott 1998:322).
The standardisation verging on automation in the realm of ethics is evident, but it bears asking 
why it is desired. Miyazaki (forthcoming) recounts the dream of Tada, a derivatives trading team 
manager, for an ‘automatic trading machine’ which, once programmed with ‘one or two hundred 
variables’ would be able to outperform his entire trading team. All it needed was traders to share 
their strategies, so patterns could be found. To Miyazaki, Tada was ‘assigning traders the task of 
creating the very means of replacing themselves’, the machine accomplishing the task of ‘reimagin
[ing] the present from the perspective of the end, the moment of the machine’ (2012:151). What 
intrigues me about Tada’s dream is that it combines Koski’s machinic ambition with Sam’s 
obsolete Ethics Committee. Perhaps, then, what is desirable about Koski’s dream above is not the 
removal of uncertainty of ‘temporally linked strategies’, leaving the ‘machine’ as the only agent, 
the calculations the only act. Ethics with these scientific traits, a scientific ethics, produced and 
distributed through practices of audit, risks becoming unable to ask questions about ‘the theories, 
knowledges, ethical thought and principles’ (Overing 1985) of those upon whom research might 
be conducted. Ethics, as an late-modern enterprise, assumes the knowledge producing traits 
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(scientific rationality) (Edwards, Harvey and Wade 2007:4) of the knowledge producing 
mechanisms (science) which it evaluates.
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Conclusions 
Within the scope of the International Science and Bioethics Collaborations Project, this research 
was charged with the analysis of capacity building in mechanisms of governance. Taking ethics as 
the mode, and committees as the form, this thesis has examined some of the relationships that 
constitute that governance. I have looked closely at FERCAP’s implementation of the SIDCER 
Recognition Program and the rooms of ethics review committees through the stories of those 
involved. While much of its subject matter may have seemed dry — standard operating 
procedures, strategic quality management, committee meetings — I  have sought to show why 
people care so much about this; why they dedicate energy, resources and time to the various forms 
of ‘ethics’ that have populated this thesis. The questions that they are asking are far from dry, 
indeed, they are hugely important. In their content and in the way in which they are posed they 
are also, as Kapferer would point out, products of their times (2010:205). How do you make 
people good?  How do you protect those who participate in clinical trials — whatever their reasons 
for doing so? 
The central argument of this thesis is that an ethics committee is not a neutral device. While 
commentaries on the ‘western’ origins of contemporary ethics have focused on its Judaeo-
Christian roots, I sought to show just how many assumptions the committee as a form carries: 
about people, discussion, evaluation, even the nature of politics (Latour and Weibel 2005). I have 
sought to demonstrate that ways of doing ethics in themselves have political histories, legacies and 
effects. The worlds in which a committee is both required and works have been subjected to 
anthropological attention, the contextualisations reframed. Let me separate the terms committee 
and ethics, for that is how this thesis has approached them. In the first three chapters I explored 
the materiality of the committee, FERCAP’s efforts to operationalize ‘ethics’ through processes 
over principles. I focused on making ethics real through rooms, photocopiers and standard 
operating procedures; the co-imbrication of objects and people in monitoring, measurement and 
standards. I also took up this theme in my examination of the committee as a ‘form’; something 
which arranged space, people and, in so doing, revealed its assumptions about what people and 
‘society’ were. The central chapters of the thesis (Five and Six) investigated the ideal(s) of the 
committee and how it both exploits and controls ‘perspective’, opening the question of what it 
means to ‘do’ ethics. The varying logics of the committee were explored through laypersons and 
the ‘society’ they represent or contain. True to the opening question, I pursued this particularly 
Durkheimian theme through FERCAP’s interest in making people ‘believe’ in ethics, the use of 
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duty and hope in ‘moral force’, deemed necessary in the absence of ‘systems’. But this too carried 
assumptions of what people are, how and what they believe, and how their ‘insides’ are 
configured.
The division between internal and external forms of governance does not only echo the debates in 
the field of ethics, such as those laid out by Noah and Coleman in Chapter 4. It also repeats 
anthropological and sociological distinctions, revealing their explanatory power. I have asked after 
the locations of ethics and found — in the framings that the question prompts — the product of 
a particular way of thinking. The ethics committee is a product of what Euro-Americans think 
governance should look like. It is outside, and at a ‘higher level,’ it puts ethics in a realm ‘above’ 
medical research. The committee works to be ‘objective’ and authoritative through its expertise, 
and through the work of groups like FERCAP, the committee and ethics are measurable. While 
‘the West’ has been a key actor throughout the chapters, a ‘gold standard’ and site of already–
existing systems, this is largely an image of a West which does not exist. The USA, ‘are the worst 
of the lot for consistency [in IRB operation],’ commented Frank Wells of the European Forum for 
Good Clinical Practice96  in a speech to the FERCAP Conference in 2010: ‘How many ethics 
committees are there, in the States? Actually they don’t quite know.’ Despite this, I have shown 
how standards, stories like Leslie’s and images such as Dr Koski’s cloth weave through the the 
narratives of FERCAP as both threat and encouragement, showing that the concerns which that 
environment produces also travel.  
I suggest that the formulation of an answer to the question of the ‘where’ of ethics repeats internal 
and external divisions, again revealing  the:
intransigence of pre-existing social forms that get in the way of, or alternately, encourage 
certain kinds of social/sociological understanding. They reside in how as practitioners we 
already think (Strathern 1999a:272).
There is a component vital to European and American debates which seems absent from the 
material presented in this thesis. It occasionally enters FERCAP discussions through the 
presentations of international guests: ‘the public.’ While ‘the public’ has not played the same role 
in this research as it does in Euro-American discussions of science and ethics, or “Mode 2 
Science” (Nowotny et al. 2001), Latour reminds us, in his conversations with students, that 
apparently invisible entities always leave a trace:
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96  A not-for-profit organisation based in Brussels, established for and by those with a professional 
involvement in the conduct of biomedical research. Membership includes universities, pharmaceutical 
companies, pharmacists, doctors and regulators. 
If they act, they leave some trace. And then you will have some information, then you can 
talk about them. [...] Invisible things are invisible. Period. If they make other things move, 
and you can document those moves, then they are visible (Latour 2005: 151).
While ‘the public’ leaves few traces in the Asian parts of this material, I believe the most 
compelling trace lies in fears expressed about the potential, the possibility, of scandal. When stories 
such as the Coast close-down circulate (Chapter 1), they lead committees to feel they are operating 
in the shadow of a scandal to come, to seek ways of avoiding it. As a Taiwanese committee 
member lamented wearily,
The problems are never ending, but goal can’t be sacrificed. You cannot say ‘Don’t do any 
more human subjects research.’ We need IRB in the system but IRB is just a Review Board. 
Research scandals, like the scandal in Korea? We’re working to prevent that. We must push 
it, [keep it] moving.
The latent publics of Asian bioscience ‘make other things move’ (Latour 2005:151); what is seen is 
a reaction in preventative anticipation, the effect of a home grown scandal. ‘The public,’ arising in 
the stories and imaginaries of American and European commentators, is not invoked as a reason 
for IRBs in Asian narratives. No Tuskegee stands for injustice, crimes of World War Two never 
led to East Asian Nuremberg Trials (Kleinman 2010:1075). Koski’s opening image of a broken 
thread revealed the vulnerability of “science” to scandal, as did Coleman’s opening concern with 
the suspicions of the American public about research. It is not coincidental that both 
commentators are American. I suggest that concerns about ‘the public’ arise not only in their 
images and descriptions but also in the form of the committee. To merge the discussions of 
Chapters 3 and 4, I suggest that the committee as it operates in the countries where FERCAP 
works is a model hewn from Mode 2 science (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003), but 
running largely in the absence of public debate, sometimes in the absence of legislation and even 
governmental interest. This slide from Dr Dissanayake, the Sri Lankan delegate at the 2008 
FERCAP Conference makes the point (Figure 33): there has been no demand from the public or the 
government for the ‘action’ his presentation has detailed — the establishment of the Forum of 
Ethics Review Committees in Sri Lanka (FERCSL), the creation of National Guidelines for Ethics 
Review Committees, Workshops and Courses on GCP and SOP development, and the 
establishment of the Sri Lankan Clinical Trials Registry.
Like the ethics committee’s assessment itself, ethical review of research in Asia is largely 
anticipatory. ‘Public trust’ is not conceived as lost because it is not (always) deemed necessary. 
More than this, it is absent because of different political histories of governance. As Holden and 
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Demeritt remark critically of Singapore, public statements on human subject protection in 
research are aimed at an ‘international research community and its investors, rather than to an 
agitated Singaporean public concerned about the proper and dignified use of their bodies in 
biomedicine’ (2008:81). Committees are not the result of scandal (for an American history see 
Stark 2011b), they anticipate it. I propose to take this present absence of publics a step further. In 
Chapter 4, I argued that versions of the committee in use invoke ‘microcosms’. These rely on a 
notion of a public for their legitimacy, but the public represented on them is a very select version: 
Harsha’s enactment of the layperson (p.180) shows this most clearly. Staying with my Sri Lankan 
examples, Colin (p.156) argues that a public debate would not be a ‘rational debate.’ In the place 
of national mechanisms of public accountability, in Chapter 2 I demonstrated the way the 
implementation of the SIDCER Recognition Program through the Survey brings members of the 
FERCAP network together in reciprocal monitoring. This is regarded not as bias but as strength: 
the committees depend upon one another to keep standards high. FERCAP, I argue, can be 
viewed as a mutualistic mechanism through which the network forms its own public.
In my Introduction I pointed to Stark’s concern about how committees define what can be 
known (2011:234). Developing her observation using the material in this thesis on the way 
committees operate outside the USA I want to suggest that the integration of “ethics” into what 
makes good science has links to the long tradition of witnessing in knowledge–making. While the 
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Figure 33: Dr Dissanayake’s 2008 Concluding Conference Slide. 
touchstone for the figure of the witness is the Hobbes–Boyle debate over the space and way in 
which science was ‘witnessed,’ (Shapin and Schaffer 2011[1985]) there are some important 
differences to note between it and my allusions towards witnessing in and through the spaces of 
ethics. I proceed by laying out some of the parallels. 
Where Boyle’s experimentalists ‘insisted upon the public nature of their activity’ (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985:333), Hobbes’s philosophy had to be public in the sense that it must not become 
the preserve of interested professionals. (Shapin and Schaffer 1985:333) Hobbes’ concern was that 
‘knowledge was dependent on a practice of witnessing by a special community, like that of clerics 
and lawyers’ (Haraway 1996:431). The question of the publicness of Ethics Committees is 
beginning to be raised, as shown by both Coleman (2004a:14, see also Goldner 2002:109-111) and 
Stark (2011b), and I addressed concerns about ethics being the ‘preserve of interested 
professionals’ in Chapters 4 and 5. When Haraway writes of the air pump, she writes that the 
‘separation of expert knowledge from mere opinion […] is the founding gesture of the separation 
of the technical and the political’ (1996:430). Ethics committees, I have argued, are part of the 
bringing-in of ‘society’ to science. What my material makes evident is the existing politics of their 
form, as members of committees across Asia struggle to make their existing social relationships fit 
with the formulas the committee demands. In showing whose views will count as 
‘society‘ (Chapter 5; Strathern 2005b: 476) I have shown different methods of making different 
voices heard. One of the challenges of the ethics committee, as I have shown, is that it strives to 
combine expert knowledge and ‘mere opinion’ (qualities deemed separated by the air pump, 
Haraway 1996:430). As I has shown, however, in the principle ‘if it is not scientific, it is not 
ethical’ questions about the scope, methods and questions of research are challenged on the 
grounds of ethics. The ethics committee is not a direct witness for the object world; it operates at 
one remove. The nature of that ‘remove’ came under question in Chapter 5 where the Nuffield 
Discussion Report (2005) and the experiences of ethics committee members I interviewed showed 
that committees often review the scientific merit of research at the same time as they review its 
ethical aspects. 
It matters that ethics committees can change what research is done and how. It also matters that 
the ‘social literary and material’ technologies which gave air pump ‘power to establish matters of 
fact independent of the endless contentions of politics and religion’ (Haraway 1996:430) are now 
in use by quite a different instrument: the ethics committee. The committee is a material device 
(Chapter 3) with a literary means (minutes and letters) which employs a social technology of 
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deliberation (consensus and voting) (Shapin and Schaffer 2011[1985]:25). In their discussions and 
decisions rests the ‘oscillation between the condition of knowing through investigation (research) 
and the condition of asking what is to be done with that knowledge (management)’ (Strathern 
2006:195).
I am struck by the similarity between what Haraway describes for the experimental science of 
Boyle’s time — which ‘spread as its materialised practice spread,’ being ‘not a question of ideas, 
but of the apparatus of production of what could count as knowledge‘ — and Dingwall’s 
reasoning behind the spread of ethics committees:
Unless biomedical research has been approved by an IRB-type body, it cannot be published 
in any major journal. Most leading research countries, and many lesser ones, have installed 
such systems in order to maintain their access to the international scientific community 
(Dingwall 2007:788).
Dingwall’s description of its spread is another way in which the committee is integrated into the 
making of ‘good’ knowledge. Yet part of the challenge faced by ethics committees in the absence 
of law is persuading investigators to do as they recommend. For this reason, I propose that the 
ethics committees I worked with are, unlike Stark’s declaratory bodies, engaged the work of 
attesting, after Ezrahi’s work on visual cultures in science and democracy (1990). I mean this in two 
senses. First, most ethics committees with whom FERCAP works cannot declare in the way the 
committees Stark worked with; their decisions are not backed up by law. But their role is 
(particularly in the case of international multi-sited trials) to bear witness to something being 
‘ethical.’ They attest that they have examined it, and attest it to be so. While I have shown that 
what is known, how it is known and by whom it is known all matter, I have also shown that the 
personal function of the witness becomes — in this ethics — the attestive work of the group. 
While studies of expert and lay knowledge focus on the roles, capacities and characteristics of 
each, this analysis of these actors in a committee and as a committee allows insight into what I am 
calling its attestive role. Untethered from an individual point of view, the attestive assemblage 
mobilises combined evidence into the voice of the committee, which ‘speaks as one.’ Ethics 
becomes something that can be obtained and proven through stamps and certificates, and it is the 
voice of the Ethics Committee which both achieves and grants this. 
The second sense in which I intend their attestation is that this act of attesting must itself be 
attested to; evidenced, minuted, documented. Attesting ethics committees are the objects of the 
very practices they practice, a relationship complicated by the mutuality of FERCAP. In the 
transference of principles of evidencing from science to ethics via audit, ethics committees 
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involved with FERCAP become accountable to an evidentiary regime in which attesting to their 
own operation is as important as attesting to the ethics of proposals. A committee cannot just be 
the gatekeeper with which we began at the Regional Collaborative Workshop. FERCAP’s work of 
recognition and the changes in practices it provides through Surveys and Trainings mean that 
committees learn new ways of functioning materially, from their minutes to their decisions to 
their archives, their work is made valid through its traceability. The audiences of FERCAP’s ethics 
committees are not ‘publics’ of the Euro-American accountability discourse but at an audience of 
concerned (medical) professionals, whom the gatherings of FERCAP make visible. No wonder 
that to the conference presenter from Sri Lanka, it looked like science was ‘governing itself.’
I remarked in the introduction that the concept of ethics in current circulation did not come 
from nowhere. Strathern reminds us that, ‘in pushing and pulling language for the sake of 
argument, people may force new properties onto old concepts’ (2005:51). At the opening of the 
FERCAP conference in Shanghai, with a nod to the interest shown by Chinese hospitals and 
ethics review committees in ‘ethical review systems’, the Chair of FERCAP chose to base his 
opening comments on his study of Chinese philosophy as a child in Japan, one of the countries 
over which Confucius’ work had ‘had influence.’ In his brief address, he projected four characters, 
Jin, Gi, Rei, Chuyou, linking these four characters with the operation of ethics review committees:
Love, humanity and kindness. To hate the wrong thing. Honesty. The right thing to do. 
Standard to behave, believe. No extreme, no deviation. Balance. These are still important. 
It is not necessary to produce new things. Confucius already established such a system of 
SOP! FERCAP is original, but also based on… [I’m] very happy to discuss new things based 
on old things. 
He was suggesting continuity between contemporary developments in the governance of 
biomedicine through ‘ethics’ and ‘old things’ in Confucius. Speaking of the New Reproductive 
Technologies, Strathern observed that it is perhaps:
this very capacity to think one is perpetuating old ideas, simply doing again what has been 
done at other times and in other places before, elsewhere, that is itself a profound engine 
for change (1992b:44, see also discussion in Green 2005:14) 
Throughout the thesis, I have detailed moments of slippage, where what ethics is seems to shift. A 
preoccupation with quality makes it difficult to see the difference between quality and ethics. 
Awareness of vulnerability can stand as ‘ethics’, indeed, awareness of other points of view can 
even seem sufficient (Strathern 1999a:252). As Juntra seeks ways of measuring and quantifying, 
we see ethics slip into a form in which it can be numerically evaluated. In analyses of the decision-
making of committees such as Coleman’s, ethics seems to reduce into a risk assessment, a 
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balancing act of risks and benefits, modeled on cost/benefit equations which, since the 1930s 
have given form to rational decision-making (Stark 2011b:11). But in these transformations, the 
ethical can always escape elsewhere. This is, I suggest, part of its success; part of the continuing 
chase. If it cannot be easily found in ‘society’, let us look to the individual. If, as Koski asserted in 
his webinar, monitoring mechanisms such as ethics review committees leave us ‘dissatisfied,’ then 
let us turn to responsibility, professionalism, integrity. These were the qualities which were lacking 
in the first place, when in the 1980s the UK’s Ian Kennedy (1980a, 1980b, 1980c 1981) and the 
vanguard of bioethicists in the USA drew upon ethics to regulate biomedical research, with 
‘Kennedy’s belief that the inequities of the doctor–patient relationship could be redressed by 
involving outsiders in the development of medical guidelines’ (Wilson 2012:207).
While ethics can be used to address certain problems of proximity, through reference to processes 
and procedures (Chapter 3), it also causes them. Relationships, with rules or without, have been 
everywhere in the chapters of the thesis. Dr Sams’s rendering explicit of the possible perception of 
military invasion in his ‘follow up visit’ slide gave him the scope to play on the potential danger of 
the Survey, and diffuse tensions. Researchers have been approached gently, with committee 
members likening their approach to counselling. Some were refused face-to-face meetings with 
committees, in order that paperwork ‘speak for itself’. Knowing enough was essential as “sufficient 
expertise” came under fire; knowing too much was dangerous, barkadas might side with one 
another. Camilla was kicked out of her committee for her approach to ethics and for forcefully 
speaking her mind. Edith encountered a version of this problem when she attempted to 
implement the ‘raise hand’ voting system on her committee.
Treating [ethics] like an abstract and absolute science that can be easily downloaded into a 
variety of cultural settings […] is likely to obscure and distort the way that local responses to 
biomedical ethics are being formulated in the developing world (Simpson 2004a:8). 
In this thesis I suggest that in fact ethics is treated as a kind of science, borrowing techniques of 
objectification, measurement and standardisation for its legitimacy. Indeed, a ‘local’ response to 
biomedical ethics may be to further the traits it borrows from science, particularly in settings where 
ethics is used as a way to create space in existing relations.
FERCAP, I have argued, cultivates a proximity to the comprehension of difference through their 
distance from it: to use Riles’ phrase (2002), difference is left in the gaps. Un-formalized, un-
addressed, un-programmed it acts as a ground for the standardisation process. In Chapter 6 I 
developed an approach to the comparative work of the organisation, looking at the dialogues and 
comparisons which constitute the regional imaginary through which it achieves its aims. Its 
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continued ability to ‘work’ is revealed to lie in careful and skillful talk. In such talk — set against a 
justificatory background of ‘cultural difference’ within the region — what is foregrounded is 
commonality, and what is backgrounded is the detail. This exemplifies Strathern’s observation 
(1995:11) about the phrase ‘cultural difference’: its simultaneous identification of the 
incommensurable, and the creation of a framework in which to compare it commensurably. 
Chapter 6 also demonstrated the way in which influence is made. By not taking for granted the 
correlation between size and importance, and instead subjecting the creation of that ‘size’ to 
rhetorical examination, the thesis demonstrates the utility of Jensen’s (2008) suggestions to focus 
on where power emerges, and how. 
Unable to find ethics that are universal, as a method of dealing with difference, form has taken 
precedence over content. Standards not principles, GCP not Helsinki. Integral to this precedence 
is measurement: discussion must look like discussion. The layperson must speak, though we do 
not know what s/he says. Perhaps, in arriving at the ultimate form, the hope is that the 
environment has been achieved in which something that looks like ethics can be done. Is ethics in 
the answers or the process? In ‘not doing bioethics,’ in refusing the endless deliberation towards 
answers it sees in moral philosophy, in insisting that ethics committees must make a decision, 
FERCAP chooses process. Unable to watch over every discussion, knowing the infinite 
permutations of research projects, it has chosen form. It is the pursuit of a sonnet, a form of 14 
lines in whose perfect shape poets make play with words. SOPs are far from sonnets, and wordplay 
would render them the opposite of their intent, but the comparison allows us to see another 
dimension of the tool: it is a form with sufficient flexibility. Standard operating procedures can 
always be changed. 1.2.1.2.2 can, without difficulty, become 1.2.1.2.2.1. What more can be said of 
this apparently technocratic reduction?
Now able to reflect back on the chapters together, I want to point to the the repeated instances, 
replications of almost-but-not-quite self-similarity across scales and contexts (Green 2005:14; 
Strathern 2004[1991]: xx). There have been many moments in the chapters where I have pointed 
to the ‘same’ arguments being used, the ‘same’ images repeated or the ‘same’ patterns of thought 
present. I return now to a few instances of that ‘seriality’ (Hornborg 1998:168) to show how not 
only that scaling matters, but attention to scalar principles does too. The elephant is an obvious 
example, used in Chapter 2 by the FERCAP Survey to explain how teams worked together, and 
used by Cristina in Chapter 5 as an example for how a committee might ideally approach a 
protocol. At times, these moments of replication caused difficulty in analysis, as in in Chapter 3 
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where I pointed to confidentiality slipping between authors of texts and reviewers of them, 
between what a protocol must demonstrate and what a committee must maintain (for an example 
of one pattern of thought being found inside another see Godelier and Strathern 1991). This was 
equally true of the idea of police, with both surveyors and committees refusing the name. In 
Chapter 5 I explored the committee as a device of transparency and accountability, principles (and 
techniques) called for again in the desire to see the spread of clinical trials databases: as an Indian 
commentator remarks, 
if every piece of research conducted in India were available on a publicly searchable 
database somewhere, one would know what issues are being addressed, and if they are 
relevant to the population in which the research is being conducted (Chatterjee 2008:581).
But what to do with this observation of social self-similarity? Perhaps the best course of action is to 
pay attention to what these replications achieve. To that end, I want to conclude with a final 
replication: the measurement of balance. 
In research, collaboration and its associated multi-part imagery is, as those at the Regional 
Collaborative Workshop with whom I began remarked, as much an answer to these fears of 
injustice as a balance of existing inequalities (Volmink 2005; London 2005; Wagner et al. 2001; 
Emanuel et al 2000, 2004; although see Okwaro and Geissler 2011). In research ethics, dual-ended 
review seems like a way of weighting against decisions made elsewhere; weighing the detail of the 
specific will weigh against expertise in ‘Geneva’ (p.22).
Speaking of biomedical clinical trials, Simpson and Sariola observe that ‘[b]ased on principles of 
evidence, and reinforcing those principles […] knowledge and un-knowledge are balanced in the 
blinding of a trial’ (n.d). Informed consent is one area in which this has been particularly evident. 
In balancing the information between doctor and patient, or changing that balance, information 
is given power. Sariola and Simpson show that the information of informed consent can be given 
an inverse weighting — the more information, the less credible. ‘They will think this doctor does 
not know what he is doing’ (Sariola and Simpson 2011:518).
When in Chapter 7 the South Korean Expert Secretary General described to trainees the work of 
a committee, she highlighted ‘balancing.’ ‘The IRB is actually a compromise activity in terms of 
ethics’, she said, ‘[i]f you have high abstract standard you can’t approve any proposal.’ The 
Belmont Report was also interested in balances, balancing between maximising possible benefits 
and minimizing possible harms, and the distribution of the benefits and burdens of research 
(HHS 1979). Stark writes (2011b:11) that there was no inevitability in the way cost-benefit analysis 
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became naturalized as the ‘dominant logic of government’ in America (Espeland and Vannebo 
2007:24, see also Centeno 1993). Nonetheless, balance oriented cost-benefit mechanisms came to 
inform the risk analysis that Coleman (2004a) sought to rationalize, permeating the discussion of 
Juries and Ethics Committees I took up from Coleman (2004a, 2004b) and Noah’s (2004) debate 
in Chapter 4. 
A focus on balance — deliberate or not — makes things that can be balanced: fractally generated 
it looks recursive, organising and producing the ‘same-but-different’ (Green 2005:14) concern at 
different scales. Corsín Jiménez (2012:227) observes that ‘ours is a society of balances. Of 
equilibriums and resting points. The macro is balanced by the micro; the local by the global; the 
self by the other.’ In this thesis I have paid attention to the way biomedical research talks of the 
‘local’ and ‘global’ in clinical trials (Chapters 1 and 4), I have critically examined the poles of the 
micro and the macro (Chapter 6) and I have considered the balancing done by ethics committees 
to ensure that participants in trials are protected. In this, I suggest that the repeated instances of 
balancing in this thesis be seen less as repeated principle than coordinating technique: they are 
achievements which bring things together in such a way that they seem stable, even if only 
temporarily. Furthermore, this fractal generativity has other uses. Riles writes that Callon’s (1998) 
work on markets illustrates how the a market as a
field of knowledge and exchange […] depends on the possibility of certain forms of 
equivalence, and hence upon a wide range of techniques for cutting off, excluding, or 
purifying complexity so as to render values universally calculable (Riles 2011:59).
ICH-GCP, Holden and Demeritt claim, is a ‘particularly effective form of standardisation that 
allows scientific research to travel significant distances and still be relevant to dominant markets 
of the US and Europe’ (2008:83). Ethics when viewed as a part of GCP, and treated in the same 
way, must also be standardised to ensure that the trial data is valid, that it can be used elsewhere. 
FERCAP works to create a metric by which Asian ECs can be compared with “Western ECs” in 
an extension of the way in which trial data from Asian sites can be compared with data from 
elsewhere in the world. Here I have sought to show how closely political and scientific dreams run 
together in this standardisaion, and the consequences of this for ethics. 
If the replication of balance is a technique, it is one with a long history. Sahlins returns us to 
biomedicine when he recalls John Adams, ‘that famous apostle of the balance of powers’ who 
wrote that
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Some physicians have thought if it were possible to keep the several humors of the body in 
exact balance it might be immortal; and so perhaps would a political body, if the balance of 
power could always be exactly even (Adams 1977:99 cited in Sahlins 2007:93). 
Sahlins’ nod to the history of ideas reminds us that ‘[b]alancing and proportionality [...] are 
cultural categories, even if ones deeply entrenched in Euro-American habits of thought’ (Corsín 
Jiménez 2012:228). Similarly, contemplating a global bioethics, Campbell (1999:186) observes 
that, 
Our idea of ‘free, open and reasoned’ has been shaped by a particularly western mode of 
reasoning, one which has been remarkably successful in enabling the emergence of an all-
controlling technology, but is by no means the only way, or the even best way, of 
establishing our ethical signposts. It cannot be accidental that such a way of doing ethics 
fits neatly into the idea of constant economic progress as an end for humanity.
It may not be the only way to make ethical decisions, but these principles of ‘free, open and 
reasoned’ discussion I argue, are found not only in the words of ethics but also the forms of 
ethics. In this thesis, I have shown how the form of the committee emerges, through FERCAP’s 
work the dissemination, as a device replete — in its physical and social form — with ideas about 
balance, equality and reason: ethics itself as a device for teaching balancing, to find over and again 
the location of ethics. In this sense, for all the places I have found for it in this thesis, ethics could 
be said to lie in the balance.
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